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introduction
Values of happiness 
Harry Walker and Iza Kavedžija
“Tell me how you define happiness, and I’ll tell you who you are!” So concludes 
one survey of the concept’s treatment by Western philosophy over the past two 
millennia (S. Bok 2010: 54), testifying not only to the diversity of ways in which 
happiness has been understood—even just within our own intellectual heritage—
but also, and more importantly, to its role as what we might term a diagnostic of 
forms of life. How people conceive of, evaluate, and pursue (or not) happiness can 
reveal much about how they live and the values they hold dear. An ethnographic 
inquiry into happiness, we argue, offers a unique window onto the ways in which 
people diversely situated in time and space grapple with fundamental questions 
about how to live, the ends of life, and what it means to be human. 
The idea of happiness—however defined in its specifics—makes a claim 
about what is most desirable and worthwhile in a person’s life. It purports to be 
an all-inclusive assessment of a person’s condition, either at a specific moment 
in time or in relation to a life in its entirety; it expresses a hope that the various 
aims, enjoyments, and desires that characterize a life—though they may often 
conflict with each other—may ultimately be harmonized, or somehow rendered 
coherent (White 2006). For most people in the West today, happiness is about 
feeling good; it denotes a preponderance of positive over negative affect, and a 
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general sense of contentment or satisfaction with life. It is inherently subjective, 
consisting of people’s evaluations of their own life, both affective and cognitive 
(Diener 1984; Argyle, Martin, and Crossland 1989). This is, of course, but one 
of many ways in which the term has been understood—and, like all others, says 
much about the social, economic, and political conditions in which it emerged. 
Insofar as the study of happiness necessarily draws together considerations 
of meaning, values, and affect, it could be seen to lie at the very heart of the 
anthropological endeavor. Indeed, while the term itself has only very recently 
returned to fashion in academic circles, there is a real sense in which the under-
lying questions in which it deals have long been subjected to the ethnographic 
gaze: about the diverse ends that people pursue and how they seek fulfillment; 
about the structure of motivation and action; about the relationship between the 
sensuous and the moral. Since Durkheim, anthropologists have recognized that 
people are generally happiest in those moments when they feel most connected 
to others—hence, perhaps, the overwhelming interest in the ebb and flow of 
kinship, not to mention the power of those liminal moments in which social 
barriers melt away to produce an integrated, often joyful sense of communitas 
(see also Freeman, Walker, Robbins, this collection). Anthropologists have also 
long been acutely aware of the diversity of ends for which people strive, many of 
which may stand in a complex relationship to happiness (reproducing the line-
age, say, or attaining the status of ancestorhood); not to mention their passion 
for engaging in a bewildering variety of projects and practices, from the Nuer’s 
enthusiasm for oxen to the fervor of the kula ring (cf. Lambek 2008: 143). As 
Marshall Sahlins (2006) pointed out, moreover, there is more than one possible 
“road to affluence,” because there exists more than one way of narrowing the 
gap between human wants and the means to satisfy them. And on the whole, 
desiring little would seem more conducive to living well than producing much 
in order to meet escalating material desires.
Given its unique ability to unravel what matters most to people and why, 
the relative silence of anthropology in the face of the recent “happiness turn” 
(Ahmed 2010) in the social sciences is all the more striking. As the most cursory 
glance reveals, the topic of happiness has achieved an extraordinary prominence 
over the course of the past decade, not only in academic research, but also in 
popular and public discourse. Bhutan’s now-famous “Gross National Happi-
ness” index has been widely heralded as an alternative to gross national prod-
uct and other conventional measures of prosperity and growth for arriving at 
policy decisions and measuring progress; the idea has captured the attention of 
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governments around the world,1 and indeed the United Nations General As-
sembly has now passed a resolution that happiness should have a greater role in 
development policy, encouraging member states “to pursue the elaboration of 
additional measures that better capture the importance of the pursuit of happi-
ness and well-being” (United Nations News Service 2011).
Placing happiness at the center of public policy is not, of course, a new 
idea; after all, the pursuit of happiness is famously enshrined in the French 
Constitution and the US Declaration of Independence. Bentham’s utilitar-
ian “science of happiness” was intended to be a means by which governments 
could measure the expected pleasures and pains resulting from policy propos-
als and select those that would produce the greatest net happiness. His ideas, 
though influential, were not adopted at the time in part because of the obvi-
ous difficulties of directly measuring something as intangible as happiness. In 
recent decades, however, psychologists and economists have made increasingly 
sophisticated attempts to overcome this problem, producing ever more refined 
sets of instruments and techniques, with ever more influence on governmental 
policy. 
At the very heart of their methodology lies the deceptively simple procedure 
of asking people more or less directly, in the context of a survey or questionnaire, 
how happy they are; or how satisfied they feel overall with the lives they lead.2 
Such a procedure is useful because it produces results that are easily quantifi-
able, and which lend themselves to systematic comparison. Nevertheless, the 
1. In Britain, for example, Prime Minister David Cameron has identified happiness as 
a “key challenge” for politicians everywhere, and he announced in November 2010 
that it would be a major governmental objective to be regularly measured in the 
national statistics (BBC 2006).
2. The “happiness turn” has probably made the greatest impact in the fields of economics 
and psychology, with increasing numbers of economists proposing happiness indices 
and self-reported wellbeing as alternatives to measurements such as income or gross 
national product; and with growing interest among psychologists in “mental health” 
rather than illness, including the development of positive psychology. Both groups 
tend to measure “subjective wellbeing,” which is often used synonymously with 
happiness or as a broader measure which encompasses it. Involving both cognitive 
judgments and affective reactions, measurements of subjective wellbeing typically 
try to capture both the momentary pleasurable sensation and an evaluation of one’s 
life as a whole (for an overview of measures see S. Bok 2010: 33–34). Typical survey 
questions might include the following: “Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?” 
“How much purpose does your life have?” “How satisfied with are you with your life 
these days, on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘completely satisfied’?” 
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potential limitations of such a method should immediately also be apparent, 
perhaps especially to an anthropologist. We may well ask: Just how reliable are 
such responses, and what exactly do they reveal? As Sara Ahmed has pointed 
out, the model of subjectivity on which this research relies is a quite specific 
and somewhat peculiar one, “where one knows how one feels, and where the 
distinction between good and bad feeling is secure, forming the basis of subjec-
tive as well as social well-being” (2010: 6). What do people really understand by 
happiness anyway? Why should we assume respondents are all talking about the 
same thing? What if happiness means vastly different things from one place to 
the next, perhaps to the extent that the meanings contradict one other? 
There are still broader concerns: Even if we could identify precisely what is 
meant by the term, is happiness really the best or most desirable goal? It has 
been suggested by some that happiness as such is illusory, or at best a side-effect; 
indeed, that pursuing happiness directly can only lead to further unhappiness, 
especially when it becomes a kind of duty (e.g., Bruckner 2011). In any case, 
what about other desirable goals for policy—or grassroots struggles for that 
matter—such as freedom, equality, or social justice? Why is maximizing happi-
ness a better aim than, say, alleviating poverty or enhancing “capabilities” (e.g., 
Sen 2008)?3 In a trenchant critique of the “happiness industry,” William Davies 
(2015) decries the fact that a particular concept of happiness as something ob-
jective, measurable, and capable of being administered is rapidly gaining cur-
rency among the global elite, as well as increasing numbers of policy makers 
and managers, and mobilized in ways that potentially expand forms of surveil-
lance and social control. He suggests that the current concern with happiness 
grows out of a particular scientific utopia originating in the Enlightenment, but 
gaining real traction in the late nineteenth century, in which “core questions of 
morality and politics will be solvable with an adequate science of human feel-
ings” (ibid.: Loc114). A promise, that is, that a science of subjective feeling will 
prove the ultimate tool for working out how to act, both morally and politically. 
It must be emphasized, though, that the aim of making public policy “scien-
tific”—and thus divorced from any specific moral or ideological foundation—is 
3. Robert Nozick (1990: 117) writes: “We want experiences, fitting ones, of profound 
connection with others, of deep understanding of natural phenomena, of love, 
of being profoundly moved by music or tragedy, or doing something new and 
innovative, experiences very different from the bounce and rosiness of the happy 
moments”. 
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not without practical consequences, and—as we argue below—is certainly not 
apolitical.
The rapid spike of interest in happiness over the past decade or so would also 
seem to have much to do with the nature of twenty-first-century capitalism. 
Western economies increasingly depend on psychological and emotional en-
gagement with work and commerce, but find this ever more difficult to sustain 
in a context of rising inequality and alienation. At the same time, increasingly 
sophisticated consumer technologies for monitoring and quantifying people’s 
moods and feelings are enlarging the opportunities for surveillance and “expert 
administration” of their lives, and beginning to generate the promise of a new, 
“post-neoliberal era,” in which the market is no longer the primary tool for this 
capture of mass sentiment (Davies 2015: Loc172). The techniques of positive 
psychology are thus mobilized in order to bring emotions and wellbeing within 
broader calculations of economic efficiency. 
Whether for these or other concerns, anthropologists have had little to con-
tribute to these prominent debates. There is a certain suspicion of happiness as 
an essentially bourgeois preoccupation, increasingly associated with a neoliberal 
agenda, and potentially at odds with emancipatory politics. To this we might 
also add that the discipline has often gravitated toward more “negative” forms 
of human experience, such as suffering, pain, or poverty (Thin 2008; Robbins 
2013a). As a result, to the extent that “cultural” factors, including issues of trans-
lation and comparison, are taken seriously in the wider cross-disciplinary litera-
ture, discussions tend to be dominated by cultural psychologists and economists, 
who often have a more quantitative orientation, and may prefer to direct efforts 
toward refining the questionnaires used to gauge levels of happiness in a popu-
lation.4 We firmly believe that disengagement from one of the most important 
and high-profile recent developments in cross-disciplinary research and public 
debate would be a grave error. While beyond the scope of this introduction, 
many of the findings of happiness studies—from both cultural psychology and 
economics—are of significant interest and relevance for anthropology, as Neil 
Thin (2012) has shown at length in his excellent overview. It is important to 
note that the methods and techniques of happiness research have already been 
4. For discussions of intercultural differences in the constitutive elements of happiness, 
beyond the apparently differing “levels” of happiness reported, see, for example, 
Mishra (1994); Camfield et al. (2009); Kan, Karasawa, and Kitayama (2009); Bull 
et al. (2010); Lu (2010); Oishi et al. (2013).
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subjected to extensive critical scrutiny, with many of the most thoroughgoing 
and elaborate criticisms coming from within the field itself.5 Moreover, some 
practitioners have explicitly tried to encourage more input from anthropolo-
gists, acknowledging the need for—and possible advantages of—more nuanced 
ethnographic approaches (e.g., Diener and Suh 2000; Suh and Oishi 2004: 221). 
While our approach does not preclude critique, nor does it take critique to be 
the paramount goal; our intention is to open up rather than foreclose debate 
with happiness studies, engaging the field on our terms, but in a constructive 
and inclusive manner. 
The approach we pursue in this collection is thus ethnographic, first and 
foremost. Owing to the sheer volume of work on the topic, we felt it especially 
important to develop an approach from the ground up, as it were, led by eth-
nography rather than the findings and assumptions of other disciplines, for it is 
precisely in this way that anthropology might have something genuinely origi-
nal and interesting to contribute to cross-disciplinary discussions and debates. It 
is significant that none of the contributors to this volume employed the strategy 
of asking people directly about happiness as a central part of their research. This 
may be, in the end, what most distinguishes our approach from that adopted by 
the happiness studies community. Needless to say, while this avoids some of the 
problems faced by studies reliant on self-reporting, it raises other problems of 
its own. One is that we are simply unable to contribute to the vast enterprise of 
gauging comparative levels of happiness around the world, or indeed quantify-
ing in any way “how happy” people are. The problem of how we can know or 
infer (let alone describe) the internal psychological states of others has gained 
renewed attention in recent years, especially in light of recognition that in some 
cultural contexts, the concealment of one’s “true” thoughts or emotions may be 
deemed desirable or inevitable (see, e.g., Robbins and Rumsey 2008; Keane 
2015: 125). Our focus here, then, is not on gauging or comparing levels of hap-
piness, but on how happiness figures as an idea, mood, or motive in people’s 
day-to-day lives: how they actually go about making their lives happier—or 
not—whether consciously or otherwise, in ways conditioned by dominant social 
values as well as an array of aims and aspirations that are potentially conflicting. 
While happiness is not necessarily an easy topic for anthropology, given its 
notoriously elusive quality, we hope to show why it is nevertheless an important 
5. For an overview of some of these problems, see D. Bok (2010: 30–37). The validity 
of measures is discussed at some length by Dolan and Peasgood (2010).
7VALUES OF HAPPINESS 
and promising one. In what follows, we direct attention to a number of themes 
we consider particularly relevant to an ethnographic approach, including con-
siderations of scope, virtue, and responsibility in gauging how happiness is con-
ceptualized and how it comes to figure in people’s actions and judgments; the 
link between happiness and values; the nature of happiness as a moral mood; 
and, finally, issues of temporal orientation, including senses of happiness as a 
receding horizon, a pursuit or promise more virtual than actual, ever so slightly 
out of one’s grasp. 
QUESTIONS OF HAPPINESS 
Despite the general dearth of dedicated ethnographic treatments, the past few 
years have witnessed the emergence of a handful of engagements with hap-
piness and the related topic of wellbeing from an anthropological perspective 
(e.g., Corsín Jiménez 2008a; Berthon et al. 2009; Mathews and Izquierdo 2009a; 
Miles-Watson 2010; Jackson 2011, 2013; Johnston 2012; Thin 2012; Fischer 
2015).6 These works suggest—contrary to the assumptions of some social scien-
tific researchers—that there is no single or unified “pursuit of happiness”; or as 
Gordon Mathews and Carolina Izquierdo put it, “Happiness is not one thing; 
it means different things in different places, different societies, and different 
cultural contexts” (2009b: 1). This conclusion finds increasing support from the 
work of cultural psychologists, although systematic cross-cultural comparison to 
date has been overwhelmingly structured around the contrast between so-called 
“individualistic” and “collectivistic” cultures, with one of the more oft-repeated 
findings being that happiness in the latter context (paradigmatically East Asia) 
is more a matter of collective welfare, social harmony, or fulfilling one’s duties 
than it is of individual achievement, sensory pleasures, or positive evaluations 
of the self (see, e.g., Lu 2010; Selin and Davey 2012). The emerging anthro-
pological literature also draws attention to three important observations that 
resonate strongly with the present collection: that happiness in general is best 
understood as intersubjective and relational (Thin 2012); that even pleasure, as 
6. Several of these authors explicitly prefer the term “wellbeing” to “happiness,” largely 
on the grounds that the former includes objective elements or measurements such 
as quality of life, and as such lends itself more easily to cross-cultural comparison. 
Happiness is more “experience-near,” being intrinsically linked to a person’s own 
evaluation of his or her life. 
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a universal human experience, is informed by cultural expectations (Clark 2009: 
207); and that wellbeing throws into relief the difficulty of considering both 
social realities and human virtues simultaneously (Corsín Jiménez 2008b: 180). 
In other words, studying happiness requires attention to the social and cultural 
as well as moral and political dimensions of human experience. 
To this end, we find it especially useful to consider happiness in relation 
to values, or what matters to people, in three interrelated senses. Firstly, happi-
ness is not only imagined very differently across cultural contexts—and indeed 
within specific contexts by differently situated actors—but is also itself quite 
differently valued, that is, evaluated as more or less important according to cir-
cumstances.7 In other words, happiness may not be an unquestionable good in 
every social context, let alone the ultimate good. Secondly, happiness is itself 
intrinsically evaluative. To say that one is happy is to make a positive evaluation 
or overall assessment of one’s condition; typically in a way that purports to take 
into consideration the whole multiplicity of aims a person may have. Thirdly, 
happiness cannot therefore be separated from the spectrum of cultural values 
in relation to which it becomes meaningful, and which necessarily inform the 
process of evaluation. As the contributions to this collection show, a range of 
values may be seen to promote happiness, in the conventional sense of good 
feeling: from peaceable sociality and the absence of worry to financial success or 
the security of one’s family. Whether these values actually do promote happiness 
is another question; and such values can also be potentially contradictory, as we 
discuss further below. 
While it can be useful and important to consider what happiness “is,” in-
cluding how it is imagined or (in some cases, perhaps) achieved, we are equally 
concerned in this collection with how happiness “works,” or what it “does”: how 
it enters into people’s lives, leading them to choose one path over another—and 
what it reveals about those people in the process. We draw on the strengths 
7. Thus Catherine Lutz (1988: 167) observes that on the Micronesian island of Ifaluk, 
in stark contrast to those American approaches to child rearing and emotion which 
elevate happiness to an important position, the Ifaluk view happiness/excitement 
as something that must be carefully monitored and sometimes halted in children. 
In other, more extreme cases, individual happiness can be envisaged in direct 
opposition to broader ideals of the good life, as in the case of the Jain renouncers 
described by James Laidlaw (2005). Jainism, he argues, “devalues worldly well-being 
to the extent of institutionalising, and recommending for the spiritually advanced as 
a telos of religious life, the practice of fasting to death” (ibid.:158).
9VALUES OF HAPPINESS 
of ethnography to explore how notions of happiness may give rise to or de-
limit possibilities for action, entering as motives into personal projects, along-
side the range of other goals, aspirations, or values that may together comprise 
specific conceptions of a life well lived, or worth pursuing. As such, we hope 
to reveal something of people’s attempts to create good in their lives (Robbins 
2013a: 457): how people strive to make not only their own life happier, but also 
the lives of those around them, often within challenging or even downright 
hostile circumstances. 
HAPPINESS IN TRANSIT: SCOPE, VIRTUE, RESPONSIBILITY
The currently dominant conception in the West considers both happiness and 
its pursuit to be largely private matters. That is, happiness is best understood as 
an interior state of an individual actor, or what one prominent spokesperson of 
the “new science of happiness” suggests can be glossed as “feeling good—enjoy-
ing life and wanting the feeling to be maintained” (Layard 2005: 12). This state 
might best be achieved by those same individuals, acting in their best interests, 
cultivating relationships with others, and so on. Yet this has not always been the 
dominant understanding, and may in fact be a relatively recent development. 
In the ancient world, happiness was understood with reference to a far broader 
conception of human flourishing, or eudaimonia, implying a relatively objective 
evaluation of a whole life, with particular reference to the practice of virtue: 
a happy life, simply put, was a life of virtue. Those who promote the modern 
conception point out that the two contrastive definitions are not necessarily in 
conflict; after all, as Richard Layard (ibid.) reminds us, doing good makes you 
feel good. Nevertheless, the relationship between eudaimonia and hedonia con-
tinues to structure many recent debates in the field (see also Engelke, Walker, 
this collection). 
The transition from the ancient conception of human flourishing to the 
modern understanding of happiness as an inner psychological state, a feeling or 
mood, might in some ways be understood as a gradual process of interioriza-
tion that recalls venerated anthropological discussions of concepts of personhood 
(e.g., Mauss [1938] 1985). There seems to be an analogy of sorts to the kinds of 
transformations often thought to have taken place whereby some idea of a dis-
tributed, relational, or “dividual” person, construed as constituted by her relations 
with others (e.g., Bird-David 1999), is progressively replaced by a more “modern” 
10 HARRY WALKER AND IZA KAVEDŽIJA
conception of an autonomous, self-contained “individual,” who is now seen to 
exist prior to relations rather than constituted by them. As Charles Taylor (1989) 
has made clear, insofar as the self is constituted in and through the taking of moral 
stances, such notions of personhood are intimately connected to ideas of the good. 
Looking back more broadly at how happiness has figured through the histo-
ry of Western civilization, it is evident that a succession of monumental changes 
have taken place. As Darrin McMahon (2006) demonstrates in a magisterial 
study, the idea of happiness as an aim suitable for (and potentially available to) 
everyone—that is, something potentially within the grasp of each individual 
and attainable largely through his or her own actions—is indeed a highly cul-
turally specific idea that only came into being as late as the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment. In the tragedies of the ancient Greeks, happiness could only 
be achieved through some miraculous, divine intervention or blessing; it was 
deemed to be beyond human agency, a matter of luck or fortune, fragile and 
highly contingent upon external conditions (Nussbaum 2001). After Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle, happiness came to be seen as a final end (Annas 1993: 
12, 39); and with the latter two thinkers in particular, the responsibility for hap-
piness began to shift to human beings themselves—in this case, as something 
to be attained through virtuous behavior, and thus partially within one’s control. 
It was thus only under the stable conditions of small, democratic city-states, 
during the “Golden Age” of Periclean Athens, that happiness came to be envis-
aged as a realizable human goal. During the precarious conditions following 
the demise of the city-state, a widespread sense of insecurity coincided with 
the popularity of the ideas of Zeno and Epicurus (S. Bok 2010: 48). Despite 
their differences, both these schools emphasized personal control and agency, 
and envisaged happiness as independent of external goods: whether through 
virtuous living aligned with the natural order of the world, in the case of Zeno’s 
stoicism; or through reaching a state of tranquility, recognizing that many of our 
desires are idle or misplaced while taking pleasure in life’s simple enjoyments 
(McMahon 2006: 47–64). For the ancients since Socrates, in other words, hap-
piness was not in conflict with virtue (Annas 1993: 449) and could be expected 
as a reward for virtuous living: a possibility, even if a rare or exclusive one. 
For Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, true happi-
ness was not possible in life but only in heaven (S. Bok 2010: 71), even though 
virtue remained central: “Happiness remained a telos, an end, and virtue the 
principal means to guide the way. But whereas the ancients had conceived of 
virtue as almost entirely of human striving, won only by the efforts of a happy 
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few, Christians understood virtue as a divine gift, obtainable, in theory, by all” 
(McMahon 2006: 137). A much later formulation, a modern one, drew from 
these ideas the promise of universal deliverance attainable for all, as well as 
the notion of human responsibility for one’s own happiness. In the eighteenth 
century, these ideas came together to form a particular vision of happiness as 
something all people deserved (ibid.: 230). At the same time, its connection to 
virtue weakened. This gave rise to a more receptive attitude toward good feeling 
and pleasure, with significant long-term consequences. Some thinkers of the 
time, including those utilitarians interested in “the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number,” attempted to resist the dissociation of happiness and virtue. 
John Stuart Mill, for example, whose work is often considered to be more subtle 
than Bentham’s calculus, includes virtue among the pleasures, along with music 
and health (Nussbaum 2010: 85). Nevertheless, the connection between the two 
did not arise naturally from their system of thought, but rested instead on “the 
moral capital of the past” (McMahon 2006:230). The incongruity to which this 
gave rise was addressed explicitly by Kant, who saw happiness—already under-
stood by that time as pleasure or good feeling—as opposed to both reason and 
morality (Annas 1993: 449). In Kant’s words, “Making someone happy is quite 
different from making him good” (1996: 90). 
Once the ties of happiness to virtue were no longer seen as binding, many 
thinkers (Tocqueville, for instance) considered the pursuit of individual happi-
ness—through focusing on private pleasure and wealth, for example—as being 
in tension with the wider social good, and perhaps ultimately damaging for the 
actual realization of happiness (McMahon 2006: 341). We thus arrive at the 
modern conception of happiness, and with it the particular range of concerns 
most debated by happiness scholars today, particularly those with an interest in 
applying happiness research to public policy. 
If we now consider this (necessarily schematic) historical overview in light 
of the existing comparative literature on happiness across cultures, as well as the 
contributions to this collection, some key themes emerge which are of particular 
interest in formulating an anthropological approach to happiness. In particular, 
we suggest that happiness can be considered as a triangulation of scope, virtue, 
and responsibility: three axes, as it were, along which the concept varies in sig-
nificant ways, and in relation to which it may be apprehended and interrogated. 
Firstly, then, the scope of happiness is always constrained or delimited in 
some way, such that we may usefully ask who can hope or even expect to be 
happy, and to what extent, and why. It is noteworthy that the ancient Greek 
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conception of happiness as dependent on good luck and fortune, or favorable 
external circumstances, is also found in many other parts of the world (see, e.g., 
Lu 2001; da Col and Humphreys 2010); and that the English term “happy” is 
apparently used far more loosely—and is thus potentially more accessible as a 
condition—than its equivalents in other languages, including Polish, Russian, 
German, and French (Wierzbicka 2004; see also Oishi et al. 2013). Among the 
Amazonian Urarina, anyone can achieve the ideal state of tranquility, though it 
is rarely lasting (Walker, this collection). Most migrants from Sylhet in Bang-
ladesh consider happiness attainable, even if their expectations are not fulfilled 
all that often (see Gardner, this collection); though happiness seems destined 
always to elude the young militiamen from Guinea-Bisseau (Vigh, this collec-
tion). What is more, the scope of happiness can also vary in terms of pertaining 
primarily to an individual or a group. It is clearly the former on Yap—hence 
its ambivalence (Throop, this collection)—while among people of the Gamo 
Highlands in Ethiopia, happiness is inconceivable in isolation and arguably per-
tains to the group as a whole (Freeman, this collection). 
Secondly, happiness always stands in a particular relationship to virtue: for 
instance, as the goal of virtuous action, or as its precondition; or as severed from 
virtue altogether. This relationship lies at the heart of at least two crucial ques-
tions: What kind of life will bring happiness? And, how is happiness morally 
evaluated? One has the impression that the life of the retired Swiss farmer Willi 
discussed by Lambek (this collection) was a happy one largely because it was 
characterized by virtuous activity. Similarly, for British humanists, virtue—or 
being “good without God”—is central to how they understand the promise of 
(secular) happiness (Engelke, this collection). On the other hand, virtue scarcely 
enters into the calculations of the young Guinea-Bissau militiamen in pursuit 
of hedonic pleasure (Vigh, this collection); while happiness is in tension with 
virtue on the island of Yap insofar as it impedes attunement to the suffering of 
others (Throop, this collection). 
Thirdly, happiness implicates specific forms of responsibility. It raises the 
question of who is responsible for the happiness of whom, and in what ways 
they may be held accountable. The notion that individuals are responsible for 
their own happiness is without doubt one of the most politically significant 
features of the modern conception, and goes some way toward accounting for its 
embrace by the purveyors of neoliberalism—even if this is only part of the story, 
as Cook shows here in her analysis of increasing political interest in mindfulness 
in Britain. Similarly, for the British humanists described by Engelke, assuming 
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full responsibility for one’s own happiness in the here and now is crucial for living 
well, and for creating purpose in life. In other contexts, emphasis may be placed 
on the duty to care for the happiness of others. It is widely maintained that East 
Asian conceptions of happiness in particular are deeply social and relational 
and may have little to do with individual achievement (Kitayama and Markus 
2000; Kan, Karasawa and Kitayama 2009). Like the collectivism/individualism 
dichotomy itself, this may be an oversimplification, especially in a contemporary 
context of rapid individualization and changing social values. As Stafford shows 
(this collection), some Chinese today are struggling with the issue of whose 
happiness they should strive for: whether their own, that of their aging parents, 
or their children. Moreover, they must deal with the fact that while Chinese 
parents are still expected to take some responsibility for the marriage choices of 
their children, they may be no less successful at forecasting the future happiness 
of their children than they are at forecasting their own. 
The issue of responsibility is also in many ways at the core of Hannah 
Arendt’s analysis of that crucial moment of transition in which the right to the 
pursuit of happiness was inscribed in the framing of the American Constitu-
tion. Arendt ([1963] 1999) argues that the original concern of the founders was 
squarely with “public happiness,” an eminently political conception associated 
above all with participation in public affairs, or an individual’s laying claim to 
public power—in recognition of the fact that people could not be altogether 
“happy” if their happiness was located and enjoyed only in private life. This soon 
gave way, however, to the later concern with “private happiness,” associated with 
the rights of subjects to be protected by the government. Arendt laments what 
she describes as “the conversion of the citizen of the revolutions into the private 
individual of nineteenth-century society . . . this disappearance of the ‘taste for 
political freedom’ as the withdrawal of the individual into an ‘inward domain 
of consciousness’ where it finds the only appropriate region of human liberty” 
(ibid.: 140). Yet whereas Arendt saw the currently dominant “private” concep-
tion of happiness as depoliticized, we would argue that it is in fact eminently 
political, albeit indicative of a different kind of politics.
THE COMMENSURABILITY OF VALUES
Happiness researchers working in or influenced by the utilitarian tradition take 
happiness to be the greatest good and ultimate end of life. From the perspective 
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of the utilitarian ideal of greatest happiness for the greatest number, the con-
cept itself is relatively unproblematic, being closely associated with pleasurable 
feeling, and constituting the one “ultimate goal that enables us to judge other 
goals by how they contribute to it” (Layard 2005: 113). In other words, happi-
ness offers a single, ultimate good that can be measured and under which all 
other goods may effectively be subsumed. Yet as we have just seen in consider-
ing the history of the idea of happiness in Western civilization alone—and as 
the articles in this collection show in a comparative, contemporary context—
the notion of happiness as the ultimate end or highest value has hardly been 
undisputed.8 Indeed, some scholars—Amartya Sen among them—have raised 
important questions about how we should judge the goodness of human lives, 
and in particular whether other key concerns, such as freedom, can really be seen 
as subsidiary to utility (or happiness), as relevant only insofar as they determine 
or enhance it.9 
The argument for value pluralism—that there may be many different values 
held dear to people and that they are not necessarily commensurable, as they make 
different demands on us and thus cannot be reduced to a common medium of 
8. Bentham identified happiness with pleasure, considered to be homogeneous and 
differing only in duration and quantity, whereas Mill (whose ideas are somewhat 
closer to those of Aristotle) considered pleasures as differing not only in quantity 
and duration, but also in kind or quality, thus distinguishing between “higher” and 
“lower” pleasures. According to Nussbaum (2010: 85), it is this latter approach that 
forms the basis of the most modern discussions of pleasure among philosophers. 
Layard (2005) rejects as faulty the distinction between qualitatively different 
pleasures, or what he refers to as the happiness of experiences, arguing that certain 
kinds of pleasures have a more long-term effect on our happiness, while others 
only increase our happiness short-term. He rejects as paternalistic any qualitative 
differentiation of pleasures that results in enumeration of goods: “We ought never 
to say: this is good for you, even though it will never make you or others feel better. 
On the contrary, if we want to measure the quality of life it must be based on 
how people feel” (ibid.: 113). This is a powerful and persuasive argument, and its 
apparent simplicity makes it an appealing tool for public policy. 
9. Sen (2009) questions the claim that happiness is the supreme good and ultimate 
goal because it alone is self-evidently good, arguing that how people feel should not 
necessarily be the ultimate yardstick, given people’s well-documented abilities to 
adapt to hardship, and that they may have good reason to subject their own positive 
feelings to critical scrutiny. He nevertheless acknowledges that the achievement of 
other things that people may value may influence their sense of happiness, because 
people take pleasure in success in achieving their objectives; and that happiness can 
thus have indicative merit insofar as it reveals whether people are succeeding or 
failing to get what they value and have reason to value. 
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pleasure or utility—has been made forcefully by Isaiah Berlin, among others. This 
critique can be situated within a broader philosophical debate around value, one 
that has recently begun to attract greater anthropological attention. A central ques-
tion concerns the relationship between the multiple values held in high regard, 
whether across social groups or within them: whereas monists argue that values 
can be seen as working harmoniously together—either because they can be sub-
sumed under a higher value or because the important values support each other—
pluralists tend to see them as fundamentally at odds, as some values may preclude 
pursuing others seen as of equal worth (Robbins 2013b: 100). It should come as no 
surprise that many anthropologists, deeply concerned with cultural specificity, find 
their position to be closer to value pluralism, and may feel discomfort at sugges-
tions of any one value being a universal metavalue or ultimate end. Nevertheless, 
as suggested by recent anthropological discussions around the topic (e.g., Graeber 
2001, 2013; Lambek 2008; Otto and Willerslev 2013; Robbins 2013b), the debate 
itself remains unresolved, and neither side can easily be dismissed.10 
Value pluralism rests on an assumption that certain values are simply irrec-
oncilable. Berlin was concerned that if the highest values of different people are 
at odds, then conflict may be inevitable; his suggestion recalls a more general 
statement by Weber that “the various value spheres [or values] of the world 
stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other” (1946: 147, cited in Robbins 
2013b: 100). The articles in this collection, however, point to a different con-
clusion: while it may be difficult to endorse the possibility of any universal 
metavalue that allows for reconciliation of all lower values, the position that 
irreconcilability implies conflict is an oversimplification. We propose that values 
may well be incommensurable, and yet not stand in any direct conflict. In the 
everyday world of practical ethics, people routinely make judgments involving 
incommensurable values in a straightforward, formal, or schematic manner. 
Instructive here is Michael Lambek’s (2008) work on virtue and value, which 
argues that while economic values rest on an assumption of commensurability, 
ethical values are incommensurable and subject to judgment rather than choice. 
Nevertheless, historically speaking, 
it is the nature of society, culture, or mind to posit or require some absolute stand-
ard of value or a meta-value that could provide a sound and universal measure 
10. For example, Ronald Dworkin (2011) has recently made a forceful case for the 
unity of value. 
16 HARRY WALKER AND IZA KAVEDŽIJA
of things. . . . There is a dialectic in human history between establishing absolute 
values against which everything else is relative and to be measured, hence ren-
dered commensurable to one another, and discovering things that render those 
absolutes relative in turn. (Lambek 2008: 147)
In most societies there is a pressure to establish some overarching value as the 
ultimate one, even though, historically, these values do not remain uncontested. 
Two important lessons can be drawn from these observations. Firstly, the in-
commensurability of values need not imply total conflict, or the impossibility 
of communication or translation between them; it presents instead a “partial 
barrier” that can be navigated daily through judgment. In bringing the focus 
back to everyday moral practice and decision making, this point is echoed by 
several contributions to this collection (Freeman, Stafford, Vigh, among others). 
Secondly, economic values are by definition commensurable, and market logic 
calls for commensurability across different spheres of social life. This insight 
is important, because it goes to the very heart of the question of why happi-
ness has received such extraordinary attention across the social sciences over 
the past decade or so. We suggest that as monetary value became increasingly 
problematic as the basis for this market commensurability, happiness has proved 
appealing to many because it appears to offer, in the form of an ultimate end, 
precisely such commensurability. In other words, it is because of its potential 
for translating across apparently diverse ends that happiness as a metavalue has 
proved so powerful and alluring, while at the same time remaining thoroughly 
embedded in—even further entrenching—a market logic. 
Opposing the utilitarian conception of happiness as the highest end, a force-
ful argument for the multiplicity of values has recently been made by Robert 
and Edward Skidelsky (2012). These authors list seven basic goods (health, se-
curity, dignity, personality, friendship, harmony with nature, and leisure)—no-
tably excluding happiness, at least in the modern sense of a pleasant state of 
mind, which they argue is not a good in itself, as everything depends on what 
one is happy about. In this way, they effectively seek to renew the link between 
happiness and virtue. They emphatically defend their substantive account of the 
good life against the charge that it is potentially paternalistic, or even danger-
ous, by directly challenging the liberal assumption of “neutrality”: the assump-
tion that policy makers should refrain from making positive statements about 
the way people should live, or creating policies with positive content, on the 
grounds that doing so leads to authoritarianism. It is the legacy of John Rawls, 
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in particular, that only those principles necessary for people of different tastes 
and ideals to live together harmoniously should be embodied and promoted 
by a liberal state. The Skidelskys argue that this neutrality is largely fictional: 
“A ‘neutral’ state simply hands power to the guardians of capital to manipulate 
public taste in their own interests” (ibid.: 12). The refusal to state values clearly, 
in other words, fosters policies that are far from neutral in consequence. 
Rather than the value pluralism represented by the Skidelskys, it is value 
monism that has been most closely associated with the danger of slipping into 
authoritarianism (Robbins 2013b: 102). Outside this particular debate, happiness 
discourse in economics and policy making may have acquired such power and 
prominence precisely because of the way it manages to evade both of these issues. 
It promises a unified value—the translatability and uniformity so very useful for 
policy making and measurement—while avoiding substantive claims about the 
nature or content of happiness, which is often defined simply in subjective terms. 
Whereas it could well be argued that the major flaw of this discourse is its con-
ceptual emptiness, it must be remembered that this is precisely what makes it so 
versatile, flexible, and, ultimately, more powerful. A similar point is made by Cook 
(in this collection) in her analysis of the multiple meanings of “mindfulness.” 
Metavalues in general, as anthropology has taught us, are most effective when 
they are not clearly defined. As Lambek observes in relation to religious values: 
“Rappaport argued that . . . [they] do their work best when they are stripped of 
informational content and specificity. Ultimate sacred postulates like ‘God is one’ 
may be deeply meaningful to their adherents but they are effective and enduring 
because they are referentially empty and unfalsifiable” (Lambek 2008: 144). We 
propose that “happiness,” as it currently figures in the rising discourse of happi-
ness studies, acquires its power precisely from its elusive definition. 
HAPPINESS AS A MORAL MOOD
Are moral considerations external to happiness? Is there a conflict, in other 
words, between what it is morally right to do, and what is conducive to one’s 
happiness? Or does happiness necessarily include, even depend on, being virtu-
ous or morally upright? Insofar as happiness is considered to be a mood, feeling, 
or emotion, it has been relatively isolated from considerations of morality in 
recent work. Some of the reasons for this were touched upon above: the decou-
pling of happiness and virtue led to a view of the former as standing in tension 
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with the wider social good. For some thinkers—most notably Kant—there is 
necessarily a conflict, in deciding what to do, between one’s own happiness and 
the demands of morality. Within psychology, while researchers have been eager 
to emphasize the importance for individual happiness of rich social relation-
ships, happiness (unlike, say, gratitude) is not considered to be prosocial; instead 
it is thought to occur primarily when (good) things happen to the self.11 It can 
also occur when good things happen to another, although such reactions seem 
to require a prior social relationship, as when one is happy for a friend’s success. 
Nevertheless, according to some philosophers at least (Max Scheler for in-
stance), happiness can be an affective motive of moral action. Ethnographi-
cally, there seems to be a close relationship between happiness and the interests 
of others. Among the Pintupi of Australia, for example, to be happy is to be 
shown affection and concern, and to show it to others. Because people repre-
sent their happiness as deriving from relations with “relations,” there is in fact a 
very close connection between what it means to be among “kin,” to be related, 
and to be “happy” (Myers 1979). Several of the contributions to this collection 
would similarly suggest that people are indeed often happiest precisely when 
they are attuned to others (see also Thin 2012). Successfully managing one’s 
moral obligations may in fact be crucial for happiness: as among the Kuranko 
of Sierra Leone, for whom wellbeing is described as “dependent on an adjust-
ment or balance between our sense of what we owe others and what we owe 
ourselves” ( Jackson 2011: 195). After all, as Jarrett Zigon and Jason Throop put 
it, “a good deal of moral experience is about the care of relations,” or what they 
term “being-together-with” (2014: 9).
The extent to which pleasure and virtue conflict, or reinforce each other, is 
a largely empirical question—still unresolved—that anthropology is perhaps 
uniquely well situated to answer. In any case, the contributions to this collec-
tion converge in suggesting that “real” happiness is not only highly relational—
subsisting in the affective dimension of social relationships—but other-oriented. 
The direct pursuit of one’s own individual happiness very often fails (e.g., Vigh, 
Stafford, this collection); on the other hand, in those cases where some form of 
happiness is actually achieved, it is often a result of actions carried out either 
11. Some studies focusing on the effects of happiness on decision making even indicate 
that positive moods correlate with less generous or empathetic behaviors, or a 
higher degree of selfishness (Tan and Forgas 2010). 
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for or by others (e.g., Engelke, Freeman, Walker, this collection). The pursuit of 
happiness, we might conclude, is best left in the hands of those who care for us. 
TEMPORALITIES
A final, though no less important, dimension of happiness concerns its tem-
porality, or orientation in relation to the perception and social organization of 
time. Happiness clearly allows for multiple temporal vantage points: someone’s 
overall condition could be evaluated at a particular moment in time, over a 
stretch of his or her life, or over that life as a whole (the perspectives taken 
by, respectively, Kavedžija, Vigh, and Lambek in this collection, for example). 
Happiness can also contain within it both long-term and short-term compo-
nents (Walker, Robbins, this collection)—while the sources of happiness may 
themselves change dramatically over time, even over the space of just a few years 
(Freeman, this collection). A further key issue may be, as Lambek (this collec-
tion) puts it, “the way the temporal and the ethical dimensions intertwine.”
Happiness is sometimes seen as pertaining to the distant past, imbuing 
memories of past times or events; or as located in the future, something for 
which one hopes or strives. Alternatively, it may be construed as immanent 
and immediate: as the British humanists profess, “the time to be happy is now” 
(Engelke, this collection). Wherever it is temporally located, happiness seems 
closely linked to a sense of “right orientation,” a feeling that one is headed in 
the right direction. Of course, this allows for the distinct possibility that when 
people get what they want, they may cease to be happy (Bruckner 2011). Hap-
piness can function as a powerful source of motivation, one that shapes the way 
people’s lives are oriented toward certain horizons and not others. This may be 
true even when the pursuit of happiness itself becomes a kind of moral duty, as 
it arguably has in the modern West (see also Cook, this volume). To the extent 
that happiness is future-oriented, and to the extent that people’s actions may be 
seen as motivated by this goal of future happiness, it is particularly interesting 
to consider the emerging body of work by psychologists demonstrating that 
humans are exceedingly poor at predicting what will make them happy, or, more 
precisely, how happy some given event or thing will actually make them in the 
future (Gilbert 2007; see also Stafford, this collection). Moreover, according 
to a number of studies conducted across widely different social contexts, peo-
ple are surprisingly resilient in the sense that their self-proclaimed happiness 
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levels remain relatively stable throughout their lives (D. Bok 2010). Even life-
changing events, both positive and negative, affect their subjective wellbeing 
only temporarily, and it soon restabilizes at its “default” level. How, then, should 
we account for the wide range of actions ostensibly motivated by the pursuit 
of happiness, but which rarely if ever result in its achievement? The rational 
choice theory favored by economists (not far removed from utilitarianism) can 
only discount these efforts as misguided, based on the faulty reasoning to which 
humans are regrettably prone (Kahneman and Thaler 2006: 221). Our posi-
tion, by contrast, is that studying these motivations in a broader sense involves 
placing the values of happiness alongside other those values seen as comprising 
or leading to it, as well as those seen as equally if not more important. It is in 
this way that we can understand the risky, reckless, and often futile pursuits of 
happiness of the young militiamen described by Vigh (this collection), for ex-
ample; or the migration stories of young people from Bangladesh, as described 
by Gardner (this collection), whose expectations are not infrequently frustrated 
in their pursuit of a better life. 
One question that arises, both philosophically and practically, is whether 
there is anything “real” about happiness. If it always “illusive” (Vigh, this col-
lection), or imagined, endlessly deferred, and elusive when pursued outright 
(Gardner, this collection), where is it located? Happiness, we might suggest, 
provides a sense of orientation; like a horizon it delimits a space of action and 
understanding, even as it recedes from view. Situational and contingent, it 
brings some things into focus while occluding others, and adds a sense of depth 
to the mundane and everyday. As Hans-Georg Gadamer observed, speaking of 
historical consciousness: “To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look 
beyond what is close at hand – not in order to look away from it but to see it 
better” ([1975] 2006: 304). 
The elusive or virtual quality of happiness would not make it any less real in 
its consequences, or capacity to orient people’s actions. In many contexts, happi-
ness may be seen as a worthwhile aim; in others it may be seen as lowly, selfish, 
or in competition with other values. Some of these evaluations will inevitably 
affect the way people direct their actions and imagine their futures. In contexts 
where happiness is valued highly, as in the West, the objects and aims with 
which it is associated will themselves typically be evaluated highly. This is what 
Ahmed (2010) calls the “promise of happiness”: if you do “this,” happiness will 
ensue. Conversely, “this” must therefore be good; and “you,” as the kind of be-
ing who is guided by it, must therefore be good too. We can thus read Ahmed’s 
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observation as suggesting a crucial link between the temporality (and futurity) 
of happiness and its valuation. Depending on the values of happiness, as they 
stand in relation to other values, the social world takes its form: people’s actions, 
plans, and motivations are offered to them along with their moral consequences. 
CONCLUSION
One of the central challenges of anthropology is to recognize the potential di-
versity of human ends and to understand and interpret how people strive collec-
tively to reach a balance between the different ends they value. These need not 
be commensurable, and may require a continuous exercise of moral judgment 
(Kavedžija, this collection); they may not all point to happiness. And yet, happi-
ness seems strikingly well suited as a starting point for inquiring into what gives 
lives a sense of purpose or direction, or how people search for the best way to 
live—even in dire and hostile circumstances. For happiness is often something 
to be achieved—or not—by living a life of one kind or another. In contem-
plating the diversity of images revealed through ethnographic inquiry, we have 
suggested that happiness might usefully be considered in terms of questions of 
scope, virtue, and responsibility. Happiness may not always be seen as available 
to everyone, nor need it even be considered the property of a single individual; 
on the contrary, it may be construed as part of the uninterrupted flow of social 
life, an inherently relational quality not reducible to an individual person. More-
over, happiness always stands in a particular relationship to ideas of virtue, and 
at a greater or lesser distance from it; just as it always implicates specific forms 
of responsibility: who, ultimately, is responsible for the happiness of whom, and 
in what ways they may be held accountable. 
Happiness always involves an evaluation of sorts: of one’s condition at a 
moment in time, or of a life as a whole, or of several interpenetrating lives. As 
such, it is intrinsically linked to questions of value, both in terms of the cultural 
values that inform and enable the process of arriving at a positive assessment; 
and in terms of how happiness is itself evaluated in relation to that multiplic-
ity of aims, desires, or experiences that may comprise one’s conception of a 
full, good, or meaningful life. On the island of Yap, for example, happiness is 
less socially valued than suffering, which elicits empathic concern (Throop, this 
collection), while in the Ethiopian Gamo Highlands, by contrast, suffering is 
seen as unnecessary misery, whereas happiness consists of smooth and peaceful 
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social relations—formerly achieved through the constant joking and interac-
tion which ensured “present moment consciousness” and discouraged isolation, 
though increasingly through Pentecostal religious gatherings (Freeman, this 
collection). A different sense of changing values in China, and competing vi-
sions of family life, call into question the relative importance of individual and 
family happiness, as well as different possible evaluations of progress and ma-
terial prosperity (Stafford, this collection). Among Japanese elderly, happiness 
can only be understood in relation to values of sociality, self-development, and 
responsibility to others (Kavedžija, this collection), while for British human-
ists, happiness involves a shared commitment to the Enlightenment values of 
secular reason (Engelke, this collection). Recent political interest in mindfulness 
in Britain reveals an indisputable affinity between individual happiness and the 
self-governing values of neoliberalism, and yet the experiences of mindfulness 
practitioners themselves reveals a broader and more diverse set of motivations 
and experiences (Cook, this collection). Happiness is bound up in the values 
of connectivity for Bengali migrants (Gardner, this collection), and in flexible, 
self-directed work, freedom from trouble, and the cultivation of a “style of life” 
for the Peruvian Urarina (Walker, this collection). For the retired Swiss dairy 
farmer Willi, it is his adhesion to the values of hard work and political engage-
ment that underpins his achievement of a happy life (Lambek, this collection). 
For young militiamen in Guinnea-Bissau, happiness is closely related to social 
worth and status, or “becoming somebody,” along with the values of stability 
and solidarity (Vigh, this collection). 
An ethnographically grounded inquiry into happiness directs attention to 
what actually matters to people, or what gives life a sense of meaning and pur-
pose, and it does so in a number of useful ways. To be clear, the answer to such a 
question of what matters most need not always be happiness, at least not in the 
sense of a pursuit of sustained good feeling. Our suggestion is rather that asking 
after happiness and its valences can offer a powerful way of understanding how 
diversely situated people grapple with fundamental questions of how to live, 
questions of value, motivation, and purpose; how they negotiate and reconcile 
their obligations to others with their sense of duty to themselves; and how they 
imagine their future, including how it feeds into their present and becomes their 
past. If value brings universes into being (Graeber 2013), the values of happi-
ness go some way toward constituting the worlds of lived moral, political, and 
emotional experience, and an examination of those values may reveal to us their 
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outlines and contours. We hope readers will find in the essays that follow a sense 
of worlds both familiar and unfamiliar. 
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chapter one
Ambivalent happiness and virtuous suffering
C. Jason Throop
One of the fundamental fantasies of anthropology 
is that somewhere there must be a life really worth 
living. 
– David Schneider, 1967
This sardonic reflection on one of the core fantasies motivating anthropological 
fieldwork is found in a brief two-page foreword that David Schneider penned 
to introduce Roy Wagner’s book The curse of the Souw (1967).1 The statement, 
classically Schneiderian in terms of its deeply ironic tone and scope, could very 
well have served as a preface to Schneider’s own ethnographic research on Yap, 
however. As a member of the Harvard Yap Expedition—one of twenty-one 
“expeditions” launched as part of the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian 
Anthropology (CIMA)—Schneider was required to contribute ethnographic 
data that would help to better understand, and ideally “solve,” the problem 
of “rapid depopulation” on the island. During the period of Japanese colonial 
rule, depopulation had accelerated to such an extent that in 1924 “the Japanese 
1. Joel Robbins (2013) references this same quote as a means to illuminate critical 
differences between so-called “savage slot” and “suffering slot” ethnography. 
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delegation to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission was 
criticized regarding the ‘alarming’ danger of ‘extinction’ of the Yapese native 
population” (Bashkow 1991: 195).2 As Ira Bashkow notes, at this time perhaps 
the 
most famous anthropological statement on de-population in indigenous com-
munities was that of W. H. R. Rivers, who had argued that “underlying” the 
“more obvious causes” of depopulation, such as “the new diseases and poisons,” 
was a “psychological factor”: the “loss of interest in life” caused by colonial dis-
ruptions in the religious and economic institutions that had previously motivated 
vigorous native pursuits. (Bashkow 1991: 187)
A strikingly similar perspective was voiced, Bashkow observes, by Japanese co-
lonial administrators, who, in responding to the League of Nations commis-
sion, had “apparently convinced themselves that ‘psychologically, the natives 
were absolutely indifferent to . . . their extinction’” (ibid.: 195). That the Yapese 
themselves may have no longer been able to hold on to the belief that their own 
lives were “really worth living,” and that there could be significant psychologi-
cal “factors” at the root of such a radical form of world-collapse, established the 
backdrop against which Schneider’s fieldwork on the island was cast. 
While Schneider’s research eventually led him to the conclusion that “the 
population had begun a ‘slow but steady’ increase” and that “the Yapese suf-
fered no Riversian ‘loss of the will to live’” (ibid.: 227), as his fieldnotes attest, 
he was deeply unsettled by his inability to attune to the affective expectations 
and responses of his Yapese “informants” as he tried to establish “rapport” with 
them. In contrast to the tonality of many of his own idealized romantic and hu-
manistic impulses prior to entering the field, Schneider discovered quite quickly 
that the Yapese “were not blissfully sexual, nor loyally communal, nor politically 
easygoing, and not by a long stretch were they egalitarian” (ibid.: 226). Nor were 
they, in any straightforward sense of the term at least, “happy.”
2. Estimates of precolonial population on the island range anywhere from 28,000 to 
50,000 inhabitants (Hunt, Kidder, and Schneider 1954; Schneider 1955; Labby 
1976). By the time of the first census conducted by the Catholic mission in 1899, 
however, the population had shrunk to just under 8000. Yap’s population reached 
an all-time low during the American Navy’s first census in the wake of the Japanese 
occupation in 1946, with merely 2478 inhabitants (Hunt, Kidder, and Schneider 
1954; Egan 1998). 
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A LIFE REALLY WORTH LIVING 
What makes a life “really worth living,” and what, if anything, does “happiness” 
have to do with it? As detailed in Walker and Kavedžija’s introduction to this 
collection, the relationship between understandings of happiness as eudaimonia 
(a form of human flourishing) or hedonia (a specifiable emotional feeling) has 
structured many debates about happiness in contemporary social scientific and 
philosophical accounts. From a phenomenological perspective, however, “hap-
piness” is taken to be an intermediary phenomenon (Throop 2009a; cf. Jackson 
1998) that manifests neither strictly in terms of a generalized capacity for flour-
ishing nor as an interiorized state. It is considered instead a modality of being, a 
felicitous form of attunement, attachment, and attention, which orients persons 
to themselves, others, events, situations, and the world in particular sorts of 
ways. To put it differently, happiness in such a view is understood as an exis-
tential orientation to self, other, and world, rather than as a particular mode of 
living well or feeling good. 
As Michael Jackson (2011) argues when speaking of the related concept of 
“wellbeing,” however, such felicitous attunements are never settled states of ex-
istence (see also Jackson 2013; cf. Corsín Jimenez 2008; Mathews and Izquierdo 
2009; Thin 2012). They arise and dissipate, flow and ebb, constrict and expand in 
ways that are never simply coterminous with, nor necessarily predictable from, 
the dictates of culturally constituted expectations and desires that inform puta-
tively shared understandings of what constitutes the parameters of a good life or 
the discernible qualities of hedonic feelings. Rather, such positive attunements 
are always haunted by “insufficiency and loss,” as well as by a basic “condition of 
existential dissatisfaction” that marks the ever-present discontinuities “between 
who we are and what we might become” ( Jackson 2011: ix).
That we could be happier, that things that should make us happy sometimes 
do not, that we are not happy in the right way, measure, or degree, that some 
forms of happiness may be incommensurate with other forms of joy we may yet 
equally desire, that our happiness is not shared by others, that our own happi-
ness may actually diminish possibilities for happiness in others, or, even worse, 
that it may only be possible by means of others’ unhappiness and suffering—
all of these are existential possibilities that not only inhabit the background 
of any foregrounded experience of happiness (see also Vigh, this collection), 
they also at times break through to unsettle and transform it. Happiness in the 
context of those concrete specificities of situated encounters in which singular 
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and complex beings engage with one another and their surrounding world is 
thus seldom experienced without some degree of ambivalence, ambiguity, and 
instability. 
THE SPIRIT OF HAPPINESS
Having witnessed the effects of cultural dissolution at the hands of four dif-
fering colonial administrations (Spanish, German, Japanese, and American), 
Schneider’s adopted Yapese “father” embodied in a particularly striking way the 
tonality of despairing “unhappiness” that seemed to permeate everyday life in 
the wake of the US Navy’s “liberation” of the island. As Bashkow describes it, 
Annually performing ceremonies that no one else remembered, Tannengin re-
garded the forgetting of customs as an actual threat to Yapese survival, because 
words to be spoken to the spirits were “lost and cannot be recovered.” Lamenting 
depopulation—the people had died around him—he wondered if the spirits of 
fertility had not already “all gone away from Yap.” (1991: 211) 
And indeed, as Schneider’s “father” well knew, the “words to be spoken to the 
spirits” were of paramount concern given that they not only facilitated commu-
nication with them but also helped to ensure their “happiness.” As Schneider 
later famously observed, when confronted with a significant problem, the “head 
of the lineage” must divine “to locate a happy ancestral spirit, and on finding 
one, . . . [beseech] that ancestral spirit to intercede on behalf of its living lineage 
with the generalized spirit who can effect the cure for the illness, improve the 
fishing, make the woman pregnant, and so on” (1984: 15–16). Such efforts to 
discern and maintain the relative “happiness” of spirits, Schneider argued, were 
considered crucial to ensuring the wellbeing of individuals, families, and com-
munities alike.
Concern for the “happiness” of spirits was also echoed in the reflections of 
Liffer, one of two women on the island who was known to still be able to com-
municate with spirits at the time at which I conducted the bulk of my fieldwork 
in the early to mid-2000s. In her late eighties, thin with short well-cropped 
hair, sharp features, and penetrating dark eyes, Liffer spoke quietly, but with a 
confidence that reflected the fact that people had approached her cautiously for 
many years, with respect, knowing that she had the ability to communicate with 
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spirits (ngathaliy). When recounting her life story to me, Liffer recalled that the 
spirits (thagiith) first came to her when she left her natal village to move in with 
her husband and her husband’s family. Her own family had not blessed the mar-
riage and had cut off all ties with her in the wake of her decision to marry a man 
they did not first approve of. Liffer was only nineteen when all of this happened 
(about a decade prior to Schneider’s arrival on the island). Not long after her 
family abandoned her, Liffer became terribly sick and remained incapacitated 
for the better part of three months. 
As her illness showed little sign of abating, her mother-in-law, who had 
kept a close eye on her throughout her affliction, decided that her sickness was 
a symptom of ngathaliy. Since her mother-in-law had some previous experience 
calling the spirits, she offered to help. Frightened but unsure what else to do 
(or in fact if she had any choice in the matter), Liffer accepted the offer. Sitting 
down facing her directly, her mother-in-law looked deep into her eyes and in-
structed her not to resist, before beginning to utter in a repetitive and rhythmic 
fashion the phrase moey moey (“come, come”). As the spirit entered her body, 
Liffer recalled yawning and feeling a cold sensation running down the length of 
her spine, and then apparently nothing more until the spirit left her. 
When she regained consciousness, her mother-in-law explained that the 
spirit who possessed her was her deceased father, who said that he had come on 
account of the sickness from which his kanaawoq (“host”; literally “path”) was 
suffering. The spirit then explained that the way to cure her sickness was for 
Liffer to return to her natal estate and to have her family make sweet-scented 
flower necklaces, as well as gather food and other valuables that could be then 
used to propitiate him. When her natal family eventually complied with the 
spirit’s request, her father’s spirit was falfalaen’ (“happy”), she reported, because 
there were now “good feelings in the estate” (feal ’ ea laen ii yaen’ ko tabinaew). 
Her father’s spirit had been acting out of “compassion” (runguy) for her, she ex-
plained, and was not “angry” (puwaen’) at the other members of her family who 
had abandoned her. Other spirits may and do act quite differently, however. The 
happiness of spirits is, it seems, a precarious achievement. 
PRECARIOUS HAPPINESS 
As Sara Ahmed (2010) points out in her excellent book on the topic, the 
instability and contingency of the English term “happiness” is captured in 
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its etymological roots. The lexeme is derived from the Middle English word 
“hap,” a term that refers to chance. In its earliest derivations, the word “happy” 
originally referred to “having ‘good ‘hap’ or fortune,’ to be lucky or fortunate” 
(ibid.: 22). According to Ahmed, the term “happy” was first used to refer to 
chance and contingency, to the fact that something beyond our control has 
happened to us—in this particular case, something good. Ahmed suggests, 
however, that the inherent contingency once tied to the meaning of the term 
“happiness”—its precariousness—has been slowly lost over time. No longer 
thought to be exclusively connected to unpredictability and chance, happiness 
has become deemed an internalized condition or state of being that can be 
cultivated or produced through our actions, choices, efforts, and work. As such, 
happiness is now deemed a state of the self that is produced through the self ’s 
efforts. A failure in happiness can thus quite easily be read back as a failure of 
the self.3 
A primary goal of Ahmed’s theoretical interventions into contemporary un-
derstandings and uses of happiness is to reclaim the contingency entailed in its 
original formulations. In so doing, she hopes to expand its range of possibility. 
She also aims to show how “unhappiness” can significantly unsettle and reveal 
aspects of our taken-for-granted assumptions about the world that may in fact 
limit the range of possibilities for happiness in the context of our own and oth-
ers’ lives. In this respect, she argues, “we need to think about unhappiness as more 
than a feeling that needs to be overcome” (ibid.: 217). It is only when this happens, 
she suggests, that we can, “witness happiness as a possibility that acquires sig-
nificance by being a possibility alongside others . . . [and accordingly] can value 
happiness for its precariousness, as something that comes and goes, as life does” 
(ibid.: 219). In Ahmed’s estimation, such a view of happiness is only rendered 
properly visible, however, when the variable “‘worldly’ question of happenings” 
that define the limits, contingencies, and possibilities of happiness is given care-
ful consideration. 
3. With the global circulation of psychiatric mood disorders, and the 
psychopharmaceutical management and “enhancement” of moods to fit within a 
range of the “happy,” an ongoing diagnostic accounting of such failures of the self 
(which we should also note all too easily takes attention away from other political, 
social, and economic failures) is quite arguably one of the defining marks of our 
contemporary situation. To preserve the integrity of the self ’s wellbeing, the locus of 
failure is increasingly construed as one of neurobiological deficiency or malfunction 
(see Rose 2006).
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WORLDLY HAPPENINGS 
Paer was a large woman with pure white hair in her late sixties living in a mid-
caste village on the east coast of Yap. Married three times, with four children, 
and recently widowed, she walked with a visible limp that required her to use a 
cane to get around. On this particular day, Paer sat on the veranda of her house, 
avoiding my gaze, looking out over her garden. She had planted this garden 
close to the house, she explained, to reduce the distance she had to walk to get 
food when her grandson was visiting. Her leg was hurting a lot these days and 
it was just not possible for her to get to her favorite taro patches and gardens 
without some help.
Her present pain seemed to be evocative of the traces of past suffering, how-
ever; at that moment our conversation shifted rather abruptly, I thought, to her 
memories of gardening for the Japanese soldiers during the war. “During that 
war, there was great suffering that was put upon us,” she exclaimed. 
Very great suffering that the Japanese gave to us. We all stayed and we all worked. 
And there was work and that is how it went. We went to work and we all, we all 
cooked for them . . ., so in the morning we ate [whatever we could] and then off 
to work . . . in the gardens [to get] food for the Japanese.
After a long pause, my field assistant Manna interjected, “Very hard work was 
put in.” “Very hard,” Paer continued. 
Those Japanese I tell you, very hard work there. You could not . . . because . . . you 
were working it didn’t matter . . . you see, you would work and [even if ] there is 
pain in your back and you cannot stand up, you are told to return to work because 
they are watching . . . and they will beat you.
While the suffering associated with Japanese forced labor camps was brutal, the 
end of the war did not, however, mark the end of Paer’s pain. “Myself, my life, 
there has been very intense suffering in my life, from long ago [before the war] 
to present.” Not only did she lose her first husband in a car accident, but her 
efforts to pursue renewed possibilities for living were shattered yet again when 
her second husband beat her so badly that she had to end the marriage and re-
turn to her parents’ village. While unwilling to say much about those years, she 
explained that through it all she somehow managed to find the wherewithal to 
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keep going for the sake of her children. After a few years of struggling to make 
do in her parents’ village, she eventually met the man who would become her 
third husband. While they, too, often struggled, argued, and fought, his final 
succumbing to cancer was perhaps the most devastating experience of her life. 
While Paer believed that she had done the best she could have given the 
circumstances that were thrown her way, she had reached the limit of what she 
could bear. As she confided, 
I got married and I became pregnant, myself and my children, we lived together, 
.  .  . [and] I helped my [family’s] and my children’s life [as best I could]. But 
[then] there was my [last] husband who died so right now there is nothing that 
I can do, I stay and I wait for the time that I will [die].
Reflecting upon her situation in the wake of her third husband’s passing, she 
characterized herself as having lost the ability to “hope.” “I usually try a bit you 
know,” she explained, 
[but] now I have no more responsibilities [my husband is dead and my children 
have grown] . . . if there is something [to do], I make every effort to do it . . . [if ] 
there is something [to do] I try my best to garden . . . [for instance] if there is 
someone [visiting] who is hungry I don’t like that they will [go] hungry, but, at 
present I am [mostly] living idly, perhaps I have lost hope, or I don’t know what. 
The fact that she had worked, endured, and persevered in the face of suffering 
was for Paer, as it was for many of the people I spoke to in the context of my 
research, something of significant moral worth (see Throop 2010a). Regardless 
of its perceived moral value, however, such experiences did not in the end bring 
her “happiness.” They only resulted in her experiencing on a daily basis, now that 
she was close to the end of her life, a painful loss of hope. 
ATTUNEMENT, ATTACHMENT, AND ATTENTION
Key to phenomenological approaches to lived experience is the idea, first articu-
lated by Edmund Husserl ([1913] 1962), that individuals are continually shift-
ing between differing “attitudes”—or what Clifford Geertz (1973) termed “per-
spectives”—in the context of their engagements with their social and physical 
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worlds. It is by means of what Husserl termed “acts of phenomenological modi-
fication” that individuals come to transform their orientations to experience: 
from despairing to hopeful perspectives on a given situation, for example (see 
Throop 2003, 2010a, 2010b, 2015; Duranti 2009a, 2009b, 2010). 
Differing phenomenological modifications can, however, have greater or 
lesser transformational effects on the experience of particular objects, acts, events, 
and persons. Some modifications are radical enough to transform an experience 
of an object to such an extent that it is no longer experienced as the “same” object 
at all—shifting between the incommensurable images of the Rubin Face/Vase 
Illusion being one good example. Other modifications may be quite subtle, how-
ever. Such attenuated shifts in perspective include everyday and ongoing fluctua-
tions in attention by means of which different properties of an object come into 
focus: noticing the smooth surface of an actual vase after appreciating its amber 
coloring, for instance. Subtler modifications are also entailed in those moments 
where an object is experienced as the “same” object existing under different con-
ditions through time—such as when it becomes apparent that the same vase 
placed in different lighting is actually a hue of brownish-red (see Throop 2015). 
Whether radical or subtle, such shifts in orientation to objects of experience 
necessarily involve what are often unnoticed alterations in forms of understand-
ing, feeling, emotion, and mood that color the experience of a given object, action, 
event, situation, or person moment by moment. Such everyday acts of modi-
fication Husserl termed “intentional modifications” (see Husserl [1913] 1962; 
Duranti 2009a, 2009b). In Husserlian terms, “intentional modifications” refers 
to the ways in which consciousness is directed toward given objects of experience 
(e.g., intentionality).4 “Intentional modifications” implies, in short, that conscious-
ness constitutes objects of experience by means of particular, and shifting, acts of 
judgment, feeling, sensing, imagining, remembering, anticipating, or perceiving. 
The surrounding world is never a neutral canvas upon which subjects freely 
paint their experiences, however. The world itself also draws us in, has a hold on 
us, and pulls our attention toward it. Attention, as Husserl argued, is “pulled” 
or “affected” by worldly happenings, events, situations, and relations (Husserl 
[1918–26] 2001; see Throop and Duranti 2014). Accordingly, depending on the 
context, at any given moment, we may be drawn to notice or engage with certain 
4. The term “intentional” is used here in reference to the phenomenological concept of 
intentionality, which refers to the “aboutness” of consciousness as directed toward 
particular objects of experience.
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aspects of a given situation and not others. We are thus, as Jarrett Zigon argues, 
attuned to the “diverse and particular relationships that make possible the vast 
diversity of ways of living we find in the social world” (2014: 22).5 
Happiness, as a form of attunement and intentional modification that trans-
forms perspectives on the world, thus organizes attention in particular sorts of 
ways. Happiness brings attention to certain aspects of the world that would not 
otherwise be noticed in other emotional or mood-inflected orientations. It also 
covers over aspects of the world that would be disclosed in other, non-happy 
modes of being. As such, happiness significantly shapes the contours of the 
world, as well as those possibilities for action, attachment, attention, and at-
tunement that are encountered within it. According to Ahmed (2010), who also 
productively draws from Husserl in her approach to happiness, such modes of 
“affective interest” shape the horizons of an individual’s embodied experience, 
cares, and concerns, and the range of practical actions enfolded within them. 
To say that happiness is a form of attunement that organizes attention, rede-
fining what is salient and desirable, in the process reconfiguring the experience 
of particular situations, interactions, persons, or objects, is another way of saying 
that happiness establishes horizons. The phenomenological notion of horizon 
highlights the existential fact that humans are necessarily embodied, finite, and 
positioned beings who are never able to exhaust their experience of the world in 
which they are emplaced, “as there is always something more yet to come, a side 
yet to see, an aspect, quality, action, or interaction yet to experience” (Desjarlais 
and Throop 2011: 90). Happiness, its pursuit or realization, thus significantly 
organizes what it is that individuals attend to, how they attend to it, as well as 
what they ignore. It is, of course, necessary in this regard to recall that particular 
5. My use of “attunement” throughout this article resonates strongly with Zigon’s 
articulation of the concept, which builds directly upon Heidegger’s original 
formulation (ibid.). As Heidegger explains, “Attunements are the fundamental ways 
in which we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way. Attunements are the 
‘how’ [Wie] according to which one is in such and such a way. Certainly we often 
take this ‘one is in such and such a way’ . . . as something indifferent, in contrast to 
what we intend to do, what we are occupied with, or what will happen to us. And 
yet this ‘one is in such and such a way’ is not—is never—simply a consequence or 
side-effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. . . . And precisely those attunements 
to which we pay no heed at all, the attunements we least observe, those attunements 
which attune us in such a way that we feel as though there is no attunement there 
at all, as though we were not attuned in any way at all—these attunements are the 
most powerful” ([1929/30] 1995: 67–68).
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horizons are defined for us, as much as by us, and that social, cultural, political, 
economic, and historical processes are always significantly at work in partially 
shaping the sedimented, habituated parameters of particular lifeworlds. This in-
cludes affectively configured horizons as well.
HORIZONS OF HAPPINESS
Over the course of my fieldwork, Tamag, a short and athletic man in his late fif-
ties, had become a close friend whom I often visited whenever I had the chance 
to make the thirty- to forty-minute drive up to the northern municipality of 
Maap. Known for his good-natured affability, Tamag was a thoughtful, socially 
astute observer, with much to say about the contemporary challenges Yapese 
communities are facing. During one such visit, sitting together in the com-
fortable shade of his newly built rest house (koeyeeng) overlooking the ocean, I 
listened intently as Tamag reflected on the difficulty he and others were having 
motivating the village youth to participate in community work projects, such 
as their village’s current effort to replace the roof on the village men’s house 
(faeluw). The problem, Tamag suggested, was one of falfalaen’ (“happiness”). 
Rather confused by the statement, I asked him to elaborate. Whereas com-
munity work had traditionally been a nonnegotiable obligation that took prior-
ity over all other considerations, he explained, for the younger generations it 
seemed that the self-sacrifice implicated in such community-mandated forms 
of service was increasingly at odds with the youth’s growing desire to feel only 
“happiness” (falfalaen’) in their lives. While it was certainly enjoyable to feel 
“happy” (falfalaen’), a major problem with aspiring to be happy at all times, 
Tamag lamented, was that individuals who are always happy will never directly 
embody suffering (gaafgow u fithik ea dooway). Without directly experiencing 
suffering, he reasoned, an individual will never be able to effectively cultivate 
feelings of runguy (“compassion”) for others who may yet still be suffering. 
All of this was not to say, Tamag reassured me, that there were not times in 
his own life when he felt falfalaen’ or desired to be “happy.” In fact, he fondly 
remembered moments of playing with friends and cousins during his childhood 
as times when he felt some of his greatest contentment. The fact remained, 
however, that such experiences of “happiness” were fleeting and contingent af-
fairs that arose in the wake of an absence of responsibility to and for others. Ex-
periences of falfalaen’ did not, therefore, in his estimation, significantly impact 
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his attachments and obligations to friends, family, and community. Such moral 
bonds were instead defined, he believed, by his experiences of suffering-for oth-
ers in the context of effortful work in the village and for his family (see the 
discussion in Walker and Kavedžija’s introduction to this collection on the axes 
of “virtue” in relation to “happiness”). 
Even though still at times sought after and valued modes of being, “content-
ment” and “happiness” (falfalaen’) were in Tamag’s case modes of attunement 
that limit horizons of compassionate responsivity to others in the community 
who may be suffering (gaafgow). One of the key logical assumptions undergird-
ing his reflections was that if an individual is falfalaen’ (“happy”), he or she is not 
focused on the wellbeing of others. The attention of such “happy” individuals 
will not be drawn, as Ahmed might say, to others’ “unhappiness.” Individuals 
who are falfalaen’ are instead characterized as focusing their attention solely 
upon their own success, wellbeing, and comfort. Social attachments are thus 
neglected in the wake of happiness’s horizon. In short, a key moral question 
arising in the face of such forms of self-focused happiness is: If others are still 
suffering, how can you claim to be happy?6 
THE UNHAPPINESS OF HAPPINESS
According to Ahmed, conventionalized forms of happiness that give shape to 
particular “horizons of experience” are affective forms of orientation that often 
6. It is interesting to note in this regard that the Yapese term that can be most 
easily glossed as “selfishness” (fal ’ngaak) can be literally translated as “his or her 
goodness-wellbeing.” Why would goodness or wellbeing be directly associated with 
self-centeredness? There are a number of cognate Yapese morphemes that carry 
the connotation of “good” or “well” (fal, feal ’, faal, and fael ’) that are also used to 
designate morally problematic states of being. These include fal ’ngaak (“selfish”), 
fal ’fal ’l ’ugun (“liar, falsehood”), and fael ’ (“to fool someone”). On the positive end 
of the spectrum are the terms faalngin (“propitious act, abstention, or sacrifice”), 
fal ’eag (“to create, build, or repair”), fal ’egin (“to fix or mend”), falaaqaab (“fortunate, 
lucky”), and falfalaen’ (“happiness, contentment”). Even in the case of these 
more positively valenced terms, however, there are notable connotations of lack, 
contingency, imperfection, and sacrifice implicated in them. Bridging between 
these polarities is the term falaay, which may refer to either “beneficial medicine” or 
“harmful magic” depending on the context. That the same morphemic root is used 
to designate terms for happiness, good fortune, beneficial medicine, harmful magic, 
falsehood, and selfishness is quite striking and not, I think, arbitrary. 
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result from an unquestioned inheritance. The normative standards, values, and 
assumptions embedded in such affective orientations narrow the horizon of 
what counts as happiness for any given individual or group (cf. Laidlaw 2008). 
Conventional forms of happiness recurrently focus our attention to particular 
objects, actions, and situations and not others, in the process bringing defini-
tion and prominence to particular possibilities and relations and not others. If 
particular horizons of experience are defined by such an affective narrowing of 
attention, then, Ahmed asks, “what kind of world takes shape when happiness 
provides the horizon?” (2010:14). And perhaps more pointedly, whose happi-
ness counts in the shaping of such a horizon?
“The promise of happiness is what makes certain objects proximate, affect-
ing how the world gathers around us,” Ahmed suggests (ibid.). And yet, on the 
flip side, happiness also causes objects and others to recede from our view. Most 
significantly, this includes those objects, others, and situations that threaten to 
diminish our happiness. As Ahmed explains, 
Happiness might play a crucial role in shaping our near sphere, the world that 
takes shape around us, as a world of familiar things. Objects that give us pleasure 
take up residence within our bodily horizon. . . . To have “our likes” means certain 
things are gathered around us . . . [conversely] awayness might help establish the 
edges of our horizon; in rejecting the proximity of certain objects, we define the 
places that we know we do not wish to go, the things we do not wish to have, 
touch, taste, hear, feel, see, those things we do not want to keep within reach. 
(2010: 24)
Happiness augments attachments to felicitous objects as much as it diminishes 
attachments to infelicitous ones.
Facing toward some horizons and away from others, happiness is a form of 
attunement, attachment, and attention that foregrounds some events, relations, 
and objects, while necessarily backgrounding others. Walking quickly past a 
homeless man on the street while averting our eyes, turning the channel on the 
TV so as not to hear about the latest onslaught of tragic news, avoiding “touchy 
subjects” in conversations with family and friends, dwelling in the happiness of 
places or times now long past or in the future possibility of a happiness yet to 
come—all are routine ways that happiness is guarded and guards, thus limiting 
and defining our proximity to the suffering of others or to those unhappy situa-
tions or relations that might threaten happiness (even if such happiness is only 
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ever an anticipated goal). Happiness may mask the roots of suffering as well. 
As Ahmed argues, “Happiness can work to cover over unhappiness, in part by 
covering over its causes, such that to refuse to take cover can allow unhappiness 
to emerge” (ibid.: 87).
Happiness can define and narrow worldly horizons, thus excluding others, 
objects, events, and acts from a person’s purview. It can also cover over or mask 
unhappiness and its roots. As Lauren Berlant (2011) claims, the very pursuit 
of happiness as a means of attaining “the good life” may also be implicated in 
forms of “cruel optimism,” wherein objects of desire become themselves the 
primary obstacles to present and future flourishing. Happiness is, however, 
only one of many possible experiences of “affect” that may be attached to the 
“structure of relationality” characterizing Berlant’s view of optimism. As she 
explains, 
Whatever the experience of optimism is in particular, then, the affective structure 
of an optimistic attachment involves a sustaining inclination to return to the 
scene of fantasy that enables you to expect that this time, nearness to this thing 
will help you or a world to become different in just the right way. But again, op-
timism is cruel when the object/scene that ignites a sense of possibility actually 
makes it impossible to attain the expansive transformation for which a person or 
a people risks striving. (2011: 2) 
Even though Berlant explicitly distances herself from Ahmed, whom she sees 
as dealing primarily with emotion and not “affect,” that is, with “the feeling of 
optimism itself ” rather than the diffuse and uneven atmospherics implicated in 
the “optimism of attachment” (ibid.: 12), she certainly seems to share her suspi-
cion that happiness may be implicated in binding people to particular “modes of 
life that threaten their well-being” (ibid.: 16). Her analysis of the global obesity 
epidemic as a form of “slow death” is one powerful example. 
A SLOW DEATH
This disease is terrible . . . it is just a terrible disease . . . it doesn’t . . . the one thing 
I don’t like about it is that it doesn’t just kill you right there. It slowly, you know, 
. . . kills you little by little. One body part goes, then this, this, this, this . . . same 
. . . same . . . and that is worse . . . that is the pain . . . painful part of it. 
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The once assertive, self-assured, and at times intimidating young man whom 
I often saw stumbling around town in a half-drunken stupor, always sporting 
his ubiquitous sunglasses and baseball cap, had been reduced at the time that 
he uttered these words to a skinny, glassy-eyed, feeble man now facing the very 
real possibility of his own death. As he spoke these words to me, lying there on 
his hospital bed the day before he was to leave for Guam for treatment for his 
failing kidneys (Yap State Memorial Hospital has no dialysis machines), all of 
Chep’s previous bravado and intensity seemed to have been drained from his 
being. As he explained to me, his diabetes had progressed to the point where his 
right leg had been amputated above the knee, his eyesight was steadily deterio-
rating, and his kidneys were failing. He also had a “bad heart” and there were 
problems with his “veins,” which were not, as he put it, “letting enough blood 
through.” As a result, he was suffering from shortness of breath. He could barely 
sit up in bed without feeling dizzy and faint. Standing up was simply out of the 
question. 
As we spoke together in the poorly lit space of his hospital room, Chep 
knew that he did not have long to live, and, tragically, he was right; he died a 
few months later in a much better lit hospital room in Guam. Largely immo-
bile, weak, at times disoriented, in constant pain, and unsure of his future, Chep 
spent much of his last days contemplating the events and circumstances that led 
up to the onset of his illness. As he recalled, 
My diabetes I think it is definitely the . . . the lifestyle the way I used to have to 
uh . . . do things . . . I think . . . ah . . . alcohol is the one thing that is not good 
for that . . . and I had so much alcohol when I was growing up . . . and . . . like 
twenty years or the last twenty years when I started drinking before I stopped 
. . . it didn’t bother me at the time. I didn’t even feel anything. And I kept on 
doing it and people kept telling me, “Hey, you have to slow down, you’re sick 
. . .” “Who said?” . . . um . . . I really, I really, I really don’t know when . . . until 
I knew that I could not do it . . . I was so sick, I couldn’t do it . . . so [it is only 
then that] I stopped. 
The simple truth was that Chep enjoyed drinking. It did not matter to him if 
the doctor told him to stop because he was sick or if he happened to hurt or 
disappoint his family when he was drunk. (He would often abandon his wife 
and children, disappearing for days when off on a bender.) The bottom line was 
that drinking made him “happy.” It made him feel like his life was really worth 
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living. When he was drunk, he asserted, he was falfalaen’—all of his worries, 
anxieties, and concerns faded away. That is, until his diabetes progressed to the 
point where he was far too sick to even consider taking another sip. By that 
point, however, his possibility for second chances had run out.
The tragic results of Chep’s abiding in the “happiness” that he experienced 
while drinking resonated with what many voiced to be the narrowly present-
focused temporal horizon that experiences of falfalaen’ are prone to engender. 
Indeed, when people spoke to me about “happiness,” their own and others’, 
they often characterized it as a fleeting state of being in which one is no longer 
adequately oriented to either past or future concerns. To be falfalaen’ in this mo-
ment is thus to forget the suffering of the past, not only one’s own suffering but 
also the suffering of others, one’s family, one’s community, and one’s ancestors. 
It is to forget Schneider’s “father’s” concern for the happiness of spirits. The 
restricted temporal reach of experiences of falfalaen’ also obscures its precarious-
ness in the face of an always-unpredictable future. It thus also covers over the 
contingency of happiness, as Ahmed would put it.7 
In contrast to the narrow temporal horizons that falfalaen’ putatively fore-
grounds, experiences of suffering (gaafgow) are understood to offer an extended 
existential vista onto both past situations and future happenings. Suffering, its 
avoidance, and “suffering-for” the benefit of others were in fact explicitly held to 
give rise to possibilities for appropriately planning and thinking through what 
can be done in the present in the service of bettering one’s family’s and commu-
nity’s position in future generations. Suffering was also a way to tangibly con-
nect one’s present suffering with the suffering of others who have also worked to 
better those material and social conditions that define an individual’s, family’s, 
7. A similar such ambivalent characterization of the narrow temporal horizons of 
happiness is also detailed in Catherine Lutz’s classic ethnographic work on emotions 
on the nearby Micronesian atoll of Ifaluk. As Lutz observes, in Ifaluk, “happiness/
excitement” is often seen to be a “dangerous, socially disruptive” emotion (1988: 
145). “In this regard, the concept of ker (happiness/excitement) plays what is, from 
an American perspective, a paradoxical role. Happiness/excitement is an emotion 
people see as pleasant but amoral. It is often, in fact, immoral because someone who 
is happy/excited is more likely to be unafraid of other people. While this lack of 
fear may lead them to laugh and talk with people, it may also make them misbehave 
or walk around showing off or ‘acting like a big shot’ (gabos fetal)” (ibid.: 167). 
Accordingly, whereas “American approaches to child rearing and emotion elevate 
happiness to an important position, setting it out as an absolute necessity for the 
good or health child (and adult), the Ifaluk view happiness/excitement as something 
that must be carefully monitored and sometimes halted in children” (ibid.).
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or community’s contemporary existence. This includes the day-to-day efforts of 
those who suffer alongside each other in the present, as much as it does those 
whose past suffering has paved the way for current possibilities for prosperity 
and wellbeing. Indeed, each “estate” or tabinaew within a given village in Yap, 
along with all the various house foundations, taro patches, and gardens associ-
ated with it, was traditionally understood to be invested with particularized 
histories and ranks that reflect the labor of differing successive clans upon the 
land (see Labby 1976; Schneider 1984; Throop 2010a). “The place established 
by estate ancestors within this order,” Jim Egan observes, was directly “bound to 
the land upon which they lived, imbuing its soil with essences that were passed 
on to the very taro grown within it” (1998: 45).
Suffering was thus generally deemed virtuous by local standards to the ex-
tent that it helped to orient individuals, families, and communities to future ho-
rizons of possibility and past legacies of effortful sacrifice. In so doing, suffering 
defines extended horizons of experience, and accordingly gives rise to possibili-
ties for “hope” (athapaag). This is not the hope that suffering will be transformed 
without remainder into future happiness. It is instead more akin to the hope that 
Jackson (2011) sees as rooted in an existential dissatisfaction that traverses the 
expanse of who we are, who we have been, and who we might yet still become. 
Recognizing past suffering, acknowledging the ongoing suffering of others, 
as well as being attuned to the ever-present possibility of an arrival of unwanted 
future suffering, are each aspects of the moral worth of gaafgow (“suffering”) 
that actively bring into relief the precariousness of “happiness,” as well as its 
limited intersubjective and temporal scope. “Happiness” (falfalaen’), while still 
at times valued, falls short in its capacity to organize horizons of experience 
that enable those forms of belonging, caring, and striving that best define moral 
modes of being in Yapese communities. It is important to note here, however, 
that the sense of precariousness articulated in such ambivalent moral framings 
of falfalaen’, especially when understood against the background of virtuous suf-
fering, is rather differently pitched than Ahmed’s call to value the “hap” of hap-
piness—that is, its fragility and instability. For Ahmed it is precisely the “hap” 
of happiness that illuminates its value in disclosing possibilities. From a Yapese 
perspective, such precariousness is instead understood to be a temporal attribute 
of happiness that problematically narrows possibilities for social connection, 
responsibility, and care—possibilities that extend well beyond the contingen-
cies of present relations and situations to those of previous and forthcoming 
generations.
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THE BEING OF HAPPINESS
The precariousness of happiness, whether it is considered a desired or problematic 
aspect of its phenomenological manifestation, evokes again questions about the 
relation between feeling and being happy. If feeling happiness can lead us astray, 
is it possible to live a good life without happiness? Are Areliving a good life and 
living a happy life commensurable as modes of being? As Ahmed points out, for 
Aristotle, who took happiness to be an ultimate good or virtue, happiness cannot 
be “reduced to good feeling” (2010: 36). Rather, “happiness or eudaimonia refers to 
‘the good life’ or the virtuous life, which is a life-long project” (ibid.). To say that 
happiness is not reducible to a specifiable good feeling in Aristotle’s view is not 
to say, however, that happiness does not involve feelings (see also Lambek, this 
collection). “The virtuous agent will not only feel pleasure and pain where appro-
priate, in relation to the right objects, but will also experience the right amount of 
such feeling, where the right amount is the ‘mean’, which means not too much or 
too little” (Ahmed 2010: 36). The relationship between feeling and being happy, 
that is, between hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives on happiness, is one that piv-
ots not only on the relative degree to which happiness can be understood to satu-
rate a given moment of existence, but also on the temporal expanse of happiness 
itself (what Walker and Kavedžija term in their introduction to this collection the 
“scope” of happiness). If the good life is a “life-long project” and happy feelings 
are precarious and fleeting, then clearly, while the experience of happiness may be 
considered by some to be a necessary condition of living well, it can never in itself 
be a sufficient one. In short, there must be more to life than happiness if life is to 
be lived “well.” And yet, is it really accurate to say that the experience of happiness 
is always temporally and situationally bound to such an extent that it cannot be 
anything otherwise than fleeting and ephemeral? What of happiness that extends 
within, between, and beyond generations? What of the happiness of spirits?
If happiness is a felicitous modality of being, a form of attunement, attach-
ment, and attention that orients us to others, events, situations, and the world in 
particular sorts of ways, how might the horizons of “happiness” variously expand 
or contract? In terms of its positively inflected affective tonalities, happiness as a 
hedonic experience certainly ranges in duration, focus, and intensity as it mani-
fests in particularized emotional experiences and more diffuse moods. When it 
is experienced as an emotion, happiness is a narrowly temporally bounded and 
positively valenced embodied feeling that is registered at an intensity that is 
strong enough to both catch and direct our attention to specific and specifiable 
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contexts, situations, occurrences, objects, actions, and people. As an emotion, 
happiness is often, though not always, also reflexively available to us. We not 
only feel happy; we may recognize that we are happy. We may also recognize 
what or who is causing us to feel that way. 
Happiness is not always so clearly rendered nor closely tethered to the im-
mediate contexts in which we find ourselves enmeshed, however. It may in fact 
be distinctly decoupled from them. We may find ourselves feeling happy for 
no good reason or encounter others who seem happy despite the horrible cir-
cumstances they are in. We may also remain only vaguely aware of our happily 
mooded state as we move through obstacles and challenges with an ease that 
is not normally possible for us. In these contexts, happiness arises in situations 
that should evoke unhappiness or perhaps other more neutral or negative feel-
ings. This form of happiness, as Ahmed terms it, is “unattributed happiness” 
(2010: 25). In my terminology, this would be an instance of happiness express-
ing itself as a mood (Throop 2014).
Seldom the endpoint of our reflection, moods are instead the existential 
medium through which our reflections take shape (Throop 2012, 2014). As 
E. Valentine Daniel suggests, moods connote “a state of feeling—usually vague, 
diffuse, and enduring, a disposition toward the world at any particular time yet 
with a timeless quality to it” (2000: 333). As a vague, yet enduring, “disposition 
toward the world,” a mood provides the existential expanse within which reflec-
tion is deployed. To be in a mood is thus to inhabit a vague and diffuse orienta-
tion toward the world that suffuses our every perception, action, and reaction to 
it. In short, mood is our being, being affected and attuned (see Throop 2009a, 
2009b, 2012, 2014).
Accordingly, when we are “in” a mood, let’s say a “happy mood,” the line 
between our subjective experience and the intersubjective world that surrounds 
us is often significantly blurred. As Geertz famously observed, 
Moods vary only in intensity: they go nowhere. They spring from certain circum-
stances but they are responsive to no ends. Like fogs, they just settle and lift; like 
scents, suffuse and evaporate. When present moods are totalistic: if one is sad 
everything and everybody seems dreary; if one is gay everything and everybody 
seems splendid. (1973: 97) 
In this sense, happy moods are atmospheric. According to Ahmed, an atmos-
phere is “a feeling of what is around, which might be affective in its murkiness 
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or fuzziness, as a surrounding influence which does not quite generate its own 
form” (2010: 40). And yet, the atmospheric quality of a happy mood is only 
ever made tangible from a particular point of view. As Ahmed argues, “If we 
are always in some way or another moody, then what we will receive as an im-
pression will depend on our affective situation” (ibid.). In this capacity, we can 
understand a happy mood to be a dispersive and ongoing mode of attuning our 
attention to salient aspects of our own and others’ ways of being, as well as to 
the situations within which we find ourselves emplaced. This is true, however, as 
much for happy moods as it is for unhappy ones.
ATMOSPHERIC AMBIVALENCE
Even despite the moral problematization of the horizons of falfalaen’ in Yapese 
communities, individuals’ everyday dealings often disclosed what seemed to me 
to be traces of tangible moods of happiness that were legible in stories, jokes, 
and exchanges between family and friends. Simple forms of copresence also 
often bore the glimmers of subtler forms of happy attunement. Moments of 
sitting quietly together on the veranda with a family member, attending a cel-
ebration, barbecue, or traditional dance, or even enjoying the taste of a good 
betel nut with a friend were all situations that seemed to be palpably imbued 
with an atmospheric mood of happiness. The presence of infants and toddlers 
also seemed to soften and yet enliven the mood of those caring for them, again 
bringing into being possibilities for experiences that might fall into the range 
of the felicitous. Moments of satisfaction arising in wake of having participated 
in a particularly successful fishing trip or when having completing a given work 
project were also often intersubjectively discernible, even if subtly so. For the 
most part, however, such moods were seldom if ever explicitly remarked upon. 
Nor were they brought up as examples of falfalaen’ (“happiness”). When people 
did explicitly comment upon such moods, they almost always did so indirectly 
through deploying an idiomatic metaphorical allusion to fair meteorological 
conditions: for example, Ke manigiil yifung ea doba (“There is excellent weather 
today”).  
While talk of experiences of suffering came with relative ease for the major-
ity of people I knew, most individuals had difficulty talking openly about their 
experiences of falfalaen’. In fact, even when I asked people directly about it, by 
far the most typical response was for individuals to simply deny that they had 
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experienced much, if any, “happiness” in their lives. In the words of Tina, a hard-
working woman in her early sixties who was suffering with chronic pain in her 
back, hands, and knees,, “I don’t think there is anything in my life that brought 
me much happiness.  . . . There is a lot of sadness in my life, lots of sadness and 
suffering, perhaps I have forgotten about the happiness since there was so little 
of it.” 
Of those few individuals who did have something specific to say about 
happiness, many spoke of experiences they had during their childhood. Being 
carefree and unencumbered by the responsibilities, duties, and expectations of 
adulthood stood out for them as a time in their lives when they were falfal-
aen’. Having limited social obligations, having fun, and playing were often fore-
grounded as being key to their experience of “happiness” at that particular time 
in their lives. As Buulyal, a single woman in her late thirties, phrased it, 
In my life, the only time I remember feeling falfalaen’ was when I was a child, 
six or seven years old. At that time I had yet to go to elementary school and I 
was sent to stay with my grandparents. My parents and siblings were not there. 
But I was happy. At that time I was enrolled in the Head Start Program for pre-
schoolers. Everyday I would wash and eat by myself before heading up the hill to 
school. At school I learnt songs and stories, I got to draw with crayons, and play. 
I was really happy with what I was doing. 
Other individuals located experiences of “happiness” in those spaces and places 
where they were able to find some solitude. This often arose in the context of 
what seemed to me to be rather depersonalized accounts of individuals’ experi-
ences walking along village paths, spending time in gardens, or out at sea alone. 
For many who spoke of falfalaen’ in such terms, the emphasis was most often 
placed on how such spaces provided them with a chance to get away from oth-
ers, to reflect, be peaceful and calm. For instance, Dammal, a low-caste woman 
in her early fifties, responded as follows when asked when she was most happy, 
Just sitting somewhere. When I was little I liked going out to sea. I wanted to 
sit and look around and listen to the waves. I went with my uncle once, that was 
happiness. People might call other things happiness, like hanging around with 
a lot of people. Yes, there is happiness in it, but it doesn’t last. It will be for only 
a short while before it is over. But that . . . if I listen to the singing of the birds 
while gardening or walking through the forest and when I come back home I 
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can still hear the sound that lingers in my mind. . . . Happiness in my life are the 
moments I am alone listening to everything around me. If there’s nothing to do, 
I can just sit. I will not get bored. I do like being around people and talking to 
them, but it is when there’s no one around that I’m happy. 
Still others voiced experiencing happiness in the context of their work. As 
Gonop, a village chief in his early sixties, explained to me,
My work, I really enjoy it and I would say that the happiest I have been in my life 
has been while I was working. That is the thing that brings me the most happi-
ness. It is true that there is a lot of suffering associated with work but my mind 
does not dwell on it. I try not to think about suffering, the pain, or the things that 
hurt. It doesn’t matter what you do, there is suffering in work, but I think there 
is also some happiness. 
Statements concerning an overall lack of “happiness” in one’s life, narratives that 
restrict “happiness” to the context of experiences that were had in childhood, 
or claims that “happiness” arises in situations where one is able to find isolated 
reflective solitude all resonate with the view that falfalaen’ is a mode of world-
ly attunement in which moral responsibilities, long-term projects, past debts, 
and current social obligations are avoided, backgrounded, or ignored (cf. again 
Walker and Kavedžija’s discussion of the axes of “responsibility” and “virtue” in 
the introduction to this collection). Gonop’s characterization brings to light, 
however, a more complicated articulation in which suffering, pain, hardship, 
effortful striving, and work are interlaced with experiences of “happiness.” In 
this view, “happiness” is not realized in a pure state. Its horizons are not uni-
form. Falfalaen’ does not only exist, in other words, in suffering’s absence. It is 
instead intermixed with other embodied modes of being, most pointedly those 
associated with work. In this respect, falfalaen’ was deemed as at times poten-
tially blended with experiences of magaer, a local term that designates the ef-
fort, fatigue, or feelings of physical exertion that arise from hard work or service 
(see Throop 2010a: 61–67).
When speaking of work and the effortful suffering associated with it, many 
individuals explained to me that such forms of work-induced suffering, particu-
larly in the case of collective work projects, played a significant role in fostering 
strong bonds of attachment in the family, the village, and the broader commu-
nity. The phrase used to describe such forms of attachment when speaking at the 
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level of the village was amiithuun ea binaw, literally, “pain of the village” or “the 
village’s pain” (Throop 2008, 2010a). Having participated in my share of village 
work projects over the years, I understood quite well the bodily aches, soreness, 
and pains associated with the demands of physical labor associated with them. 
That mutual suffering that arose from working together could foster shared ho-
rizons of purpose, attachment, accomplishment, and social belonging seemed 
rather reasonable to me in light of such experiences. The way that “happiness” 
could arise within such efforts took a bit longer to sink in. 
As far as my own embodied understanding of possibilities of a “happiness” 
born of, and interlaced with, collective work was concerned, it was not until the 
summer of 2005, when I spent the better part of my visit helping the men in my 
village reconstruct a community meeting house (p’eebaay), that I came to un-
derstand the possibility of happiness arising in the midst of backbreaking labor. 
Particularly salient to me at the time was the fact that the activity of working 
itself seemed to play a role in mollifying building tensions in the village. These 
had arisen in the wake of a heated meeting that had occurred a few days prior 
wherein the chiefs had vocally chastised some villagers for failing to show up 
regularly to help out with village work. This concern was voiced, as Tamag’s had 
been, in the register of a selfish striving for “happiness” on the part of those who 
had been absent. I reflected on the experience in my fieldnotes in the following 
terms,
As far as I could tell, there was no discernible tension and the work continued 
with the same vigor as it had the previous days. In fact, I would say that this 
was the first time that I really understood from a firsthand perspective how the 
power of collective work, effort, and exertion could foster a sense of connected-
ness within the community. At the time this insight occurred to me, we were 
all working to pull the large carved mahogany trunks that are to be the main 
weight-bearing posts for the p’eebaay—posts that will hopefully last for the next 
thirty to forty years and that will have been put in place through the collective 
effort of all of the men of the village. As we pulled on ropes affixed to the end 
of the logs, we chanted in a call and response fashion, first Iy gamow! [“We to-
gether”], then Ke bowchuw!, [“A little more”]. Straining with all of our collective 
power, we managed to slowly move the logs, a few feet at a time, into position. 
Amidst grunts and groans were laughter and smiles. The feeling of sore, tighten-
ing, tiring, and later aching muscles was intermixed with feelings of happiness, 
amusement, and belonging. (August 11, 2005)
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Again the specific goal was not to experience falfalaen’ through work. Nor was 
“happiness” understood to be that which sediments social belonging in such 
contexts. Collective suffering and pain were instead thought to be at the root of 
such forms of social intimacy. While not deemed to be a specific goal or out-
come of collective effortful work, “happiness” remained, however, a possibility 
as an aspect, layering, or lamination of it. In this way, falfalaen’ is part of a more 
complex attunement that also includes horizons established in and through 
suffering-for and -with others. 
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have tried to make the case that “happiness” should not be 
understood strictly as either a generalized capacity for flourishing or as an in-
teriorized state. It is instead a form of intermediary experience: an existential 
orientation that brings into being certain possibilities for articulating relations 
between self, other, and world. If we are to think of happiness as a felicitous 
mode of attunement, attachment, and attention that configures the contours of 
the horizons of our experience, then it might well be true that there are aspects 
of happiness that mark it as an existential possibility of our shared human con-
dition. As such, happiness, like hope or empathy, might evidence an existential 
structure that is somehow traceable across individuals, contexts, historical time 
periods, and cultures. That happiness may manifest in the intensity and contex-
tual specificity of an emotion or may diffusely permeate one’s perspective on the 
world in the form of an intermediary experience like a mood seems to suggest, 
however, that whatever its existential structure might entail, happiness is not, 
and can never be, a singular or static phenomenon. Furthermore, the complexity 
of happiness may be amplified by its combinatorial laminations with other af-
fective and embodied forms. Even in its “purer” realizations, however, happiness 
is always a dynamic affective formation that shifts, intensifies, diminishes, and 
transmutes through time. While it seems clear that the contents or objects made 
relevant by happiness may also vary from one individual to the next and one 
community or historical period to another, the experiential horizons defined 
by happiness may further differ, and be differently valued, in significant ways 
(see Walker and Kavedžija, this collection). For instance, while the precarious-
ness of happiness might in one context give rise to a generative opening up of 
possibilities, in yet another it may be deemed to foreclose them. 
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In the case of Yapese communities, orientations to “happiness” are ambiva-
lent. In the lives of the people I got to know best, it was certainly true that sub-
tle, often unmarked and unremarkable, felicitous moods arose in the context of 
everyday moments of being together, talking, or eating with family and friends. 
It was also true that experiences that might be recognized as “happiness” fur-
ther arose, in somewhat more complex ways, in the context of effortful striving 
to collectively endure the pain and suffering associated with community work 
obligations. And yet, in the Yapese context, “happiness” is still largely under-
stood to be an experience that narrowly focuses attention to the self ’s cares and 
concerns, in the process making less prominent the struggles and suffering of 
others. 
The experience of suffering-for others, in contrast, is taken to define a rather 
different horizon of experience in which there is a distinct foregrounding of 
attunements to past suffering, compassion for present suffering, and effortful 
work to better one’s family’s and one’s community’s wellbeing in the future. As 
such, we can understand “happiness” in the context of this particular configura-
tion to be a mode of attunement, attachment, and attention that narrowly de-
fines horizons, in the process excluding others, object, events, and acts from the 
self ’s purview. The trouble with ”happiness,” in this account, is that it takes our 
attention away from the unhappiness of others (including spirits), the unhap-
piness of previous generations, and the precariousness of our own happiness, 
which is in the end always fleeting and fragile. 
As is evident in the case of Ahmed’s and Berlant’s writings, local framings 
are not the only accounts that trouble the horizons established by happiness. 
For Ahmed, happiness is characterized as entailing normative assumptions and 
values that take our attention away from the unhappiness of others. For Berlant, 
happiness is an affective modulation of optimistic attachment that may in fact 
be considered cruel to the extent that its very pursuit directly limits possibilities 
for its actual attainment. Even the most expansive forms of happiness may have 
thus a constrictive, and perhaps cruel, side.
To conclude, I think it is worth reflecting briefly again on one of the more 
compelling arguments made by Ahmed in her efforts to return to the original 
meaning of happiness, a meaning that foregrounds the “hap” or happenstance 
of happiness. This is a meaning that arguably shifts us away from the narrow 
horizons that conventionalized forms of happiness define. When the contin-
gency and precariousness of happiness are foregrounded, Ahmed argues, we 
open a place for possibility, singularity, and difference to arise in the ways that 
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happiness is articulated for ourselves and for those others who may or may not 
share our particular horizons of experience. While contingent, such forms of 
happiness may thus be more expansive than those realized within the param-
eters of normative visions of the good life. Such an orientation to the “hap” of 
happiness arguably opens a space to come into contact with ways of being that 
are not simply replications of our own normative understandings of what hap-
piness entails. It is also an orientation to happiness that does not occlude the 
realities and possibilities of unhappiness. And yet, while a contingent under-
standing of happiness resonates well with Yapese framings, the putative virtues 
of the horizons provided by it do not. 
Happiness is not alone in evoking such possibilities, however. As Emmanuel 
Levinas (1998) argues, suffering may also open and not foreclose our own pos-
sibilities for being, being with others, and being morally attuned. According 
to Levinas, in the presence of another’s suffering, suffering that is not and can 
never be my own, there is a recurrent refusal of my attempts to domesticate 
another’s pain to the self-sameness of my being. The suffering in the other, and 
the suffering that arises in me as the suffering of compassion for the other’s suf-
fering, are foundationally incommensurate experiences that are yet articulated 
through the call to responsibility that they each evoke. 
Meaningful suffering-for another in the form of compassion results from our 
experiencing the asymmetry evidenced so forcefully, so palpably, in the face of 
the other’s pain. In confronting the stark impenetrability of pain, the integrity 
of another being is revealed against the intimate backdrop of our own self-
experience. It is in this primordial orientation “for-the-other” as suffering other 
and not as an object or thing—that is, as a living being and not a thing to be 
used—that there exists an ethical obligation, Levinas argues, “prior to the state-
ments of propositions, communicative information and narrative” (ibid.: 166). 
Such an understanding of the moral worth of suffering resonates with a number 
of Yapese sensibilities and assumptions.
Some forms of suffering, like some forms of happiness, it seems, hold exis-
tential possibilities for opening up orientations to alternate ways of being. The 
problem remaining to be understood, however, is whether or not the possibili-
ties for being revealed within the horizons of the “hap” of happiness and the 
unassumability of suffering disclose commensurate excesses and singularities, 
or if instead, as I suspect, each in its own way defines a distinctive horizon of 
experience that opens upon a unique region of being. 
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chapter two
Being careful what you wish for
The case of happiness in China
Charles Stafford
Let me start by drawing a contrast between happiness as a motive (something 
I want) and happiness as an outcome (something I get). I may be motivated to 
do certain things—for example, buy chocolates or ask someone out on a date—
because I believe or hope that these actions will lead to me being happy in some 
sense; but whether I really will be happy as a result of them is another matter, 
of course. I could accidentally buy what for me is the wrong kind of chocolate, 
the kind with pieces of orange in it, in which case I will be disappointed. As for 
asking someone on a date: even if things go well—that is, it’s not that I end up 
on the wrong kind of date—the experience may not bring me the happiness I 
had hoped for. The former case is about life going wrong. The latter (and per-
haps more interesting) case is about life going right but still failing to live up to 
expectations. 
This possible disconnect between what we aim for and what we get—emo-
tionally speaking—has been the focus of sustained research by psychologists, 
economists, and others in recent years. The findings suggest, in brief, that our 
“affective forecasting” skills are very imperfect (see, e.g., Wilson and Gilbert 
2005; Gilbert and Wilson 2009). We tend to overestimate the extent to which 
supposedly wonderful life events will make us happy and the extent to which 
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supposedly catastrophic life events will make us unhappy; the same holds true, 
it seems, for more everyday kinds of good and bad experiences. There are dif-
ferent explanations for this phenomenon, including the fact that people do not 
generally know much about things they have not yet lived through. Moreover, 
cognitive biases may lead them to focus on particular aspects of (prospective) 
experiences while downplaying others: for example, to focus on how much their 
friends will admire a new pair of shoes while ignoring what it will feel like to 
wear them.1 
Such findings, whatever else they may do, raise interesting questions about 
the psychological foundations of classic utilitarianism and thus of standard eco-
nomics. It may be rational for us to pursue happiness or more generally what-
ever it is that we want —“utility”—through the means we have. But what if our 
predictions of what will make us happy (or more generally satisfied) are unreli-
able? In that case, the risk is that our actions will misfire: we may well end up 
with things—including emotions—we were not actually wishing for. 
One especially consequential version of this forecasting problem relates to 
the pursuit of wealth. When the developed Western economies in the post-
World War II era are taken as an example, there is some truly striking evidence, 
assuming one accepts it. Per capita income has gone up dramatically, leading 
to sharp improvements in living standards. It seems, however, that people are 
no happier on average than they were back in the 1950s (for an overview, see 
Layard 2005). Why, one might ask, have they worked so hard to get rich if 
the end result is no more happiness than they had when they started? Richard 
Easterlin suggests that, among other things, they fail to grasp how short-lived 
the psychological benefits of extra wealth will be and thus “allocate an excessive 
amount of time” to trying to get it (2003: 11176; see also Easterlin 2001). They 
would be better off following the advice of Richard Layard, an economist who 
embraces a version of old-school utilitarianism. Summing up the evidence, he 
concludes that happiness/wellbeing is a function not of wealth per se but of 
having strong and stable families; solid communities and friendships; secure 
employment and income; good health; personal freedoms (including hold-
ing significant rights vis-à-vis government); and religious beliefs, or at least a 
1. For an accessible introduction to the psychology of happiness, see Gilbert 2007. A 
very thought-provoking commentary on some of the analytical and methodological 
issues surrounding research by psychologists and economists on happiness can be 
found in Kahneman 2011: 375–407. 
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guiding system of personal morality.2 He argues that we should allocate collec-
tive time/energy/public funds to sorting out such matters rather than increasing 
GDP. Indeed, as noted in the introduction as well as other contributions to this 
collection, policies along these lines have gained significant traction in places 
as diverse as Bhutan and the United Kingdom (see Cook’s article for a detailed 
discussion of the latter case). 
* * *
And yet most anthropologists reading this snapshot of interdisciplinary work 
on happiness are likely to have serious reservations about it, and not without 
reason (again, see the introduction, as well as the article by Freeman; see also 
the recent commentaries in Barbara Rose Johnston et al. 2012). Aside from the 
challenge of defining and measuring “happiness” in a way that will work across 
cultures— good luck with that—anthropologists will surely object to the idea 
that happiness can be assumed to be the priority for humans everywhere that 
it was for Jeremy Bentham. As the arch anti-utilitarian Marshall Sahlins once 
remarked, “A people”—by which he means irrational Westerners, and especially 
irrational Americans—“who conceive life to be the pursuit of happiness must 
be chronically unhappy” (2002: 17). His broader point is that desires, the things 
we are motivated to aim for in the first place, are always culturally and histori-
cally constituted. 
Take the case of happiness in rural China and Taiwan. In fact, the people 
I have met there during fieldwork do indeed seem highly motivated to pursue 
happiness, pleasure, and wellbeing, and there are many Chinese terms, notions, 
folk sayings, and practices that relate explicitly to happiness in one form or 
another.3 Chinese weddings, for example, are redundantly organized around the 
2. Framing this in quantitative terms, Layard suggests that six variables “can explain 
80% of the variation in happiness” between the fifty countries in the World Values 
Survey in four different years: the divorce rate, the unemployment rate, the level 
of trust, the rate of membership in non-religious organizations, the quality of the 
government, and the fraction of people “believing in God” (2005: 70–71). 
3. Note that I have never started fieldwork with the specific aim of studying happiness 
or wellbeing, per se, nor have I asked my informants to speak directly to the question 
of happiness. Nevertheless, more general questions related to life aspirations, 
wellbeing, and personal fulfillment have been central to all of my fieldwork projects, 
as a result of which I have collected a good deal of data about what actually makes 
people happy/satisfied, what they appear to enjoy in the course of life, and (to frame 
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ideal of “double happiness” (shuangxi) and the “sweetness” (tianmi) that should 
accompany a “joyous event” (xishi) of this kind. Nowadays a whole industry 
surrounds this. And yet, in traditional Chinese weddings, a lack of joy was also 
meant to be part of the proceedings. As Throop (this collection) says of Yap, 
the idea that suffering and unhappiness, in certain circumstances, are especially 
virtuous is one that has a definite traction in China. Chinese brides (being filial 
daughters) were expected to be at least superficially miserable about separation 
from their natal kin via marriage, and thus to sit grim-faced through the ac-
companying rituals. In some parts of China, they even sang wedding laments in 
which their marriages were portrayed as a kind of death (Blake 1978; Johnson 
2003). Speaking more broadly, the primary focus of weddings (and of the mar-
riages they ritually instituted) was not the happiness or other emotional state of 
the bride—nor, for that matter, that of the groom. As Freedman explains, “The 
chief parties to a [traditional] marriage [were] the most senior direct agnatic 
ascendants of the boy and the girl [to be married]” (1979: 263). For these elders, 
the emphasis was on sorting out a new affinal connection, one that would ben-
efit all concerned. In short, marriage sealed a relationship between families, not 
individuals, and responsibilities to elders and ancestors lay at its core. This does 
not mean that happiness was a matter of indifference; but nobody imagined that 
the emotional fulfillment of the bride and groom was what it was all about—at 
least not in the traditional system. 
As is well known, however, the landscape of Chinese family life and kinship 
has changed in recent decades along with ideas concerning the emotions sur-
rounding it. The best account is provided by Yunxiang Yan, who documents an 
increased focus on “private life,” and more specifically on the emotional bond 
between wives and husbands. This is reflected, for example, in the creation of 
private spaces, such as separate bedrooms in rural homes, where intimacy and 
marital happiness can be nurtured (Yan 2003: 112–39). In short, people do now 
appear to care about the bride (and the groom) being happy. 
Much more could be said about all of this, but here I simply underline two 
relatively straightforward points, uncontroversial ones for anthropologists. Yes, 
one can say that the pursuit of happiness exists in China, but, first, many social/
things negatively) what it is that makes them notably unhappy, anxious, and so on. 
For an excellent (historically informed) discussion of Chinese happiness/pleasure, 
see Farquhar 2002. For recent discussions that seek to bring Chinese folk models 
of happiness/wellbeing into direct dialogue with quantitative research, see Ip 2011 
and 2013. 
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cultural particularities surround this, and these are bound to deeply shape the 
actual experience of happiness. Indeed, the general understanding of “being 
happy,” for Chinese people through history, must presumably have been closely 
linked (albeit often in complex and even paradoxical ways) to whatever one was 
meant to be doing with one’s life. As Sangren has shown, for example, in the 
traditional Chinese family/kinship system there was a particular cultural logic 
to the (constructed) desires of individual agents, for example as when daughters 
sought “recognition” from the parents who would inevitably send them away to 
another family; in this context, happiness for married-out daughters was surely 
hard work (Sangren 2003). Moreover, second, the social/cultural particularities 
of Chinese emotional life do not exist in a historical vacuum: some of the most 
important of them have been seriously transformed in recent decades (again, as 
shown by Yan). 
Beyond these two points, however, I want to make a third one, and this takes 
me back to the question of affective forecasting. The examples I began this chap-
ter with are about me forecasting my emotions, and possibly getting it wrong. 
In the case of Chinese weddings, however, a great deal of attention is paid to 
what other people might feel if this or that thing were to happen. (Of course, I 
am not suggesting this is unique to China: that happiness is often conceived as 
relational, and that it routinely entails moral responsibilities, are among the key 
points made by the editors for this collection as a whole. Note that Gardner’s 
article, with its discussion of the relational and temporal aspects of migration 
trajectories between Bangladesh and the United Kingdom, is directly relevant 
to the points I am raising here.) Suppose, for example, that a young Chinese 
woman ends up marrying a particular man—not the one she would have cho-
sen herself. Her decision to do so and/or her acquiescence in it happening are 
likely to have been premised, at least in part, on affective forecasting. The elders 
around her may have told her what they thought and felt, or even just instructed 
her what to do. But she may also have let the unwanted marriage take place 
based on her own guess or assumption about what her parents will feel if prospec-
tive fiancé x (the one she likes) is chosen instead of prospective fiancé y (the one 
they prefer). Conversely, her mother and father may disapprove of a particular 
match for their daughter on the grounds that they expect it will not lead to her 
being happy in the long term, whatever she herself may think in advance of it. 
In such cases, to reiterate, affective forecasting—which, by definition, may be 
mistaken—is relational rather than being contained within individuals; more 
specifically, it is intergenerational. As soon as one frames the business in this 
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way, it becomes clear just how complicated it must be in practice, and thus how 
inadequate simple models of rational maximizing are for capturing real world 
decision making by socially embedded agents.4 For not only do we predict what 
people around us might feel about given outcomes; we also, in many cases, ex-
plicitly manipulate each other on the basis of such predictions. The parents who 
want their daughter to avoid a given outcome—an unhappy marriage to the 
good-looking but unreliable x—may try to persuade her directly to do what 
they want, or they may threaten her, or they may work behind her back to un-
dermine the love match. What they hope to achieve via these manipulations is 
a degree of intergenerational coordination: of attitudes, intentions, decisions, 
and actions. Simply put, they want her to want, or at to least to accept enough 
to act upon, what they want. And their own preferences for the future are based 
in part on their (reliable or unreliable) predictions of her future emotions. But 
what if they are wrong? 
* * *
Now let us return to the pursuit not of love but of wealth. As already noted, 
research broadly suggests that “money does not make people happy,” but the 
detailed findings are naturally more subtle than this. It turns out that—with 
some important qualifications—people of limited means are generally made 
happier by moving beyond the strains and uncertainties imposed by poverty. 
In this sense, someone who is poor and desires money as a route to happiness 
is not being irrational. What is surprising (assuming one accepts the premises 
and findings of the research) is the point at which the link between wealth and 
happiness begins to tail off. There is much discussion of this cut-off point; but 
summing up the state of the field back in 2005, Layard concluded that above 
about US$20,000 per year (to be more specific, once a country has achieved 
4. In this article I do not have space to engage fully with the psychological critique 
of standard economic modeling; for a very interesting cognitive anthropological 
contribution to this critique, see Quinn 1978. Note that Quinn’s point—an 
absolutely crucial one—is that the people she studied often use relatively simple 
heuristics to take decisions about economic life rather than engaging in probability 
calculations, and so on. Similarly, although I am noting here how “complicated” 
affective forecasting is in practice, it might also be argued that people often break 
through this complexity by using simple heuristics (e.g., for selecting husbands) 
that are readily available in their social environments. 
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this figure for annual income per head), “higher average income is no guarantee 
of greater happiness” (2005: 34). Obviously, in many places around the world, 
this would even today be considered a very high income; but in the United 
Kingdom, for instance, it is only slightly above the annual pay for someone on 
the national minimum wage. In other words, most people living in developed 
Western economies would, I think, find a happiness cut-off point of US$20,000 
surprisingly—even astonishingly—low. 
So how does this translate to the rural Chinese and Taiwanese cases that 
I know through fieldwork? Before turning to ethnography, a few things must 
be noted by way of background. The people I have met during fieldwork have 
almost all had relatively low incomes, not only by comparison with Western-
ers, but also by comparison with their urban compatriots. If the economists of 
happiness are broadly correct, then these people might reasonably anticipate 
some years of increased happiness, assuming their incomes continue to rise as 
they have (on average) done in recent decades.5 It is also important to stress 
that the pursuit of wealth is a highly salient topic of public discourse in both 
China and Taiwan—although the background to the two cases is different. In 
China, people are keenly aware that chasing money (and also power in various 
forms, because the two are closely interlinked) is a pervasive social fact at this 
particular historical moment and something that everyone must engage with in 
one form or another. Ordinary people routinely debate the moral and ethical 
implications of this reality (see, e.g., Zhang 2013). The situation in Taiwan is 
different. One could say that it too is a place where money chasing is pervasive; 
however, the “economic miracle” happened there some time back—basically, a 
generation or more ago. Nowadays, people in Taiwan are, if anything, anxious 
that the economy has stalled and may well stall further owing to a range of 
politico-economic factors beyond their control. Moreover, whereas Taiwan used 
to be a capitalist success story posed against the economic failings of China’s 
communism, the mainland’s “socialist market economy” now appears to be leav-
ing Taiwan in its wake. Folk discourses surrounding the pursuit of wealth have 
been heavily shaped by these historical considerations. 
The final point to note by way of background corresponds to what I have 
noted above with respect to marriage. Individuals in China/Taiwan may ponder 
5. As I note at the end of this article, however, recent findings about levels of Chinese 
happiness/wellbeing, and more broadly about happiness in developing economies, 
present a decidedly mixed, arguably “paradoxical,” picture in relation to this.
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what kinds of economic outcomes would bring them—as individuals—hap-
piness, wellbeing, and so on. But the ebb and flow of life is explicitly framed, 
much of the time, in relation to what other people think and feel. Crucial deci-
sions about education, career paths, investments, major purchases, and so on, 
are routinely taken collectively in some sense. And it should be noted here that 
collective family success or happiness may, of course, be invoked in ways that ul-
timately benefit some members of families over others (e.g., elder over younger 
generations, men over women), just as invoking “brotherhood” within lineages 
may benefit some lineage members over others (see Watson 1985). This links 
back to a general Chinese ethos in which individuals are presumed to be mor-
ally committed to, and prepared to work hard for, long-term projects of advanc-
ing family prosperity, regardless of short-term (or even long-term) personal cost 
(see Harrell 1985).6 But how durable is this commitment in practice? Is it trans-
mitted across generations without difficulty? Would it survive, for example, the 
kind of disillusionment that might come to younger generations as they learn 
that prosperity and material wealth do not (always) equate to happiness? And 
what if the affective forecasts on which long-term projects of advancement are 
based turn out to be mistaken? 
In considering such questions, I want to draw a broad contrast between two 
ideal types of families that I will label respectively as “progressive” and “declin-
ing.” By the former, I simply mean families that are optimistic when it comes 
to economic life, and more specifically optimistic that the quality of life for 
younger generations is going to keep improving. This gives individuals a psycho-
logical incentive to work hard—that is, because by working hard, and making 
short-term sacrifices, they assume that things can and will get better financially: 
that progress can be made. Moreover, they collectively want things to get bet-
ter because they assume or hope (at least at the level of the collective) that this 
will be a good thing—that is, that more wealth will, indeed, bring them a bet-
ter quality of life and—in general terms—more happiness overall. A declining 
6. In his thought-provoking discussion, Harrell accepts that in comparative terms 
Chinese people appear to work incredibly hard. This may relate to a “work ethic” 
into which they are socialized, as well as to the existence (under particular historical 
circumstances) of material incentives that encourage work. But Harrell concludes 
that basically “Chinese will work hard when they see possible long-term benefits, in 
terms of improved material conditions and/or security, for a group with which they 
identify” (1985: 217). When this is lacking, the reality is that they often don’t work 
that hard.
67BEING CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR
family, by contrast, is one that has to some extent given up on this desire to 
pursue wealth per se as a route to happiness, as I will elaborate below. 
* * *
So what does a progressive family actually look like? From my fieldwork over 
the years, I could cite many examples. For instance, there is the Chen family, 
who live in the rural Taiwanese town of South Bridge.7 The husband and wife 
at the head of this family grew up in relative poverty, and received basic levels of 
schooling. After marriage, they both worked hard at various jobs before eventu-
ally setting up their own small business in a market stall. They made a decent 
amount of money from this and lived frugally in the countryside. As a result, 
they were able to save, to invest, and eventually to provide their only son with a 
first-rate university education in law. At the time of my initial fieldwork, he was 
just starting out on his professional career. By Taiwanese standards, this family 
would not have counted as wealthy by any means, but things were getting better. 
And, I might add, they seemed very happy. Why? In terms of Layard’s happi-
ness criteria (cited above), the Chens appeared to be set: the marital/family 
relationships were solid, they had many friends, they had reasonably secure and 
nonstressful employment (which, moreover, they seemed to enjoy), their health 
was good, and they were religious. Furthermore, the narrative arc of their lives 
was basically an optimistic and, again, “progressive” one. Mrs. Chen’s health, 
which used to be problematic, had improved. They had always been religious, 
to some extent, but had become even more so, having found a cult to which 
they were deeply devoted and which (they said) brought them true peace of 
mind. They had an only son who was obedient and loyal, and whose advanc-
ing career they followed with pride. My sense is that their concern was not for 
him to succeed, as such: they wanted him to have a good life and to be happy, 
and assumed (i.e., predicted) that some degree of success was a prerequisite for 
this. Meanwhile, his assumption (i.e., prediction) was that his parents would be 
made happy if he were to succeed in school and work, and so he set about do-
ing so. His plan was to provide for them in the future even though, in fact, they 
7. See Stafford 2006 for a discussion of this family. For the sake of the privacy of my 
informants, personal and place names, and some other details, have been changed 
in this and all other illustrations. 
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almost certainly would not need any help. The Chens’ main aspiration for him, 
they told me, was that he would end up living nearby. 
This, then, looks like a family in which the intergenerational coordination 
of goals and intentions is smooth, and life is basically headed in a progressive 
direction. The parents, by means of steady work, have constructed a future for 
their son that they believe will be in his interests, and the son—also by means 
of steady work—seems determined to make his parents happy by not derailing 
their imagined future for him (and them). I should add, however, that when I 
met them there were a few cracks in this narrative. The son, although a good 
student, did not actually pass the examinations that would have allowed him 
entry to an especially lucrative career. Furthermore, he had shown no signs of 
getting married (something his parents considered essential for a good life), or 
even of thinking about it any time soon. During my fieldwork, there were some 
tense moments: at one point the son stormed off and left for a few days as a way 
of letting off steam. It could also be said that by praising and encouraging his 
educational successes, his parents had risked some of the negative consequences 
that can follow from this: that is, that their son would become burned out by 
the pressure (cf. Kipnis 2011), that he would move further and further away as 
he became more and more successful (cf. James Johnston 2013), and/or that 
schooling itself would effectively turn him into a different type of person than 
they themselves were (cf. Stafford 1995). More broadly, I would note that the 
Chens had a rather ambivalent relationship to the ideals of Taiwanese capi-
talism. When I met them, they were classic small entrepreneurs: they worked 
incredibly hard, appeared to enjoy making money, seldom spent much of it, and 
invested their savings carefully. But they prioritized spiritual fulfillment over 
material success, and had passed up opportunities to make more money—in-
cluding, in one case they described to me, out of ethical concern for the impact 
it would have on a fellow villager in a similar business (someone who was not 
a close friend). So although they certainly count as a progressive family in my 
terms, this does not mean that they were unthinkingly and/or unproblemati-
cally on the track of pursuing wealth as a route to happiness. 
To cite another example, consider the Zhangs from rural northeast China.8 
Like the Chens, Mr. and Mrs. Zhang (both of whom lost parents during 
childhood) grew up in relative poverty. As children and young adults living 
8. See Stafford 2007 for an extended discussion of this family. Again, personal and 
place names have been changed. 
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during the collectivist era of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, their lives were 
extremely difficult in many respects. Nor were they able to have any children 
of their own after they married. However, Mr. and Mrs. Zhang adopted a 
daughter, and this daughter eventually married a yanglaoxu—that is, a son-
in-law who formally agreed to look after the Zhangs in old age. (I know little 
about the background to this match, but bear in mind that it might not have 
been the adopted daughter’s first choice: as a matter of definition, a son-in-
law who will agree to care for his parents-in-law, as opposed to caring for 
his own parents, has a low status.) Neither the daughter nor the son-in-law 
were highly educated, but they were both working extremely hard when I met 
them, and in the context of China’s post-Mao economic boom they were do-
ing rather well for themselves as construction day-laborers in the nearest city. 
So the elder Zhangs had a hard-working daughter and her husband living in 
their home, plus two lovely grandchildren. The future was looking much better 
than the past, and everyone seemed committed to the collective goal of family 
improvement. 
Again, however, there are a few complications in the narrative arc. In com-
mon with many other young couples in modern China, the adopted daughter 
and her husband felt a tension between the need to provide for the elder Zhangs 
and the need to provide for their children. To frame this well-known problem in 
somewhat unfamiliar terms: Exactly whom did they want to make happy? Her 
parents, their children, or themselves? Generally speaking, they were investing 
in the future rather then repaying her adoptive parents for support received, 
thus leading to family tensions. The adopted daughter knew very well that she 
was not complying fully with what her elders wanted, and there was a constant 
negotiation around this. Meanwhile, the fact of their frantic work schedules 
meant that (in spite of working nearby) they were increasingly “leaving their 
children behind” in the countryside: a well-known phenomenon in contempo-
rary China. Was this a reasonable tradeoff: that is, pursuing wealth for the whole 
family’s future while—in effect—leaving the children in the village to be raised 
by others? Would this increase their happiness and wellbeing in the long term? 
Would it lead to the children having a happy/fulfilled life? Moreover, I would 
note that the elder Zhangs had a somewhat ambivalent relationship to the ide-
als of China’s socialist market economy, however much they may have encour-
aged their daughter and son-in-law to succeed in it. Mr. Zhang was a commit-
ted Communist and someone who was seriously troubled by the changes he saw 
around him as market forces intruded on rural life. In short, as with the Chen 
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family, the Zhangs were not just unthinkingly or unproblematically on the track 
of pursuing wealth as a route to happiness. 
And were they happy? In another article, I have discussed Mr. Zhang’s 
chronic insomnia and his general anxiety about life, which derives from a num-
ber of sources (Stafford 2007). Compared to the Chens from Taiwan, he and his 
wife have more concerns about money, their network of friends and relatives is 
more fragile, their health is worse, and (significantly in terms of Layard’s happi-
ness criteria) they are not actively religious. But Mr. Zhang would be the first to 
admit that his standard of living is much better now than it was in the past, and 
that he and his wife are fortunate to have ended up with such a hard-working 
daughter and son-in-law. I have even heard him, with the help of a small glass 
of strong northern baijiu, become rather at peace with his life, and make glow-
ing statements about the good friends, neighbors, and relatives on whom he 
relies—not to mention the Communist Party. 
Of course, the general emotional fulfillment (or otherwise) of the Chens 
from Taiwan and the Zhangs from China is not something that can easily be 
captured in routine ethnographic observations. Their “happiness,” to the extent 
they have it, must be a complex phenomenon: shaped not only by their under-
lying material circumstances but also by a long list of conflated variables, only 
a few of which I have mentioned. Moreover, their attempts to make money 
cannot be assumed to follow from an explicit theory that wealth will bring 
happiness. Notably, in many cultures/societies, including China, some people 
work hard because work itself is valued—that is, it is not just a way of produc-
ing things, or of increasing wealth for oneself or for others; it may also be its 
own kind of “good” (cf. Potter and Potter 1990: 180–95; Harris 2007).9 Also, 
as we might predict for families such as the Chens and the Zhangs, one of the 
most compelling motivations for intense economic activity is the possibility of 
slipping back into poverty. The elder Chens and Zhangs have an observable 
9. As Harris notes, work is conceived of differently in different times and places, 
and its value is not necessarily linked to material rewards. The conceptualization 
of work/labor may entail the “celebration of human energy, creativity, and [the] 
capacity to make and expand relationships through work”. For example, in the 
particular Andean case that Harris addresses in her paper, “work is sacralised, seen 
as an obligation, both because it is part of a continuous mutual nurturance between 
humans and deities, and because rights to land are articulated through collective 
work” (Harris 2007: 148). For their part, Potter and Potter (1990) stress the role of 
work as one of the most important ways of expressing emotion in Chinese culture.
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retrospective anxiety about their difficult pasts, something that modulates their 
optimism about the future. Whatever else they might want out of life (spiritual 
fulfillment, etc.), they certainly want security: both security of income, and the 
security of living in strong families and communities that will provide support 
when difficulties arise.10 But what I primarily want to draw attention to in these 
examples is the fact of familial optimism, and a preparedness to try to succeed, 
whatever may be the contributing factors to this. In particular, I am interested 
in the outlook of the second generation—that is, of the Chens’ son and the 
Zhangs’ adopted daughter—and in the apparent willingness of this generation 
to study and/or work incredibly hard in order to have, among other things, more 
wealth. And yet, of course, actually having more wealth might be disappointing 
in the end: that is, it might not bring these individuals and their families what 
they are hoping for, and in some cases it might even bring them some things 
they definitely do not want. 
* * *
In order to reflect on this possibility, I now turn to a different fieldwork setting, 
in southwest China near the Burmese border. From my research there in the 
community of Protected Mountain, I could provide examples of progressive 
families whose situations are not unlike those of the Zhangs or the Chens.11 
But what is especially interesting about Protected Mountain is its long narrative 
of economic rise and fall. Briefly, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, local people went to Burma as laborers, and not a few of them eventually 
accumulated wealth as traders. Many of the more successful “sojourners” later 
returned to Protected Mountain to build beautiful courtyard houses in which to 
retire. However, history soon intervened. The Japanese occupation dramatically 
interrupted the Burma trade routes, and after the Communist victory in the 
Chinese civil war, the border was eventually shut down altogether. After 1949, 
10. Interestingly, as incomes have gone up in rural China, so too has expenditure on 
the rituals of gift exchange and reciprocity, which, in effect, produce and sustain 
relatedness and networks of social support (Yan 1996; Stafford 2000). Although 
this expenditure on reciprocity could be interpreted as “consumption” (consisting 
as it does of expenditure on banqueting, gift giving, gambling, etc.), most ordinary 
people, in my experience, see it as akin to buying insurance: it is a protection against 
the effects of things going wrong in the future.
11. See Stafford 2004 for a discussion of two cases from this fieldsite. 
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the explicitly Confucian orientation of Protected Mountain created problems 
for local people, and during the Cultural Revolution the beautiful traditional 
detailing of many of the old houses and buildings was either destroyed or hid-
den behind mud. Today, things have improved. But there is still an air of decline 
about the place, a sense that things were better in the past than they will ever 
be again. 
Given the circumstances, the fall of the grand families of Protected Moun-
tain must be seen as a historical phenomenon, and as something brought by 
outside and largely uncontrollable forces: the Japanese occupation, the Chinese 
civil war, Maoist antitraditionalism, and so on. From this perspective, it’s not 
that the families (or the individuals in them) lost the will or motivation to work 
hard in an attempt to succeed and improve themselves, or that they lost faith in 
progress and the advantages of wealth; it’s more that they had the misfortune 
to exist at a particular historical moment when everything conspired against 
them—no matter how hard they tried. But the decline of such families is also, 
in some cases, portrayed as an internal phenomenon, and perhaps even as some-
thing that naturally happens to families once a certain degree of wealth has been 
achieved. This may, in turn, set up tensions inside families as hopes and aspira-
tions stop being coordinated across generations, for example as children become 
disenchanted with the actual state of living with plenty. 
In considering the phenomenon of “declining” families in Protected Moun-
tain, however, I need to draw attention to two variants, both of which can be 
found there. On the one hand, people who accumulate wealth may positively 
decide to turn their efforts to higher things, and perhaps give up the chase for 
money along the way. Note also that this might be coordinated across genera-
tions: for example, a father could decide, having made money, that his children 
deserve something better than mere money making, and he could push them 
away from it. This could, in turn, be based on his assumptions about what will 
give them a good life, and what will make them happy and/or fulfilled. In the 
case of Protected Mountain, which, as noted above, was explicitly Confucian 
in outlook, the higher things in question were primarily scholarly and artistic. 
Drawing on the tradition of valuing “learning” (xuewen) over commerce, some 
families—at least as they tell the story today—began to invest their wealth in 
education; to cite the Chinese idiom, they “attained Confucianism by way of do-
ing business” (you shang er ru). Obviously, a good deal more could be said about 
this phenomenon. Using the critical terminology of Pierre Bourdieu, one might 
say that these families grew to value the symbolic capital of learning more than 
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the merely economic capital of wealth—thus investing the latter in accumulating 
the former. And in some cases, as Bourdieu would predict, the accumulation of 
“culture” actually turned out to be a good basis for making yet more money in 
the future. This analytical framing partly echoes Veblen’s stinging critique of the 
“leisure class” in human history ([1899] 1984). In brief, he claims that not work-
ing, while applying oneself to noble but ultimately unproductive pursuits, is just 
another way of competing for status within society. Conspicuous consumption 
and conspicuous leisure—however nobly construed—are signs of unproductive 
decadence, and of the human desire to be seen to be better than others, regard-
less of the ultimate (personal or social) cost. 
Veblen notwithstanding, the turn toward culture was largely construed in 
positive terms by people in Protected Mountain, as I have already said. But 
there are also instances in which the lack of focus on wealth production was 
seen negatively—not as a moral renunciation of money chasing but rather as 
an immoral descent into laziness and/or decay. This, then, is the second variant 
of a declining family. To borrow the economists’ way of putting things, the sons 
and daughters of the rich (including those in Protected Mountain) sometimes 
decide to allocate more of their time to, for example, gambling and drinking 
and vice in general than to wealth production—perhaps in part because of their 
disillusionment with having had it. Or instead of pursuing proper Confucian 
learning, while upholding and enhancing family virtue, they might involve 
themselves in decadent artistic pursuits, or just do nothing at all. They may want 
to spend without earning, no matter what the consequences. Somewhere along 
the way, they seem to have lost the incentive—wherever it came from—to work 
hard for the sake of increasing family wealth. To frame this in relation to emo-
tion and affective forecasting: they have given up striving to get what other peo-
ple (e.g., their elders) want them to want, perhaps in the pursuit of what might 
seem (e.g., from the vantage point of their elders) selfish indulgence. 
But what does a declining family actually look like in contemporary China 
and Taiwan? In Shanghai, Taipei, and other cities, there is now conspicuous 
consumption on an industrial scale, of course, and the rise of a generation gap 
between apparently hedonistic young people and their elders. In the rural places 
where I have carried out fieldwork, such tendencies have not been so obvious, 
in part because the families I worked with were mostly living on relatively low 
incomes. But the tendencies do still exist, albeit in modified form, the key point 
being that these are generally cases not of wealthy families turning away from 
wealth but rather of ordinary rural families finding their progressive narrative 
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going off track. One common issue, for example, is the existence of problem 
gamblers or drinkers or drug takers, or those who end up spending more than 
they should on household goods or other things simply in order to show off. 
Predictably, hard-working elders are bitterly disappointed to find themselves 
with descendants who seem determined to destroy their progressive economic 
narrative. In some circumstances, this is bad enough to bring a family into se-
rious decline, as in the case of one younger couple I met during fieldwork in 
northeast China who were at risk of financial destruction thanks to the hus-
band’s gambling problem. Interestingly, his daughter, still a young child, had a 
progressive attitude—instilled through a combination of her mother’s influence 
and the influence of her schoolteachers—and she was harshly critical of her fa-
ther for the chronic gambling that was, in her view, harming her family. I do not 
have enough evidence to know for sure, but I would guess that his behavior was 
partly a function of bitterness and cynicism concerning his own life prospects: 
What hope was there that a poor guy from rural China would ever make seri-
ous money in such a corrupt system? His rejection of the chase after money, his 
descent into drinking and, in particular, gambling, was thus very different from 
that of elite Protected Mountain families who, in the past, decided to focus their 
time and energy on calligraphic skills. 
In any case, the kind of familial “decline” or “decadence” I have observed 
during fieldwork has more often been of a relatively low-key and subtle kind: 
that is, neither a turning to higher things nor a cynical rejection of life as it is. 
For example, the first family I lived with in rural Taiwan, the Lins, were among 
the wealthiest in the township (although, in Taiwanese terms, not unusually 
so). Mr. and Mrs. Lin lived with their three children in a large house facing the 
ocean, and spent more than most local people on food, entertainment, travel, 
and so on. Their wealth derived from hard—sometimes truly backbreaking—
work in construction. At the time of my fieldwork, however, I spotted a ten-
sion, diffuse but observable, between the outlook of the parents and that of 
the children. In brief, the children (still young at the time) were inclined to 
avoid schoolwork or chores wherever possible, and to be a little self-indulgent, 
for example to eat as many sweets as they could. The parents did not like, and 
wished to change, these attitudes, and so there were many fights about it being 
time to study, and so on. I also sometimes felt that I observed in the children 
a mild—and largely inchoate—contempt for their hard-working parents, who 
were so obviously of rural Taiwanese stock. The children, products of high-
quality “modern” schooling as much as of family life, spent most of their free 
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time watching television programs about urban elites and seemed on track to 
be more sophisticated and “advanced” than their own parents … and possibly 
also much less hard working. One irony about this, already alluded to above, 
is that the advancement/sophistication of these children—which is precisely 
what most parents aspire to for their offspring (and certainly it is what they 
help pay for)—is also something that arguably turns them into fundamentally 
different kinds of persons than their parents (Stafford 1995). It was hard to 
picture these Taiwanese children eventually working, as their parents some-
times did, in muddy construction sites day and night. Were they themselves 
aiming for higher things? Did their parents assume that by providing comforts 
to their children, of one kind or another, they would be making them happy? 
Notably, questions of these kinds could also be asked in relation to the Chens 
and the Zhangs, that is, in relation to the progressive families I have mentioned 
above. Might the Chens’ son become, via education, more interested in pursuing 
art than in pursuing law? Might that path somehow lead him to abandon his 
(generally) Confucian outlook, his willingness to work hard just to please his 
parents? Might the ambitiousness of the Zhangs’ daughter-in-law get the best 
of her, leading her to neglect the happiness not only of her adoptive parents but 
also of her own children? Through various experiences and interactions in the 
city, might she and her husband, at some point, lose their willingness to sacrifice 
so much for a common family purpose? 
* * *
At this stage, let me briefly recapitulate the discussion so far. Some economists 
and psychologists argue that, beyond a certain level of income, wealth does not 
make us happy. The difficulty is that we sometimes behave as if it will make 
us happy—a potentially disastrous case of affective mis-forecasting. Of course, 
there is significant variation in definitions and valuations of happiness across 
cultures, and in the case of China and Taiwan the significance of happiness 
(and of emotional life in general) has changed over time. Furthermore, when 
we look at examples of real Chinese and Taiwanese families, we are reminded 
not only that happiness is a complex psychological phenomenon, but also that 
the link between the willingness to work and the desire for wealth and/or 
happiness, as such, is not always obvious. One complication is that people are 
motivated not only by what they want but also often—and sometimes more 
importantly—by what the people around them want. In what I have called 
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progressive families (such as the Chens and the Zhangs), the second genera-
tion does seem very highly motivated to work in order to have an improved life. 
This may be partly, even largely, because they are responding to their own as-
sumptions/predictions about what will make older generations happy. And the 
older generations may be pushing them because of their assumptions/predic-
tions about what will make younger generations happy. I have drawn a contrast 
between this and the situation in declining families, where the younger genera-
tions appear to be losing—or even actively resisting—the motivation for work 
and, perhaps, the general belief in progress. There are different scenarios for 
this, but some such people may come across as lazy, or self-indulgent. In terms 
of China’s cultural tradition, they may also come across as strikingly individu-
alistic in orientation, that is, as focused on their own happiness, pleasure, or 
utility rather than on family goals and family progress. The affective forecasting 
they care about, one might say, is of the purely personal kind rather than being 
intergenerational. 
In his Malinowski Lecture for 2003, Yunxiang Yan explored this issue with 
reference to material from long-term fieldwork in Heilongjiang (Yan 2005). 
What he describes, however, is not a situation in which people are giving up on 
progress or rejecting material comfort. On the contrary, Yan describes a situa-
tion in which young people in the countryside appear to be chasing utility—
basically in the form of money and material goods—at all costs. Among other 
things, some of them attempt to extract maximum bridewealth from their elders 
for their own personal benefit. They justify this partly on pragmatic grounds, 
but also with reference to a rather dimly comprehended, and deeply utilitar-
ian, notion of “Western individualism.”12 This is not something that Yan finds 
it in himself to like, but he does clearly show some of the complex motivations 
behind the (individualistic and seemingly unfilial) actions of the young people 
he met during fieldwork. As he explains, they are motivated not just by a desire 
to be happy, but also by a growing sense that personal happiness and success is 
something they actually deserve. While this can be seen as selfish, some people 
in the local community do admire young women and men for the strength of 
12. Yan suggests that while Western individualism is normally assumed to centrally 
involve elements both of self-reliance and of duty to others, the version adopted 
by his informants in Heilongjiang is premised on a good deal of reliance on others 
(especially one’s parents and siblings), and very limited duties. 
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character they show in standing up to elders and extracting what they need, or 
think they need, in order to face the future (Yan 2005: 644). 
By contrast, who has a good word to say for the truly decadent? That is, 
who has a good word to say for young people who, unlike their parents, are not 
prepared to work hard in order to improve their standard of living? For those 
who turn their backs altogether on the idea of wealth or financial security as the 
ultimate value? It is worth noting, again, that “decadent” young people of this 
kind might, in fact, be possessed of a kind of worldly wisdom. That is, having 
grown up in relative affluence—or at least in the absence of poverty—some of 
them may no longer believe that having money, as such, is a guarantee of hap-
piness or fulfillment. Having observed the lives of the relatively affluent people 
around them, they may have decided that “progress” is not what they want or 
expect from their brief existences. What some would interpret as a lack of mo-
rality could therefore well be seen as a consistent (if arguably decadent, and 
potentially radical) ethical stance. 
Interestingly, this stance also has a scientific basis, if one believes the re-
cent findings of economists about happiness and wellbeing in post-Mao China. 
Here the evidence suggests that, “paradoxically,” the huge increase in wealth has 
not produced a growth in happiness—that is, in spite of the fact that the uplift 
from relatively low levels of income should normally have done so. (In other 
words, this is not a case of a rich country getting richer.) As Richard Easterlin 
and his colleagues succinctly put it: “There is no evidence of an increase in 
life satisfaction [in China] of the magnitude that might have been expected to 
result from the fourfold improvement in the level of per capita consumption 
that has occurred”—in fact, there is probably a decline in life satisfaction, some 
would say a very steep one (Easterlin et al. 2012: 9775; for background see also 
Easterlin 2008 and Easterlin et al. 2010). And why should this be? The most 
plausible explanation, it seems, is that in spite of rising incomes, people have 
been made unhappy by a rise in unemployment, by the dissolution of China’s 
(formerly strong) social safety net, by rising material aspirations (which, in ef-
fect, can never be satisfied), and by growing economic inequality (Easterlin et 
al. 2012; see also Brockmann et al. 2008). Note that although the case she dis-
cusses is radically different in many of its particulars, the article by Freeman 
on the Gamo people of Ethiopia (this collection) has definite resonances with 
the Chinese experience: for example, they seem to be made unhappy by rising 
inequality. Even for relatively poor people, then, it seems that money is not the 
route to happiness in all circumstances.
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* * *
Of course, the idea that “money does not make you happy” is an element in folk 
philosophies in many parts of the world, along with the notion that moral perils 
attach to economic activity in general (Parry and Bloch 1989). In contemporary 
China, one certainly encounters nostalgia for the Maoist era, when wealth was 
trumped by higher (collectivist) values, and a regret that today all of social life 
appears to have been reduced to a chase after money. However, this has to be set 
against the overwhelming evidence of what people actually prioritize in their 
own actions—that is, the pursuit of wealth—and the countervailing folk philos-
ophies which encourage them to do so. The proportion of people in China and 
Taiwan who truly opt out of chasing money, as things stand, is surely very small. 
One reason for this is that every individual is a locus of affective predictions 
(reliable or not); to seriously challenge such predictions, for example by adopt-
ing a life-course that loved ones see as doomed to failure, is not an easy task. 
The economist John Kenneth Galbraith, while not exactly extolling the 
virtues of decadence, as such, has put in a good word for idleness. As Veblen 
explained back in the late nineteenth century, idleness is sometimes simply an-
other “good” which is there to impress others—especially those who still have to 
work for a living. But in a book which interestingly prefigures the conclusions 
of Richard Layard, and written almost half a century earlier, Galbraith argues 
(with considerably less cynicism than Veblen) that the modern capitalist system 
is built to address problems which are simply no longer relevant for those of 
us living in developed, affluent societies (Galbraith [1958] 1999). Everything 
is still oriented toward the production of goods, whereas in fact the last thing 
we need in the affluent world is more material goods. Like Layard, Galbraith 
thinks that sorting out inequality, unhappiness, and so on, would be a nobler 
goal than increasing productivity and generating wealth.13 So why should we 
still find the failure to be productive so offensive? Why do we condemn it? As 
13. He says: “The Benthamite test of public policy was ‘what serves the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number’, and happiness was more or less implicitly 
identified with productivity. This is still the official test. In modern times, the test 
has not been very rigorously applied. We have somewhat sensed though we have 
not recognized the declining importance of goods. Yet even in its deteriorated form 
we cling to this criterion. It is so much simpler than to substitute the other tests—
compassion, individual happiness and well-being, the minimization of community 
or other social tensions—which now become relevant” (ibid.: 214).
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he observes: “The idle man may still be an enemy of himself. But it is hard to say 
that the loss of his effort is damaging to society” (ibid.: 215). An argument of 
this kind, not to mention a fully fledged defense of decadence, will probably not 
find much purchase in the China of today, nor in Taiwan. But as these societies 
become increasingly affluent, it seems inevitable that more and more people will 
find themselves working hard in the pursuit of money that is not, in fact, mak-
ing them any happier. At least a few of them are bound to catch on. 
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The good life in balance
Insights from aging Japan
Iza Kavedžija
Seeking respite from the sweltering summer heat, a small crowd of elderly peo-
ple gathered in the Shimoichi salon, a small, warmly lit space nestled away in 
a busy, old-fashioned shopping arcade in downtown South Osaka. Oku-san, a 
wiry man in his late seventies and a gleeful storyteller, ordered a cup of black 
coffee and launched into a tirade. “I’m used to him leaving the aircon on even 
when he leaves the house, but this time he left the fridge door open! I wish my 
grandson would just return home to his mother, he’s such a nuisance. He leaves 
his things lying about and I have to do so much more shopping and cleaning 
when he’s around. . . . He even dries up my beer supply!” This last remark elic-
ited some mirthful laughter from the audience, but Oku-san continued: “My 
daughter thinks it’s easier if he lives closer to his university, and that it’s a help 
for me to have a young person around. She thought he’d give me a hand with 
housework, but I have more to do this way. I miss having my own space!” Two 
ladies in their late eighties nodded in understanding. Kondo-san, a calm, broad-
faced lady in her late seventies, agreed vigorously: “I live on my own, and it’s 
heaven (gokuraku)! I had many hard times in life and now I’m finally free, every-
thing is so easy, I don’t have to look after anybody.” She went on to explain that 
her son had invited her to live with him and his family in another prefecture 
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but that she didn’t get along with her daughter-in-law, who encouraged her to 
leave. So she moved in with her daughter, only to realize that to live harmoni-
ously with her daughter’s family, she had to be the one to adapt. In order not to 
be a burden she had to endure many things, all kinds of small annoyances. She 
eventually decided to make do on her own and now enjoys living independently, 
despite her limited means. Some of the other salon-goers voiced their agree-
ment with Kondo-san’s decision, and she cheerfully continued: “I really enjoy 
singing these days . . . since I’m “single” again my voice has become quite strong! 
I love choir practice.” On many other occasions, Kondo-san would describe the 
joys of growing vegetables in rows of pots lined up alongside her house in the 
narrow street she lives in. She was known in the neighborhood as the “vegetable 
expert” and she divided her time evenly between her quiet pottering, weeding 
and watering in her improvised urban garden, and socializing in the Shimoichi 
salon, exchanging stories and news with others in the cheerful and sometimes 
raucous atmosphere that Japanese people so often associate with Osaka.
In contrast to the stereotype of the elderly as dependent and frail, many of 
the older Japanese people I got to know during fieldwork frequently spoke of the 
sense of freedom they enjoyed in their later years, their enjoyment of hobbies, 
and the importance of self-cultivation. They were, on the whole, a calm, content, 
and cheerful crowd.1 That said, they rarely spoke directly of “happiness”; stating 
such things about oneself could be perceived as bragging, and it is customary 
in Japan to represent oneself and one’s associates in a modest, self-deprecatory 
manner. Indeed, if asked directly whether they were happy, or even contented, 
many would have been reluctant to say that they were. Nevertheless, in their 
daily conversations among themselves, they often expressed gratitude for what 
they have, or for what others have done for them, or their joy for certain events, 
and their deep appreciation of positive, interesting, or beautiful objects or mo-
ments. They stated their contentment or dissatisfaction in a variety of ways, 
and by following their interactions and daily behaviors, and later discussing my 
1. Overall, the salon-goers were mostly in their seventies or eighties with some in their 
early nineties. While far from affluent (many were receiving modest state pensions), 
most owned their own houses, in which they typically lived alone. I deliberately 
chose to focus my research on relatively healthy older people who lived in their own 
homes in an urban context, since most previous studies were about the elderly in 
institutional settings (Hashimoto 1996; Wu 2004; Thang 2001), disembedded from 
their communities and many of their previous social relations, or alternatively set in 
rural Japan (Traphagan 2000, 2004).
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observations with them directly, I was able to discern certain a range of issues 
that were considered to be of some importance in relation to leading a good 
life, or living well and finding contentment in everyday life. As a group, they 
especially enjoyed telling stories, both as a social activity and as a way to make 
sense of events in their lives. At the same time, they valued quiet moments of 
contemplation in everyday activities, like Kondo-san with her vegetables. While 
they strived for warm social relationships, they attempted to avoid burdening 
others with their worries or imposing obligations.
These efforts to maintain a meaningful and contented existence, as I hope 
to show in this article, led them to strive to hold a number of factors in bal-
ance, to negotiate a tension between autonomy and dependence, as well as be-
tween isolation and burdensome social relationships. On a broader level, they 
strove to navigate a tension between two contrastive orientations or modes of 
being in the world: one involving meaning-making activities connecting the 
past with the present, and pointing to desirable futures; and another focused 
on the experience and appreciation of the present moment. In tracing through 
these balances, this article approaches happiness, in the sense of life satisfaction 
and a sense of purpose, as it is envisaged and crafted through practice—includ-
ing narrative practice—among this group of older Japanese. To be clear, I have 
not sought to approach happiness through direct questioning or self-reporting. 
While my interlocutors seemed generally quite content with their lives, finding 
much pleasure and enjoyment in the everyday, the question of “how happy they 
are” was never a central concern. Of greater interest was how they envisaged 
what it meant to live well, to be happy, and the efforts they made to lead a life 
they found both pleasant and satisfying.
LIVING WELL IN JAPAN: BALANCING ACTS
In Japan, the literature on happiness is abundant.2 The shelves of bookshops 
are populated by a range of popular titles, such as The mechanism of happiness 
(Maeno 2013), by a neuroscientist and robotics expert who argues that hap-
piness can be “controlled” and who proposes four “factors’ of happiness” (“let’s 
give it a go,” “thank you,” “things will turn out somehow,” “true to yourself ”); 
2. A comprehensive analysis of this extensive literature is well beyond the scope of the 
present article, though it would comprise a very valuable study in its own right.
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Five things you need to know about happiness (Hakunetsu Kyōshitsu 2014), based 
on a popular program aired on the national television network NHK, entitled 
Happiness studies; and “Happiness treatise” for businessmen (Egami 2015), to men-
tion but a few—along with a wide range of books by foreign authors. In addi-
tion to these more practically oriented, “self-help”-style books, there are also 
numerous scholarly writings by sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, 
some of which are also read widely.3 Some of these have a critical orientation: 
for example, philosopher Gen Kida (2001) analyzes the reasons for the appar-
ent lack of interest in happiness in historic Japan, as evidenced by the lack of 
explicit terms. Happiness (kōfuku4), he argues, denotes the state of mind of an 
individual, and increased interest in it reveals an egotistical tendency in society 
(see also Coulmas 2008).
Two of the most common terms for expressing happiness in Japan are shia-
wase, which might be translated as “happiness, good fortune, blessing,” and ure-
shii, “happy, glad, pleased.” Thus one of my elderly interlocutors explained to me 
that she joined a sports club after turning fifty, and as a consequence became 
much more active and outgoing, expanding her social circle. “You know, as I 
told you, I was already over fifty when I joined the sports club. I made many 
friends and become more outgoing. Now I’m really happy” (honto ni shiawase). 
Nevertheless, most of my friends were not inclined to describe themselves or 
their own lives (or the lives of those close to them) as shiawase; doing so would 
be considered immodest. The term was perhaps more commonly used in the 
context of advice, or in the form of an endorsement: for example, a kind, ninety-
year-old lady who came to know me well after many months of meetings, con-
cluded her life story with something she really wanted me to know: “In life, if 
you look after your husband’s parents, you will be most happy (jinsei tte, shujinno 
oya daiji shitara ne, ichiban shiawase ni ikimasu). Then your children will follow 
suit and you will live well. Yes, if you live like a good couple and look after his 
parents, always kindly and with care, then the children will turn out well.” Here 
as in many other accounts I was given, happiness (shiawase) is closely related 
3. While my interlocutors did not read such books, they were not entirely unaffected 
by these larger discourses, most notably those involving the term ikigai, referring 
to purpose in life, or “that what makes life worth living” (Mathews 1996). For a 
detailed discussion of discourses of ikigai, including their role in these peoples’ lives, 
see Kavedžija (2013).
4. This abstract notion of happiness as kōfuku, used mostly in writing, overlaps with 
well-being and to that extent it is close to the Western concept.
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to care and to close, warm relationships with others. It is to be found in the 
hope that one will be cared for, as much as in the very process of caring for oth-
ers. The term ureshii5 was used rather more frequently, and it often punctuated 
everyday communications, including emails or text messages: “I was happy to 
receive your postcard, thank you”; “If you could stay a bit longer we would be 
glad”; “I was pleased you came to visit.” In fact, when young children visited the 
salon on several occasions some of the older ladies remarked how glad (ureshii) 
they were: “How good of you to come, yo’u kite kurehatta ne.” As these examples 
suggest, ureshii also has a strong social and relational component but was often 
used to convey a happy feeling arising from something done for you by another, 
thus expressing a sense of gratitude.
Despite the relative affluence and stability of Japanese society, reported lev-
els of happiness appear to be rather low (see, for example, Diener, Diener, and 
Diener 1995). How should we interpret this? The Japanese case suggests that 
one can be relatively healthy and materially well off, with reasonably good so-
cial relationships, and yet nevertheless feel something is missing in one’s life. 
For this reason, as Gordon Mathews (2009: 167–68) suggests, a study of well-
being must also focus on sources of meaning in life. Some explanations of this 
discrepancy of results and predictions focus on terminology and the process of 
self-reporting, pointing out that Japanese may find it inappropriate to describe 
themselves as particularly happy, or in any way above average and thus differ-
ent from the majority. Nevertheless, not all studies have relied on self-reporting 
(Kan, Karasawa, and Kitayama 2009), and yet they have come up with similar 
results. Chiemi Kan and colleagues acknowledge that some of this may be a con-
sequence of a constraining social structure, but choose to focus on the cultural 
conceptualizations of happiness used as a basis for the measurement. They argue 
that the conceptualizations that had been used may be biased and overly nar-
row, focusing mainly on personal achievement and positive feelings and assum-
ing that happiness is itself evaluated positively. They show that Japanese people 
rate much higher in surveys based on a more holistic and culturally appropriate 
5. These two terms, shiawase and ureshii, have some similarities but they are not 
interchangeable, as the examples above indicate. Ureshii seems to more often to 
indicate something immediate, while shiawase(na) can have a more evaluative 
dimension, as in “shiawase na jinsei”—a happy life. Another term, koufuku, written 
with characters kō (lucky) and fuku (fortune, good luck), is more formal and more 
frequently used in written language and denotes contentedness. For a discussion of 
other relevant terms and historical changes in meaning see Coulmas (2008: 11).
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conceptualization of happiness, and argue that happiness in Japan can often be 
seen as transient, and the social world as fluid (a place where much depends on 
others and not just on one’s own actions and achievements). Feelings that result 
from successfully removing oneself for a while from the flow of social life, or 
associated with a sense of distance or dissociation—such as peacefulness and 
calm—are therefore an important aspect of wellbeing in Japan, as well as some 
other Eastern cultures (Kan, Karasawa, and Kitayama 2009).
Similarly, Yukiko Uchida and Shigehiro Kitayama6 (2009) suggest that in 
contrast to American conceptions of happiness as an enduring positive state 
frequently associated with excitement (or high arousal) and personal achieve-
ment, in Japan attitudes that might be seen as negative in some ways (for in-
stance, avoiding or withdrawing from reality) and low arousal positive states 
(such as calmness) were deemed to be relevant aspects of happiness (Uchida and 
Ogihara 2012: 395). In short, their research indicates that Japanese conceptu-
alizations of happiness not only are less focused on independence and personal 
achievement than some of the Western equivalents but are also less focused on 
positive attitudes and often include both poles of an emotion. For example, they 
may include social support as contributing to a sense of well-being, while calm 
and quiet relaxation without the pressures of the social world remain equally 
important. While methodologically and conceptually quite distinct from eth-
nographic research, these findings resonated with some of my own observa-
tions in the field. These conceptualizations of happiness specific to Japanese, 
and perhaps other East Asian contexts described by psychologists as “holistic,” 
can be seen as incorporating opposite poles of an emotion, or even, I would 
argue, seemingly opposed values. In this sense they can be described as a series 
of balances between opposites. In other words, the sense of happiness is derived 
from a series of balancing acts between extremes and different modes of being.
The tendency of my interlocutors to pay careful attention to achieving this 
balance is not one that is unique to the elderly, or in any way restricted to the 
Japanese context. As a way of describing and understanding the good life, it 
6. These authors also draw attention to the difference in emphasis on independence 
in individualistic societies, such as America, and social harmony and dependence 
in East Asian societies, such as Japan. In the latter, incorporation of the negative 
experiences into conceptualization of happiness has a social aspect to it, according 
to this viewpoint: for instance, one may feel happy and grateful for sympathy of 
others, which resulted from a negative experience that brought one misery and 
suffering (see Uchida and Kitayama 2009: 442).
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bears a certain resemblance to Aristotelian ethics, in which happiness is de-
fined in terms of virtuous activity, and every virtue is a middle state between 
conditions of deficiency and excess (Kraut 2012). A similar tension, and its 
relevance for well-being, is described by Michael Jackson: “well-being is .  .  . 
dependent on an adjustment or balance between our sense of what we owe 
others and what we owe ourselves” ( Jackson 2011: 195). While the Kuranko of 
Sierra Leone with whom Jackson worked place their demands on others loudly 
and explicitly, in contrast to the more formalized interactions and internalized 
expectations experienced by the inhabitants of Shimoichi, they share the con-
cern with finding a difficult yet valuable balance. I would like to suggest that 
formulating the elements of the good life in the form of tensions or priorities 
that need to be kept in balance allows for a certain degree of abstraction, which 
in turn facilitates comparison with other cultural contexts,7 as well as other life 
stages.
Among my older interlocutors these balancing acts included attempts at 
harmonizing rich social ties and avoiding over-closeness, including the burden 
that such close relationships can bring with them in the form of social obliga-
tions and complex gift exchanges. Similarly, a related balancing act regarding 
family ties—in which autonomy and freedom must be balanced against de-
pendence and reliance on others—emerged as central for older people I spoke 
with.8 In other words, the balances that are required for living well are those that 
embody the tensions between the values held in high regard by my interlocu-
tors. At the same time, happiness itself is seen as valued positively only to the 
extent that it encompasses both of these poles, and can otherwise be seen as a 
fleeting state, or an antisocial one. It can be argued, therefore, that happiness 
among older Japanese, in practice, is a matter of balancing particular social and 
moral values. These kinds of values, unlike exchange values, are not simply in-
terchangeable or commensurable, and their conflict cannot be resolved through 
simple choice, but only through moral judgment (Lambek 2008). In this sense, 
I argue, happiness is approached as a form of practical moral judgment.
7. Such an abstraction maintains a degree of nuance and at the same time may provide 
useful conceptual tools (if not quite hypotheses to be tested) to crosscultural 
psychologists, policy makers, and others concerned with happiness research.
8. A number of other balancing acts seemed relevant for the pursuit of the good life, 
including the navigation of a tension between fate and agency, or life choices and 
opportunism, though limitations of space preclude a fuller description here.
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HAPPINESS IN OLDER AGE
The relationship between happiness and age (or life course) has been the focus of 
much recent research by psychologists and economists. Some of the most widely 
reported studies in the media9 suggest that older people are on average happier 
than their younger, middle-aged counterparts. The data collected as a part of a 
large-scale 2008 Gallup survey, for example, examines how psychological well-
being varies with age in the United States (Stone et al. 2010), and suggests that 
older people generally tend to experience positive emotions (or positive affect) 
more frequently, and that their overall appraisals of their life tend to be more 
positive than those of younger people. The trend, as described by psychological 
researchers, seems to follow a much-discussed, U-shaped curve: a gradual de-
crease in levels of psychological well-being from early youth onward, followed 
by a movement upward from around the fifties and into the later years. Negative 
affect, or the prevalence of negative emotions such as stress, worry, and anger, 
seems to decrease with age (see, for example, Rossi and Rossi 1990; Mroczek 
and Kolarz 1998).
Based on my own experiences with older Japanese, one explanation for this 
tendency would be that older people tend to focus more on the things they 
consider worthwhile, and avoid situations that cause them discomfort. This is 
not always perceived as something positive, however, and in Japan one would 
sometimes hear it said that the elderly are “selfish” (wagamama). For example, 
Takahashi-san, a quiet, smiling lady in her mid-seventies who moved to Osaka 
some years before and had few friends in the area, told me how making friends 
when you are older can be difficult: “It’s easy to have acquaintances, but it’s hard 
to make close friendships (shitashii). Older people seek comfort and they with-
draw when they don’t feel like doing something.” Nevertheless, in many other 
situations, this attitude had positive consequences, as people tended to focus on 
those aspects of things that they perceived as good.10
9. For example, Carstensen (2011); The Economist (2010); Bakalar (2010).
10. Recent psychological research on older adults in the United States indicates that 
older people’s perception of time changes, and with realization that time is limited 
people tend to consider their priorities more carefully. They therefore focus more 
on positive emotions and things they consider to be worthwhile (Carstensen 
2006).
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SOCIALITY AND OVER-CLOSENESS
Shimoichi community salon,11 where I spent much of my fieldwork,12 is an in-
viting, warmly lit space in a small, refurbished townhouse located in an old 
shopping arcade. This arcade was once the vibrant center of Shimoichi, an old 
merchant neighborhood in downtown South Osaka, but was progressively 
overshadowed by large supermarkets and convenience stores. With a high pro-
portion of elderly residents, some of whom have lived in the area for several 
generations, the neighborhood was changing—small, wooden buildings in the 
inner streets were now surrounded by large high-rise apartment blocks lining 
the main arteries outlining the boundaries of the neighborhood. The salon was 
well known to most residents of the neighborhood, as it offered affordable tea 
and coffee and a space to meet others. It offered a range of activities such as 
weekly music sessions, weaving workshops, and monthly concerts with an aim 
of reaching out to the people in the neighborhood. Most of the daily visitors 
were older people, relatively healthy and independent, mostly living on their 
own or with their families.
For the most part, the older people who regularly stopped by the salon did 
not necessarily think of each other as close friends but they expressed concern 
for each other in various ways, by sharing information and checking up on their 
neighbors, albeit in a casual manner. For example, one afternoon in late March, 
Okuma-san came in for the first time in two weeks. Upon greeting everyone 
she apologized for her long absence and explained that she had been very busy 
over the cherry blossom viewing season. She had a couple of house guests, and 
complained how exhausted she was from all the cooking and serving of elabo-
rate, Japanese-style meals, though she’d also had a lot of fun, going to inter-
esting places while showing her guests around. Her explanation was listened 
11. This kind of community salon, resembling a café but often staffed by volunteers 
and offering a small selection of affordable hot drinks and sometimes activities or 
cultural events, can be found in many urban neighborhoods in Japan. Many of the 
salons are attended mostly by the elderly and are open only on designated days of 
the week. Shimoichi salon was run by a small not-for-profit organization (NPO) 
providing various support services for the elderly in the neighborhood, some of 
which created a small financial surplus used for the maintenance of the salon and 
its activities, which attracted not only older local residents but also a significant 
number of young families.
12. The fieldwork on which this article is based was conducted over the course of 
fourteen months in 2009, with follow-up visits in 2013.
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to attentively, and her story attracted the attention of most people gathered 
around the table. They were very happy to hear she was well, having grown a 
little worried about her, wondering whether she might have fallen ill. Kato-san 
had even walked to her place but was baffled at what to do, as Okuma-san lived 
in a massive apartment block (manshon) with hundreds of apartments and a se-
curely locked front door. She realized she couldn’t just knock and check on her, 
so she left. Okuma-san thanked her for her concern and took out a big box of 
biscuits from Nara, which she had brought as an omiyage (a present or souvenir) 
from the trip she’d made with her friends during their stay, and offered them to 
everyone.
Most of the salon-goers were concerned about the possibility of appear-
ing thoughtless and were very cautious in their dealings with others, paying 
particular attention not to burden them, for example, with unpleasant or overly 
intimate details of their lives, or with their worries, or by giving inappropriately 
large gifts that would then have to be reciprocated. Gift giving in Japan is a 
formalized affair, involving exchanges of set value on specific occasions, each 
meticulously accounted for and reciprocated (Rupp 2003). The kinds of gifts 
brought to the salon were small packages of food, which were shared and con-
sumed together, and not taken back home. Often these were in the form of omi-
yage (souvenirs) brought back from places people had traveled, or gifts people 
received from family or neighbors that they wanted to share, such as the small 
crate of mandarins that one lady received from her granddaughter, too much for 
her to eat on her own. This act of redistribution allowed for confirming social 
ties and provided an opportunity to tell a story about her granddaughter to the 
others in the salon, who praised the latter’s caring gesture.
In an attempt to minimize the burden on the salon-goers, the NPO staff and 
founders explicitly discouraged formal exchanges, stating firmly that, for exam-
ple, New Year gifts were unnecessary, and politely declined them, referring to 
such exchanges as “ki wo tsukau” (literally, “using one’s spirit”). Kuroki-san, one 
of the NPO staff, explained that this tendency to politely reciprocate probably 
contributed to the weakening of old-style neighborhood support networks. Now, 
both when offering and requesting help people are aware of the burden and they 
started feeling reticent and restrained (enryo). Such statements imply a realization 
that extending too much help and making formal gift exchanges places a burden 
of obligation on others, such that people became less inclined to ask for help.
The sentiment of not causing trouble (meiwaku) to others is a very wide-
spread one in Japan (on the train, for instance, reminders are issued to switch off 
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mobile phones lest one cause meiwaku to others). Many of my older interlocu-
tors were worried about becoming a burden on their children and causing them 
meiwaku if they became frail, so they were grateful for the introduction of the 
Long Term Care Insurance, on which they could rely to get help and support in 
their own homes. In the salon, while the visitors would sometimes share their 
worries, they were careful not to impose an overly heavy tone and often made 
light of their troubles, in an attempt not to burden others with their problems. 
In short, in order to create and maintain social ties and networks of support, 
people were cautious not to impose, balancing a tension between sociality and 
stifling social relationships, or between supportive friendly relationships and 
excessive closeness.
INTIMACY AND INDEPENDENCE
Many of my interlocutors mentioned that the “three-generational household”—
sharing a house with one’s children and grandchildren—was widely seen as an 
“ideal” way to live. Nevertheless, when it came to their own life choices, they 
were clear that this would not suit them in practice for one reason or another. 
Kondo-san and Oku-san were not alone in their preference for living on their 
own; perhaps around half of the salon-goers lived alone, and most of them 
spoke of their feeling of freedom and of their comfortable way of life. Such 
examples require us to rethink the link between coresidence and intimacy as 
represented in the ideal of the three-generational household. Although inti-
macy almost everywhere in the world, and perhaps especially in Japan, can be 
created through embodied practices such as sharing food or bathing together 
(Clark 2009),13 coresidence is a balancing act between familial involvement and 
private, individual comfort. According to Inge Daniels (2010: 47), happy homes 
are those that achieve both the intimacy and shared enjoyment of the family 
and satisfy the needs of the individual for peace and relaxation, for an escape 
from the outside world. This dynamic is further complicated by the fact that the 
well-being of individual family members also to a significant extent depends on 
the links with people outside the household, something that the ideal of a three-
generational household rarely takes into account. Many salon-goers mentioned 
13. Importantly, this kind of embodied intimacy achieved through communal bathing, 
for instance, is not connected to privacy (Daniels 2010: 47).
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ties to the area in which they lived as one of the main reasons for not wanting 
to move to their children’s house. Of course, in situations of tensions within the 
home or even just restricted space and conflicting daily routines of older and 
younger generations, this balance may be disturbed and the effort to maintain 
harmonious relationships can feel overwhelming. As noted earlier, Kondo-san 
found living with her daughter too difficult because she always had to adjust and 
keep out of everyone’s way; she eventually decided to move back to Osaka to live 
on her own, precisely in order to keep the relationship healthy. She enjoyed the 
company of her neighbors and felt that she could rely on her support networks 
in the area.
These examples illustrate a tension between intimacy (and dependence on 
others for various kinds of support, including emotional), and maintaining a 
degree of autonomy14 and a sense of freedom. These two were sometimes in 
tension but, as pointed out by my interlocutors, at times it was precisely by 
maintaining a degree of independence that warm, intimate relationships were 
thought to be preserved. In addition, older people in Shimoichi were intent on 
cultivating various sources of support—like Kikuchi-san, who had no children 
and made an effort to help out her friends whenever she could, in order to have 
more people she could rely in times of need. In this context, state resources 
(including the pension and Long-Term Care Insurance [LTCI], which covers 
care and home-help for everyone above the age of 65) were understood as one 
among many possible sources of support, alongside family and neighborhood 
relationships, including those established through the salon. On various occa-
sions people commented on the limited nature of these resources; a couple of 
ladies who attended a seminar for volunteers interested in giving older people 
in the neighborhood a hand, told me one cannot expect that one will be able to 
get all the support covered by the LTCI (especially in times when the increase 
in number of older people meant an increasing pressure on the limited funds). 
Similarly, one man who was reluctant to rely on his family as his only source 
of support, lest he become a burden on them, was looking for accommodation 
in a serviced apartment with some support funded by LTCI. In short, in order 
to lead a good life one needs to strike a balance between maintaining intimacy 
14. This tension, or more precisely its specific form, is likely to be a recent phenomenon. 
A historical analysis is, regrettably, beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion 
of living with others and independently in the Japanese context see also Suzuki 
(2013).
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and a degree of independence. Cultivating multiple sources of support, a varied 
“dependability” (Lebra 2004: 20), permits one to live independently, so to speak.
“DOING THINGS PROPERLY” AND SELF-CULTIVATION
While not strictly speaking a balancing act in itself, two tendencies seemed 
very important for my older friends in Shimoichi: self-cultivation, for instance 
by practicing an art form or dedicating oneself to a hobby; and “doing things 
properly,” with dedication and attention to detail. These tendencies are closely 
related to each other and provide important background for understanding 
the immediate orientation, which I describe further in the following section. 
Kondo-san cheerfully described to me her enjoyment in singing and her choir 
practice and, on another occasion, the sense of achievement she feels when her 
singing improves. This tendency to take up a new hobby and focus on develop-
ing a skill in later life is sometimes termed rokujū no tenarai, or “study in one’s 
sixties.” Another man in his late sixties told me about his own new hobbies and 
those of his friends: he started a drawing course and joined a choir, while his 
wife attended a hula dancing class with her friends, and his neighbor enjoyed 
photography classes. I eventually spoke to all of them, and they explained how 
they enjoyed group learning, as it gave them an opportunity to make new ac-
quaintances, beyond their work colleagues and neighbors. They explained that 
one’s sixties were the ideal time for studying something new, as one was finally 
free of many obligations, the children having grown up, and being retired one 
finally had more free time. They also spoke of their fear of becoming too de-
pendent on the routine that their work, care for the family, and housework 
provided, so learning something new was a way for them to move away from 
their earlier roles.
Some of my older interlocutors in Shimoichi rarely referred to pastimes 
as hobbies. Often in their seventies and eighties, they talked about them less 
in terms of pastimes and more in terms of practice, or the importance of be-
ing in the moment, or becoming immersed in the task (muchū ni naru). They 
emphasized the importance of dedication for doing things properly but also 
for feeling a sense of achievement, and relaxing by not thinking about any-
thing else. Pastimes and daily activities, whether artistic or mundane, were often 
guided by the principle of “doing things properly” (chanto suru), the way they 
should be done, not sloppily. While this principle may seem constraining in its 
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formality—especially in its more mundane forms, such as being mindful of the 
proper way of serving tea or coffee to customers—knowledge of the rules and 
mastery of the pleasing form of an action may bring genuine pleasure. Doing 
things properly need not be restricted to mastering new skills but when it is, it 
can further be linked to a notion of self-development, or self-cultivation.
This striving for self-development should nevertheless not be understood as 
a merely individualistic pursuit, aiming at one’s own pleasure. On the contrary, 
self-cultivation can be understood as equally important for the advancement 
of the community, and indeed may even be presented as an obligation to the 
group. For example, older people in Japan who are involved in various societies 
and groups in order to pursue their hobbies show the commitment to the group 
they belong to by being involved in projects of “self-development.” Further-
more, by cultivating themselves they show their commitment to the wider soci-
ety and their family, in an attempt to maintain vitality and avoiding becoming 
a burden (Traphagan 2004: 58). The very engagement in hobbies or pastimes 
indicates an individual’s focus on self-cultivation and discipline, which as such 
benefits the community, and which in the case of elderly people means showing 
an effort to maintain mental and physical health in order to avoid burdening 
the family and community (Traphagan 2004: 74). The well-being of group and 
individual are, therefore, conceived as closely linked through the idea of the 
“good person.”
“I DON’T NEED SUCH A THING”
Another important aspect of “study at sixty” is the age itself—while the phrase 
“study in one’s sixties” (rokujū no tenarai) certainly implies a sentiment that it is 
never too late to learn, the age of those who took up new hobbies and dedicated 
their time to self-development was indeed usually the sixties, and less often 
early seventies. Some people above this age explicitly expressed a lack of inter-
est in learning something new or taking up a hobby, dismissing it as fanciful or 
frivolous. This need not mean that this generation, many now in their nineties, 
has no interest in pastimes, but rather that they usually cultivate those they were 
already involved in, such as origami or growing vegetables. While they happily 
participated in singing classes organized in the salon, composed of singing tra-
ditional or old popular songs, several of the ladies in their nineties or late eight-
ies flatly refused invitations to participate in workshops that involved mastering 
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new skills, such as weaving. When one such lady, Kato-san, was presented with 
a leaflet advertising “fun classes” designed to improve mental ability, she just 
giggled and waved her hand saying she has no need of such things (sonna koto 
iranai ne). This was not simply because she thought of herself as sufficiently 
mentally agile but also because she felt no need to maintain her abilities for a 
future far ahead. In another conversation this sentiment was made even clearer. 
When one of the ladies in her late eighties expressed concern about her mem-
ory, noting the need to socialize and talk to other people as a form of mental 
practice, the reaction was positive and encouraging. Ikeda-san and other ladies 
in their eighties and nineties confirmed the importance of conversations and 
keeping active but they also agreed with Kato-san, who suggested that if you get 
to the age of ninety or thereabouts without becoming senile (boke), there was re-
ally no more reason for concern, as one is most likely to stay bright enough until 
the end of one’s life. In many ways, I think, this positive outlook seemed related 
to an attitude of appreciation and enjoyment of the moment. While the future 
is not necessarily foreclosed to older people, as it is nevertheless not available as 
a place where delayed gratification will occur.15 As such, they are led to focus on 
the present moment.
Many older salon-goers had clearly cultivated an attitude of quiet enjoy-
ment and contemplation of everyday things, such as preparing meals or growing 
vegetables. The sense of enjoyment to be derived from focused, immediate expe-
rience was reflected in the idea of “doing things properly,” something everyone 
clearly considered to be especially important. While the insistence that things 
should be done “the proper way” might be experienced by some as constraining, 
my hosts showed me how doing things according to a set of rules or customs 
can lead to sense of control and joy that comes from immersion in the activity. 
The pleasing feeling that stems from it, even when the activity in question is as 
mundane as preparing a small origami rubbish box for the coffee tables in the 
15. While the future does not always seem open in older age, as people approach 
the end of their lives it is not seen as entirely closed off either. The approaching 
death is not invariably seen as an end, and many older people dedicate some of 
their attention to cultivating links with the ancestors (see Traphagan 2000; 
Danely 2014), and even prepare for death by organizing “living funerals” (Kawano 
2004). Nevertheless, precisely because delayed gratification does not seem always 
available, the sense of one’s life as being set on a trajectory relieves one from some 
of the pressures and responsibilities of youth, as I discuss in more detail elsewhere 
(Kavedžija 2013).
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salon, or cutting spring onions for soup, can be a form of aesthetic enjoyment. 
This aesthetic disposition, which implies a tendency to observe beauty in eve-
ryday things and activities, is certainly not a uniquely Japanese trait, and seems 
similar to what Joanna Overing (2003) describes as a propensity of Amazonian 
peoples to appreciate beauty within the flow of social life: an “aesthetics of 
everyday life” (Overing 2003). Besides skillful activities, taking a moment to 
observe the changes in weather, a flower arrangement, or the color of tea is 
something that my older companions would tell me they enjoyed, and as they 
thought less about what they can expect in the future, this gradually became an 
increasingly important source of enjoyment in their lives. Such moments, less 
verbal and thus less often discussed within conversations in the salon, were seen 
as no less important for leading a good life.
The tendency to do the things one enjoys was further related to a certain 
sense of freedom arising from having fulfilled one’s duty. The stories about 
their lives that salon-goers gladly shared with each other often detailed the 
everyday work they did, in employment and for their families. Tokuda-san, a 
dark-haired bespectacled lady, spoke of her early mornings in the years when 
her husband worked as a newspaper delivery man, how she would get up at 
four to prepare his breakfast in time. Ono-san told stories of his work as a 
graphic designer, the late nights and deadlines and the many drinking parties 
with workmates that were sometimes a pleasure but also often impossible to 
decline—a reason, he thought, for his poor health now. Kato-san16 spoke of 
her many days spent caring for her four children, how she devoted herself to 
making them healthy and nutritious meals. Such stories allowed these peo-
ple to represent themselves in a certain light but also to view themselves in 
relation to dominant life models, thus contributing to a certain kind of self-
understanding, to a manner of making sense of the events in their lives (see 
Kavedžija 2013). Other mundane and everyday stories were no less important. 
For instance, one afternoon Kato-san and her friend returned for a cup of tea 
after an outing to an okonomiyaki17 restaurant. She told us of the different 
kinds they had and this soon led to a heated discussion of regional varieties 
16. For an elaborate analysis of life stories of Kato-san and many others see Kavedžija 
2013.
17. Okonomiyaki (literally, “what you like”) is sometimes described as Japanese-style 
pancake, mostly made with flour and cabbage, with additions according to taste—
pork and shrimps being among the favorites.
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of this omelette-like specialty. Most people had a story to contribute to the 
conversation, about food and regional specialties—Kan-san, for example, told 
us of a time when he visited Hiroshima for the first time. Eventually, this led 
to a discussion of meals from their youth. “Do you remember hot cakes? After 
the war my father made them, baked them on the fire. We lived in a shelter. . . . 
There was no rice, so we ate hot cakes, made from flour. . .” Memories of those 
pancakes had a trace of melancholy, despite the hardship; many nodded, and 
soon told their own stories of the Second World War, of shortages, and of the 
food of their youth.
In the process of retelling stories such as these, especially those pertaining 
to everyday matters, people reassemble their own lives and the groups of which 
they are a part. This retelling puts their lives together, reaffirms their groups 
but also, as implied in the term “reassembling,” changes them gradually and 
imperceptibly in each act of retelling18 (Frank 2010: 83). Each narrative act then 
both preserves things (memories, stories, groups, evaluations) and changes them 
gradually. This sense-making activity is part of the attitude, or mode of attune-
ment, that I call the narrative orientation. To the extent that such activities help 
to create a sense of meaning or purpose in life, and to evaluate one’s actions in 
relation to other events in one’s life, to other people’s actions and to their expec-
tations, they are an important element in striving for a good life. Nevertheless, 
as revealed by the countervailing tendency to focus on the present, on what 
is immediately in front of one’s senses, on doing things in the right way in a 
dedicated manner, the narrative orientation is not the only attitude contributing 
to leading a good life, and under certain circumstances, can even jeopardize it 
(see also Cook, this volume and Stafford, this volume). My own interlocutors 
acknowledged the perils of too much reflection—as one seventy-five-year-old 
man said, “It is no good to think about [your life] too much. If I stay on my own 
too long, I think too much (kangaesugi).”
18. “Lives and groups require constant reassembling, which is Bruno Latour’s 
general descriptor, and stories reassemble, both individually and collectively. But 
reassembling is as much about change as continuity; the act of reassembling does 
not mean keeping things, including memories, as they are. Reassembly enacts what 
Norbert Elias called process: what is reassembled is never exactly what was, but 
always a slightly changed version. Most of the time these changes are imperceptible, 
and the process proceeds unnoticed. Mundane stories—kitchen table stories—
imperceptibly reassemble” (Frank 2010: 83).
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MAKING SENSE AND BEING IN THE MOMENT—NARRATIVE 
AND IMMEDIATE ORIENTATION
Leading a good life seems to involve balancing these two distinct orientations. I 
present them here as a contrastive pair, a dichotomy, but they are so only in the 
sense that the more one is engaged in the one, the less one can simultaneously 
be engaged in the other.19 In this sense, everyday storytelling and other forms of 
narrative activity can be seen as a part of the narrative orientation, whereas at-
tention to detail and “doing things properly” can be seen as part of the immedi-
ate orientation. The former can involve narration but more broadly encompasses 
sense-making and analytical activities; it is a mode in which one attempts to 
make sense of a situation, for example, by comparing the existing state of affairs 
to that desired, and by problem solving. The immediate orientation, by contrast, 
is oriented toward direct experience. Attention is focused on the present and on 
one’s immediate sensations and surroundings, without comparing these to what 
is expected or to some ideal, or relating them to memories, and without trying 
to order them into a sequence. The distinction between these in everyday life is 
not rigid or absolute20; they simply refer to different states that can be experi-
enced by anyone at different times, though some people may naturally incline 
toward one or the other.
19. In the words of Robert Desjarlais and Jason Throop: “From a phenomenological 
perspective, then, distinctions between subjective and objective aspects of reality, 
between what is of the mind and of the world, are shaped by the attitude that a 
social actor takes up toward the world, as well as by the historical and cultural 
conditions” (2011: 89). The world cannot be grasped in its totality and we always 
turn our attention to particular aspects of the world and reality that surrounds us 
and as we do that, other aspects fall out of focus—our changing perspective, our 
shifting attitude influences our perception, or experience and ultimately, our actions 
(ibid.: 90).
20. The distinction between these is not clear-cut, so I separate them for heuristic 
purposes only. They might be best thought of as tendencies, as these states in their 
pure forms may be impossible. For instance, the example of experienced meditators 
who manage to achieve a state of focus on the here and now, in which they barely 
react to distractions in the outside world by trying to understand them, is an extreme 
case as close as possible to the state of pure immediacy. Most people can rarely 
expect to experience this kind of state for more than a few seconds (see Williams 
and Penman 2012). Furthermore, not every form of narrative activity is necessarily 
part of this reflexive orientation; in fact, some of the sociable storytelling can anchor 
one in a moment.
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What are the implications of these two attitudes or orientations for hap-
piness21 or leading a good life? The stories we know of others and from others 
teach us about how to lead a good life, sometimes directly or by example, and at 
other times by making us aware of what we would rather avoid. The capacity of 
stories and the storytelling process to create a meaningful sequence from appar-
ently disconnected events makes them an important part of the sense-making 
process (Ochs and Capps 1996). The narrative orientation, then, promotes a 
good life to the extent that it helps to transform daily events and happenings, 
including traumatic or difficult ones, into a meaningful sequence, thereby cre-
ating a sense of a meaningful existence. By allowing a comparison with other 
stories we know, this orientation can facilitate the assessment of what we want 
and where we would like to go, guiding our choices and (moral) actions. Yet to 
the extent that reflection and comparison with others can make one’s life more 
miserable and increase a feeling of isolation, the narrative mode can also have 
negative consequences for leading a good life. Tokuda-san, for example, faced 
a fear of loneliness as her husband was hospitalized with a serious heart condi-
tion. The stories of other ladies in the salon who were living on their own and 
praised their freedom made her upset and feel even more alienated and lonely. 
The comparison of her own story with the stories of others kept her in a state of 
discontent. It is apparent than that while narrative orientation can contribute to 
a sense of leading a good life, it can also have a detrimental effect. Furthermore, 
it is important not to overstate the importance of narrativity and reflexivity in 
the lives of others.
Since the narrative orientation is closely related to meaning-making pro-
cesses and thus of crucial importance for understanding the relationship of a 
meaningful life to a good life, I wish briefly to explore some of the problems with 
which a narrative orientation may be associated. The importance of narrativity 
21. While beyond the scope of the present article, it would be worth discussing the 
temporal aspect of happiness with reference to these two modes, and the older 
age. Happiness is very often seen as oriented toward the future, in a form of some 
receding temporal horizon, or a promise (Ahmed 2010). In the Aristotelian sense, 
the assessment of (eudaimonic) happiness has to take into account an entire life, 
and to this extent it connects the present with the past, somewhat like the narrative 
orientation. Balancing the narrative orientation as a way of relating past to the 
present and pointing to possible futures, with an immediate orientation on the 
present moment, reveals a very different temporal frame for happiness than merely 
situated in an indeterminate future, a retreating and elusive image of something to 
come.
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for leading a good life has been resolutely criticized by the philosopher Galen 
Strawson. In his article “Against narrativity” (2004), he formulates two versions 
of the so-called narrative claim: the psychological narrativity thesis, which states 
that human beings experience their life as a narrative or story, or collection 
of stories; and the ethical narrativity thesis, which states that perceiving one’s 
life as a narrative is good, and that narrative awareness is positive. Strawson 
argues against both of these claims, asserting that some people do not experi-
ence themselves in terms of a continuity between past and present. This gives 
rise to a distinction between what he terms “Diachronic” and “Episodic” self-
experience–Diachronics tend naturally to conceive themselves, their own “self,” 
as something that extends in the past and future, whereas Episodics do not have 
this tendency to see themselves as something that was there in the remote past 
and will continue in the remote future (Strawson 2004: 430). Strawson first 
describes these as distinct types of experience and then uses them to character-
ize two distinct types of person. He argues that people who are Episodic are 
unlikely to perceive their lives in narrative terms. Based on his own experience 
as an Episodic, he argues against the position that narrativity is necessary for 
leading a good life, and asserts that “the best lives almost never involve this kind 
of self-telling” (437). He speculates that narrativity can, in fact, stand in the way 
of self-understanding, because every time we recall something from our past, 
our memory of it changes, and every retelling alters the facts: “The implication 
is plain; the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk moving 
away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your being” (447). In 
contrast to Strawson’s conception of Episodics and Diachronics as distinct types 
of person,22 I would maintain that the immediate and narrative orientations are 
states, or modes of being in the world, that anyone can experience, even if some 
are slightly predisposed toward one or the other.
While there are several points of Strawson’s argument that I find problem-
atic23 his warnings against narrative self-refection raise some important issues. 
First of all, it makes a strong point about the fact that not everyone leads their 
22. My understanding is somewhat closer to Maurice Bloch’s (2011) reinterpretation 
of Strawson, in which he distinguishes the “core,” “minimal,” and “narrative” self, 
and argues that Strawson’s distinction between types of person is only valid at the 
phenomenological level. All people have a narrative self, though some—Strawson’s 
Diachronics—have an “extra,” a deep feeling of having a meaningful biography.
23. For instance, I am not certain that it is useful to think of “the truth of your being” 
as something separate from the process of understanding.
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life narratively, construing their experiences in a narrative form. The narrative 
claim in this strong form, implying that all people live their lives as protagonists 
in a story, seems implausible to me, and if it presupposes a constant activity, cer-
tainly is not supported by my ethnographic evidence, which points to a number 
of occasions where being in the moment is preferred. In a more general sense, 
Strawson cautions against judging nonreflexivity to be some sort of morally de-
ficient mode of being in the world. In this light, the resistance to narrativization 
exhibited by some of my interlocutors should not be seen as problematic, but on 
the contrary, as a potentially equally fulfilling way of leading one’s life, and in 
some cases, even, as an achievement: successfully living in the present free from 
the resentment or distress arising from comparison to what could be. Neverthe-
less, this does not mean that some forms of narrative activity are not considered 
important by my interlocutors nor that narrative does not have an important 
role in constructing a meaningful existence. While most of my hosts probably 
did not narratively conceive their self on a daily basis, various narratives, includ-
ing a diverse range of stories they heard and recounted, and encountered in the 
media, played a major role in their everyday lives. It is also worth pointing out 
that narrative activity conceived broadly need not imply a “diachronic” disposi-
tion, and can be “episodic” in the sense that the story can relate to particular 
episodes or events, without a claim for an overarching unity of life experience. It 
is thus important to distinguish Strawson’s strong narrative claim, which hinges 
on people conceiving their own selves narratively, and the many other forms of 
narrative activity.
The importance of stories in people’s lives makes it virtually impossible to 
dismiss the importance of narrative activity for living well. I nevertheless agree 
with Strawson to the effect that narrativity, to the extent that it involves a self-
reflexive construction of self, may present a threat to one’s ability to lead a good 
life, though not necessarily for the reasons he mentions. To the extent that view-
ing one’s life in narrative terms likens it to a biographical project in the making, 
as theorists of late modernity have suggested, one may feel an increased sense of 
responsibility for one’s life choices and decisions (for example, Giddens 1991). 
While this means that one is increasingly liberated from traditional social in-
stitutions, the process is accompanied by a rise in risks and personal insecurities 
(Beck 1992). Shaping one’s life, just like a story, is cast as one’s own responsibil-
ity, and this may lead to anxiety—ultimately an existential anxiety that links 
freedom and responsibility (Yalom 1980). The interest in “mindfulness” as a 
mode of therapy for depression, helping people to find “peace in a frantic world” 
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(Williams and Penman 2012), is indicative of the type of problem created by 
the late modern condition. Mindfulness in this sense refers to a type of medita-
tion practice that focuses on the flow of one’s own breath. The intention is to 
focus on immediate experience and to assume an attitude of observing what is 
transpiring in one’s mind and body, as a way of countering the tendency to com-
pare one’s current state to an ideal and to treat the disjuncture as a problem to 
be solved, leading to the questioning and restlessness that characterize depres-
sive thinking (Williams and Penman 2012). It remains to be seen whether the 
recent marked increase in cases of depression in Japan (Kitanaka 2011) can be 
related to the tendencies associated with late modernity, to take responsibility 
for one’s own life and life trajectory, and to internalize blame and dissatisfaction. 
Yet this seems like a question worth serious exploration.
VALUES IN BALANCE
The construction of meaning in life may contribute to a sense of leading one’s 
life well, but the good life cannot be reduced to a meaningful life. A focus on the 
meaning of one’s own life can have a negative influence on one’s general sense 
of well-being, and can lead to a focus on one’s own life as an individual, thus ex-
acerbating a sense of personal responsibility and separation from others, which 
can also be anxiety inducing. This is illustrated by the fact that a range of local 
psychotherapies in Japan focus on recognition of one’s relationships to others, 
and feelings of dependence (Doi 1973; Reynolds 1980; Ozawa-de Silva 2006). 
A good life nevertheless requires a sense of meaning in life, even if the orienta-
tion that allows for its creation must be tempered, or kept in check. A good life 
is also effectively a moral project, involving more than merely a life that is coher-
ent and makes sense (as opposed to a collection of events that follow one after 
another). In short, the narrative quest for coherence and meaning, and mindful 
presence in the moment, each have their benefits but also their dangers. The 
ability to lead a good and fulfilling life would appear to rely on maintaining the 
right kind of balance between the two.
For my Japanese hosts, happiness was constructed more specifically through 
a series of balancing acts: between sociality and the burden of over-closeness, 
or intimacy and a sense of freedom, dependence and autonomy, among others. 
The poles of these tensions encapsulate important social values: intimacy and 
sociality and dependability on others on the one hand, freedom and a sense 
105THE GOOD LIFE IN BALANCE
of autonomy on the other. My older Japanese friends often spoke of the im-
portance of either or both of these, and did not believe that one could choose 
between them and still feel content. Navigation between the opposed poles de-
scribed above involved a more complex form of moral judgment. In this sense, 
as noted earlier, such values are unlike exchange values, which are commensura-
ble and between which one can chose. As Michael Lambek (2008) points out, 
while anthropologists have often seen obligation as the opposite of choice in 
weighing up nonexchange values, it is more useful to think of judgment as the 
opposite: “Such evaluation or judgment is grounded in more general, culturally 
mediated, understandings of the human condition and the ends of human life 
as well as those internal to the practice at hand” (Lambek 2008: 137). Further-
more, happiness (which can otherwise be seen as fleeting and overly selfish, or 
self-centered) is only evaluated positively when it involves just such a balance 
between both poles, both social and moral values. To the extent that its achieve-
ment takes place through a balancing of moral values, happiness can be under-
stood as a form of practical moral judgment.
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chapter four
Techniques of happiness
Moving toward and away from the good life 
in a rural Ethiopian community
Dena Freeman
Scholars from many different disciplines have written about happiness and 
well-being in recent years. Psychologists and economists have dominated the 
field (see, for example, Frey and Stutzer 2002; Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz 
1999; Lane 2000; Seligman 2003), but contributions have also been made by 
sociologists, neuroscientists, philosophers, historians, and evolutionary scien-
tists (see Davidson 2004; Inglehart et al. 2008; Nesse 2004; Veenhoven 1991; 
White 2006). Anthropologists, however, have been fairly resistant to the no-
tion of studying happiness (for notable exceptions see Adelson 2000; Jiminez 
2008; Mathews 1996; Mathews and Izquierdo 2008; Thin 2005). Part of the 
reason that anthropologists have been slow to engage with happiness research 
head-on has been the terms in which this research has been framed by the 
other disciplines. By far the majority of existing happiness research is based on 
assumptions about the self, emotions, and experience that anthropologists find 
questionable, and methodologies that anthropologists find shallow and uncon-
textualized. People are assumed to be like homo economicus, rational, transparent, 
and universal, and insights into their well-being are garnered by asking them 
how happy they are on a scale of 1 to 10, and then finding correlations between 
110 DENA FREEMAN
these scores and various other factors. Research in this vein has generated a 
huge amount of data about happiness levels in different countries, how happi-
ness correlates—or doesn’t—with wealth, or with marriage, or with living in a 
city, and so on, and has led to much interest in developing happiness indicators 
and designing policy in order to improve people’s happiness. This is all rather 
alien to the way that anthropologists approach questions of experience and has 
led to a situation in which anthropology is perhaps the only social or behavioral 
science discipline that has virtually nothing to say about happiness or the foun-
dations of the “good life.”
So, then, how might anthropologists contribute to the study of happiness 
and well-being? What might we add to the debate? This collection shows many 
ways that anthropologists can add depth and richness to the study of happiness. 
In this article I will focus on two key ways that anthropologists can contrib-
ute to the debate. Most obviously, anthropologists can provide detailed eth-
nographic accounts of how people in different places and in different cultural 
contexts conceptualize happiness, how they talk about it, how they strive for 
it, and how they experience it. Rich ethnographic descriptions of happy lives 
in different cultural contexts are as yet few and far between and such accounts 
of socially and culturally contextualized happiness could do much to broaden 
the very narrow accounts and assumptions that dominate much contemporary 
happiness research.
A second contribution that anthropologists can make, and the main focus of 
this article, is to begin to tease apart the different factors that lead to either hap-
piness or unhappiness in a particular social and cultural context. We can look at 
specific social and cultural practices that appear to enhance happiness—what I 
will call cultural techniques of happiness—and analyze how they function and how 
they are intertwined with certain forms of social organization and cultural idea-
tion. In this way we can begin to bring into focus ways that happiness is socially 
and culturally constituted in different settings and how the nature of happiness, 
as both concept and lived experience, can change over time.
Tolstoy claimed that “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family 
is unhappy in its own way.” Is the same true of communities? Is there an ideal 
form of happiness that all communities can aspire to or do forms of happiness 
vary in different places and different times? How do we take into account the si-
multaneous presence of happiness-increasing and happiness-decreasing factors? 
When happiness researchers tell us that the people of X and the people of Y 
both score 7 on a happiness scale of 1 to 10, is there is a difference in the nature 
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of this 7, to put it rather glibly, for those that arrived at it by combining, say, a 
happiness of 8 with an unhappiness of -1, and those that combined a happiness 
of 9 with an unhappiness of -2?
Ethnographies of happiness as experienced in different historical and cul-
tural settings can offer some insights into these questions and begin to deepen 
our understanding of happiness as it is experienced by real people, embedded 
in particular communities, at specific points in time. In the rest of this article I 
will consider happiness in a community in rural Ethiopia at two different points 
in time. By comparing the factors and practices leading toward and away from 
happiness in these two contexts I will try to open up and complexify the notion 
of happiness and to show how both the concept and the lived experience of 
happiness can and do change quite radically over time.
TRADITIONAL GAMO IDEAS ABOUT HAPPINESS
The people of the Gamo Highlands in Southern Ethiopia don’t talk much about 
happiness, or about any kinds of feelings or emotions for that matter. But, at 
least on a cursory surface level, my impression when I first arrived in the mid-
1990s and walked through the lush green fields and saw people working to-
gether, talking, laughing, and smiling, was that generally they seemed to be very 
happy. As I stayed longer in the village of Masho, I began to get a clearer picture 
of what ideals Gamo people held about the good life and how the lived experi-
ence of their daily lives engendered a certain feeling of contentment.
Gamo ideals of the good life, what they strive for and what they wish for 
their community, can most clearly be seen in the blessings made at the begin-
ning of any local or communal assembly. Local and community discussions are 
a regular feature of Gamo life, often taking place several times a week, and 
they are always preceded by a series of blessings made by the senior men. These 
blessings always take the same general form and call for two essential elements: 
peace and fertility. Peace encompasses the values of togetherness, mutuality, and 
smooth social relations, while fertility includes crops that grow well, women 
that give birth, and children and animals that grow strong and healthy. In the 
mid-1990s, and for a long time before, these could be considered to be the 
Gamo recipe for a good and happy life. And indeed, in their patterns of thought 
these two ingredients for the good life were interconnected, such that peace-
ful social relations were actually thought to be part of the cause of biological 
112 DENA FREEMAN
fertility (Freeman 2002a, 2002b). So, quickly solving conflicts and restoring 
peace was seen as a sacred as well as a political act, and something that would 
keep the community and its members healthy and fertile. Thus, when, in 1996, 
I asked people why they were going to an assembly, they did not reply that they 
were going to discuss a case about some stolen sheep, or that they were going to 
decide what to do about a certain community problem, but instead they would 
say something like, “We are going to the assembly to bring reconciliation to the 
community. For the grain, for the milk, to make the community well” (Freeman 
2002b: 134).
The importance of smooth social relations was emphasized again and again 
in daily life. Conflicts happened but they were relatively rare. And when they did 
occur, it was generally on a quiet level—more a case of cold silences or fake smiles 
than shouting or screaming. And kin and neighbors always made sure to involve 
themselves in others’ conflicts and to help resolve them as soon as possible. Any-
one who had an argument with someone else during the day could expect to find 
the neighbors gathering in his house in the evening, where in a gentle and friend-
ly way, they would ask to hear both sides of the story and steer the two parties 
to a resolution. It was always stressed that one had to get right to the bottom of 
things so that there would be no grudge to hold and genuine good relations could 
be restored. This process of reconciliation is an important technique of happiness 
in Gamo. I was party to many of these reconciliations during my two years in the 
village of Masho, and I was always impressed at how people came to a resolu-
tion and then left their hurt and anger behind. Anthropologist Judith Olmstead, 
whose work on the Gamo Highlands was cut short in 1974 by the Ethiopian 
Revolution, was so impressed by the Gamo techniques of conflict resolution and 
reconciliation that she later went on to become a professional mediator.
The people of the Gamo Highlands do not value suffering. While there are 
numerous accounts in the anthropological literature of suffering being consid-
ered as important for character formation or for moral purity, the people of 
Gamo simply see suffering as a miserable state that should be remedied as soon 
as possible. It is seen as a sign that something is wrong, that things are not in 
balance, or that a taboo has been broken. If someone is suffering from an ongo-
ing misfortune the response is to look for the cause of this misfortune so that 
the situation can be rectified and the suffering relieved. If someone is suffering 
from a known misfortune, such as the death of a relative, people will come to 
cheer them up, to laugh and joke with them and try to ease them back into the 
smooth flow of happy social relations.
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So while there is no one word for “happiness” and it is not overtly theorized 
or discussed, it is clear that happiness is seen as the default state that everyone 
should seek to attain in their social lives. Gamo people do not strive for it, in 
the sense that they might strive for wealth or political power, but rather it is 
a way of being that is valued and appreciated. Gamo concepts such as “joy” 
(uffaisi), “smiling” (michidi), “peace” (salame), and “reconciliation” (makaino) are 
the integral elements of happiness as sought for and experienced in the Gamo 
Highlands. It is a fundamentally social conceptualization of happiness and it is 
inherently bound up with the lived experience of peaceful sociality.
HAPPINESS AS LIVED EXPERIENCE
In general day-to-day life it was indeed smooth social relations that did seem 
to bring about feelings of happiness and contentment. Life in Masho in the 
mid-1990s was intensely social. People were always with people—farming the 
land together with family or in work groups, cooking food together with other 
household women, walking together to market, sitting in community assem-
blies. There were very few occasions that someone would do something alone. 
Even if a man might occasionally farm his land alone, other people passing by 
on footpaths or working in adjacent fields would call out greetings, wish him 
strength, and perhaps stop to chat about some communal affair or to tease or 
joke with him. Walking anywhere always took twice as long as it could have, 
because it was always necessary to stop and greet everyone you passed on the 
way, to wish them a good day, and again to joke around with them.
Psychologists have suggested that both dyadic social connections and the 
feeling of being part of a community are important for well-being (see, for ex-
ample, Baumeister and Leary 1995; Haidt, Seder, and Kesebir 2008) and both 
of these experiences were available in abundance in Masho in the 1990s. As an 
outsider-anthropologist I was perhaps aware of these dynamics more acutely 
than those who had always lived this way. I was overwhelmed with the number 
of people that I had to relate to and the constant stream of friendly social inter-
action. At times I would try and hide away for an hour or so in my room, to find 
some time to be quiet and think, and I would always be sought out after about 
five minutes with calls to come and talk/eat/play. If I resisted for more than 
about ten minutes people would become genuinely concerned and start asking 
if I was feeling ill. When I tried to reply that I was fine and that I just wanted 
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some time to think, I found that such a concept could not be expressed in the 
Gamo language. The verb that best translates as “to think” also means “to worry” 
and so I found myself saying “I’m just worrying.” People were quick to respond 
that I shouldn’t “think/worry” and to pull me out of my aloneness and back into 
sociality. Eventually I stopped resisting and surrendered. I remember noticing 
some months later how different I felt living like that and how much calmer and 
happier I was—how I felt safe, connected, embedded.
Gamo sociality is emphasized and intensified by two more cultural tech-
niques of happiness. The first of these is the act of “playing” or ka’o. The same 
verb is used to describe children’s play, or playing football, but when applied 
to adult “playing” it refers to the joking, teasing, and banter that characterize 
much of Gamo social interaction. It would probably not be an exaggeration 
to say that most day-to-day social interaction in 1990s Masho was “playing.” 
Seventy-year-old Shato,1 in whose house I lived, was a master at playing. Here 
are some examples:
Murunesh, a neighbor, comes into our courtyard. Shato, with a sparkle in his eye 
and a mischievous smile, shouts, “What are you doing in my house? Did I call 
you?” Murunesh, laughing, says, “I came because I missed you. I wanted to see 
your handsome face.” Shato: “Nonsense! You’ve come to eat my food, I know 
it! And who is this child you have brought with you? Give her to me and get 
out!” Murunesh, pushing her three-year-old granddaughter in Shato’s direction: 
“Here, take her, she will make you a second wife. . .”
Shato is hoeing one of his fields near the house of Abera, a second cousin. Abera 
walks past and calls out: “Good morning! Strength to you!” Shato replies, “It’s 
not a good morning, come and help me with this work!” Abera has to quickly 
find an answer: “Bring me a second hoe and I will hoe with you.” Shato: “No, 
no, take this one. Here, you scoundrel, why are you running in the other direc-
tion?” Abera: “Strength to you, strength to you! I must go to the town.” Shato, 
laughing: “Go, go, return in peace.”
These types of exchange took place literally all the time, several per hour, and 
generally left both parties smiling and laughing.
I was forever being told to marry people, to take children back to England, 
to come and cook dinner, or hoe the fields, or cause the rain to start or stop. 
1. All names have been changed. 
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These invitations to play did more than make me laugh. They kept me on my 
toes—they forced me to keep sharp and focused, to quickly find witty replies 
or rebuffs, and to warmly engage with my interlocutors. Rather like a mind-
fulness meditation, these exchanges kept me constantly “present” and “in the 
moment.” With the constant calls to play there was no time for daydreaming, 
thinking about something else, or otherwise sinking into one’s own world—ac-
tivities I was rather prone to in my previous life in London. Recent research 
by psychologists suggests that people—European and American students, that 
is—who daydream more and have more so-called “stimulus-independent and 
task-unrelated thoughts,” or SITUTs, and are therefore not fully aware and at-
tentive to the present moment, report increased negative affect and lower psy-
chological well-being (Stawarczyk et al. 2012).
The Gamo focus on adult playing encouraged a state of nonreflexivity. It 
pulled people out of their own thoughts and their own concerns and served to 
train their attention on the immediate experience of the present moment and 
the other people in that moment (cf. Kavedžija, this issue). Michael Jackson 
has suggested that the dance between “being part of and being apart from the 
world” is a universal feature of human consciousness ( Jackson 2012: 2). We all 
constantly oscillate between states of engagement and detachment, relationship 
and aloneness. In the Gamo Highlands, the cultural practice of playing serves to 
continually push people toward the pole of engagement and relationship and to 
encourage them to be “part of ” rather than “apart from” the world. Much more 
than just a mere backdrop to social life, the Gamo cultural activity of playing is 
thus an important technique to increase happiness—by making people laugh, 
by fostering warm social relations, and by training peoples’ attention to the pre-
sent moment.
The second technique of happiness that intensifies sociality in the 1990s was 
the drinking of coffee. As in many parts of Ethiopia, it was common in Masho 
for women to prepare coffee and invite friends and neighbors round to drink. 
Starting with raw coffee beans, the actual preparation of the coffee would take 
about an hour and a half, and guests would be invited soon after the process 
started. Guests would straggle in over the next hour or so, and sit in the house 
and play while the coffee was being prepared. Then the actual coffee drinking 
would generally take between 30 and 50 minutes, as the pot was boiled three 
times and guests drank three cups. Coffee drinking was an occasion to down 
tools, have a rest, and most of all, to play. Groups of neighbors would invite each 
other on the basis of a loose reciprocity, while passers-by and others would get 
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added to the mix when they were around. During my fieldwork in the 1990s it 
was typical to partake in coffee like this at least once or twice a day, sometimes 
more. These occasions were pleasant, relaxed, and sociable. And they were so 
central to life that even on the occasion when Abebech, the wife of Shato’s son, 
Wendu, happened to give birth one morning—round behind the back of the 
house—when the house itself was full of guests for coffee, no one thought to 
leave or stop the coffee drinking. They simply put some straw on the floor for 
Abebech to lie on, wrapped the baby up and gave it to one of the guests, and 
carried on with the second cup of coffee.
Thus through three main techniques of happiness—playing, drinking cof-
fee with neighbors, and quickly resolving any interpersonal conflicts—the ideal 
of smooth and friendly social relations were to a very great extent maintained 
in Masho in the 1990s, and contributed greatly to people’s happiness and life 
enjoyment.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE IN MASHO AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON HAPPINESS
I have returned to Masho on average once or twice a year since I completed my 
doctoral fieldwork in 1997 and have witnessed many changes over that time. 
One of the most important changes has been in the area of production and 
economic relations. In the 1990s most people in Masho were engaged in sub-
sistence agriculture, growing barley, wheat, potatoes, beans, and enset, the false 
banana plant. Most men would spend much of their time working in the fields, 
often with household members or with local work-groups, with frequent breaks 
to stop and play with passers-by and with each other. The work was physically 
hard but relatively unpressured, and would generally generate enough food to 
feed the family, plus a small amount of surplus that could be used in various 
ritual exchanges at marriage, initiation, and the birth of a child, and to contrib-
ute to offerings made to the spirits by clan and lineage elders.
However, in 1998, an NGO started a development project in the area and 
selected Masho as one of its target villages. This was the first NGO project in 
Masho and it led to great changes in many aspects of life. As I have discussed 
elsewhere (Freeman 2009, 2012a, 2013a, 2013b), one of the main aspects of this 
project was to get people to grow a cash crop, in this case apples, and to become 
more involved in the national market economy. By 2010 over two-thirds of 
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the households in Masho were successfully growing apples, a number of apple 
cooperatives had been established in conjunction with neighboring communi-
ties, and many apple farmers were making a lot of money from the sale of apple 
fruits and apple saplings.
While still agricultural, working with apples was very different from grow-
ing barley, wheat, and the other subsistence crops. Apples, and particularly apple 
saplings, could bring in big money. Thus, in the decade or so since apples were 
first introduced, there have been significant changes in working patterns and 
social relations, which I believe have seriously impacted on people’s experience 
of happiness and well-being.
First, men who produce apple saplings have started to work much longer 
hours. Since there is a fairly direct link between the number of apple saplings 
you produce and the money you earn, people have begun to produce apple sap-
lings in the spirit of maximization. Grafting apple saplings is quite labor inten-
sive and thus apple farmers find themselves investing many hours in this work. 
They have generally been reluctant use family labor or to hire workers to do this 
for them, both because of the training and skill required and because of the fear 
of theft, as I will discuss below. So instead they have become more conscious 
about when they are working and when they are not working, and the previous 
relaxed experience where work was fairly embedded in the flow of social life 
has started to fracture (cf. papers by Walker, Lambek). Apple farmers are less 
keen to take breaks or to stop for coffee. In fact, when I visited Masho in 2008, 
2009, and 2010, the number of coffee invitations was noticeably smaller. When 
I asked Wendu about this he said, “ We are busy now. Before we were lazy. Now 
people are growing apples and they don’t want to sit around drinking coffee.”
Similarly, while people did still greet each other on the paths, it was becom-
ing much more common for people to simply wish each other well and walk 
on. The occasions of long conversations and elaborate playing sessions in these 
chance encounters seemed much fewer. While people in Masho do still play 
with each other and do still drink coffee, they do it much less than they used to. 
And thus the joy, connection, and “present moment consciousness” that these 
forms of sociality used to engender, now do so rather less.
Second, the apple boom brought with it a massive increase in theft. Never 
much of a problem before, from around 2003 onward theft—primarily of ap-
ple saplings—became a major social problem. People would creep into open 
fields at night, uproot apple saplings, and sell them for a quick profit to the 
traders that arrived in the local town. The extent of this theft was so great that 
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most apple producers moved their saplings from the fields into their home com-
pounds and started to stay up all night to guard them. As people quipped at 
the time, referring to the grafting of male and female in apple propagation, and 
finding the funny side to their unpleasant situation, “the apple sleeps with his 
wife, while we sleep outside.”
Wendu was one of the apple farmers who slept outside for a year or so to 
guard his apple saplings. During that period he often looked tired and stressed. 
He also bought a dog to keep in the compound to deter would-be thieves. Start-
ing from this period, people started visiting each other’s houses less. No one 
was sure who was a thief and who wasn’t. People had been caught stealing from 
neighbors and close relatives, so everyone was under suspicion. In this situation, 
Wendu would keep an eye on visitors who came to the compound. He would 
get particularly uneasy if they spent too much time looking at his apple seed-
lings or the fence in that area. Perhaps they were plotting to come back at night 
and try and steal them? Likewise Wendu and Abebech stopped visiting other 
compounds so frequently—maybe people would think they were plotting to 
steal this person’s apples? The fear and distrust that developed during this period 
had a dramatic effect on social relations and how people thought about others. 
Whereas previously people had related to others in a light and easy way, now the 
boundaries between one household and the next became psychologically firmer.
In 2005 the local government managed to solve much of the theft problem 
by closing the route to market for apple saplings and requiring all apple saplings 
to be sold via cooperatives to licensed traders with appropriate receipts and pa-
perwork. This made it much harder to sell stolen saplings and the intense period 
of theft came to an end, and apple farmers returned to sleep with their wives 
(Freeman 2013). However, the changes to local social relations could not be so 
easily repaired. While visiting has become more frequent again, it is not as easy 
and frequent as it was before.
Other changes in social relations have also come about due to involvement in 
the apple business. Instead of working together, farmers now increasingly com-
pete with each other. Neighbors have become competitors, competing to pro-
ducing the best apples, to sell the most saplings, to get the highest price. Staff at 
the NGO that implemented the apple project were aware, and rather dismayed, 
at this situation. The Agriculture and Food Security Program Facilitator told me:
Our strategy was to build a caring, interdependent society, not a competitive 
society. But a competitive society has come about. Farmers compete with each 
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other over apple production and access to market, they say that their variety of 
apple is good while that of others is bad, they argue about everything. There has 
been a lot of fighting since the apples came. . . . While the project is good because 
people are getting more money and can send their children to school and wear 
clean clothes, it is true that it is also making people more separate. People here 
used to help each other, but now they compete. It’s not good what is happening.
As well as being potential thieves and potential competitors, “other people” 
have also become potential customers. Now that more people have more cash, 
a number of households have set up little tea shops, particularly those situated 
on the road into the local town. These houses will typically be new style rec-
tangular mud houses with several rooms. A large room at the front will act as 
the tea shop, while household members will live in the other rooms at the back. 
Small benches typically line the walls and a kettle of tea sits on a charcoal stove, 
ready to serve those wanting a rest on their way into town. Very often customers 
include kin and neighbors, and thus the line between social visiting and market 
transaction has become uncomfortably blurred. I recall one time in 2008 when 
Wendu and I went to visit Adanech, a young neighbor who we saw often, who 
was at the time ill in bed with flu. We walked in through Adanech’s tea shop, 
where one or two people were sitting drinking, being served by Adanech’s hus-
band’s younger sister, and into her bedroom. Adanech lay there in bed, wrapped 
in blankets and sneezing. We sat on small stools opposite her and she propped 
herself up to talk to us. Wendu immediately started to play, telling her to get 
out of bed at once and go to work, and soon we were all laughing together. 
She then offered us some tea and three small cups of tea were bought into her 
bedroom and we all drank together. We carried on laughing and joking some 
more, and then when we saw she looked tired we got up to leave. As we wished 
her a speedy recovery and she thanked us for coming, Wendu put a few coins 
on the table to pay for the tea. It was an awkward moment, but Adanech didn’t 
refuse. . .
A third change caused by the shift to market-based apple production has 
been a massive increase in inequality. While there have always been differences 
in wealth and land-holdings in Masho, these have become much more signifi-
cant since the arrival of apples. Those farmers with lots of apple saplings have 
made lots of money very fast—in some cases thousands of US dollars per year, 
while those with few or no saplings have remained at the same subsistence 
level as they were before. The differences have become huge. And furthermore, 
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while previous wealth differences used to translate into status differences, as 
wealthier farmers used their surplus to throw big initiation feasts and in the 
process redistribute their surplus food around the community (Freeman 2002a, 
2002b), today’s wealth differences translate directly into differences of con-
sumption. Wealthy apple farmers have built new, modern-style houses, wear 
nice clothes, own smart bags and cassette players, and in some cases even have 
televisions and DVD players. Their poorer neighbors continue to live in tradi-
tional bamboo houses, wear old clothes, and struggle even to send their chil-
dren to school.
An interesting finding from the existing happiness research is that hap-
piness and well-being are inversely correlated with inequality. High levels of 
inequality have been shown to lead to poor health, social conflict, and violence, 
particularly in those at the bottom of the hierarchy (Wilkinson 1996, 2005), 
all of which lead away from happiness and well-being. It has also been demon-
strated that relative wealth is much more important than absolute wealth (above 
a certain level of poverty) in leading toward happiness (Layard 2005: 43–48). It 
is a universal feature of human psychology for people to compare themselves to 
their reference group—if everyone is doing about the same, or they are doing 
better than others, people tend to feel happy. So an increase in inequality such 
as we have seen in Masho will have led to an increase in happiness for the few 
people that have made a lot of money and changed their consumption patterns, 
and a rather larger decrease in happiness for the many people that have been less 
successful in the apple business or have failed to enter it at all. This polarization 
of happiness between the successful and the less successful is a well-known facet 
of market societies (Lane 2000).
These changes in Masho have led to a further weakening of the social fabric 
and an increase in resentment and jealousy. In fact, I only learned the Gamo 
word for jealousy during a visit in 2010. In my two year’s intensive fieldwork 
and all the subsequent trips that I had made I had never come across a situation 
when the word was used. But in 2010 it came up in a conversation with Wendu 
and his twenty-year-old daughter, Muna. We were discussing some problems 
Wendu was having with the Pentecostal Church in Masho. Wendu was in fact 
one of the longest standing members of the church and had been one of the 
earliest converts. He had done much to bring in other believers and had been 
a preacher and a member of the church committee for several years. So I was 
surprised to learn that the current church committee was accusing him of being 
involved in inappropriate, un-Christian activities. I asked Wendu what this was 
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all about and he struggled to explain. None of the accusations made any sense. 
Then Muna, who was also active in the church, leaned forward and said:
It’s because they’re jealous. Wendu has done well with apples and they don’t like 
it. They cause him all these problems and make all these accusations, but really 
they are just jealous that we are doing well. We have done well through work-
ing hard, not by doing anything bad, so we know we are in the right. So we will 
continue to work hard and pray to God and just ignore all these accusations.
Wendu concurred that this was the case. “It’s been a headache since the apples 
came,” he told me, “there has been so much fighting and arguing.” As well as 
the arguments with the church, he is always being asked for help by poorer 
neighbors, and he feels uncomfortable in these situations. He told me about 
Lembo, just one of the many people that keeps coming to his house to ask for 
food, money, or work. According to Wendu, Lembo sold all his land some years 
ago and quickly “ate” the money. He now goes around begging for help and of-
ten turns up at Wendu’s door. Faced with a direct request, Wendu finds it hard 
to say no, but he also believes that their different fortunes are due to their own 
personal decisions and that it is not his responsibility to look after Lembo. Even 
though Wendu has been one of the “winners” of the apple revolution and now 
sits toward the higher echelons of Masho society, he has also found that the 
changes have both decreased as well as increased his happiness.
So, to sum up so far, there seems to be quite a case for thinking that most 
people’s happiness has decreased since the apple boom and increasing involve-
ment in market-based economic activity. The culturally valued state of smooth 
and peaceful social relations has diminished and the techniques of happiness 
that previously facilitated warm sociality and “present moment consciousness” 
have receded into the background. If these are the things that make Gamo peo-
ple happy, then it would seem safe to say that they are less happy now than they 
were ten years ago. But . . .
But there is a caveat. Alongside these changes that I do believe have led to 
a decrease in happiness, there has been another change that I believe has led to 
an increase in happiness. This is not the increased consumption of goods, which 
I don’t believe has led to any sustained increase in happiness, but a change of 
religion and, in particular, the engagement in a new form of religious ritual. 
Alongside the change in production and market activity, there has also been a 
major religious shift in the same ten years, during which time by far the majority 
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of the people of Masho have converted to Pentecostal Christianity (Freeman 
2012a, 2013b). I have suggested elsewhere that there are some quite Weberian 
links between the move toward market capitalism and the move toward Pente-
costalism (Freeman 2012b), but that is not my concern here. Instead, I want to 
focus on the change in religious and ritual life that people are experiencing and 
to consider, perhaps, how it affects their happiness.
RELIGION, RITUAL, AND HAPPINESS
For most people in Masho, direct personal engagement with Pentecostal Chris-
tianity is very new, something that has only started in the past 2–7 years. Be-
fore that the vast majority of the community participated in traditional rituals 
centered on animal sacrifices and an elaborate series of initiations (see Freeman 
2002). These rituals and associated practices structured social and political life 
and appeased the spirits so that they did not cause illness or misfortune. I have 
not discussed these traditional beliefs and practices in the foregoing sections 
because I do not think that they function as cultural techniques of happiness. 
Like many traditional rituals, they focus on formalized speech patterns and con-
ventions and function to insert persons in the public order and to legitimize 
the redistribution of surplus wealth. As many classic anthropological analyses 
of ritual have argued, this formalism renders the intentions or experiences of 
the participants largely irrelevant (see Bloch 1974; Tambiah 1979; Rappaport 
1999). The purpose of these rituals is not to do something to the inner emo-
tional states of individuals; it is to do something to the social order. Their focus 
is not on the happiness of people but on the happiness of the spirits.
Pentecostalism, however, is a completely different thing. One of its very main 
objectives is the reconfiguration of the self of the believer. While it is probably 
true that all of the major world religions seek to effect structured transitions in 
the inner world of the subject (Shulman and Stroumsa 2002), Pentecostalism 
puts a particular emphasis on this and is extraordinarily effective in its methods 
and outcomes. Scholars of Pentecostalism have talked about its ability to bring 
about a “revision of consciousness” (Martin 1990: 287), a “remaking of the indi-
vidual” (Maxwell 1998: 352), a “reorientation of persons” (Barbalet 2008: 75). In 
the context of Gamo, and indeed more generally, the key subjective transforma-
tion is to turn the person into a “believer.” What this means, though, deserves 
a little unpacking.
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Joel Robbins has pointed out that the verb “to believe” can have two differ-
ent meanings—“to believe in” and “to believe that” (Robbins 2007). “To believe 
in God,” for example, means to trust God and to commit yourself to Him. It is 
an act, more than a statement, and it signifies a relationship between the believer 
and God. “To believe that God exists,” however, is something very different. It is 
a propositional statement and it implies a state of uncertainty about the propo-
sition. “To believe,” in this second sense, is in contrast to “to know.” “Believing” 
in Gamo is very much believing in. It is not about believing that something 
(e.g., the Bible) is true, or believing that something (e.g., God) exists. It is more 
about trusting and believing in a God that can and will help you, and is only 
waiting for you to enter into relationship with Him in order to start bestowing 
His magnificent power and goodwill on to you.
For people in Gamo this is a radically new concept. When I asked if they be-
lieved in the spirits, people laughed at the absurdity of the question. For them it 
is clear both that (a) the spirits exist—there is no question about that—and (b) 
you can’t “believe in” them because they do not have anything good to give you, 
they do not relate to people in that way, they do not care about people and are 
not able to protect them. Believing in God or Jesus, for Gamo Pentecostals, is 
about opening yourself to a new kind of relationship with a new kind of benevo-
lent power. As such, it is a radically transformative process and leads a person to 
begin to experience him or herself in a profoundly new way, as someone that is 
both loved and empowered.
The process by which this transformation of the self takes place is long and 
complex, and can only be briefly touched upon in this paper. The main tech-
niques used are Christian study and experiential ritual. The church’s head office 
in Addis Abeba produces study materials that are distributed to all the local 
churches. The book currently used has ten chapters on topics ranging from “rev-
elation” to “man and sin” to “salvation” and “Holy Spirit.” All those visiting the 
church are soon invited to participate in a series of small group classes with the 
preacher or some of the other church elders that slowly works through the book. 
The initial series of classes can last over a year and people then often continue 
in other classes or group learning activities. Slowly, gradually, people learn a new 
way to view themselves and the world, a new narrative, and a new set of values.
The second technique, and the one on which I will focus a bit more here, is 
experiential ritual in the Pentecostal church service. In contrast to traditional 
rituals that focus on the social order, Pentecostal ritual focuses almost exclu-
sively on the inner emotional world of the participant. For this reason it has 
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proved difficult to study with classical anthropological theories of ritual and 
most scholars have tended to lean to a more phenomenological approach, focus-
ing on bodily experience and meaning-making (see, for example, Coleman and 
Collins 2000; Lindhardt 2011; Luhrmann 2004, 2012; Steven 2002). As Martin 
Lindhardt has commented, this approach sees Pentecostal ritual as “an arena of 
practice through which new dispositions and new senses of self, agency, com-
munity and mission are cultivated” (Lindhardt 2011: 8).
Going to a Pentecostal church service in Ethiopia is like going on an emo-
tional rollercoaster. There is no way to sit at the back, remain a neutral observer, 
and not get swept up in the collective emotional journey. At least I couldn’t find 
a way. Church services generally last around three hours and have a fairly stand-
ard emotional shape. After some warm-up with quiet reflection and singing, 
participants are led to feel first guilt and suffering. The preacher will harangue 
them, bemoaning the sinfulness of the community, the things that they have 
done wrong, how they haven’t helped others enough, haven’t been doing God’s 
word, how there are problems in the community, and so on. During this time 
it is common to see people with tears in their eyes, looking down at the floor. 
I would find myself with a heavy heart and somehow absorbing the feelings of 
sadness and remorse that emanated all around me.
Then the tone would shift, and through stories of God’s forgiveness and 
awe-inspiring good deeds, arousing singing and the use of call-and-response 
that pulled you into praising God, the mood shifted to awe and gratitude.




“Why did he do it? Because he loves us! Hallelujah!”
“Hallelujah!”
“And he cares for us! Hallelujah!”
“Hallelujah!”
“Turn to your neighbor, look into their eyes, and tell them that God cares for 
them!”
In this way, at high volume, and interdispersed with vibrant singing, people’s 
emotions are manipulated from state to state. By the end many people are 
standing up, arms spread upward, with huge smiles on their faces. The energy 
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causes others to run around the church and occasionally someone will speak in 
tongues. Most times that I have attended these services, I have found myself 
swept up in this emotional frenzy and by the time I come out I am feeling 
somewhat exhausted, and full of gratitude and love and warm feelings toward 
everyone. Facial expressions and movements suggest that many other people are 
feeling the same way.
Anthropologists have long noticed that rituals very often make people feel 
good—they are a prime example of a cultural technique of happiness. From 
Durkheim’s notion of “collective effervescence” through Victor Turner’s “com-
munitas” to many more recent studies, we have many ethnographic descriptions 
of rituals generating feelings of joy, ecstasy, and exuberance during the ritual 
itself and then leaving people with a sense of peace and calm afterward (see 
Csordas 2002, 1994; Eliade 1964; Goodman 1988; Katz 1982). There is even 
a small body of literature seeking to find the causal physiological mechanisms 
for this generation of positive emotion. Earlier studies looked at the release 
of endorphins during various ritual activities (e.g., Prince 1982), while more 
recent work has suggested that various bodily techniques, such as singing to-
gether or moving together in synchrony can lead to the experience of positive 
emotions (Csordas 1997, 1990; McNeill 1995; Williams 1981; Wiltermuth and 
Heath 2009). Radcliffe-Brown talked about the experience of the dancer losing 
himself in the dance—a notion very similar to psychologist Mihaly Csikszent-
mihalyi’s concept of “flow” (1991)—and recent work by psychologist Jonathan 
Haidt has suggested that experiences of transcending the self, feeling part of 
something that is greater than the self, can generate very positive emotions of 
awe and elevation (Haidt 2000, 2003, 2008).
The point that I want to make here is that Pentecostal church services in 
Masho are phenomenally effective techniques of happiness, in more than one 
way. First, they regularly generate bursts of positive emotions in their partici-
pants, a weekly “fix” of love and gratitude, if you like. In fact, many people attend 
church services 4–5 times per week, so for these devout followers the emotional 
fix is even more frequent. The regular experience of these heart-overwhelming 
bursts of positive emotion considerably changes people’s lived experience of 
themselves and the world. Psychologist Barbara Fredrickson, working in a very 
different context, has suggested that experiences of positive emotion such as 
gratitude can lead to a broadening of people’s attention, more creative thinking, 
and the cultivation of more social connections, thus leading people to shape 
their lives so that they experience more well-being (Fredrickson 2001). I have 
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not yet been able to investigate this in Masho, but it is an interesting avenue to 
explore.
Second, Pentecostals change their subjectivity by deepening their interior-
ity as they develop the process of looking inside. This “opening of inner space” 
seems crucial to the process of self-transformation (Handelman 2002). All 
prayer meetings start with a few minutes of silent, personal prayer where peo-
ple articulate their hopes and desires and also scrutinize themselves and their 
activities for sins and wrong-doing. This process of introspection is developed 
through other programs, confessions, and prayer meetings, and is very different 
to traditional notions that what is inside is best kept there, hidden and out of 
sight. Through the emotional journey that they then traverse during the church 
service—through shame, guilt, and sadness to joy, love, and gratitude—Pente-
costals are able to understand and experience their emotional lives in new ways 
that has lasting effects beyond the ritual itself.
Thus the various practices of Pentecostal Christianity, particularly its rituals, 
act as new cultural techniques of happiness. They provide believers with a new 
sense of self that is loved and empowered, a new set of values, new forms of 
community and togetherness, and a new emotional landscape. While I would 
not go so far as to suggest that all major religions are “ways to happiness,” as 
theologian Don Cupitt has recently claimed (Cupitt 2005), I am sympathetic 
to the arguments of Paul Heelas and his associates that the focus on “spiritual-
ity” and “inner experience” that has emerged in many contemporary religions 
and spiritual movements does indeed lead participants toward increased hap-
piness and well-being in an increasingly complex world (Heelas 2008; Heelas 
and Woodhead 2005).
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the changes in Masho over the last ten years have led to both 
decreases and increases in peoples’ happiness. For most people the day-to-day 
lived experience of happiness in peaceful sociality and nonreflexive present-time 
consciousness has decreased with the move toward a more market-based socio-
economic reality. The increase in inequality and the broadening of the differenc-
es in peoples’ consumption habits has decreased the happiness of most people, 
rich and poor alike. And yet, over the same period, as people have converted to 
Pentecostal Christianity, they have come to access a new form of happiness, one 
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built on a transformation of their sense of self and a deepening and reconfigur-
ing of their emotional lives.
Are the people of Masho happier now or before? It’s hard to say. But what 
is quite clear is that they are happy in a different way. The integration of Masho 
into the market economy through apple production has transformed happi-
ness from being imbued in the social fabric of the community to being more 
about cultivating deep interior spaces. While happiness was once grounded in 
the experience of peaceful sociality it is now to be found in the experience of a 
more empowered and liberated self in relationship with God/Jesus. As exchange 
has become increasingly commoditized, so happiness appears to have become 
increasingly privatized.
There are two key theoretical points that emerge from this ethnography, 
one more particularizing and one more universalizing. The first point is that 
the experience of happiness is fundamentally linked to the cultural sense of 
self. When the self is transformed, new avenues of happiness (and unhappi-
ness) become manifest as more and different interior spaces are opened up. This 
point should be taken more seriously by happiness researchers from other dis-
ciplines who routinely assume a modern, rational, straightforward self. The eth-
nographic approach used in this essay makes it clear that such assumptions are 
not warranted when studying “non-Western” peoples. Cultural senses of self are 
varied and shifting and need to be taken into account particularly when doing 
comparative studies of happiness across different countries or populations. It is 
also extremely likely that the modern rational self is also somewhat of a fiction 
among “Western” subjects, among whom different interior spaces have devel-
oped in response to widely differing childhood experiences. A more nuanced, 
experience-based account of happiness among these subjects would also unveil 
richer shades of meaning and deeper understandings of the many and diverse 
ways that happiness is and can be experienced.
The second point is more universalizing. Despite the differences in the expe-
riences of happiness in the two different cultural-historical contexts in Masho, 
there is nonetheless one major feature that is shared in both of the different 
routes to happiness—both of them involve the experience of transcending the 
self. In the earlier historical period the self is transcended by being subsumed in 
the social fabric. Cultural techniques of happiness encourage this by constantly 
directing (mental/psychological) attention away from the self and toward the 
other, whether by playing, by drinking coffee together, or by generally spending 
time constantly with other people. In the later historical period the transformed 
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self is transcended in its new relation with the all-encompassing God/Jesus. 
New cultural techniques of happiness encourage this, particularly in the highly 
emotional Pentecostal church services and in new narratives of meaning. While 
in the first context transcending the self is part of everyday life and is very much 
a way of being, in the second context it is more punctuated, taking place in par-
ticular contexts such as church ritual, and is much more intense. Nonetheless 
the structural similarities are there. This suggests that the experience of tran-
scending the self may possibly be a universal feature of the human experience 
of happiness.
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chapter five
“Good without God”
Happiness and pleasure among the humanists
Matthew Engelke
In 1965, a competition was held by the British Humanist Association (BHA) 
to design a logo for the humanist movement, a universal symbol to signify a 
commitment to “non-religious people who seek to live ethical lives on the basis 
of reason and humanity.”1 Over 150 entries were received; the winning design, 
by a humanist from north London, is called “the happy human.” This symbol 
is now used by humanist organizations throughout the globe—from India to 
Australia to Canada. Members of the BHA can sometimes be found wearing 
lapel pins with the Happy Human which read “Happy Humanist” or “Good 
without God.” 
In 2008, the comedian Ariane Sherine launched the “Atheist Bus Cam-
paign,” with the backing of the BHA and one of the association’s most promi-
nent members, Richard Dawkins. The campaign was inspired by Sherine’s upset 
over an advertisement by a Christian organization, which she saw on the side 
of a bus, the upshot of which was that only Jesus can save you from hell. The 
1. This is how the BHA currently puts it, on the top of its homepage, www.humanism.
org.uk, accessed December 1, 2015. 
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Atheist Bus Campaign’s riposte—which raised over £150,000 in support—was: 
“There’s probably no god. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life.”
In 2011, I met Andrew West, a humanist, photographer, and computer 
whiz; he did a lot of photography for the BHA and later that year went on 
to become the Association’s IT officer. Not long before joining the BHA, he 
completed a degree in photography, the thesis project for which was a series of 
portraits of humanists accompanied by their answers to the question: What are 
you happy about? 
In March 2014, the BHA produced a series of short animations explaining 
humanist values and principles, narrated by the actor, comedian, and writer, 
Stephen Fry (another prominent member of the Association). One of these 
animations addressed the question: “How can I be happy?” The video went viral, 
and was viewed on YouTube over 750,000 times in the first several days. It was 
picked up by the Independent newspaper and dubbed, on March 25, “the best 
thing you’ll watch today.” Shortly after the launch of the video, and this head-
line, I had dinner with the BHA’s chief executive officer. We talked a lot about 
the video; he was very happy. 
Happiness is part and parcel of humanism. Humanism in contemporary 
Britain is driven by a passion for the pursuit of happiness.2 But why happiness? 
What is it about happiness that stands out for humanists, and what does it en-
tail? To answer these questions, we need to pay particular attention to the ways 
in which British humanists understand happiness as the struggle for, and prom-
ise of, enlightenment. Humanists see themselves as children of the Enlighten-
ment, as taking up the mantle of reason, the tools of science, and the potentials 
of free thought. Being happy and being “good without god” is a commitment 
both to pleasure and to progress.3 And for the humanists, happiness is a subjec-
tive experience—but also a sign of the secular. 
2. “Humanism” is a term with many meanings and a long history. In this article, it 
means secular humanism. The BHA members I got to know called themselves 
many things, each of which had specific motivations and intentions. But in general, 
these humanists, secular humanists, atheists, agnostics, freethinkers, materialists, 
and so on, wanted to emphasize that they admitted no beyond, that they did not 
“believe” in anything supernatural, miraculous, or divine. 
3. The 2014 World Humanist Congress, hosted by the BHA in Oxford, brought 
together over a thousand delegates from more than sixty countries. The theme 
was “Freedom of Thought and Expression: Forging a Twenty-First-Century 
Enlightenment.” 
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At least one distinguished anthropological elder, Elizabeth Colson, has 
warned the discipline off the idea of studying happiness—and, still more, any 
attempts to measure it. “Happiness,” she writes, “is in the heart and not in 
the eye of the beholder” (Colson 2012: 8). In line with the points made by 
Harry Walker and Iza Kavedžija in their introduction to this HAU collection, 
I find it difficult to see how measuring happiness could ever be anthropology’s 
proper remit. That doesn’t, however, mean that happiness should be a no-go 
area for anthropology—especially when the people we study make it so central 
to their lives and social projects. Indeed, as Walker and Kavedžija note, what 
anthropology can contribute to happiness studies is “how happiness figures 
as an idea, mood, or motive in people’s day-to-day lives.” A small number 
of anthropologists have also recognized this, and have worked to point out 
that happiness is more than a subjective experience (see, e.g., Corsín Jimenez 
2008; Thin 2012; Jackson 2013; Fischer 2014). As Neil Thin would have it, 
for instance, “happiness is best understood not as a definable entity but as an 
evaluative kind of ‘conversation’ (broadly conceived to include internal dia-
logues) about how well our lives go” (2012: 33). Thin emphasizes the “internal” 
aspect of such conversations, and in doing so highlights particular models of 
subjectivity, models which Colson is also clearly drawing upon. So perhaps 
in this idiom we can say that happiness may well be “in the heart,” as Colson 
puts in, but also that it is “in the head.”4 For the humanists I studied, happi-
ness is very much like this; it is an idea. They have an ideological commitment 
to happiness, expressed above all as a pursuit of the good life.5 And for these 
humanists, what that means is working to articulate, and live out, Enlighten-
ment values. 
4. This idiom might not work everywhere in the world (see Throop’s and Walker’s 
articles in this collection, for example), but it does roughly for such contexts as 
Britain and the United States (although in her brief reflections Colson extends 
it to 1950s Zambia, where she made her mark as an anthropologist). The idiom 
certainly works well enough for the British humanists I studied: such “head/
heart” distinctions map well onto their readings of post-Enlightenment models of 
subjectivity. 
5. It is worth noting that the small amount of anthropological work addressing 
happiness is often framed in relation to questions of wellbeing and pursuit of the 
good life (see, e.g, Corsín Jiménez 2008; Fischer 2014). These studies also underscore 
a common thread in the articles of this HAU collection, which is a “concern with 
values” (Fischer 2014: 12, his emphasis; see also Corsín Jiménez 2008: 17–19). 
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THE BRITISH HUMANIST ASSOCIATION 
Founded in 1896 as the Union of Ethical Societies, the BHA has existed in its 
current constitutional form since 1967. During the main period of my research 
(2011), the BHA had approximately twelve thousand members (who pay annu-
al dues of £35) and another eighteen thousand supporters (who, at a minimum, 
receive updates of BHA activities via an e-newsletter). (These figures have now 
risen.) Based on a survey I conducted in June 2011 (midway through a year of 
fieldwork), 69 percent of members were male; 31 percent female. Seventy-three 
percent had university degrees, and 80 percent donated monthly or annually to 
charities (Oxfam, Save the Children, Cancer Research UK, and Amnesty In-
ternational were some of the most common). The BHA has a number of high-
profile members, many of whom are very active in promotion of the association. 
In addition to Dawkins and Fry, these include the scientists Jim Al-Khalili, 
Brian Cox, and Alice Roberts (all of whom have significant media careers in 
the United Kingdom), journalist Polly Toynbee, comedians Tim Minchin and 
Natalie Haynes, philosopher A. C. Grayling, and fiction writers such as Philip 
Pullman and the late Terry Pratchett. The actors Patrick Stewart and Ricky 
Gervais are also distinguished supporters and so, too, is Simon Le Bon, front-
man for Duran Duran. 
The work of the BHA can be divided into three areas. The first is the promo-
tion of humanism in policy and public debates. Much of this work is classically 
secularist, such as campaigning for the abolition of state-funded faith schools 
and the constitutional right of Anglican bishops to sit in the House of Lords. 
The second is servicing and fostering local humanist groups; there are about 
sixty of these, ranging in size from six to sixty people. This grassroots work is 
extremely important to the BHA: the more locally embedded humanists are, 
forming communities of discussion, debate, and care, the better. The third main 
area of focus is the provision of ceremonies: weddings, naming ceremonies, and, 
above all, funerals for BHA members and anyone else who wants to have a rite 
of passage that is self-consciously humanist or “not religious.” Within the BHA, 
there is a network of approximately three hundred trained celebrants to provide 
these ceremonies throughout England and Wales.6 The BHA is increasingly 
starting to support other forms of social care, piloting programs in prisons and 
6. There is a Humanist Society of Scotland, which operates independently of the 
BHA (although cooperatively). 
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hospitals to provide humanist chaplains and other forms of pastoral support. 
(Not all humanists like using these terms—chaplain, pastoral—to describe the 
activities, but there is a lot of support for the initiatives, and the BHA itself sees 
no reason not to draw on the common understandings of such words.)
“THE TIME TO BE HAPPY IS NOW” 
I have said that humanists see themselves as children of the Enlightenment. 
There is, of course, no way to understand the various intellectual movements and 
social changes in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe and America as 
part of a single, straightforward story. And these movements and changes built 
on what came before them. For the humanists, Greek and Roman traditions of 
thought are also often embraced. Within the BHA, however, it is the language 
of the Enlightenment that dominates, and one particular version of the En-
lightenment story has pride of place: that in which reason snuffs out religion 
and gives rise to a modern world governed by science. Theirs is a world in which 
individuals “think for themselves,” and refuse to accept as fact or authority any-
thing that is not based on “evidence.” “With these brains we have the ability to 
question,” says Robin Ince, a BHA patron and well-known comedian; “if we fail 
to do that, if we look for a high priest or elder to do our thinking for us, to in-
struct us and manipulate us, then we are failing to live up to our potential.”7 The 
echoes of certain pieces of Enlightenment rhetoric here are unmistakable, those 
in which the Enlightenment serves as “the starting point of secular modernity 
and rationality” (Sorkin 2008: 1)—the “Radical Enlightenment” (Israel 2001: 
11–12), for which religion cannot be rehabilitated and reason must be exercised. 
As one member reported to me, on joining the BHA, “Finally I found an or-
ganized voice of reason that represented my views and acts as a counterpoint to 
oppressive religion.” “Enlightenment,” wrote Immanuel Kant, in 1784,
is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to 
make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is 
7. This quote is taken from the BHA’s website, in the page header; see https://
humanism.org.uk/news/, accessed December 1, 2015. The quote is one of many 
by prominent humanists that is randomly generated when loading and reloading a 
BHA webpage. 
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this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and 
courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! “Have courage to 
use your own reason!”—that is the motto of enlightenment. (1963: 3) 
It is not that all BHA members spend their days reading Kant, or John Locke, 
or David Hume. Yet the mantle of Aufklärung is held tight and proudly worn. 
Several of the BHA’s most prominent champions and contemporary inspira-
tions—the philosopher A. C. Grayling, the late critic Christopher Hitchens—
have, however, read Kant and Locke (and others); they have charted, through 
their popular writings, a genealogy that links the humanist project to such 
figures. Less prominently, but no less importantly, the BHA coordinates the 
Humanist Philosophers group, which includes a number of well-respected aca-
demics, such as Richard Norman and Peter Cave. In addition to publishing on 
their specialist interests, and for general readers too, humanists such as Norman 
and Cave are regularly invited to speak by local humanist groups, where they 
present overviews of how humanist thought is linked to that of Enlightenment 
thinkers and those who came after them, especially such nineteenth-century 
figures as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Darwin. In other 
ways, humanist scientists and science writers—Dawkins, Cox, Al-Khalili, and 
Roberts—emphasize the Enlightenment through their treatments of science, 
promotion of the scientific method, and critiques of creationism. The BHA’s 
members, supporters, and publics eagerly soak this up, through their reading 
practices, for instance, and attendance at the BHA’s numerous annual lectures, 
named, tellingly, after Voltaire, Darwin, Bentham, and Shelley.8 These pack 
sold-out auditoriums in London, Oxford, and elsewhere. BHA staff are always 
giving talks—to local groups, to trainee teachers, to trainee nurses, to school 
students—which include potted histories of humanism, illustrated by slides 
with quotes on reason, free thought, and the pursuit of happiness by eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century philosophers and scientists (Hume, Darwin, Thomas 
Huxley, Ludwig Feuerbach). 
8. In the survey I conducted, 72 percent of BHA members said they had read Dawkins’ 
most well-known critique of religion, The God delusion, in which he is very explicit 
about his commitment to Enlightenment values. Asked which of three books they 
would want on a desert island, 2 percent of members chose the Bible; 62 percent 
chose the collected works of Shakespeare; and 36 percent chose Darwin’s On the 
origin of species. 
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Among historians, none has been more insistent than Roy Porter on the 
fact that “there never was a monolithic ‘Enlightenment project’” (2000: xxi). Yet 
even so, Porter identifies some lowest common denominators of the changes 
that took place. One of them concerns the understanding of happiness. “The 
Enlightenment’s great historical watershed,” he writes, “lay in the validation of 
pleasure. . . . The Enlightenment’s novelty lay in the legitimacy it accorded to 
pleasure, not as occasional binges, mystical transports or blue-blooded privilege, 
but as the routine entitlement of people at large to pursue the senses (not just 
purify the soul) and to seek fulfilment in this world (and not only in the next)” 
(ibid.: 258; 260). 
The temporal framing of Porter’s characterization is important. There is in-
deed what we might call a “temporality of happiness,” as Walker and Kavedžija 
stress (see the introduction to this collection). In Porter’s analysis, after the En-
lightenment it gets increasingly premised on a shift from what we might gloss 
as a religious sense of time to a secular sense of time, a shift that a number of 
other scholars have written about at great length (see Anderson 1991 for one 
well-known example, drawing on Walter Benjamin). The temporality of here-
and-now, immanent being-in-this-world, is certainly central to the humanists I 
studied. We see hints of this in the Atheist Bus Campaign’s riposte to fire-and-
brimstone Christianity; it is also expressed in the BHA’s motto: “For the one 
life we have.” A popular quotation on happiness among the humanists comes 
from the nineteenth-century American agnostic Robert Ingersoll. “Happiness 
is the only good,” Ingersoll said. “The time to be happy is now. The place to be 
happy is here. The way to be happy is to make others so” (see Jacoby 2013: 97). 
Like a meme, this proclamation of immanence and the immediate circulates 
among humanist communities, as, for instance, in the BHA’s many PowerPoint 
presentations dedicated to the promotion and spread of humanism. It is all 
part of the conclusion that being happy is being secular.9 To say “the time to be 
happy is now”—to stress what we do “for the one life we have”—is to take a very 
9. In her history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century atheism and agnosticism 
in Britain, Susan Budd highlights this kind of view at several points. In her 
discussion of the British Secular Union, for example, founded in 1877, she cites its 
constitution, which advocates “the promotion of political, social or religious reform 
in any wise tending to increase the secular happiness of the people” (1977: 59). 
Readers of Budd’s history will see how the dynamics and arguments behind 
antireligious sentiment in the nineteenth century have many parallels with those of 
contemporary Britain. 
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particular view of history, of human potentiality, and of the fabric of meaning. 
As another historian puts it, “Happiness, in the Enlightenment view, was less an 
ideal of godlike perfection than a self-evident truth, to be pursued and obtained 
in the here and now” (McMahon 2006: 13). “Humanists do not see that there 
is any obvious purpose to the universe, but that it is a natural phenomenon, 
with no design behind it. Meaning is not something out there, waiting to be 
discovered, but something that we create in our own lives,” says Stephen Fry, in 
the BHA video on how to be happy. “The time to be happy is now,” he goes on 
to conclude. “And the way to find meaning in life is to get on and live it, as fully, 
and as well, as we can.”10 
Colson might eschew it altogether, but in any case no one who studies hap-
piness claims that it is easy to limn or measure. Happiness has to be seen as 
an admixture of sentiments, affects, demeanor, and declarations, even actions. 
Andrew West’s photography project, for example, which includes portraits of 
fifty-eight humanists, contains a range of concrete answers to his question: 
What are you happy about? Many of the answers are generic: “I am happy today 
because my kids have been making me laugh,” says Stephen, a philosopher in 
Oxford. Others are generic yet inflected with humanist particularities: “I’m hap-
py to be alive, happy with my children and grandchildren who are the only im-
mortality I need. I am happy to live in a world with food, drink, flowers and the 
astonishing abundance that flows from the imagination of other humans, dead 
and alive,” says Polly, a writer in London. (Notice Polly’s emphasis on here-and-
now, on the one life we have.) Several of the answers include similar references 
to children and grandchildren, or, failing that, other pleasurable things: flowers, 
birds, and food. Not a few also reference consumption of various kinds: televi-
sion shows, clothes, a new pair of stilettos—even the purchase of a camper van.11 
10. “How can I be happy?” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tvz0mmF6NW4, 
accessed December 1, 2015. I might note here that humanists’ commitment to 
here-and-now does not preclude them from thinking of the future. Some of the 
humanists I got to know were also deeply involved in environmental campaigns 
and organizations, for instance; they certainly understood climate change as a 
serious challenge for humanity and the ecosystem (and had no patience for climate-
change skeptics). Interestingly, however, they tended to think of these commitments 
separately, as if humanism and environmentalism had to be discrete. 
11. Porter emphasizes the link between the Enlightenment and modern consumerism 
and consumption: “New lobbies of enlightened economists and progressive 
social commentators began to argue that market culture, sport, print and leisure 
were economically productive entities, forces of civilization and social cohesion” 
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Other replies are highly specific and tailored, humanist plugs. Says Chris, from 
Bournemouth: “I’m happy during February 2009 to have been invited to talk 
to North Yorkshire Humanists & Dorset Humanists about ‘Darwin, Science & 
Humanism.’ Darwin showed how man & all living species evolved from earlier 
ancestors. A supernatural creator is not necessary to explain any living creature’s 
existence on earth.” And Allison, from London, is happy “about spending an 
evening with enlightened people.” Joanna, from Lansdowne, tells West she is 
happy because she has “no worries about dying.” 
West’s portraits give us an excellent range of the ways in which humanist 
happiness can be understood. The small number of examples I’ve provided are 
indicative of the range, and we can use them to explore humanist conceptions 
of happiness yet further, in terms of both “heart” and “head,” as I put it above. 
Indeed, in reading through West’s book, and looking at the portraits, I had 
confirmed much of what I found in my own fieldwork—not only in outline, but 
often quite specifically. Of the fifty-eight humanists portrayed by Andrew in his 
book, twenty-four of them figured in my own research. 
Happiness for humanists contains both hedonic and eudaimonic compo-
nents. When Fry says in the BHA video that we should live fully and well, he 
is saying we should combine pleasures (wine, gardening) with purposefulness 
(political commitments, social justice). And for every humanist I met, the two 
had to be seen as of a piece. Heart and head. Another of Andrew’s photographic 
subjects, Harry, from London, sums this up perfectly in relaying the two things 
that make him happy: “making love” and “progress in moral philosophy.” 
Clearly, as we’ve seen, happiness is recognized by these humanists in the 
terms of much happiness science today, and more generally the stereotypical 
understanding of smiles and joy. (Forty-nine out of West’s fifty-eight subjects 
are smiling in the photos, it might be noted.) The emphasis on laughing with 
one’s children, enjoying a curry, loving a new pair of high-heeled shoes, and 
making love is all about what Richard Layard calls “feeling good—enjoying life 
and wanting the feeling to be maintained” (2006: 12). 
To be happy because you don’t need any more “immortality” than that pro-
vided by your grandchildren, though, or because you enjoy the company of 
(2000: 268). Today, of course, this is often further refined with respect to fair 
trade campaigns, socially responsible investment, and the like; see Fischer’s (2014) 
comparative ethnography of wellbeing and the good life in Guatemala (among 
Mayan coffee farmers) and Germany (among supermarket shoppers) for an example. 
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“enlightened people,” or because of progress in moral philosophy, or because 
you’re not afraid of dying, or because you have an opportunity to deny the exist-
ence of a supernatural creator (and celebrate Darwin’s birthday in the process) 
is not quite the same. It may well make you feel good, but that’s in part because 
you see yourself as doing good, as living up to your values. The happy life is, 
in this important respect, the good life. In The conquest of happiness, Bertrand 
Russell, one of contemporary humanism’s heroes (and a committed mem-
ber of the BHA-as-then for much of his adult life), puts it in precisely these 
terms: “The happy life is to an extraordinary extent the same as the good life” 
(1930: 173). And the good life is not all about smiles, pleasures, and joys per se. 
It’s here that humanists inject a bit more Hellenism into their Enlighten-
ment sensibilities than we might find in, say, some utilitarian calculation of 
pleasure. For while the validation of pleasure is crucial to their cause—while 
the hedonic matters—this pleasure is, I would argue, part and parcel of a larger 
ethical and social project in which happiness gets defined through “virtuous 
conduct and philosophic reflection” (Layard 2006: 22). In short, I argue, for the 
humanists, the hedonic (the pleasurable) has to be seen as serving the eudai-
monic (the good). For a humanist to say she loves her new high heels is not, 
at core, to betray her entrapment by the “hedonic treadmill” (ibid.: 48–49) of 
consumption. Or, at least, it is not only ever that. For what such embracement 
of earthly pleasures is also supposed to suggest is that there are only earthly 
pleasures to be had—that we are each our own makers. Humanists use their 
stilettos to beat God over the head; they use their camper vans to run him down 
in the road. They use their chances to explain why they’re happy to be happy 
here and now in a way that underscores its ethical valences. This is what I mean 
by arguing that we need to approach happiness as an ideological commitment. 
CHOCOLATE AND SEX 
Andrew Copson is another of the humanists featured in West’s book. Andrew 
is the CEO of the BHA, and he tells us he’s happy “because the sun is shining, 
I have a new book to read and a glass of ice tea.” 
Andrew is one of the humanists I got to know particularly well through 
my research. From January to August 2011, I probably spent about twenty-five 
hours a week with him, either sitting in the corner of his office, or out and about 
at various events, meetings, and engagements. Since that time I’ve seen him 
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regularly. I’d like to use Andrew as an extended example of the happy humanist, 
to fill out in a bit more detail what we’ve considered thus far, and in particular 
how the pleasurable aspects of happiness (the hedonic) should be seen as serv-
ing the purposeful aspects of happiness (the eudaimonic).12 
Andrew certainly liked ice tea. And coffee and hot chocolate and cake. Not 
long before we first met, he had quit smoking and it made his sweet tooth all 
the worse. In many ways, Andrew’s delight in food, especially sweets, was in-
discriminate. He’d just as soon have a hot cross bun from the snack trolley on 
an intercity train (not really very good) as an artisan brioche from the upscale 
coffee shop around the corner from his office (quite nice). But at core, Andrew 
actually had a very well thought-out approach to confections. One day at the 
office, he was particularly happy when a small, nondescript package arrived. He 
clapped his hands and gave a little jump in his desk chair before opening it to 
reveal a box of something called Chelsea Whoppers. Chelsea Whoppers are 
chocolate-like, fudge-like strips of goodness; they’re also hard to find in stores, 
so Andrew would special order them from online retro candy sellers. They were 
pure nostalgia, a reminder of his childhood and days gone by. He ate the whole 
box that day, over the course of which I got to hear a lot about growing up in 
Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Andrew grew up in Nuneaton in what he described as a very multicultural 
environment. His family was not religious, but not particularly antireligious ei-
ther. He first learned of humanism in secondary school, in a book by Barbara 
Smoker (a legendary member of the BHA and the National Secular Society, 
another important nonreligious organization in the UK). He never gave much 
thought to humanists, though, or to religion, until he arrived at Oxford, to read 
classics at Balliol College. At Oxford, he got “very angry” at an event he at-
tended sponsored by the Christian Union (at which, he mentioned to me, they 
were handing out free donuts). A man had come to speak, and 
12. Copson has given his consent to be named in this section; he felt no need for 
anonymity, and, given his public profile, as well as the specificity of some of the 
encounters upon which I draw, I use his real name. In the sections to follow, though, 
and in line with my other publications on the BHA, where I draw on primary 
ethnographic data, I follow one standard anthropological convention of using 
pseudonyms. In almost all cases, however, the humanists I worked with saw no 
need for this. I think this has something to do with their commitment to a certain 
understanding of the scientific method and transparency; a humanist should have 
nothing to hide—not when it’s in the service of (social) science. 
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he said that every time people heard more about the gospel, more about the 
Good News, but still refused to believe it, the more likely it was that they would 
be damned. And then later on in his talk, he sort of threw his arms up in frustra-
tion and said, “Oh, I don’t know why I come to these university events, you’re all 
so clever-clever, you’re never going to believe.” And I put my hand up and said, 
“Well, if you think that the more people learn about Christianity and refuse it, 
the more likely they are to be damned, and if you think that people will inevitably 
refuse it on [university] campuses, why are you going around deliberately making 
everyone’s damnation worse and worse and worse?”
This is classic Andrew. There were many things that came to bother him about 
religion and religious belief. And he is on the more explicit end of commitment 
to being an Enlightened modern. Andrew once chided me, only half-jokingly, 
for not ever having read the New Testament in Greek. He could recite Matthew 
Arnold’s poem “On Dover Beach” by heart and very well. Half way through his 
degree at Oxford, he switched to reading History. “I studied Europe up to the 
end of the classical period,” he told me, 
and [then] from the eighteenth century onwards, and so missed out completely 
the middle bit, where all these Christian things happened, and I think actually 
that is genuinely something that has influenced my view of things. .  .  . And 
although obviously I’m not thinking of Pericles every day, I’d be much more 
comfortable with the literature and culture of classical Athens than with church 
culture or whatever.
But Andrew is not a “new atheist” humanist; he is not as pugnacious as some. 
He has worked closely with various bodies on faith-based issues, and serves on 
the board of the Religious Education Council of England and Wales. (Andrew 
is a strong supporter of religious education in the national curriculum—and of 
humanism being included in it.) And for him, the BHA’s provision of ceremo-
nies is absolutely crucial to a humanist future. It was Andrew who pushed for 
(and engineered) the expansion of humanist networks of care into the realms of 
chaplaincy and pastoral support in hospital, prisons, and the military services. 
These kinds of community provision are central to his understandings of happi-
ness, wellbeing, and a good life. 
One area where Andrew could get indignant, though—where he could get 
annoyed in the manner of the new atheists—was when the pleasures and joys 
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of this life came under attack. Sometimes the indignation played out sarcasti-
cally. In January 2015, he appeared on the BBC’s Sunday morning discussion 
show, The big questions, to discuss the government’s recent decision not to give 
legal recognition to humanist weddings in England and Wales.13 (Andrew is 
regularly on television and the radio, representing a humanist or “nonreligious” 
point of view.) Taiwo Adewuyi, a conservative Christian and the founder of 
“Discuss Jesus,” was also on the show; in explaining why he opposed humanist 
marriages, Adewuyi said that “humanism is . . . a first-class ticket to the very 
hypersexualized culture that we’re seeing.” Andrew, with an incredulous smile 
on his face, began his reply by saying, “Well, if you’re going to go to wantonness 
and debauchery, I suppose you might as well travel first class.”14 Another time, 
in 2012, we were together, speaking to a prominent conservative evangelical 
Christian after an event. He and Andrew knew each other relatively well (the 
public square isn’t that big), and the three of us were engaged in polite small talk. 
Somehow the conversation turned to marriage, at which point Andrew said, 
“Isn’t it strange how evangelical Christians spend so much time telling their 
children that sex is horrible and disgusting and sinful and yet, at the same time, 
that they should save it for the person they marry?” As with what we see in some 
of West’s portraits, the barbs and jibes have an ethical valence here, all the more 
so when they pertain to the pleasures that people might rightly enjoy as human 
beings with one life to live. This isn’t about hedonism for hedonism’s sake: this 
is about being good without God.
It is important to stress that Andrew didn’t spend all his time eating Chelsea 
Whoppers, or mocking evangelical Christians about their attitudes to sex. I 
have only given a focused account of his character and commitments as relevant 
to the themes of this article. I got to know Andrew as a serious, committed 
campaigner for the causes he believes in: equality in state school admissions 
policies; dignity for those suffering with a terminal illness (the BHA strongly 
supports legislation on assisted dying); the importance of teaching humanism 
13. Humanist weddings are legal in Scotland; in England and Wales, BHA celebrants 
do conduct weddings, but the couple have to have a ceremony at the local Registry 
Office as well in order to be legally married. The BHA’s lobbying in Parliament 
came very close to success, but faced strong opposition from the Anglican Church 
and others who opposed the move. 
14. BBC One, The big questions, “Should humanists have equal rights to religions?” 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3j8jQkSydeo, accessed December 1, 
2015. 
146 MATTHEW ENGELKE
in the school curriculum; campaigning for humanist weddings; and free speech 
and its safe exercise (both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere; the murder 
of three atheist bloggers in Bangladesh has been a recent major concern). But 
chocolate and sex, and the happiness they bring, are an important part of the 
overall picture of being good without God. 
RELIGION, REASON, AND EMOTION 
The critique of religion and the cultivation of humanism go hand in hand. With-
in the BHA, religion is humanism’s opposite and other; religion is, for many of 
these humanists, inimical to reason and the kind of flourishing they value.15 We 
have already had a sense of this. In some cases, humanist happiness is defined in 
opposition to religious misery, worry, suffering, or delusion. This is where the com-
mitment to a radical version of the Enlightenment becomes especially relevant. 
Christianity, in particular, is, as we’ve seen, heavily criticized. It is not unusual to 
see BHA members, or those in affiliated local groups, turn sour at the thought 
of Christian approaches to life, approaches which many of them understand as 
dominated by a fixation with and even embracement of suffering, asceticism, 
and self-denial. There is no equivalent of theodicy in the BHA’s articulation of 
humanism. Claims that someone’s cancer or a flood or other personal or social 
misfortune is “God’s will,” or, even less nefariously, “telling us something,” drive 
them mad. Religious mores get cast as tools of subjection and shaming, or called 
out as hypocritical, as with Andrew’s comment to the evangelical back in 2012. 
More generally, humanists often express dismay and sometimes disgust at the 
thought that the master sign of Christianity is not a happy human but a suffer-
ing man. How, they ask, could any community orient themselves by a crucifix?
The point here is that religion, in this humanist view, is inimical to happi-
ness—true happiness, that is: a eudaimonic happiness grounded in the good 
15. While I have been writing here about members of the BHA, the attitudes, 
dispositions, and commitments we’ve found are not unique to them. Indeed, 
while there are some notable differences with the American context (in terms of 
organization, and, in particular, the scale of provision of nonreligious ceremonies), 
humanist and atheist groups there often define themselves in explicit opposition 
to religion, as defenders of reason, and as committed to a similar understanding of 
happiness; see the work of Jesse M. Smith (2013) for one qualitative, sociological 
case study. 
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(secular) life. There are equal measures of opprobrium, then, for Christians and 
other believers who don’t dwell on the crucifixion or suffering. The stereotyped 
“happy-clappy” Christian is considered just as problematic as what some BHA 
members would gloss as the guilt-laden, crucifix-wearing Catholic. For some, 
such believers are seen to be not happy so much as deluded into thinking they 
are happy, or at least are only superficially happy, because their worldviews can-
not allow for the good life as humanists conceive of it. For others, this expression 
of faith is assumed to be a façade. Even humanists who do accept some of the 
academic research suggesting that religious people are happier (e.g., Stavrova, 
Fetchenhauer, and Schlösser 2013) argue that the “religion bit” is secondary: if 
these people are happy, it is because of the human community they share, not its 
metaphysical aeration.16 As BHA members regularly told me, there are clearly 
benefits to voluntary associations: this is why local groups are such an important 
part in the BHA’s work. Increasingly, local groups are doing the kinds of things 
that religious groups have traditionally done: calling on elderly members in 
their homes for social visits; volunteering for local charities and programs; par-
ticipating in community fairs and civic life; even, in some cases, forming choirs 
and other corporate activities, such as parkland walking clubs (during which, in 
some of the more well-developed cases, botanists or geologists might be invited 
along to explain the local flora, fauna, and landscape). It is this, they said, that 
fosters happiness and well-being. God has nothing to do with it. (We might 
compare the similarities and differences with Ethiopian Pentecostal “techniques 
of happiness” discussed by Dena Freeman, in her article for this collection.) 
Alongside such arguments, humanists also often point to levels of happiness 
and well-being in Scandinavian nations, which are regularly referred to as the 
“least religious” in the world.17
16. See also Amy C. Wilkins’ (2008) qualitative study of the way in which a particular 
evangelical Christian group in the United States worked to foster happiness and a 
happy demeanor among its members; what she shows so well is how happiness is 
not necessarily epiphenomenal, but a normative demand. In this group, at least, “one 
cannot be a real Christian and not be happy” (ibid.: 294, emphasis in original). One 
point to keep in mind, then, is how happiness can become a demand of authenticity 
within certain communities of practice. Wherever we find that happiness has an 
ethical valence, then, it can present something of a catch-22: be happy, or else. 
17. The sociologist Phil Zuckerman (2008) has written about these issues in his 
informative study of Denmark and Sweden. Zuckerman’s work is largely qualitative, 
but he points to quantitative research as well, including that of Ronald Inglehart, 
Miguel Basáñez, and Alejandro Menéndez Moreno (1998), to support the argument 
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 Another problem with religion, when it comes to the realization of this 
particular good life, is its disregard for “evidence.” This is part of what I mean 
by saying that in this humanist project, “true happiness” can’t be realized except 
in secular form. Religion frustrates eudaimonia. For these humanists, evidence 
is a precondition for eudaimonia, because the good life can only be lived with 
due regard for science. And “evidence” does mean scientific evidence: objec-
tive, verifiable, and replicable. Evidence means knowledge rather than belief: 
fact rather than feeling. If immortality or the supernatural could be “proved” 
in the same way as the value of the antioxidants in blueberries, then humanists 
would alter their positions. Striving after truth in such terms, according to strict 
and well-defined evidentiary protocols, is a central aspect of humanist virtue. “I 
care passionately about the truth because it is a beautiful thing and enables us 
to lead a better life,” says Dawkins, in a promotional statement on the BHA’s 
homepage.18 As one member told me, she joined the BHA “to work towards a 
more rational society.” “I had to do something,” said another woman. “I had to 
understand more about religion and how to make Britain a secular society . . . 
the BHA[’s] values are my values.” 
 Logic is another key element here, and was often used by humanists I met 
to explain why they weren’t religious, and why religion itself is a dead end. They 
are simply not willing to accept that the Son of God, for instance, can defy the 
laws of nature. As one BHA staffer told me, his mildly active Anglicanism start-
ed to unravel from the age of twelve, when he realized that what his Religious 
Education teacher at school was saying simply wasn’t plausible. He began look-
ing up things in the family encyclopedia—archaeological records, geological 
records. “I think you’ll find this with a lot of atheists,” he told me. “It’s the little 
things that get you into it [investigating religious claims], because, if there’s no 
evidence . . . a lot falls down in Christianity.” 
that there is no necessary correlation between religiosity and happiness. Notably, 
too, Zuckerman’s qualitative work (see 2008: 57–75) picks up on Scandinavian 
attitudes toward death, and a strong sense in which the finality of death means that 
we should seek pleasures and progress in, and for, this world—very much akin to 
what we find in the BHA’s invocations of Ingersoll’s saying “the time to be happy is 
now.” 
18. It is important not to overstate Dawkins’ seeming dourness; while it doesn’t get 
picked up on nearly as often, most of his work—not least his recent memoir 
(Dawkins 2013)—is threaded through with appreciations of beauty, wonder, and 
enjoyment: the thrill of science and the majesty of nature. 
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The dangers of emotionalism are also regularly emphasized. For humanists, 
a “happy-clappy” Christian is, in this sense, more prone to deny reality and com-
mon sense. Edward, who ran a local group in London, gave me an example. For 
a time he worked at a software company, and one of the women he worked with 
was a Born-Again Christian. Edward once asked her whether, if her church 
suggested as much, she would say white is black and black is white. When she 
suggested she would—if that’s what her pastor told her—he concluded that 
further discussion was pointless. This Christian, he told me, was letting subjec-
tive relationships upend reality. “An awful lot of religious people are in that 
situation,” he said. “Having emotional reasons for accepting anything.” Among 
humanists, the first reaction to anything, or the first articulation of a position or 
a view, was normally made in relation to the primacy of reason and a skepticism 
toward and wariness of emotion. 
Yet the humanist commitment to happiness makes it clear that emotion 
and sentiment are not necessarily antithetical to reason, or a humanist vision 
of the world. Secular humanism has often come up against versions of this 
claim—that it drains the passions, or, in a related set of arguments, “disen-
chants” the world. Indeed, the extent to which secular humanism has been cast 
as a bloodless, passionless rendering of modernity has even prompted one aca-
demic and secular humanist to make a case for “the joy of secularism” (Levine 
2011). A new grouping of popular humanist authors has emerged as well, in-
cluding a chaplain at Harvard University whose book Good without God: What 
a billion nonreligious people do believe is much more focused on the cultivation 
of community, joy, and happiness as both a pleasure and a purpose (Epstein 
2009).19 
Certainly, within the BHA, Max Weber’s key indices of disenchantment—
rationalization, calculation, and intellectualization (Weber 1946: 139–40)—are 
not uncritically lauded. To be sure, humanists do not go in for what Weber called 
the “intellectual sacrifice” (ibid.: 156) of the believer; this is, as we have seen, 
precisely what they want to end. It’s what Edward understood his colleague to 
be admitting—deferring, as Ince puts it, to what the high priest or elder says. 
Yet “thinking for yourself ” and “daring to know” do not demand the surrender 
of the emotional or, even, certain understandings of wonder. In the funerals 
that BHA celebrants conducted, for instance, or in local group activities and 
19. See Paul Dolan (2014) for a popular recent argument on the need to understand 
happiness in relation both to “pleasure and purpose.” 
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discussions, I often found strong appeals to, and endorsements of, emotion and 
sentiment. BHA celebrants are a small yet important grouping of association 
members who consciously stop short of the lauding of reason that often marks, 
or is seen to mark, the secular-humanist disposition. BHA funeral officiants 
are called “celebrants” for a reason.20 A BHA funeral is supposed to “celebrate” 
the life of the deceased. It is not that sadness and mournfulness are denied or 
discouraged; of course, humanist funerals can be gut wrenching for family and 
friends. But BHA funerals are often joyful and irreverent in ways which, for the 
celebrants at least, are part of their ethical and ideological commitments to “the 
one life we have.” Within the funeral industry more generally, there is increas-
ing talk of “the happy funeral,” which is juxtaposed to the “solemn” nature of the 
traditional church counterpart.21 These days, jocular and ironic Monty Python 
and Frank Sinatra tunes are more likely to be heard than Anglican hymns or 
live organ music. BHA celebrants see themselves at the vanguard of this shift, of 
helping effect a more general transformation away from suffering, sin, and the 
horizon of happiness being set in an afterlife. 
All the same, celebrants had concerns about emotionalism and, because of it, 
the dangers of irrationality. One of the most common was with respect to what 
I’ve called “the coffin question” (see Engelke 2015): many celebrants saw the 
presence of the coffin at the funeral as a potential rent in the immanent order, an 
object that could be imbued by the mourners with an agency or animate pres-
ence, and prompt emotional breakdowns (the figure of the widow who refuses 
to let go of the coffin, drowning in tears). Even among the celebrants, then, the 
ultimate ordering of things was usually clear. Sentiment should be the servant 
of reason. 
It is in the course of explicitly ethical deliberations that the links between 
happiness, sentiment, and reason can be seen to matter most. Let me illustrate 
this by turning to an extended example of a collective exercise in which a group 
of humanists saw themselves as instantiating their commitment to being good 
without God. 
20. I did know one celebrant who wouldn’t use the label. He insisted on “officiant.” As 
he put it to me: “I’m not going to use ‘celebrant’ when I phone up a father whose 
eight-year-old child’s just been killed in a car crash and say, ‘Hey, we’re here to 
celebrate her life.’ I’m not going to say that.”
21. See “Happy funerals: a celebration of life?” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
magazine-31940529, accessed December 1, 2015. 
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GRAN’S CAT 
When I met Edward—the man who couldn’t believe his Born-Again Christian 
colleague’s “emotional reasons for accepting anything”—he ran the Green Vale 
Humanists and Secularists out of a Friends House (Quaker meeting house) on 
a pleasant, late-Victorian side street in London. Green Vale was not a large local 
group; it only had about a dozen regular attendees. In Edward, though, they had 
an enthusiastic and committed chair. He would organize not only the twice-
monthly meetings (one at the Friends House for a semiformal discussion with a 
guest speaker; the other, less formal, for socializing at a pub), but also occasional 
trips into central London to see a prominent humanist speak at Conway Hall or a 
university. In the spring, he would organize bluebell walks through a local nature 
preserve, followed by a pub lunch. Socializing was important to him, and when I 
last saw him, in July 2014, just as he was in the process of stepping down as chair 
of the group (in anticipation of a move abroad), he lamented that if he had had 
more time, he would have worked on building up “practical involvement in the 
community,” visiting more local schools, for instance, and ramping up a mentor-
ing program with which the group had become involved at the nearby prison. 
Edward’s primary passion as a humanist was for developing what he called 
“secular morality.” He summed this up in three imperatives: be honest with 
yourself; be kind; be courageous. When I asked him what makes a morality 
secular, he said: “Self-honesty, because it is incompatible with religion.” But 
self-honesty is not a term he liked; it involves integrity and courage, as well as 
self-esteem. “It is a source of frustration to me that there is no English word 
meaning self-honesty,” he wrote to me, in an e-mail, when reading a draft of this 
article. “So far I have not been able to find one in any other language and can’t 
help thinking it could be because our species would rather avoid the subject. 
If you find such a word in any language, please let me know.” Back when we 
conducted an informal interview, in summer 2014, he said: “I see virtually all 
religious people as compromising their integrity, their honesty. They’re desper-
ate for comfort. If you’re not being honest with yourself, you’re not living your 
own life—you’re living someone else’s.” Sapere aude! 
Ethics and morality were a major focus of all local groups.22 At Green Vale, 
they were even more so than usual. This was partly down to the fact that Edward 
22. As with reason and rationality, most of the humanists I knew used these terms—
ethics and morality—interchangeably. For a discussion of how anthropologists can 
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staged a series of “ethical juries” at the monthly meetings at the Friends House. 
Between 2010 and 2014, Green Vale hosted five such events. Edward got the 
idea of running them from Michael Imison, a trustee of the BHA during the 
course of my research, who came from a career in television and drama (Michael 
was a director on an early series of Doctor Who). Michael is someone who had 
also been involved in the Society for the Furtherance of Critical Philosophy 
(SFCP), which recognizes in particular the importance of Immanuel Kant’s 
work. One of the core activities of the SFCP is to facilitate “Socratic dialogues,” 
a key aim of which is to help “people develop capacity to live as independently-
thinking rational ethical agents.”23 
I attended an ethical jury at Green Vale in September 2012. It was a Thurs-
day evening and people were slowly arriving at the Friends House. The rented 
room was small and looked out onto a garden; it was painted that shade of 
green that only churches and schools seem to have to suffer. We gathered in a 
circle of chairs around the evening’s facilitator, Ralph, who was visiting from 
elsewhere in the greater London area, and who had experience of running 
ethical juries. James, the local group treasurer, was chairing the evening in 
Edward’s absence. In addition to the facilitator, treasurer, and me, four women 
and eight men attended. This included a woman who was a member of the 
Friends House, and a Sikh man (who self-identified as such, and was wear-
ing a turban). Another was Mark, a young man in his early twenties from a 
university on England’s southern coast. He was involved in the national-level 
governance of student atheist, humanist, and secularist groups and, like me, 
wanted to learn more about ethical juries. Mark hoped to conduct an ethical 
jury back at his university.
As the group came to attention, one of the men asked Ralph: “What do you 
mean by ethical? It’s so misused that word.” Ralph paused for a moment before 
replying: “I can tell you an answer off the top of my head,” he said, “but it’s up to 
you.” With no greater steer, Ralph moved on by welcoming everyone, and then 
putting up a PowerPoint slide. He also had a flip chart, which would see much 
use over the course of the evening. The PowerPoint read: 
approach this issue, see Lambek (2010: 9); following Lambek (and others), I opt 
for ethics over morality as an analytical term because of its “greater association with 
action than propriety and with ‘the good’ than ‘the right’.” 
23. See http://www.sfcp.org.uk/education/, accessed December 1, 2015.
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Ethical Juries: original idea 
Gather jury 
Select dilemma from personal experience 
Discuss – protect your example giver
Use Golden Rule, Least Harm 
Vote 
After expanding on these points briefly (including the basics on different moral 
philosophies), Ralph asked us to offer up some possible dilemmas. “It’s defi-
nitely best to have personal dilemmas,” James said, “so someone can share all 
the details.” James offered one about a relative’s relative who needed bail for 
a sex trafficking offense. One of the women wanted to discuss relativism, but 
she didn’t have a specific dilemma in mind. Mark offered another possibility: 
his grandmother has asthma and it’s starting to take its toll, and she has a 
cat, which makes it worse. How much should her children and grandchildren 
intervene? In a scattershot way, two more potential cases emerged: a friend of 
a member who is committing adultery; and, even less personally, the public 
apology that day by a national-level politician over his party’s broken campaign 
promise. But the facilitator, who offered up this last example, was also wary of 
it: “How can we discuss this as a moral question without getting sucked into 
‘yah-boo’ politics?” 
With this mix of choices on the table, all scribbled up on the flipchart, 
the facilitator asked us to decide on one. Nine people wanted to discuss the 
cat; three voted to discuss the politician’s apology; and one—the woman who 
mentioned it—wanted to discuss relativism. So we went with Gran’s cat. Ralph 
asked Mark for all the “key features” of the situation. 
Gran is eighty-four and of sound mind. She is a widow and has been for some time. 
Mark’s mother is her daughter. Mark suffers from asthma and it runs in the family. 
His gran has always had cats. Someone asks if she’s always had breathing difficulties; 
no, Mark says, and she has only been diagnosed with asthma in the last year. She has 
always been very active: loves bowling and badminton. “I would say she’s irrational 
about the cat,” Mark says. “I would never tell her this. But I’d like her to rehome the 
cat.” Gran also has low hemoglobin and an arthritic hip, so her condition is not all 
down to the asthma and the cat. “She has been living life as an elderly person very, very 
well. Not too long ago she went to China for three weeks.” Mark asks us if we need any 
more facts. Everyone is satisfied for the moment. 
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“We need to pinpoint the moral issues,” Ralph said. One of them is intervening. 
But what is intervening? Do you put pressure on her to get rid of the cat? Or 
do you just say something? 
“I think suggesting to the lady that she get rid of the cat is very reasonable,” 
said a man in a blue shirt. “Just saying something: I don’t see that as putting any 
pressure.” 
The facilitator wrote this up on the flip chart: 
Pressure vs. suggestion
Then an elderly man with glasses and a beard said: “I don’t see this as an entirely 
moral question, really. This is a health and welfare issue. The GP [doctor] can 
give her a simple choice, which isn’t moral.” 
Another elderly man said: “This is a question of trade-offs. Probably over 
sixty, you say, no, don’t change things.” He goes on to tell us he had a friend who 
died recently, aged seventy, from lots of drinking and smoking. But he wouldn’t 
have told him to stop; he was too old. “And the pleasure was worth it.” It would 
have been doing more harm than good. 
“If you were to remove the cat, the loneliness would do more harm,” said 
the Sikh man.
“The GP has to tell her she has a choice,” said the elderly man with glasses 
and a beard, again. “Live with the cat and accept the consequences; or get rid of 
the cat, live longer but perhaps less happily.” 
The woman interested in relativism, who was a nurse, raised the possibility 
of Mark kidnapping the cat. Then she went on to tell us about the health is-
sues and dilemmas she’s seen with religious people who refuse treatment, before 
coming around to Mark’s gran. “But it’s her choice!” she ended by saying. 
Ralph tried to focus us. “What are the moral principles? I’m not seeing these 
here.” 
At this point, Mark added that one of the considerations had to be that his 
gran is of sound mind; she has her faculties. The bearded man, seeming to pick 
up on the nurse’s earlier question, wondered what would happen if the cat just 
“disappeared.” 
“I think this is more your problem than your gran’s,” the Quaker woman 
suggested. 
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“That’s true in a way, yes,” admitted Mark. She’s the only grandparent he has 
left, though, and he doesn’t want to lose her. 
Ralph wondered: “Is the cat issue more a diversion from the issue of how 
Gran will look after herself as she gets older?” 
Mark didn’t really focus on Ralph’s question. He went on to tell us his family 
had the opposite scenario with his paternal grandfather, who was of sound body 
but not sound mind. 
“As a nurse,” the nurse offered at that point, “I think that after a few months, 
she would feel better.” 
There was some shuffling in the seats at this suggestion; not everyone agreed. 
“The most moral solution to the problem is to leave her alone,” said the 
bearded man, definitively. 
“Yes,” replied Mark. “And we’re [Mark’s family] very much on the ‘sugges-
tion’ end [of the facilitator’s spectrum]. But she says she’s getting depressed 
about being old.” 
James came in at this point to suggest that at issue are three ethical princi-
ples (respect for autonomy; honesty; concern for welfare) and two “skills” (judg-
ment; diplomacy). Ralph said there’s another “moral principle”: frankness. 
“It’s all based on quality of life,” said a man who had been quiet to that point. 
“As she’s of sound mind, you have to respect that,” said the bearded man. 
“Well, any suggestion is pressure,” said the nurse. “What for someone is a 
suggestion is pressure to someone else.” 
“That’s where diplomacy comes in,” Ralph offered. 
“There’s a least-harm-thing end, as well,” said Mark, referencing Ralph’s flip 
chart, which by this point was littered with scribbles, Venn diagrams, and vari-
ous connecting lines, including a split between the “social/psychological” issues 
involved and the “physical” ones. Pointing to them, Mark said the social/psycho-
logical side and the physical side couldn’t be neatly separated. 
Ralph started to wrap things up. “How have you experienced this discus-
sion?” he asked Mark. 
“I think everyone [relates to] the issue of getting old,” Mark said, “because 
this is very emotionally charged. I haven’t heard anything that suggests I should 
be more interventionist. But I didn’t think I would. But I feel happy to have 
been affirmed. And I can look back on this in years and not feel guilty, feel I’ve 
approached it in the right way.” 
We didn’t formally vote after this, but it was clear that the group wasn’t sug-
gesting a radical course of action. Given how this only confirmed Mark’s view, 
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there was not much further ado. Just as we were about to break up, though, and 
share some biscuits, the bearded man with glasses said he brought up the GP 
because it’s a GP’s job to interfere. A woman in a floral-patterned shirt, who had 
been totally quiet to that point, jumped in quickly: “And he’s objective!” Mark 
admitted he never would have thought of the GP as relevant (he also didn’t say 
if the GP was a man or a woman); surely it was up to the family. And with that 
we did get to the biscuits, small talk, and our journeys home. 
As with events I observed at other local groups, the ethical jury at Green Vale 
circled around the exercise of reason, here in the pursuit of happiness. The di-
lemma posed by Gran’s cat involved the issue of responsibility—but also balance, 
and discerning motivations. What must one do for others, and how can such 
action be recognized? Was this about Mark’s happiness, or his grandmother’s? 
How can her pleasure, in spite of its costs, be differentiated from Mark’s pain? 
Turning the matter over to the doctor—making it a scientific rather than a social 
issue—was, clearly, a nonstarter for most participants, yet not all of them, and it 
kept recurring until the very end of the session. I was struck by the after-the-fact 
contribution by the woman in the floral-patterned shirt. It was as if she had to 
say it—she had to point to what she perceived as a doctor’s objectivity. Objectiv-
ity really does matter to humanists; where it is perceived, it must be pursued. 
For most of the participants, though, such objectivity was, in this instance, 
not relevant to the discussion. Without it, what mattered most was Mark’s gran’s 
ability to decide for herself. The fact that Mark emphasized his gran was of 
“sound mind” was crucial to the deliberation. Guided by their own compasses 
of reason, those gathered had to respect her freedom of choice. Despite Mark’s 
concern that she was being “irrational,” the group—and even Mark, I would 
argue—recognized that rationality and reason are, in some instances, not the 
final appeal—“Because this is very emotionally charged,” as Mark said. The cat 
made Gran happy. That was what mattered in the end. She was getting increas-
ingly depressed about being old, Mark told us, but the cat was clearly a source 
of comfort, despite any extent to which it might have been exacerbating her 
physical condition. 
CONCLUSION 
In August 2014, almost two years after this ethical jury, I spoke to Mark on the 
phone. “Things are much the same,” he told me. Gran still had the cat. “There’s 
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unlikely to be, to my mind, any resolution. The cat will likely outlive Grandma, 
and the cat gives her a lot of comfort.” Mark’s love for his grandmother struck 
me as irrepressible. I was surprised by the course of our phone call. This is not 
someone I got to know in my research; we only met at the ethical jury and I 
called him out of the blue. Within a minute of being on the phone, though, 
Mark was filling me in on his grandmother’s continuing verve for life, and her 
independence. Not long before, he explained, Grandma had prepared a big din-
ner at her house, much to Mark’s mother’s dismay; Grandma had only recently 
returned from a spell in hospital. (And it was always Grandma or Gran with 
Mark; he never used the possessive to differentiate her identity.) And then there 
was her plan to go to Vietnam, at the start of 2014. This was “kiboshed” by 
Mark’s mother, Mark said, much to Grandma’s frustration. 
Had the ethical jury been helpful? It had, he said. In line with what he said 
at the jury, it was mostly about confirming his sense of things—about knowing 
he had reached his decision in the right way. Yet the perspectives of others really 
helped. “I got the inkling that I was undervaluing the comfort this creature was 
providing to Grandma. It was well meaning [to think of getting rid of the cat] 
but perhaps unfounded. . . . The opinions that people give [in ethical juries] are 
fairly well informed, and I appreciated how these should be taken seriously.” He 
was appreciative of the reasoned deliberation. “It’s a funny situation to be in a 
group where [reason] guides discussion so strongly,” he said, but very valuable. 
Reason, he said, is “an overarching principle. It definitely does guide conversa-
tion. But I think there’s a self-awareness of it being an unobtainable goal. Part 
of the human condition is that we want to be reasonable and rational. But we’re 
not.” 
In his masterly book on Britain and the Enlightenment, Roy Porter has 
occasion to cite a saturnine remark of William Hazlitt’s: “Reason, with most 
people, means their own opinion” (in 2000: xxiii). Hazlitt is another of the hu-
manists’ predecessors and inspirations (he is the subject of a recent biography 
by A. C. Grayling [2013]), someone for whom reason is not one’s own opinion. 
Not entirely. 
It is in the tension between the objective and the subjective understandings 
of reason, and how this relates to happiness as both a pleasure and a purpose, 
heart and head, that we find Britain’s humanists today—people like Mark, for 
whom “true” reason is an overarching principle, yet one we can never live up to. 
Mark was “happy,” he told the group at Green Vale, to have been confirmed in 
his thinking. The issue here, though, wasn’t about living up to some categorical 
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imperative (à la Kant). Nor was it a straightforward utilitarian calculus (à la 
Bentham). Humanist ethics are, in the terms of moral philosophy, a virtue eth-
ics, what James Laidlaw has recently described, after Alasdair McIntyre, as 
“the pursuit of ideals through socially instituted and habituated practices, the 
importance of narrative understanding and reasoning, and the idea of ethical 
traditions being constituted in part through ongoing argument” (2014: 79). As 
one of the BHA’s trustees once put it to me, reason “applies when you would 
have a serious decision to make about how to do something, more than what to 
do.”24 Mark was happy to be confirmed in what he did (or didn’t do) about his 
gran and her cat, but the process of deliberation itself, of judgment, was equally 
central to the character and quality of his happiness. 
In Man a machine, a mid-eighteenth-century text that was scandalous even 
by radical Enlightenment standards (see Israel 2001: 704–9), Julien Offray de 
la Mettrie offered a withering attack on metaphysics and the soul, on the exist-
ence of anything beyond the material and here-and-now. His work was offered 
in praise of science—and of pleasure. “The world will never be happy until it 
is atheist,” he wrote. In such a world, “deaf to all other voices, tranquil mortals 
would follow only their own spontaneous inner council . . . the only one that 
can guide us to happiness along the happy paths of virtue” (cited in McMahon 
2006: 227). 
According to Darrin McMahon, such talk of virtue—and the classically 
inspired understandings of reason that accompanied it—is misleading in La 
Mettrie. Virtue was vice: he was a hedonist for hedonism’s sake. In his extrem-
ism, indeed, he was “snipping the suture that had held Western intellectual life 
together since the time of Socrates: the link between virtue and happiness; the 
link between happiness, reason, and truth” (ibid.: 229). 
Humanists in Britain might well cheer at La Mettrie’s remark: being good 
without God is, in the final analysis, for them, the only authentic option. The 
world will never be happy until it is atheist. But humanists are not snipping at 
the suture of Western intellectual life. As I have tried to show throughout this 
article, they work to reinforce the link between virtue and happiness—to make 
24. See also Lambek’s (2010: 19–25) discussion of Aristotelian virtues, in which “a 
practice is ethical insofar as the goal is not instrumental but reaching for excellence 
within the particular practice—and for human good or happiness overall in the 
practice of practices” (ibid.: 21). This is precisely what was at stake in the deliberation 
on Gran’s cat. 
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happiness about the heart, but also the head. Socrates still matters in their view, 
alongside the watershed validation of pleasure. 
Maybe we could say humanists want to have their cake and eat it too—or 
their Chelsea Whoppers, as the case may be. Pleasure is part and parcel of the 
humanist vision of the world; it is something we deserve to have. But pleasure 
for humanists comes not solely in the act of consumption or consummation, for 
any such act must be seen as part of an overarching commitment to the idea of 
happiness, to what it means to be good without God—to strive for the values of 
Enlightenment and “the one life we have.” 
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The politics of meditation and the limits of neoliberal 
critique 
Joanna Cook 
HAPPINESS AND NEOLIBERALISM 
The in-depth ethnographic approach to happiness taken in this volume reveals 
the concern people take to live well. The essays collected here explore the tem-
poralities of happiness, as well as the self-making, evaluative judgments and 
shared values that lead to and constitute happiness in both the short and the 
long term. These are variously considered with reference to the incorporation of 
ambivalence (Throop), finding balance between immediacy and narrative loca-
tion (Kavedžija), or the integration of good character, social justice, and self-
realization (Lambek), for example. 
Such an anthropological contribution to contemporary discussion about 
happiness is welcome. It provides a timely redress to the relative lack of an-
thropological intervention in current debates on the subject elsewhere. This si-
lence is in part the result of an association drawn by social scientists between 
political interest in emotional wellbeing and forms of neoliberal governance. 
As the editors of this collection note, “There is a certain suspicion of happi-
ness as an essentially bourgeois preoccupation, increasingly associated with a 
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neoliberal agenda, and potentially at odds with emancipatory politics.” In such a 
framework, happiness becomes a personal responsibility divorced from broader 
structural conditions, and its pursuit becomes a self-conscious project of self-
improvement, irrespective of the social or political contexts in which such pro-
jects are found. As such, is it little wonder that, in a volume that reveals the 
multiple values and temporalities of happiness, political interest in the emotions 
remains “a little disappointing” (see Robbins’ Afterword, this volume), framed 
as it is as the atrophying embrace of “the purveyors of neoliberalism” (see the 
Introduction, this volume)? 
Political interest in happiness is located at the “very busy crossroads of psy-
chology, economics, and policy discourse” (Robbins, this volume). I take one 
such crossroads as my ethnographic focus in order to examine the analytic 
framework of neoliberalism itself. I focus on an All-Party Parliamentary Group 
in Westminster convened to investigate the policy potential for mindfulness in 
the UK in order to ask whether political interest in mindfulness renders indi-
viduals solely responsible for their own wellbeing. What social and moral values 
inform the process of political inquiry and are they accounted for by the analytic 
framework of neoliberalism? 
I argue that an interpretation of political interest in wellbeing as “neolib-
eralism” is too narrow to account for the multiplicity of interests and values 
incorporated in the process of political inquiry. For all that it can be analytically 
useful to theorise neoliberalism as the colonization of the emotions, against 
which social scientists rail, in practice that colonization is rarely total. I argue 
that subjectification practices, even those critiqued as “neoliberal,” are rarely to-
talizing, that self-governance is not divorced from broader structural or polit-
ico-economic concerns, and that subjectification practices may hold diverse or 
multiple meanings. To reduce political interest in happiness and wellbeing to 
“neoliberal responsibilization” inhibits us from accounting for the multiplicity 
of values and motivations involved in political inquiry. By remaining anchored 
in ethnography it becomes possible to identify the limits of neoliberalism. In so 
doing we are able to account for the multiplicity of values with which the politi-
cal inquiry process is invested. Furthermore, I argue that once we recognize the 
multiplicity of values, which lies beyond the scope of an analytic framework of 
neoliberalism, we are able to examine the ways in which the maintenance of this 
multiplicity provides a motor for political processes. If, following Joel Robbins 
(this volume), we assume that all social formations contain a plurality of values, 
then we ought to be cautious of dismissing political interest in wellbeing as 
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unitary neoliberalism: here too, ethnographic inquiry reveals complex, socially 
embedded concerns with happiness and wellbeing that cannot be contained 
within the narrow analytic framework of “neoliberal responsibilization.”
IDENTIFYING THE LIMITS OF NEOLIBERALISM 
The concept of neoliberalism has been central to social scientific analyses of 
the relationship between changing forms of state responsibility, socioeconomic 
organization, and forms of reflexive self-governance. “Neoliberalism” is used to 
account for the development of a more technocratic and managerial role for 
the state (Gledhill 2004; Ferguson 2006) based on a belief in the justice of the 
market leading to deregulation, flexible working, the liberalization of capital, 
the reduction of the state, and restrictions on public spending. This is sometimes 
characterized as a move away from a theory of social welfare as the responsibil-
ity of government through a reinterpretation of the governability of subjects 
(Rose 1999a, 1999b). Risk and uncertainty increase as a result of changing so-
cioeconomic structures at the same time as technologies of “responsibilization” 
proliferate (Rose 1996a, 2001, 2007; Shamir 2008), by which state involvement 
in social welfare is reduced and replaced with groups and individuals who are 
encouraged to “take responsibility” for self-governance and decision making 
(Bennett 2008). Sennett suggests that under such conditions individuals must 
dwell “in a continual state of vulnerability” (1998: 83; see also 2006). Writing of 
flexible corporate practice, he argues that people are driven to achieve, but the 
institutional structures by which this might occur are left open and flexible. The 
economic necessity to pursue multiple possibilities and the capacity to adapt 
to volatile and changeable demands requires a particular strength of character, 
“that of someone who has the confidence to dwell in disorder, someone who 
flourishes in the midst of dislocation” (Sennett 1998: 62). Sennett argues that 
the freedom of the flexible capitalist is amoral, and that the demands of spon-
taneity and flexibility can be self-destructive.1 The individual is responsible for 
maximizing her emotional capital, and needs to protect herself in a condition 
of endemic uncertainty. The management of risk, engagement, and response 
1. Similarly, Bauman (2007) has argued that social forms and institutions no longer 
act as frames of reference, and individuals learn to be flexible and adaptable under 
conditions of unending precarity.
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becomes the responsibility of the individual (Beck 1992). With the diminution 
of the events and conditions that influence experience (the “happ” of happiness), 
experience must be privately created. Resilience and flexibility are required in an 
environment of uncertainty and risk, in which institutional supports have been 
rescinded to the capricious demands of consumer capitalism. 
Drawing on Foucauldian theory, Rose has analyzed neoliberalism as a prac-
tice of governance for the minimization of costs and maximization of profits, as 
“a ‘way of doing’ directed towards objectives and regulating itself through con-
tinuous reflection” (Foucault 2008: 318). He argues that neoliberal governance 
is achieved through techniques that encourage subjects to take responsibility 
for their decision making and subject formation (Rose 1999a). Neoliberal gov-
ernance is understood to be based on processes of “subjectivation”—identity-
forming processes by which the subject is constituted. The state and professional 
organizations assume the role of managing populations for optimal produc-
tivity, while subjects take responsibility for their own self-governance. These 
processes of self-governance lead subjects to act in ways that reinforce their 
subjection (Rose 1996b). Under this transformed understanding of governance 
and responsibility, the subject is “free” to make choices concerning her own wel-
fare, guided by the management of an “empowering” state. Such responsibility is 
meted out to all subjects irrespective of the structural or socioeconomic factors 
that might impinge on any form of decision making (Rose 1999b; Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002; Ong 2006). The neoliberal subject becomes “an entrepreneur of 
himself ” (Foucault 2010: 226), and work upon the self becomes an investment 
in capital. Gershon characterizes this as “a self that is a flexible bundle of skills 
that reflexively manages oneself as though the self was a business” (2011: 537).2 
Governing individual dispositions, emotions, and motivations then becomes 
an individual responsibility and the site of governmental focus, structured by 
economic interests and market logic (Rose 1996a, 1996b). Individuals become 
productive members of society, not only through their labour, but also through 
the labour to shape themselves as such. The subject has to be educated (“made 
up,” in Rose and Miller’s terms [1992]) through techniques that enable her to 
take herself as a project, as if she were her own entrepreneur. 
Analytically, the concept of neoliberalism helps to account for the rela-
tionship between forms of governance, self-governance, and capitalist market 
2. For Gershon, neoliberal agency creates relationships that are morally lacking and 
overlooks differences in scale.
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forces. But how do we decipher its limits? Are there forms of governance and 
reflexive self-governance that are not accounted for by a focus on neoliberal 
“entrepreneurialism”? As Hilgers asks, “Should we regard any mode of govern-
ment that adopts a principle of optimisation, sometimes in a single domain, 
as neoliberal?” (2010: 360). In this contribution, I consider the limits of neo-
liberalism through an ethnographic focus on political interest in mindfulness-
based interventions in civil society. In the United Kingdom, mindfulness is a 
political concern. Mindfulness meditation, an awareness practice which origi-
nated in Buddhism, is being interpreted as a positive intervention for societal 
problems as wide ranging as depressive relapse, criminal recidivism, children’s 
academic performance, and worker burnout. It is believed to help practitioners 
cope with life (from stress, anxiety, and depression to impulse control, emotional 
regulation, and intellectual flexibility) and is now taught in major civil society 
institutions in the United Kingdom, including hospitals, prisons, schools, and 
private businesses. In 2014, an All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) was es-
tablished in Westminster, committed to investigating the ways in which public 
policy might incorporate mindfulness-based practices. From May–December 
2014, eight parliamentary hearings of the Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary 
Group (MAPPG) were held in Westminster, each focusing on a different area 
of public life. An inquiry report was drafted by the supporting secretariat out-
lining key policy recommendations for funding, implementation, and research, 
and this was launched in Parliament in October 2015. 
As a focus of public policy, is mindfulness training placed in the service of 
neoliberal governance? Through an ethnographic consideration of parliamentary 
hearings on mindfulness, participant observation with the secretariat (the Mind-
fulness Initiative), interviews with members, and analysis of the final policy docu-
ment, Mindful Nation UK, I examine the ways in which issues of self-governance 
and responsibility were motivated, debated, and framed. In the following, I argue 
that an analysis of political interest in mindfulness as “neoliberalism” frames sub-
jectification as making people totally responsible for their mental health, de-
tached from a broader socioeconomic and structural context. This is not borne 
out ethnographically. Furthermore, I argue that an analysis of self-governance as 
neoliberalism assumes that practices of subjectification are always already in the 
service of neoliberalism. Rather than offering either a critique of, or an apology 
for, mindfulness, I take political interest in mindfulness as my ethnographic focus 
in order to examine the multiple meanings and values invested in subjectification 
practices, and the ways in which diversity is maintained through the structure of 
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political inquiry. Mindfulness as a political focus is being framed in multiple ways 
simultaneously, many of which lie beyond the limits of the analytic framework 
of neoliberalism. I argue that the political value of the inquiry process rested on 
the maintenance of multiplicity in the meanings and values of self-governance. 
MINDFULNESS IN PARLIAMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF THE APPG
Mindfulness, as it is now found in British workplaces, education, healthcare, 
and criminal justice, originated in Buddhist meditation. It gained legitimacy as 
a secular and therapeutic practice following the development of mindfulness-
based stress reduction in the 1970s and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy 
in the 1990s, and subsequent scientific research into their efficacy. Beginning 
in the 1950s in Southeast Asia, reformist monks developed, reinvigorated, 
and propagated a form of meditation, vipassanā, based on a Buddhist text, The 
Mahāsatipatthāna Sutta (see Jordt 2007; Cook 2010; Braun 2013). The propa-
gation of vipassanā was presented as a move away from “esoteric” meditative 
practices toward a more “rational” and “authentic” practice for salvation, avail-
able to monastics and laity (Van Esterik 1977). Mindfulness (Pali: sati) was 
understood to be an ethically positive perspectival awareness, which could be 
cultivated through meditative discipline, requiring morality, concentration, and 
wisdom. In the 1970s, Jon Kabat-Zinn developed mindfulness-based stress re-
duction (MBSR), at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, originally 
to address chronic pain and a range of conditions that were difficult to treat 
(Kabat-Zinn 1990).3 He interpreted mindfulness as a universal human capacity 
that could be developed by patients in order to alleviate suffering. In his foreword 
to the APPG Inquiry Report, Mindful Nation UK, he writes that mindfulness— 
being about attention, awareness, relationality, and caring—is a universal capac-
ity, akin to our capacity for language acquisition. While the most systematic 
3. Earlier movements had sought to explore the benefits of dialogue between 
psychology and Buddhist and meditative practice (for a history of the dialogue 
between Buddhism and psychology in America, see Metcalf 2002; on the 
relationship between psychology and Zen Buddhism, see Fromm, Suzuki and De 
Martino 1970; on the psychological framing of Transcendental Meditation, see 
Williamson 2010).
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and comprehensive articulation of mindfulness and its related attributes stems 
from the Buddhist tradition, mindfulness is not a catechism, an ideology, a belief 
system, a technique or set of techniques, a religion, or a philosophy. It is best 
described as “a way of being.” (Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group UK 
2015: 5)
In his development of MBSR, Kabat-Zinn sought to routinize mindfulness in 
targeted interventions in order to address the suffering of ill health in pragmatic 
ways. 
Drawing inspiration from MBSR, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy 
(MBCT) was developed in 1991 by Zindel Segal, Mark Williams, and John 
Teasdale in Cambridge, England, as a psychosocial intervention for the preven-
tion of depressive relapse (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013). In the cognitive 
framework for depressive relapse, suffering was interpreted as resulting from 
the ways in which patients related to experiences, rather than the experiences 
themselves. As such, if patients could learn to relate to experience differently, 
they would suffer less. Thus, the cognitive framework of MBCT rests on the 
premises that there is a cognitive component to depressive relapse and that peo-
ple have the capacity to learn ways of relating to their thoughts and feelings that 
will enable them to maintain mental and emotional balance, even in the face of 
challenging experiences. MBCT was found to reduce depressive relapse in three 
randomized-controlled trials (RCTs) (Teasdale et al. 2000; Ma and Teasdale 
2004; Kuyken et al. 2008), following which it received recommendation from 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and was man-
dated on the National Health Service (NHS) for people who had experienced 
three or more depressive episodes, but who were currently well. The contempo-
rary interest in mindfulness results, in part, from an increasing evidence base for 
mindfulness-based interventions and their subsequent uptake.4 
Despite the findings of the RCTs and the NICE recommendation, MBCT 
remained widely inaccessible across the NHS. One of its developers, Mark 
Williams, proposed the introduction of mindfulness courses for politicians in 
Westminster in order to bring MBCT to their attention. As one of the chairs 
4. There is increasing evidence that MBCT might help large numbers of people 
experiencing depressive affect and patterns of recurring depression (cf. Baer 2003; 
Coelho, Canter, and Ernst 2007). Kuyken et al. (2008) demonstrate that MBCT is 
equivalent to maintenance antidepressants for the prevention of depressive relapse 
but is superior in terms of quality of life and residual depressive symptoms.
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of the APPG commented, he “decided the only way to get the policy establish-
ment really engaging with mindfulness was to take it to them.” Williams col-
laborated in an in-Parliament initiative led by Richard Layard, an economist 
and life peer in the House of Lords, and Chris Ruane, then a Labour MP,5 to 
establish mindfulness courses for parliamentarians. To date, 130 parliamentar-
ians and 220 staff have completed an adapted MBCT course in Westminster. 
The course is taught in groups of eight to twelve led by a trained therapist, 
over an eight-week period. The most commonly used definition of mindful-
ness in this context is “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on 
purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgementally, to things as they are” 
(Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013: 132). The group meets once a week for 
two and a half hours. Aspects that are taught in the course include attentional 
control (mindfulness) cognitive skills (decentering, observational capacity), and 
behavioral skills (developing active/movement body-based skills) (ibid.). The 
course is built up of a series of intentional exercises, including mindfulness of 
breath, mindful movement, a body scan, mindful eating, as well as intentionally 
bringing an attitude of kindly awareness to everyday activities such as doing the 
washing up, eating, or bathing. Each session is followed by “homework”—guid-
ed mindfulness practices which participants listen to at home, bringing mind-
ful awareness to specified routine activities, and pleasant and unpleasant events 
calendars; in the penultimate week, participants also complete an action plan. 
In a presentation to the London Buddhist Society, one of the key nonpar-
liamentary members of the APPG commented, “The thing about politicians is 
once they get the taste of something they want to do something. And this is an 
important point actually, because the doing has a sort of driving momentum.” 
Politicians who had completed a mindfulness course sought to establish an 
APPG to identify problematic issues that were being faced in four areas of civil 
society—the criminal justice system, the national curriculum, the NHS, and the 
workplace—and the potential for mindfulness-based interventions to address 
them. APPGs are informal cross-party groups brought together to develop pol-
icy recommendations for government on subjects for which there is cross-party 
interest. Nominally run by members of the Commons and Lords, the secre-
tariat is provided by individuals and organizations from outside Parliament. The 
APPG was supported by the Mindfulness Initiative, an advocacy/“secretariat” 
5. Chris Ruane was the member of Parliament for the Vale of Clwyd. He lost his seat 
in the General Election of May 2015. 
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group comprised of professionals from a range of areas, drawn together by their 
professional and personal commitment to mindfulness. These included a senior 
journalist, the directors of Bangor and Oxford University Mindfulness Cen-
tres, the founder of the Mindfulness in Schools Project, the clinical lead for 
an NHS trust, and a senior economist and peer. Associates of the Mindfulness 
Initiative included a director of the Royal Society of Arts, a director from the 
corporate sector, experts in mindfulness and the criminal justice system, clinical 
psychologists, the chief operating officer of an educational trust, and others. The 
mission of the APPG was set out as providing a forum for discussion in Parlia-
ment about the role of mindfulness in public policy, promoting mindfulness in 
tackling a range of critical challenges that the government faced, advocating for 
more research to strengthen the existing evidence base, and showcasing best 
practice. 
In May 2014, the APPG was launched in Parliament in an atmosphere of 
anticipation. In a large meeting room in Westminster, there was standing room 
only as approximately three hundred people, including thirty members of Par-
liament (MPs), crowded in attendance. Professor Willem Kuyken, a cognitive 
psychologist and the director of the Oxford Mindfulness Centre, described the 
meeting as “a wow moment,” and a palpable sense of excitement filled the room. 
After the launch, eighteen people came forward to the organizers and asked 
how they could help. As one of the organizers said later, “They covered such 
a wide range of skills and backgrounds . . . this is 80 percent volunteer effort.” 
From May–December 2014, eight parliamentary hearings of the APPG were 
held in Westminster, each focusing on a different area of public life. These were: 
mindfulness in the workplace; mindfulness and mental health; mindfulness in 
the criminal justice system; mindfulness and physical pain and mindfulness for 
NHS staff; mindfulness in education; mindfulness in the workplace II; mindful-
ness and policing; and mindfulness and gangs. Following the inquiry period, a 
report was written by the Mindfulness Initiative on behalf of the MPs who had 
chaired the inquiry. The report was launched in Parliament in October 2015. It 
outlined the character and scale of the challenges identified in health, educa-
tion, the workplace, and the criminal justice system, and the existing evidence 
for mindfulness-based interventions. It called for targeted interventions in each 
area and funding for further research.6 Each section of the report was written 
6. The report can be viewed online (see Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group 
2015).
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by two or three members of the Mindfulness Initiative, and these sections were 
then edited into a single document by two editors. The contributions of each of 
these people were smoothed into a single voice and there are no authors named 
in the final document. 
MINDFUL NEOLIBERALS? 
Over the period of the inquiry process, public interest in mindfulness reached 
unprecedented heights and mindfulness made frequent appearances in the me-
dia. The primary academic analysis of the popularity of secular mindfulness 
practice has been that it is a neoliberal tool: it has been analyzed as reflecting 
changing frameworks of state responsibility and an increasing emphasis on the 
“responsibility” of subjects to self-manage at a time of increasing privatization. 
It has enabled governance at a distance by making people responsible for their 
own mental health. For example, Purser and Loy (2013) write of recent interest 
in mindfulness,
There is a dissociation between one’s own personal transformation and the kind 
of social and organizational transformation that takes into account the causes 
and conditions of suffering in the broader environment. Such a colonization of 
mindfulness also has an instrumentalizing effect, reorienting the practice to the 
needs of the market, rather than to a critical reflection on the causes of our col-
lective suffering.
Žižek (2001) has gone further and proclaimed that “Western Buddhism . . . is 
establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism.” He argues 
that a “western Buddhism meditative stance” functions as an ideological sup-
plement to the stress of capitalist dynamics, and is “arguably the most efficient 
way for us to fully participate in capitalist dynamics while retaining the ap-
pearance of mental sanity.” Such critiques extend into the relationship between 
“emotional self-optimization” and happiness. For example, Binkley (2014) ar-
gues that through self-help books, spiritual mentoring, business management, 
and relationship counseling, happiness is presented as attainable by everyone, 
irrespective of their socioeconomic circumstances, dispositions, or life experi-
ences, and this leads to a moral responsibility to be happy. As he writes, “We are 
all complicit in our own asphyxiation everyday. We do the work of asphyxiation, 
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we call it our freedom, our enterprise, and our happiness. And we should stop” 
(ibid.: 175). Similarly, Ehrenreich (2009) argues that positive thinking has en-
tered a symbiotic relationship with capitalism in America, with an emphasis on 
unending consumption and an imperative for growth. She argues that in the 
United States, happiness is in the service of a rightwing neoliberal agenda in 
which it becomes a moral and a personal responsibility. 
According to such critiques, happiness and wellbeing are psychologized and 
individualized, such that they become the responsibility of the individual rather 
than reflective of broader structural, political, or social inequalities that require 
redress. A search for happiness becomes now a self-conscious project of self-
improvement that can be trained and cultivated, and mindfulness is a means by 
which this might be achieved.7 In the United Kingdom, Davies has argued that 
the emotions have become enslaved to neoliberalism: 
Once social relationships can be viewed as medical and biological properties 
of the human body, they can become dragged into the limitless pursuit of self 
optimization that counts for happiness in the age of neoliberalism. (2015: 213) 
Davies argues that a focus on happiness as a personal responsibility deflects 
attention from socioeconomic struggle. It is suggested that individualizing and 
psychologizing wellbeing or mental health does nothing to address the struc-
tural inequalities or forms of political disenfranchisement that may lead to the 
experience of negative feelings in the first place. Stress, anxiety, and depression 
are reframed as personal, not political, problems. In a consideration of the mi-
cromanagement of individuals, he writes: 
If a certain physical context (such as work or poverty) is causing pain, one pro-
gressive route would involve changing that context. But another equivalent 
would be to focus on changing the way in which it is experienced. . . . If lifting 
7. In such a reading of mindfulness, the emotionally “fit” are happy. They put their 
time in on the meditation mat, and the result is hedonic buffness. As Nandy puts it, 
such a conceptualization rests on “a self-conscious, determined search for happiness 
from a mental state to an objectified quality of life that can be attained the way 
an athlete—after training under a specialist and going through a strict regimen of 
exercises and diet—wins a medal in a track meet” (2012: 45). The implication of this 
is that unhappiness does not result from external circumstances but is a personal 
failure.
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weights becomes too painful, you’re faced with a choice: reduce the size of the 
weight, or pay less attention to the pain. In the early twenty-first century, there 
is a growing body of experts in “resilience” training, mindfulness, and cognitive 
behavioural therapy whose advice is to opt for the latter strategy. (2015: 35) 
While this is a poor account of “resilience” training, mindfulness and cognitive 
behavioral therapy,8 we might make his argument better. It could be argued that 
training in mindfulness is creating exactly the forms of reflexive subjectivity on 
which neoliberalism thrives. Mindfulness is being encouraged in civil society 
as a technique for cultivating a particular reflexive perspective, which fosters 
intellectual flexibility and emotional resilience. Through repetitive and ongo-
ing training, practitioners seek to develop a different relationship to thoughts, 
feelings, and bodily sensations. Thus, developing an analysis of mindfulness as 
a neoliberal tool, we could argue that mindfulness not only aligns with neolib-
eralism, but it also provides the motor for it: learning practices of emotional 
regulation and reflexive awareness “responsibilizes” practitioners, who are simul-
taneously “resilient” enough to remain unaffected by the emotional and psycho-
logical effects of neoliberal uncertainty and individualism. Suffering becomes 
the responsibility of the individual rather than a result of sociopolitical influenc-
es such as class, race, gender, or the happenstance of misfortune. Furthermore, 
individualizing suffering silences the possibility of addressing it as a social or a 
political issue. In such a reading, the current political interest in mindfulness 
is indicative of broader political shifts in which state responsibility for social 
welfare has been ceded to technocratic managerialism.
THE LIMITS OF NEOLIBERALISM 
Is mindfulness in Parliament a neoliberal tool of “responsibilization” at a time 
when the state is assuming an increasingly managerial role, social welfare 
8. For example, mindfulness practitioners learn to pay more attention to thoughts, 
feelings, and bodily sensations, not less. Mindfulness-based interventions that 
address depression and anxiety are premised on the theory that patterns of emotional 
avoidance function to reinforce negative emotional states. Learning to pay attention 
“in a particular way, on purpose, in the present moment and non-judgmentally” may 
alleviate suffering because aversive patterns that contribute to emotional distress are 
reduced (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013).
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provision is being radically reduced, and significant funding cuts to the NHS 
are leading some to argue that we are witnessing a process of “stealth privatiza-
tion” (Lacobucci 2013)? In the following, I will develop an ethnographic argu-
ment critiquing such a position by demonstrating that subjectification practices 
are never totalizing, that politico-economic concerns remain central to profes-
sional interest in self-governance, that subjectification practices may hold mul-
tiple and/or diverse meanings (cf. Cruickshank 1999), and that the maintenance 
of this multiplicity is essential in the process of political inquiry. 
Mindfulness practice encourages practitioners to “turn toward” difficulty. 
It is a technique that is explicitly intended to enable a practitioner to relate 
to herself differently, with an attitude of “friendly curiosity” and compassion 
(Feldman and Kuyken 2011). This fits comfortably within a framework of sub-
jectification and reflexive self-governance. But, as I will argue, to theorize this 
as a practice of neoliberal “responsibilization” by which the practitioner is made 
totally responsible for her own mental health detached from her socioeconomic 
and structural context is not borne out ethnographically. In part, this theori-
zation rests on an assumption that neoliberalism has achieved what is feared, 
that the subject who learns to “take responsibility” for her own wellbeing and 
happiness does so totally: if we are not there yet, then we are on the verge 
of a Huxleyan dystopia in which “happiness” is achieved though the soma of 
mindfulness. Recognizing the limits of neoliberalism moves us away from a 
conceptualization of neoliberalism as a totalizing ideology and allows us to 
explore the practices of people who recognize collective and structural causes of 
suffering at the same time as seeking practices of subjectification for improving 
wellbeing.
Throughout the inquiry process, participants worried over the unhappiness 
reported in large-scale surveys and the prevalence of mental health issues pre-
sented in epidemiological statistics, basing their discussions on professional and 
personal experience. In contexts of limited institutional and financial support, 
many had introduced mindfulness courses into their work in an effort to address 
suffering. Speaking with a mental health nurse from Devon, I asked him how he 
had developed a mindfulness course at work. 
Well the real challenge is the practical stuff . . . and the culture. At work there’s 
no time and no money. I’m working with patients all day, under pressure, there’s 
never enough time. And I had to work hard to set it up. I couldn’t have done it 
without my supervisor’s support . . . finding a room was a nightmare. 
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Outside of the hearings, discussion oriented around governmental cuts to fund-
ing, the increasing prevalence of mental health issues presented in epidemiolog-
ical statistics, and the challenges that speakers had experienced in establishing 
mindfulness courses. For the people involved, mindfulness was not understood 
as a mask for austerity. They understood mindfulness as an intervention that 
might help people deal with stress, anxiety, and depression in contexts of so-
cial and political disenfranchisement. This came as a response to the immediate 
challenges of working with people who face mental health issues during a time 
of privatization and a shrinking state mandate for social welfare. Mental health 
was framed as a major problem in the United Kingdom, and this was, in part, 
because of the increasing risk, inequality, and hardship that people in different 
populations in the country were thought to face. Rather than looking at the 
macro-level of neoliberal forces, which can appear totalizing in their coloniza-
tion of wellbeing and the responsibility to self-manage, by exploring the eth-
nography of political process we can account for the concerns and interests of 
people working in different sectors of civil society. The promotion of mindful-
ness in public policy was an effort to do something about the tangible struggles 
that professionals describe witnessing in each of their sectors, given that each 
sector is undergoing transformation.
The relationship between self-governance and political economy is an im-
portant one. Governmental emphasis on patient empowerment emerges from 
changing relationships between state and citizens, and the role that the state 
plays in the welfare of citizens. It is not a coincidence that austerity and a dis-
course of “patient empowerment” are developing simultaneously. But not taking 
this seriously enough casts it as merely a smokescreen for austerity (cf. Howell 
2015).9 Encouraging subjects to take responsibility for their mental health is 
understood as a form of governance that “tricks” them into self-governance and 
effaces political-economic relations. Practices of self-governance are interpreted 
9. In Howell’s research on psychological resilience in military settings, resilience 
training is understood to optimize military force, and to reduce healthcare costs by 
preempting mental distress in soldiers at a time of shrinking defense expenditure. 
It is possible to interpret this as a form of training by which soldiers are made 
responsible for their own mental health, which has the effect of effacing a politics 
of austerity in which welfare entitlements are shrinking. But Howell argues that 
this is an insufficient analysis of the aims of military resilience programs, which 
are to enhance (not just to responsibilize) soldiers, “a more ambitious aim than 
responsibilisation” (2015: 69).
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as only individualizing and psychologizing suffering, and thereby obfuscating 
the social or political causes of mental health issues at a time of increasing social 
welfare cuts. Patient empowerment, then, becomes a mask for austerity. 
While anthropologists have theorized neoliberalism as a mode of govern-
ance based on an entrepreneurial model that emphasizes individual risk and 
responsibility (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), they have noted that it is rarely, if 
ever, totalizing in practice. Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008) consider the limits 
and challenges to theories of neoliberalism highlighted by the implementation 
of neoliberal policies. They point to the unevenness of neoliberalism’s spread 
and the ways in which it articulates and intersects with other political-cultural 
formations and governing projects. Their aim is “to treat neoliberalism as a pro-
cess rather than a fait accompli” (ibid.: 115; see also Maskovsky and Kingfisher 
2001), thereby highlighting the production and reproduction of patterns of in-
equality, and questioning the totalizing nature of neoliberalism. In so doing, 
they are able to provide analytical space to consider the limits of neoliberalism. 
Elsewhere, anthropologists have demonstrated that local manifestations reveal 
the limits of neoliberalism and its articulation with other cultural, political, and 
economic forms (see Gledhill 2004; Freeman 2007). 
Healthcare policy provides fertile ground for thinking about these limits. 
Patients are increasingly encouraged to make decisions for themselves, which 
are simultaneously embedded in broader networks of responsibility and care 
(Zignon 2010; Fordyce 2012). Trnka and Trundle (2014) suggest that ideolo-
gies of patient “empowerment” in which the citizen is imagined as independent 
and responsible, self-managing, and acting in a way that promotes her own 
health and wellbeing may in practice be neither realized nor desired. Forms 
of identity, collectivity, and interpersonal connections may intersect with and 
contest neoliberal frames. Trnka and Trundle argue that “social actors . . . move 
between different moral, ethical, and affective valences of what it means to be 
‘responsible’ subjects without necessarily feeling conflicted, in need of reso-
lution, or necessitating ‘moral breakdown’” (ibid.: 141; see also Zigon 2010). 
Social relations incorporate multiple framings of responsibility, sometimes 
accounted for through neoliberal logics of self-responsibility and care of the 
self, and sometimes interpreted in terms of interpersonal responsibility and 
obligation. As Trnka and Trundle argue, “Despite its flexibility, neoliberalism 
cannot encompass the breadth of subjectivities and collective relations that con-
stitute contemporary enactments of responsibility” (2014: 141) Furthermore, 
guidelines promoting self-managed care may be interpreted in multiple ways, 
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informed by preexisting understandings of responsibility and accountability in 
healthcare (Scheldeman 2008; Trnka 2014). Responsibility has been central to 
a range of anthropological concerns, including: political justice and an equita-
ble system (Rawls [1971] 1999; Corsín Jiménez 2008); national identity and 
kinship (Gammeltoff 2007); personal and professional ethics (Brodwin 2013); 
agency and moral blame (Davis 2012); and self-care and decision making (see 
Mol 2008; Premkumar 2015). A theory of neoliberal “responsibilization” helps 
to account for the ways in which the subject becomes responsible for emotional 
self-regulation. But if the category of “responsiblization” remains limited to the 
neoliberal framework, it becomes hard to account for other forms of responsi-
bility or responsiblization that might be in play, or the multiple effects of reflex-
ive self-governance.
THE MEANINGS OF MINDFULNESS: MAINTAINING 
MULTIPLICITY
A danger of theorizing practices of subjectification as neoliberal is that they 
come to be read as always already in the service of a neoliberal agenda. If neo-
liberalism has permeated the regulation of the emotions, then there is no room 
to understand attempts to address what are identified as the dehumanizing ef-
fects of neoliberalism through practices of subjectification as anything other 
than more neoliberalism. The way in which the subject relates to herself is both 
the symptom and the cause of neoliberalism: the symptom because anxiety and 
depression result from the uncertainty and individualism of neoliberal structure; 
and the cause because reflexivity and emotional regulation are necessary for ne-
oliberalism to flourish. Not only is neoliberalism a totalizing reality, but also any 
response to it that entails subjectification tightens its colonization of emotional 
life. As Reveley writes, subjectification is interpreted as “producing a wholly 
negative, disempowering form of strangulating self-entrapment” (2015: 88). 
The political authority of the APPG rested, in part, on the orchestration 
of participants from different social worlds without reducing the diversity of 
their interests and perspectives. Evidence was presented which suggested that 
mindfulness-based interventions might be of benefit for a range of different 
problems (e.g., criminal recidivism, impulse control, emotional regulation, and 
depressive relapse) without reducing them to the same problem, or supposing 
that mindfulness might be helpful for addressing all or some of them for the 
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same reasons. Throughout the inquiry process, mindfulness was understood to 
help practitioners cope with life in different ways. Divergent emphases on the 
meaning of mindfulness reflected the heterogeneity of those involved and the 
diversity of issues under consideration. While they were understood to share 
some characteristics, the differences between them remained present. The eight 
parliamentary hearings focused on a different area of civil society, which co-
alesced beneath four broad headings: health, education, criminal justice, and 
the workplace. In the hearing on mental health, it was reported that up to 10 
percent of the UK adult population will experience symptoms of depression 
in any given week and that depression is two to three times more common in 
people with long-term physical health problems. In the hearing on education, 
emphasis was placed on the value of “character building” and “resilience” in the 
promotion of nonacademic skills and capabilities for students. In the hearing on 
mindfulness and the workplace, the meeting was told that the leading cause of 
workplace sickness absence in the United Kingdom is mental ill health. Interest 
also oriented around the use of mindfulness in the development of higher cog-
nitive skills such as working memory functioning and decision making. Execu-
tive control and emotional regulation were also of central concern in the hearing 
on mindfulness and the criminal justice system. Violence in prisons and rates of 
reoffense were linked to, but not reduced to, problems in psychological processes 
and states. In the description below, I will draw on events from the hearings on 
criminal justice, the workplace, long-term physical health conditions, and NHS 
staff. Each parliamentary hearing was specifically targeted to address an area in 
which high levels of mental health diagnoses, stress, or anxiety had been identi-
fied. Each followed a similar structure incorporating: participation in a mind-
fulness practice; presentation of statistics on the scale and form of a particular 
societal problem and its economic implications; personal testimonies from peo-
ple for whom mindfulness practice had been radically transformative; the exist-
ing evidence for the efficacy for mindfulness-based interventions in each area; 
and reports on the implementation of small-scale mindfulness interventions. 
Hearings were held in large wood-paneled committee rooms in the Houses 
of Parliament, overlooking the Thames. Each of the hearings was full, and I was 
told that it was unusual to have so many ministers present at APPG meetings, 
and even more unusual for them to stay for any length of time. Over the course 
of the hearings, upward of eighty people presented statistics on challenges be-
ing faced by populations in different areas of UK life, accounts of research on 
mindfulness, their experiences of implementing mindfulness-based courses, and 
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their personal experiences of practice. These people were drawn from different 
areas of expertise and work, and included but were not limited to research-
ers, civil servants, MPs, ex-offenders, probation managers, patients, school chil-
dren, third-sector officers, private sector workers, NHS service commissioners, 
healthcare professionals, psychologists, and teachers. The orchestration of such 
a broad and specialist group of people was made possible by a clear agenda for 
the running order and tight time keeping by the chair of each meeting (usually a 
politician). Speakers were encouraged to keep to time, usually no more than five 
to ten minutes. This, and the range and volume of information being presented, 
gave a clear pace to the proceedings. Each meeting followed a similar running 
order: a welcome from the chair; a short mindfulness practice; statistics on the 
range, scale, and character of a problem; an overview of research evidence for 
mindfulness; testimonials from people who had benefited from mindfulness; 
accounts from professionals who had implemented mindfulness-based initia-
tives in their area; discussion around the barriers to adoption of mindfulness in 
a given area; and an open discussion on coordination and next steps.
At the start of each hearing, assembled professionals, MPs, and peers were 
invited to settle into a short mindfulness practice led by a respected mindfulness 
teacher. As one of the cochairs commented at the hearing on mental health, 
the short mindfulness practice was important because we were there to discuss 
mindfulness, and this ought to be done mindfully. At the APPG on long-term 
physical health conditions and NHS staff, the practice was led by a consultant 
clinical psychologist and mindfulness teacher from the NHS: 
So, bringing awareness into the body and perhaps noticing the contact of the 
feet on the floor. . . . Feelings of touch, pressure between the body and the chair. 
Now, taking our position in a way that has a quality of wakefulness. . . . A sense 
of dignity. . . . Being present with our experience. Choosing whether to close the 
eyes now or keep them open but with a downward gaze. . . . Guiding the atten-
tion inward. . . . Noticing the thoughts or images running through the mind. . . 
. What feelings are around for you? What’s the emotional tone, if you will? . . . 
What sensations are presenting themselves in the body? . . . Not trying to change 
anything here, just tuning in to what’s here for you. . . . And now, narrowing the 
focus of attention to the sensations of the breath in the body. . . . Noticing the 
movement of the breath, coming up close to these sensations and recognizing 
them. . . . Noticing the breath moving in the abdomen. . . . Stretching and relax-
ing back the muscles of the abdomen as you breathe. . . . Following the in-breath 
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for its full duration. . . . And the out-breath for its full duration. . . . Allowing the 
breath to be natural, not trying to change it or control it. . . . Being with these 
breath sensations. . . . Noticing how the mind moves off into thinking, guiding it 
back to find the breath once again. . . . And now expanding awareness around the 
breath to include a sense of the body as a whole. . . . Noticing subtle movements 
throughout the whole body. . . . Opening up to felt experience in the whole of 
the body right now. . . . Noticing the shape of the body and the space it takes 
up. . . . The boundary of the body in the environment. . . . Noticing sensations 
of clothes against the skin. . . . Expanding awareness beyond the body now to 
include a sense of the environment, perhaps noticing the temperature, the feeling 
of air against the skin. . . . Noticing sounds. . . . Being aware of the room. And if 
eyes are closed, beginning to open them, bringing awareness to what is seen. . . 
. Being in this room, sitting together. . . . And carrying this awareness into the 
next moments of our being together.
Participation in the mindfulness practice changed the feeling of the hearing 
significantly. Each time, the bustle of arrival gave way to a quieter and more 
focused sense of engagement. Each hearing then continued with the presenta-
tion of statistics identifying the character and scale of the problem that was to 
be considered that day. For example, at the hearing on criminal justice, statistics 
collected by the prison reform trust revealed that nearly half the prison popula-
tion suffer from depression or anxiety (Ministry of Justice 2013) and the suicide 
rate is almost fifteen times higher than in the general population (Department 
of Health 2004; Samaritans resource pack 2004). At the hearing on mindfulness 
and the workplace, it was reported that since 2009 the number of sick days lost 
to stress, depression, and anxiety has increased by 24 percent (Annual Report of 
the Chief Medical Officer 2013). 
An autobiographical narrative then followed from someone for whom the 
problems identified in the hearing were personally relevant and who had ben-
efited from mindfulness. Here, the value of mindfulness extended much further 
than the problems presented statistically (such as absenteeism, recidivism, burn-
out, chronic pain, etc.). Mindfulness was presented as having had a profound 
and transformative effect on the speaker. For example, an ex-offender told the 
hearing on criminal justice of his previously troubled life, his discovery of mind-
fulness, and how much he had been affected by this. Preventing reoffense was 
implicit in his account, but he placed emphasis on his overall experience of life 
and his relationships with others: 
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I was diagnosed with PTSD [posttraumatic stress disorder] when I was five. My 
carers were violent. I didn’t know what was happening. If you grow up in a war 
zone, you become a warrior. I got into alcohol and drugs. I ended up in prison. 
I had regret for the past and fear for the future. I was robbed of the present, and 
mindfulness gave that back. It’s revolutionized my way of seeing the world and 
myself. My kids have never seen me violent and I’m trying to teach them through 
mindfulness. You have to try it. As they say in Glasgow, “Better felt than telt.” I 
could tell you about all the miracles in my life, but you have to go out and taste 
it for yourself. Five years ago I was in a homeless shelter and now I’m sitting in 
Parliament. 
Similarly, at the hearing on mindfulness and the NHS, an Accident & Emer-
gency mental health nurse who works nights and has two teenage sons reported 
that she joined a mindfulness course at work out of curiosity and that it had a 
radical impact on her life: 
It’s been quite life changing for me. I found quite quickly that my thought pro-
cesses changed and I hadn’t realized that maybe I had got quite bogged down in 
things; I just thought it was the passage of life and it takes its toll on everyone. 
You know, we all have bereavements, we all have losses, things go wrong in our 
lives. During the course, I was just like my old self, just like when I was a lot 
younger. I was happy, I was feeling joy in things, and I hadn’t realized that that 
part of my life had gone. 
Testimonials were then followed by econometric data on the forecasted cost 
of mental health problems to the state, and a presentation of the quantitative 
evidence for the efficacy of mindfulness as a targeted intervention to address 
specific problems. This was followed by accounts from professionals who had 
introduced mindfulness-based interventions in their given field and the chal-
lenges that they had encountered. At the hearing on criminal justice, a senior 
representative for the Welsh probation service presented her experience of run-
ning a mindfulness pilot project in a probation hospital in Cardiff. This was con-
ducted with two high-risk sexual offenders and one high-risk violent offender, 
all of whom had spent at least five years in prison. Simultaneously highlighting 
economic efficiency and personal transformation, she presented a case study of 
a violent offender who had used mindfulness to control his impulse to commit a 
violent act. He had witnessed a young man being disrespectful to an older lady 
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at a bus stop and was immediately awash with powerful fantasies of violence. 
He vividly imagined putting the young man’s head through the screen of the 
bus shelter, to the extent that he heard the glass breaking and smelt the blood. 
At the same time, however, he heard his mindfulness teacher’s voice in his head, 
saying, “Notice what is happening right now. Move towards the positive.” The 
probation executive told the hearing, “He was able to witness the thoughts in a 
nonjudgmental way, and allow them to pass without reacting to them and being 
violent. We costed up that scenario and found that it would have cost £100,000 
in services if he had followed through on that impulse.” 
By collecting together sets of evidence the breadth and character of different 
problems were represented at different scales (personal, societal, epidemiologi-
cal, and professional). Mental health issues were framed as sharing a common 
identity and as being unique to each domain. This enabled the range and char-
acter of challenges experienced by different groups of people to be discussed 
without the differences between them being elided. Maintaining this multiplic-
ity of meaning and the breadth and specialism of the contributors was under-
stood to mark the success of the inquiry process and the drafting of the inquiry 
report. Participants identified diverse societal problems, and the inquiry process 
was intended to explore the evidence and potential for mindfulness-based in-
terventions in addressing them. In the course of this process, mindfulness was 
understood through different frameworks. This shifting ground—the meaning 
of mindfulness, and the range of problems that were under consideration—was 
held together through the structure of the inquiry process itself. That is, while 
the “meaning” of mindfulness was multiple and the populations and problems 
were diverse, the pattern and sequence of the process created coherence between 
seemingly very different scales and orders of issues. This did not flatten diversity 
but, rather, enabled it. 
CONCLUSION 
In her ethnography of UN-sponsored international conferences, Riles (1998) 
explores the challenge that negotiators face in holding multiple levels of action 
in view at once. She asks, how does institutional knowledge achieve its effects, 
and what effects does it achieve? She argues that the production and ratification 
of intergovernmental agreements involve nonrepresentational patterning. In fo-
cusing on the aesthetic form to which information in documents adheres, rather 
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than the meaning of information, she is able to consider “the way that the form 
of the documents made manifest a reality of levels and levels of realities” (ibid.: 
379). Similarly, standardization in the inquiry process brought together multi-
ple levels of reality—the scale changing of statistics and personal testimonies, 
for example—and also multiple realities—the experiences of people in diverse 
parts of civil society dealing with different problems. The overall aesthetic of the 
process enabled multiple meanings of mindfulness and societal problems to be 
considered in one coherent endeavor. 
The inquiry process was constituted through the orchestrated dialogue of 
a diverse and professionalized group of people rather than a “top-down” im-
plementation of “big policy.” Throughout the inquiry process and the drafting 
of the report, social problems from disparate areas of civil society were col-
lected together. This multiplicity of meaning was maintained through the de-
velopment and enforcement of a clear pattern of procedures, which enabled the 
representation of multiple levels of reality within and across each focus. This 
ensured integrity of approach in the presence of diversity of meaning. The nar-
rower focuses of each hearing (such as preventing depressive relapse or improv-
ing students’ attentional control) were contained within the standardization of 
the proceedings. The development of the inquiry process required methods for 
creating reliability of information across domains, agreed methods of gathering 
information, and some sense of integrity (of data, evidence, and recommenda-
tions) that stretched across local contingencies, interpretations, and meanings. 
Both scales of information and the framing of mental health issues remained 
multiple throughout the process. The aesthetic of the inquiry acted as a container 
allowing for multiple meanings of mindfulness without demanding consensus. 
I have argued that an analysis of self-governance as a neoliberal tool risks in-
terpreting “responsibilization” through a totalizing framework: practices of self-
governance are read as individualizing and psychologizing suffering, and there-
by obfuscating the social and political causes of mental health issues at a time of 
increasing social welfare cuts. But this leaves analysis of governance limited to a 
framework of top-down intervention and does not account for diversity in the 
motivations, experiences, and efforts of people practicing self-governance and 
the collaborative nature of the political processes by which it is promoted. Self-
governance, then, becomes a mask for austerity. I have suggested that it is pos-
sible to identify the limits of neoliberalism by resisting the temptation to move 
beyond the ethnographic movement. In so doing, the motor of political process 
is revealed to be the maintenance of a diversity of meanings of self-governance. 
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The path to happiness? 
Prosperity, suffering, and transnational migration 
in Britain and Sylhet
Katy Gardner
People between two countries always feel sorrow. 
Mothers and fathers worry about how their child is 
doing in another country. The child sometimes finds 
happiness. From the Bangladeshi point of view they 
are sleeping in a big bed, eating chicken and wear-
ing expensive saris. But some only feel pain, like 
when a chilli is rubbed into your flesh: a burning 
pain like that.
– Mrs. Khatun, London, 1996 (cited in Katy 
Gardner, Age, narrative and migration)
While it is axiomatic that migrants move in order to improve their lives, at-
tracted by “pull factors” such as economic opportunities, modernity, freedom, 
and so forth, research drawing upon metrics of well-being implies that it 
does not lead to happiness for those who leave (Bartram 2010, 2011; Nowok 
et al. 2011; Graham and Markowitz 2011), those left behind (Borraz, Pozo, 
and Rossi 2008), or those who return (Bartram 2013). Ethnographic accounts 
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point to similar conclusions: migration is associated with upheaval, rupture, 
and longing.1 Popular stereotypes support these findings, presenting a picture 
of sorrow, separation, and loss, or what Sara Ahmed calls “the melancholic mi-
grant” (Ahmed 2010: 121–59). In this article I shall explore these contradic-
tions, drawing upon my research among transnational migrants in Britain and 
Bangladesh, which I have been carrying out since the late 1980s (Gardner 1995, 
2002, 2008, 2012a). Rather than to seek definitive answers concerning whether 
or not migration makes people happy—as we shall see, the answers to this are 
highly subjective and ever changing—my intention is to ask what we might 
learn about migration in particular and the human condition in general by con-
sidering how journeys purportedly undertaken in order to find happiness so 
often lead instead to grief, longing, and dislocation.
Within Sylhet, Bangladesh and its transnational fields in Britain, migra-
tion’s contradictions are palpable. That the majority of migrants to Britain, or 
Londonis as they are known, have been successful in achieving a better life for 
their families appears to nonmigrants to be obvious. Their large houses, well-
fed bodies and consumer goods are testimony to the local dictum that if one 
wishes to prosper, migration is the only way forward. But does this prosperity 
lead to the contentment that the nonmigrants imagine? In my research Lon-
donis’ accounts of their lives are filled with loss and conflict. Since my doctoral 
fieldwork in Sylhet in the late 1980s I have revisited my research village many 
times, as well as conducting research in London with British Bengali elders 
and children (Gardner 1995, 2002; Gardner and Mand 2012; Gardner 2012a) 
and have been privileged to see these contradictions play out over peoples’ lives. 
Although migration is passionately desired and imagined as the route to a better 
life, the reality is more ambivalent, both for those who go and for those who stay 
behind (Gardner 2002, 2006, 2008). So what goes wrong? Is it that people are 
inherently bad at predicting what will make them happy, as suggested by some 
psychological research (Gilbert 2009); is migration is simply a bad choice? Or are 
more complex processes at work?
One way to answer this is to think of migration as a “happiness project” 
(Ahmed 2010). By doing this we shift attention from the ways in which mi-
gration leads to material prosperity to its emotional implications. This discur-
sive shift is also made in Sylhet, where as I describe below, people talk about 
1. See, for example, Rytter (2013); Salih (2003); Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997); 
Baldassar (2008); Parrenas (2005); Charsley (2013).
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migration in terms of the happiness it is assumed it will bring (kushi) rather 
than in strictly economic terms. This is not simply because for the very poor 
happiness and contentment are not possible without material security but also 
because bidesh (foreign countries) have assumed an almost mythical status in 
Sylhet, which transcend mere economic success. Combined with this, as Ahmed 
argues, happiness can be understood less as a measurable emotion and more as 
“a wish, a will, a want” (Ahmed 2010: 2). Rather than seeking to describe what is 
at best a fluid and elusive state of being, Ahmed suggests, social scientists might 
profitably think of happiness in terms of what it does. By becoming associated 
with certain objects or projects, “happiness shapes what coheres as a world” 
(Ahmed 2010: 2); it is a state that is anticipated rather than actual, “a question 
of following rather than finding” (2010: 32). As individuals, we therefore face 
choices or paths that we believe will lead to happiness, the promised end point 
of our journey. Such perspectives chime with work in the growing field of “hap-
piness studies” (Thin 2012), which stress how happiness is often imagined as 
a future state, rather one experienced “in the now.” As Daniel Gilbert wittily 
puts it, “our brains were made for nexting, and that’s just what they’ll do” (2009: 
191/4847 kindle). Thus, while a vast literature addresses immediate and practi-
cal ways to become happy (for example, Paul Dolan’s 2014 book Happiness by 
design) the human tendency is to imagine happiness as something that will take 
place in the future.
From this, the relationship between migration and happiness becomes more 
complex than the simplistic causality inferred by economics and metrics. After 
all, the difficulties of working out what factors cause happiness in happiness re-
search are legion (Thin 2012: 110). We also face the problem of how to evaluate 
emotions and well-being as reported by interlocutors, both in the present and in 
the past, for as we shall see, people have a tendency to forget or misreport how 
they feel or felt. A related difficulty is what is meant by “happiness,” a question 
that continues to dog philosophers, theologians, and psychologists, not to say 
anthropologists (Thin 2012; Johnston et al. 2012). What exactly is happiness, 
and how do we know if others have it, or are it? As Andrew Beatty has argued, 
anthropologists struggle with interpreting and conveying emotion across cul-
tures (Beatty 2010, 2005).
Although I cannot solve such problems here, in what follows I take Ahmed’s 
concept of happiness as a promise and project as my starting point, consider-
ing how the project of happiness via migration is worked on, experienced, and 
lived by different people, in different locations across transnational space and 
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at different stages in their life course. The question then becomes not so much 
“what are the outcomes?” but “what does this particular happiness project do?” 
By treating happiness as a project—an enterprise that projects people into the 
future—we focus on how it is imagined and the routes taken in order to reach 
it, both over the life course and over space. Migration is particularly interesting 
in this context for the project is not only spread over time (“I will meet the man 
of my dreams” or “I will lose weight”) but also over geography (“If I go to that 
place I will be happy”). It is, literally, a mapping of the future, in which par-
ticular states of well-being and affect are like contours on the map: here are the 
lows, and there are the highs. Or are they? As we shall see, while the project of 
geographical movement brings my interlocutors closer to prosperity, economic 
opportunities, security, and improved social status, these do not necessarily lead 
to long-term contentment or happiness.
So how to unravel the contradictions? And what about the tricky relationship 
between well-being (the promise of migration) and emotion? As Joel Robbins 
suggests in this volume, these may be quite different. One way forward is to fo-
cus not only on what is promised by migration but to interrogate the values that 
underlie the project and then link these to associated emotional states. After all, 
not all happiness projects are the same; they depend on cultural and historical 
context and are underpinned by specific values (romantic love, aesthetic ide-
als of bodily perfection, for example). Returning us to classical theory, Robbins 
asks how commonly held values are associated with human flourishing and the 
relationship between the quest for a good life and the emotions it produces. As 
he reminds us, Durkheim argued that effervescence is produced when social 
values are collectively performed. If family togetherness is an important value, 
for example, then a meal or family party will produce effervescence. But since in 
any society there are plural values we are left with the thorny problem of what 
happens if and when these clash or contradict each other (Robbins, this volume).
By considering the values of happiness, I suggest that some of the difficul-
ties faced by Bangladeshi migrants and their families result from the funda-
mental contraction of a happiness project aimed at the flourishing of the group 
(migration) and based around the core value of prosperity, which clashes with 
another core value: familial togetherness. In what follows, I refer to states of be-
ing that Bangladeshis call kusi (happy), santi (peaceful), or bhalo jiebon (good life). 
These are discursively opposed to kostor (suffering) and chinta (worries). As we 
shall see, while core values are deeply implicated in what people report causes hap-
piness—familial togetherness and economic prosperity are both central—these 
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states, and the degree to which particular values are enacted are also influenced 
by where people are in their life courses as well as their gender, not to say where 
they are geographically (Gardner 2002). It is not simply that values that are suc-
cessfully enacted produce eudaimonia and at times effervescence (analytically 
separate states of being that are both encompassed by the emic use of the term 
“happiness” or kushi). It is that, as Ahmed stresses, the process is temporal: to get 
to the promised happiness takes time and may involve other emotions and states 
of being. As others have noted, migration can involve considerable hardship but 
is aimed at a payoff at the end ( Jackson 2013: 131; Lucht 2013). We must also 
distinguish between the supposed beneficiaries of the project: is it the individual 
or the group? In what follows we see how individuals pay for the good of the 
group by their suffering. Here, the primary objective is the longer-term well-be-
ing and prosperity of the family mapped onto a real and imagined geography of 
good places and good things. As we also see, the suffering of individuals is tem-
poral; a migrant to Britain may face loss and yearnings for home, but over time 
these feelings subside. Similarly, his mother might weep for him but feel great 
satisfaction at the improvements to her farm that his remittances have brought. 
As always, ambivalence lies at the heart of the migrant experience.
In order to illustrate these processes I discuss a Sylheti family who, like 
many of their neighbors and relatives, has relentlessly pursued migration as a 
path toward familial prosperity. Through consideration of their stories, I hope 
that we might learn not only of the deep tensions and contradictions that trans-
national migration brings but also how “the promise of happiness” helps order 
peoples’ relationships to places and their movements across the world.
TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE PROMISE 
OF HAPPINESS
While happiness per se is rarely evoked, the literature on transnational migration 
is animated by plenty of hope, ingenuity, and innovation, as well as melancholia 
and nostalgia. While originally much work in the 1990s interrogated political 
processes, nation building, and citizenship,2 other research has examined the 
2. For example, Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc (1994); Glick Schiller, 
Basch, and Szanton-Blanc (1992); Fitzgerald (2000); Ong and Nonini (1996); 
Georges (1990); for an overview see Vertovec (2010). 
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processes of kinship across transnational space, pointing not only to how rela-
tionships are ruptured but also how they enable transnational movement, are re-
made across space, and the narrative and ritual work involved (see, for example, 
Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Chamberlain 1997, 2011; Olwig 2007; Shaw and 
Charsley 2006; Gardner and Grillo 2002; Gardner 1993; Abranches 2014). A 
growing body of work focuses on questions of care, both for elders (see Gardner 
2002; Baldassar 2008) and children (see Parrenas 2005; Schmalzbauer, Verghese, 
and Vadera 2007; Olwig 1999; Coe at al. 2011; Gardner 2012b). Here, the stress 
tends to be on separation and loss, the difficulties of long distance intimacy, or 
its lack. Rhacel Parrenas, for example, has charted the damage done to children 
left in the Philippines by their migrant mothers (2005), while in Global woman 
Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild describe a global economy 
of emotion in which love and care are drained from the South to the North, 
to the benefit of privileged children and their families in the metropole and to 
the detriment to those left behind in the now emotionally impoverished South 
(Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003).
If so much is put at peril and so much emotional work is required in thread-
ing together geographically distant lives and papering over the cracks in inti-
macy, care, and love, why migrate? While the primary reason is usually eco-
nomic—people from poorer countries migrate in order to find work—evidence 
from around the world indicates that once a pattern of movement between 
two or more countries has been established, locations on the transnational map 
can assume symbolic roles, signifying relative success or failure, happiness or 
despondency, onto which aspirations concerning a better life, modernity, or pro-
gress might be mapped (cf. Vertovec 2010). People also move between the dif-
ferent locations in order to create and recreate family relationships, provide care, 
or charity, (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002) or to educate their children (Zeitlyn 
2012, 2015; Gardner and Mand 2012). To understand these complex motiva-
tions more fully, let us turn to Sylhet, where the role of bidesh (foreign countries; 
overseas migration) in shaping peoples’ life chances as well as their emotional 
horizons cannot be understated.
THE PROMISE OF MIGRATION IN SYLHET
Although within Bangladesh as a whole the role of international migration has 
become increasingly important to the economy, Sylhet has a special history of 
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connection to foreign countries, in particular Britain. Indeed, whether or not 
one is a Londoni has become the main arbiter of wealth and status (Gardner 
1995, 2008). From the beginning of the twentieth century, men from Sylhet 
traveled to Calcutta, where they found work as seamen, or lascars. Chain mi-
gration meant that soon particular villages and areas within Sylhet had estab-
lished networks of migration. Most of the ships went to the London Docklands, 
where some of the men jumped ship. By the 1940s, a small group of pioneering 
Sylhetis was working in the kitchens of London’s hotels and restaurants. These 
men formed a bridge head for the much larger group, who were to arrive from 
the 1950s onward as industrial workers, hired to assist in the postwar recon-
struction of Britain. The connection between Sylhet and Britain was so well 
established that by the 1960s a section of the British High Commission was 
established there.
By the time I did my fieldwork in the late 1980s the signs of successful 
migration were ubiquitous. Londonis had bought up most of the local land and 
were building big houses. Chain migration meant that new geographies of Lon-
doni villages had arisen: particular gustis (lineages) as well as villages had high 
numbers of Londonis, and were far wealthier. By the time of my fieldwork, pat-
terns of landholding in Talukpur, the village where I worked, showed that those 
who originally migrated to the United Kingdom had risen to the top of the 
socio-economic hierarchy, while those who hadn’t tended to lose land (Gardner 
1995). Over the intervening twenty-five years the inequalities have become 
increasingly explicit (Gardner 2009, 2012a). While large and dominant line-
ages capitalized on the opportunities and have irregular donations (or both) by 
UK relatives in times of need (Gardner 2012a). Although agriculture remains 
important to the local economy, those that work the land are usually nonmi-
grants from low-income households. As has been reported elsewhere in Asia, 
more prosperous or middle income households have tended to withdraw from 
agriculture, leaving it to laborers or sharecroppers (Hall 2012; Jeffery 2010). 
This leaves few options available for young men from prosperous rural house-
holds. Like their counterparts studied by Craig Jeffery in India, they spend their 
days in “time pass,” hanging around and waiting for their futures to materialize 
( Jeffery 2010). Some become “business men,” running shops funded by their 
Londoni relatives (Gardner 2008; Gardner and Ahmed 2009). A minority aims 
for higher education and a profession. The majority aim to migrate.
Nowadays migration to the United Kingdom is largely only possible via 
the marriage migration of sons and daughters (Gardner 2006, 2008). Failing 
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that, there are other destinations. Within the local culture of migration places 
are arranged hierarchically, with the old and established at the top: the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and occasionally destinations in Northern Europe, 
and other destinations in the Middle East, South East Asia, or South Africa 
beneath. The possibilities for long-term settlement and the degree of economic 
opportunity are the main factors that make different destinations more or less 
attractive. While it is relatively easy to gain a contract for the Middle East, for 
example, settlement is out of the question, and however hard one might work, 
the economic opportunities are limited by legal restrictions on foreigners own-
ing businesses or property. For others, illegal migration is the only possibility: 
either to the Middle East, or taking one’s chance and facing the huge risks of 
arduous and dangerous journeys West or East. The risks are substantial. Indeed, 
it is not unusual for households to sell all their land in order to fund a member 
to migrate only to find that the dalal (agent) has cheated them, providing false 
papers or in some cases providing nothing after disappearing with their money 
(Gardner 1995, 2012a).
Within this context migration seems to be the only way to get on in life. 
While translated literally as “foreign countries,” bidesh has become laden with 
implications not only of economic prosperity but also long-term happiness. 
“Take me to London!” people exclaim when they meet me. Women proffer 
their children, men their services as drivers or housekeepers. “Why do you want 
to go there?” I ask. “Because it is beautiful (shondur),” they say, or “I will be happy 
(kushi hobe),” or “It’s peaceful (santi).” In what Steven Vertovec has termed a 
“transnational habitus” (Vertovec 2010: 69) it seems hard to imagine paths to 
happiness or well-being that don’t involve traveling abroad. “This place is full 
of suffering,” (anek kustor) they tell me, “people are poor” (manoosh garib). In 
contrast, bidesh is good, and getting oneself or a family member there, by hook 
or by crook, is deeply desirable: the path to happiness is, quite literally, the path 
to bidesh.
There is more to the adulation of bidesh than money. Aspirations and the 
desire for status figure large. Returning Londonis and their British-born chil-
dren and grandchildren arrive in their home villages in the role of patrons, their 
bags filled with gifts not only for their immediate relatives but also the many 
people who they help to support. Their modern consumer goods, whether elec-
tronic gadgets and smart phones, nappies, ground spices, televisions, or globally 
branded clothes and cosmetics, all indicate a life of ease and style. They are 
people on the move, sophisticated and educated, with lifestyles that those left 
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behind can only dream of. Their houses exemplify the dream. Two- or even 
three-story mansions, with palatial pillars, large walls, bathrooms with show-
ers, and Western toilets, they could not be more different from the houses of 
most nonmigrants: mud and thatch dwellings without sanitation. Paradoxically, 
while for those in the desh (home), Londoni houses signify all that is good about 
bidesh and are sites for dreaming of the good life, many of their owners live in far 
less glamorous homes in the United Kingdom. British Bangladeshi children on 
visits to the desh find themselves treated as high status visitors, living in palaces 
and playing in swimming pools (referring to the large ponds that are shared 
among households in family compounds) a far cry from the cramped council 
flats where they live in (Gardner and Mand 2012; Mand 2010; Zeitlyn 2012). 
Indeed, as we shall see, the reality of life in Britain is often very far from how 
it is imagined from the vantage point of Bangladesh. South Asian migrants to 
Britain experience the paradox of upward mobility in Bangladesh at the cost of 
downwards mobility in the United Kingdom, working multiple shifts in restau-
rants and taking up a lowly social position in British society, with its embedded 
racisms and exclusions (Charsley 2005).
Migration is thus more than an economic project. It is seen as a pathway to 
long-term well-being and status, a happiness project par excellence. The promise 
of migration is everywhere in Bangladesh: images of Tower Bridge, airplanes, 
and Big Ben depicted on the sides of CNG scooter taxis and rickshaws, English 
language schools going by the name of “Oxford” promoted on walls and hoard-
ings, or fast food outlets named “London Fried Chicken.” The promises are 
so vivid for young men with few other opportunities: go abroad, preferably to 
Britain, find work, and make money; reach a state of understanding and knowl-
edge and become cosmopolitan, wealthy, and sophisticated. Put simply: while 
losers stay put, winners move.
CONTRADICTORY VALUES OF HAPPINESS
Bidesh and London are therefore not simply places, they are also projects that 
give a geographical expression to a core value in Sylhet: prosperity and profit 
(laab). To be enterprising, to profit in one’s dealings and speculations—whether 
in migration or business—is a key aspiration for men. Indeed, as others have 
also noted, migration is closely tied to projects of masculinity in South Asia 
(Osella and Osella 2000). According to the narratives of older Bangladeshi men 
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living in London in the late 1990s, for example, a successful man provides for 
his family, accumulates wealth, and is cosmopolitan (Gardner 2002). In my re-
search with Bangladeshi elders in East London in the late 1990s the men’s 
stories were organized around particular tropes, which pointed to migration as 
the route for becoming fully adult, worldly, and wise. Their stories often empha-
sized how they got lost during their first days in the United Kingdom, but then 
found their way, moving from ignorance to “understanding,” how their lives 
were dominated by work and how important it was for them to provide for their 
families (Gardner 2002: 77–81).
Wealth (doni) and prosperity is materialized not just in business ventures 
or money but also the fertility of the land, vividly described as golden (shonar). 
Women as well as men take great pride in familial prosperity, materialized in 
by beautiful and expensive (foreign) saris and jewelry at weddings, but also by 
the fecundity and flourishing of their homestead land. In a fifteen-minute long 
video, taken on my phone to show to her sons in Britain, Amma walked me 
around her bari (homestead) pointing out the improvements that had been 
made with remittances from the United Kingdom: a large pond stocked with 
fish and surrounded by bean plants, a new cow, a much improved water pump 
that was noisily supplying water to an area of iri rice, and the new broiler farm.
If prosperity is a key value then its performative enactment, the event in 
which effervescence is generated, is the cooking and serving of huge meals, us-
ing homegrown ingredients. As I have described in earlier work, food from the 
desh is strongly valued by British transnationals for its spiritual and emotional 
connotations (Gardner 1993; see also Abranches 2014). Social media is used 
today to transmit images of the riches of the land. For example, I frequently 
receive pictures of fish, jackfruit, and rice fields, sent to me on the messaging 
app Wassup by family members in the desh. Likewise, photos are posted on 
Facebook by the British contingent of the elaborate dishes they have prepared 
for special occasions in the United Kingdom. But rather than simply displaying 
these riches, it is the entertaining of guests, and their consumption of the food 
in both desh and bidesh that causes real pleasure. A visit to family in the North of 
England will involve a huge meal, attended by as many members of the family 
network who can fit around the table and prepared all day by the family women, 
who watch with approval as men, guests, and children tuck into piles of rice, 
Bangladeshi fish, chicken and lamb biriyani, shabji, and so on (the women will 
eat later). The same is true for the village: when guests come, no holds are barred 
in the preparation of the feast.
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If meals enact the value of prosperity they also enact the value of togeth-
erness and connection (Shompoko). When are you happy? I asked my friends 
in both Bangladesh and Britain; “when everyone is together,” I was told. A 
large and busy household embodies the value of togetherness. Even if women 
sometimes complain of things being too busy, being alone is to be warded off at 
all costs. Here we arrive at the contradiction that exists at the heart of migra-
tion’s promised happiness: to become prosperous one must migrate. But this 
means leaving people behind. Moreover, since families were reunited in the 
United Kingdom in the 1980s, the extended family is spread over both places. 
Complete togetherness is thus never feasible. Rather than the dichotomy of 
“home” and “away” in which migrants leave their families to go abroad, trans-
national Bangladeshis face the contradiction of “home” and “away” being in 
both places at once; despite the dreams of elders in Britain, who fantasize 
about returning “home” only to find themselves alienated and missing their 
UK-based relatives (Gardner 2002), there can be no return to a place where 
everyone is together.
Let us now turn to my stories. Based on my observations of and conversa-
tions with a transnational family who I have known since the late-1980s and 
see every few years, these illustrate both the inherent ambivalence of migration 
as well as how peoples’ accounts shift over time. There is no clear ending: dur-
ing one meeting someone might appear to regret the migration, manifesting 
signs of remorse and unhappiness; a few years later they have forgotten (or do 
not want to remember) the earlier unhappiness. The researcher’s wish of clear 
outcomes is constantly confounded.
I shall start with Khaled3 and his older brothers. Khaled left for the United 
Kingdom as a young man, for according to the local “happiness script” this was 
the place where he would find fulfillment and the right path in life rather than 
lazing around in the desh, getting into trouble, and achieving very little. As a 
newly arrived groom facing the disjuncture between places and roles in Britain, 
including the downward social mobility of becoming a ghar jamai (husband 
living in wife’s home; cf. Charsley 2013) he became despondent and depressed. 
Later, however, all this was to change. After Khaled and his brothers, I shall turn 
to their sisters and mother.
3. All names have been changed and some details scrambled to maintain the anonymity 
of my informants.
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THE PATH TO HAPPINESS: KHALED AND HIS FAMILY
I first met Khaled in 1987, a cheeky, gap-toothed lad, aged about five. His family 
lived in what was known as “sareng bari” (family compound of ship foreman). 
The patriarch, Abdul Syed (Khaled’s grandfather) had gone to Calcutta in the 
1930s; as a sareng he was a key figure in establishing local migration networks. 
After his death in the 1960s, the bari was divided between his sons into four 
separate households. By 1987, only two of these households remained. Two of 
Abdul Syed’s sons, who had gone to the United Kingdom in the 1970s, had 
relocated their families to Burnley. The third, UK-based brother had died, with 
his widow remaining in the bari with her three sons. By the end of my fieldwork 
this family had relocated to the United States.
Toward the end of my fieldwork, as I was preparing to go home, something 
surprising happened. During a visit to a neighbor I was told that Khaled didn’t 
have two older brothers, but three. “Ask Khaled’s mum about Samsun,” the 
neighbor urged, somewhat spitefully. “See what she tells you!” When I broached 
the subject, Khaled’s mother burst into tears. It was true, she said. She had not 
seen her eldest son since he was nine—nearly ten years ago—when he left for 
Burnley with his uncle. It was good, she added, dabbing at her tears. He would 
be happier there. I was aghast, not only at the collective effort of keeping such a 
secret for over a year, but at what it must have meant to have sent such a young 
son abroad. Only now did I begin to grasp the emotional implications of migra-
tion. It promised regular remittances for those who stayed behind and improved 
the life chances for those who left, true. But it also meant rupture and heartache: 
the separations of husbands, siblings, and—tragically—parents and children. 
Women whose husbands or children are abroad often spoke of the pain caused 
by these separations. As Mrs. Khatun tells us in the introductory quote to this 
article, it is “like having chilli rubbed into your skin” (Gardner 2002).
This pain is ongoing for Khaled’s mother (his father died in 2004), not to 
say Samsun. Though she insists that he was sent to the United Kingdom for 
his own good, according to his older sisters he believes that it was only to earn 
money to support his family, not for his happiness at all but for the happiness of 
those remaining at home. As one of the sisters told me, while his parents were 
“senseless” with grief at his departure, today he accuses them of not loving him 
sufficiently and prioritizing the family needs over his, and is rarely in touch. 
Here, we see how the “happiness script” both plays into decisions concerning 
movement and is used to contest it. Though his parents justified the movement 
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of their son to Britain in terms of “happiness” (“tumi kushi hobe”: you will be 
happy), thirty years later Samsun throws it back at them. This is not to suggest 
that Samsun was “trafficked” by his parents—i.e., sent only to earn money for 
them—but rather that in their evaluation of possible futures, having a son in 
the United Kingdom with his uncle would bring longer-term benefits for all 
of them, the value of prosperity. As Jeffery has observed in India, the emerging 
rural middle class often prioritizes long-term future goals over short-term gains 
( Jeffery 2010: 4), shifting the temporal horizons as in the context of rapid global 
and local change. Migration is one such strategy.
Meanwhile, Khaled’s family continued their quest for bidesh, with its prom-
ises of happiness. By 2002, more members had migrated. Khaled’s older brother, 
Taj, had married his Burnley cousin and was running an Indian take away. He 
was getting bored and unruly, Taj tells me in 2013. He needed to have his ener-
gies poured into work and business, enterprises that could not be pursued in 
the desh. His US cousins had also left by 2002 and now manage restaurants 
in California. Technology changes the nature and content of transnationalism. 
These days everyone owns a mobile phone and the youngest generation are all 
on Facebook, via their smart phones. Whereas in 1987 people painstakingly 
wrote (or got others to write) letters to their relatives, sometimes waiting for 
months for a reply, now Britain and Bangladesh are routinely connected for 
hours. Sylheti London and Londoni Sylhet have become transnational commu-
nities par excellence; people are constantly moving between the nodes, marriag-
es are arranged, money transferred, deals over property and businesses brokered.
There have been other changes. One of Khaled’s sisters, married to her pa-
ternal cousin (himself the son of a Londoni) has married off her oldest daughter 
to a professional man in Bethnal Green; by 2014, her oldest son had also mar-
ried a British Bangladeshi. When I return, every two or three years, there are 
new babies and toddlers, aunties on visits from the United Kingdom, a differ-
ent family of poor relatives living in the rooms vacated by the Londoni cousins. 
In 2004, however, Khaled was still in Talukpur. His older brother Taller was 
busy looking after the land, but while he seemed relatively settled and content, 
Khaled, like Taj before him, was kicking around, stuck in “time pass” ( Jeffery 
2010). It was around this time that the family decided he should go to the 
United Kingdom for a “visit.” Why? I asked. “Because it will make him happy.” 
At the time Khaled seemed to believe this; indeed, he spoke enthusiastically of 
his plans. I was enlisted as a sponsor and official letters were written. The ap-
plication was refused. More years passed and the quest continued. Khaled had 
204 KATY GARDNER
no future in Bangladesh, the family declared; it was in Britain where he would 
find fulfillment. Then finally his British cousin Mumtaz agreed to marriage and 
after a lavish village ceremony followed by a wait for the papers, Khaled was off.
A year later I visit Burnley. Khaled has been there for six months, and I’m 
expecting to see him at Taj’s house. He is, however, notably absent. I meet 
Mumtaz, who has lived in Burnley since she was three. She’s warm and chatty 
but at mention of Khaled’s name she rolls her eyes. “Still in bed,” she sighs. 
Eventually he turns up, silent and thin. He doesn’t want to chat. As Mumtaz 
drives me to the station, she opens up. It is so difficult for Khaled, she tells me. 
The work is too hard, involving long shifts in the take-away; after a lifetime 
of ease in the village he is not used to it. Worse, he’s not bothering to learn 
English, which he will need for the citizenship test. He can’t adapt, she confides; 
coming to Britain was a shock, compounded by this new style of marriage to a 
British girl, who speaks the language fluently and knows the ropes. In sum, he’s 
depressed, refusing, in Mumtaz’s interpretation, to adapt and fulfill the role of 
successful migrant man.
Katharine Charsley described such husbands in detail in her research among 
British Pakistanis in Bristol. Charsley has identified men who have come to 
Britain to marry British Pakistani women as particularly vulnerable to depres-
sion and dejection and she has shown how the quest for migration leads in 
Britain to many to assuming the position of Ghar Jamai, (husband living in 
his wife’s family home; an emasculated figure in popular culture). As Charsley 
argues, the loss of status and perceived emasculation of being a ghar jamai, plus 
the downward mobility of migration to Britain, can lead to violence and sepa-
ration in the marriages, risking the happiness of men as well as their wives 
(Charsley 2005, 2013).
But when I next visit Burnley, in 2013, things are very different: reminding 
me, once again, of how as ethnographers we must not rush to conclusions, for 
life continues to unfold. In the four years since my last visit, Khaled has had two 
children and seems much happier. Mumtaz still rolls her eyes at him, but there 
is little sign of his earlier dejection. Meanwhile his brother, Taj, who has been 
energetically building his restaurant businesses and has assumed considerable 
local stature tells me how coming to Britain saved him from his hot temper. He 
had too much energy, he says. In Bangladesh there was no good place for it to 
go. He is much happier here.
A few months later in Bangladesh I am told a different story by Khaled and 
Taj’s sisters. Neither of their brothers originally wanted to go to Britain, they 
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say. In fact, they were pressured by their parents and extended family, who were 
worried at the way they were drifting and getting into trouble in the desh. Here, 
it seems, concern for the long-term well-being of these young men led to a fam-
ily decision in which places were measured in terms of the relative opportunities 
they might provide; in the geography of well-being and life purpose, Britain was 
seen as a better option. To my bewilderment these new accounts contradicted 
my memories of what I was told at the time. I originally believed that Khaled 
was excited by the prospect of migration but now it seems his arm was twisted. 
Given the ambiguities of migration and the mixed feelings it evokes, not to say 
the human tendency to misremember or even misread the feelings of others 
(had I assumed that Khaled wanted to migrate? Or had his sisters assumed that 
he hadn’t?), on reflection this is perhaps not so surprising.
Let us now turn to the family women: Khaled’s mother and older sisters. As 
my conversations with these women over the years reveal, the pain of migration 
is often experienced very acutely by those who stay, especially women (Gardner 
1995, 2006, 2002). Combined with this, suffering in order to promote the great-
er good of the family is expected and even embraced as part of being a mother 
and wife. Indeed, it is made bearable by the promise of eventual happiness, to be 
experienced at an unspecified point in the future. Khaled’s mother weeps every 
time she speaks to her sons on the phone. She worries about them continu-
ously. Yet despite this, she still insists that migration is “good.” She, after all, had 
wanted them to migrate; she was “senseless with grief ” when Samsun departed 
when he was aged nine, but had agreed that this was the best long-term strat-
egy. Indeed, although migration has caused heartache it does not mean that the 
family strategy of continuing settlement in Britain has failed; after all, it was she 
who so proudly urged me to film the bari with all its projects and improvements. 
Rather, within the transnational habitus of the British-Sylheti social field it is 
hard to envisage a good life without migration. The quest remains for happi-
ness—for the larger group as well as the individual—via economic security and 
the opportunities for a better life that Britain offers. But the journey to the end 
point—the happiness that should be found once the migrant has successfully 
reached and adapted to Britain—is strewn with difficulty.
As the weeping of Khaled’s mother implies, suffering on behalf of the good 
of others is gendered. Here, worries and stress (chinta) are the price paid by 
individual women for the longer-term well-being of their children and family, 
but also identify them as morally good and it is hoped that this will lead to 
rewards later on in this, or the after life. This distinction between happiness 
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as a long-term project (or promise) that one journeys toward over the life 
course and happiness as an emotion, experienced in the present, was made to 
me by one of Khaled’s sisters, Tulsama, in a conversation about her own life. 
Having left an unhappy marriage in her mid-twenties, Tulsama lives in her 
natal home, and is without children. In discussing another sister, who has three 
children, now at universities and colleges in Bangladesh and abroad, Tulsama 
commented how much her sister had suffered on their behalf, with anek chinta 
(lots of stress and worries) as she and her husband struggled to fund them 
through school, university, and so on. Tulsama, in contrast, was at peace, she 
told me. Indeed, over the years I have seen how she has reconciled what at 
first seemed to be a disaster—the breakdown of her marriage and return to 
her father’s home—with increasing acceptance, gained partly through regular 
prayer and working hard within the family home. Here, the lack of a long-term 
future-orientated project of promised happiness, embodied in having her own 
husband and children, has meant she has fewer worries and is arguably, on a 
day to day basis, happier than her stressed out sister. Once again, her story is 
unstable, because like most people she doesn’t always know exactly how she 
feels and her moods shift. Though she had laughingly declared that she didn’t 
care about diabetes (which her mother has, causing a rethink of the family 
diet) since she has no husband or children so might as well eat herself silly 
and die, a day later she told me that these days she was happy, saying that “I 
don’t have any children to worry about, so I’m at peace. I have learned how to 
be patient.”
Meanwhile, migration’s promise of happiness continues to allure, despite 
its known capacity for pain. Handing me a letter from the US government, 
Khaled’s mother and her aging brother asked me to translate. The letter in-
formed them that they had been placed in a queue for a visa number, and may 
have to wait many years before their application could be processed. Apparently 
their “American” brother had sent for them both. I was aghast: what on earth 
was Khaled’s mother thinking? In her 70s, with adult children and grandchil-
dren at home, sons in the United Kingdom, failing health, and most of her 
time spent praying and reading Quranic texts, why would she want to go to the 
United States? She didn’t, she said. Her brother nodded sagely. They didn’t want 
to go, but if the opportunity arose they would take it, for migration was bhalo 
(good), the way forward for the family. After all, despite the heartache, Khaled 
and his brothers were leading prosperous lives in the United Kingdom and their 
remittances have helped pay for the broiler farm, fish pond, and new trees that 
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I had been commissioned to film. Again, the family’s accounts of how they are 
doing changes every time I visit and according to who is speaking: like most 
families, their fortunes ebb and flow.
CONCLUSION: MIGRATION AND THE PROMISE 
OF HAPPINESS
My objective in writing this article has not been to evaluate in a straightfor-
ward way whether migration has led to happiness for Khaled and his family. As 
we have seen its emotional consequences change over time and according to 
individual subjectivities and perspectives. Rather, it has been to suggest that by 
posing the question we might interrogate some of its emotional implications. 
Transnational migration has led to increased prosperity for those concerned, 
something that, as the very poor are fully aware, is the basis for well-being. Yet 
it also involves separation from loved ones, placing conflict and ambivalence 
at the heart of the transnational experience. As we have also seen, the particu-
lar political economy of British Bangladeshi transnationalism intertwines with 
Ahmed’s “happiness scripts” (2010), which plays out around an imagined bidesh 
for those in the desh. No matter that the outcomes are often less than happy. 
The point is that it is hard to imagine future happiness without bidesh featuring. 
As Ahmed suggests, the point of the promise of happiness is to travel, not to 
arrive. In this sense, it is easier to anticipate happiness than to actually have it 
(Ahmed 2010: 31). This observation is particularly pertinent for migrants who, 
because their happiness projects involve geographical movement, face inevitable 
loss and disjuncture: by definition, moving on means leaving people and places 
behind.
It is here that consideration of the values of happiness becomes useful. In the 
case of British Bangladeshis, the key values of prosperity and togetherness work 
to produce movement, since migration brings people together across trans-
national space as well as economic opportunities, and contradict each other, 
since movement also brings separation. As my brief account of Khaled’s family 
implies, we must also distinguish between the promise of happiness and the 
more pragmatic project of well-being. While places are imagined via fantasies 
of happiness (bidesh is described, literally, as “kusi,” happy) they are experienced 
in terms of actual, measureable well-being, a state that we might usefully dis-
tinguish from happiness. As an emotion, happiness is by definition transitory 
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and experienced by individuals rather than the larger group.4 Thus, while Khaled 
experiences the jolt of becoming a ghar jamai, working long hours in a restau-
rant, and learning that life in Northern Britain is not how those back in the 
desh imagine, by marrying his cousin and joining his brothers in Burnley he has 
improved the life chances of his family in Bangladesh who now have another 
member in the United Kingdom to support them. Those left behind also suffer. 
In Bangladesh his mother weeps for him but she tells me that it is “good” that 
he has gone to Britain because life is better there. Here, what we see is how the 
quest for the long-term well-being and prosperity of the group can involve the 
temporary unhappiness of individuals. Indeed, living well, whether this involves 
ensuring physical well-being, providing for one’s family, or building a more se-
cure future, does not preclude unhappiness.
In writing of Khaled and his family and attempting to calibrate my knowl-
edge of them against these questions of relative happiness, I face the impossibil-
ity of reaching an end-point or conclusion, for their stories remain unfinished. 
Not only have their own accounts of motivations and emotions shifted as they 
look back on events but the future remains unknown, both to the anthropologist 
and her interlocutors (Dalsgaard and Frederiksen 2013). From this, we should 
take seriously Michael Jackson’s plea that the purpose of ethnography should 
be ethical rather than epistemological. Rather than producing answers (migra-
tion makes people happy/unhappy) we should be questioning what is taken for 
granted ( Jackson 2013: 118). Basing his moving account of ethics and well-
being on the detailed life histories of three migrants, who have overcome great 
hardship and adversity in order to ensure lives worth living, Jackson argues that 
the lives and stories of migrants can understood as analogies for all human ex-
perience. As he writes: “rather than implying that people necessarily find fulfill-
ment in being settled in one place or possessing a single core identity, I consider 
it imperative that we complement this view of a stable self with descriptions 
of human improvisation, experimentation, opportunism and existential mobil-
ity. . . . This capacity for strategic shape shifting, both imaginative and actual, 
defines our very humanity.” (2013: 202). Indeed, as he continues, we all have 
migrant imaginaries because all of us have to cope with change, whether across 
space, time, or shifting selfhood and relationships to others.
4. Here I depart from Dumont’s account of effervescence, which is experienced 
collectively via performance of collective values, understanding emotion as primarily 
individual phenomena.
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Migration thus exemplifies the human condition and our universal and 
ongoing ability to adapt, compromise, and suffer in order to make our lives 
better. By understanding it as a happiness project rather than a fixed process 
with measureable outcomes (does migration make people happy?) we see how it 
provides a geographical expression to the dreams and aspirations of Sylhetis, a 
literal mapping of the future that orders movements over time and space. Yet as 
with all happiness projects, by focusing on an imagined end point, in this case 
foreign countries or bidesh, migrants and their families are often unprepared for 
the contradictions, loss, and grief that the journey to arrival at this end point 
involves. In this sense the contradictions and ambivalences of migration are 
merely a particularly vivid example of the contradictions and ambivalences that 
face us all: we believe in the promise of happiness, but the journeys we take to 
reach the desired end point are inevitably bumpy.
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Raul was lethargic. For the eleven months I had known him he had done little 
but sit slumped on a chair or the low wall in front of Tio’s house. When I would 
meet up with him, we would hang out as part of a peer group of young urban 
men in an inner city suburb of Bissau. Yet while the other members of the group 
at times had things to do and places to go, Raul restricted his movements to re-
positioning his body within the few square meters of shade offered by the build-
ing and the tree in front of it. Moving only to eat or relieve himself, he became 
over the months a sort of slothful assemblage, almost inseparably connected to 
the crumbling structure on which he draped his body.
Truth be told, he could not have done much even if he wanted to. Stuck 
in a postwar city where economic decline was growing more and more pro-
nounced, and in a state where the political situation had moved toward an in-
creasingly crippling deadlock, his options were limited. As a consequence, he 
had succumbed to a state of hibernation, passing slow days in the hope that 
some kind of positive change would eventually appear on the horizon. At times 
we would spend almost the entire day together, without saying much, sharing an 
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occasional meal and commenting on the odd event on the street in front of us. 
We coexisted in a state of boredom that almost suspended the passage of time.
Raul was, like my field assistant, Vitor, who introduced me to him, a for-
mer militiaman in the Aguenta militia. When I first came to Bissau in 2000, I 
sought out the Aguentas in order to look at the demobilization and reintegra-
tion of ex-soldiers. I quickly found a field assistant who was himself a former 
member of the militia, and he led me to a group of them who would gather 
in a peer group in the barrio (neighborhood) in question. During the war in 
Guinea-Bissau (from 1998 to 1999) the government side of the conflict, led 
by the late President “Nino” Vieira, mobilized a militia to support its mili-
tary struggle. Dubbed the Aguentas (i.e., supporters), the militia was primar-
ily mobilized from Bissau, the country’s capital—one of the few parts of the 
country still under government control at the time (Vigh 2006). Though they 
were haphazardly mobilized, the Aguentas shared a number of characteris-
tics at the time of their constitution. Though ethnically and religiously diverse 
they were primarily Papel and Catholic-Animist, viz. the 5th largest ethnic 
group and the largest religious community in the country. Neither religion nor 
ethnicity seemed, however, to be influential in their constitution or everyday 
interaction. As urban youth, many were born of mixed marriages and their 
self-identification centered on being urbanite rather than rural, modern rather 
than traditional.
As the war progressed, Raul and his fellow Aguentas found themselves on 
the losing side of the conflict. The Aguentas were eventually defeated and dis-
banded in late 1999, and left to go back to their bairros, to lick their wounds and 
suffer the embarrassment of returning home as demobilized and ostracized los-
ers. When his side was defeated, Raul lost the network that he had hoped would 
help him in life after the war, which resulted in a lack of livelihoods and pos-
sibilities. Losing the war did not lead to persecution or revenge attacks on the 
Aguentas in Bissau. But it did result in a disenfranchisement of such magnitude 
that it appeared to obscure any move into a better social position and future. 
Raul was lethargic but to a large degree this was because postwar circumstances 
had closed off his possibilities in life.
This was, however, to change as fighting broke out again on November 23, 
2000. The shooting flared up in the afternoon, and as night fell, the skirmish 
escalated into full-blown battle between different military factions (see Vigh 
[2006] for a detailed political description of the event). Though Bissau had only 
recently emerged from a prolonged period of warfare, the tension had been 
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building for months, lingering as a constant and uncanny companion to the 
proclaimed peace. I was in the city center when the first shots were fired and 
made it back home as it intensified. The walk home was uneasy and surreal. 
Within hours groups of women were already on their way out of town, walking 
silently along the road, carrying their children on their backs and their belong-
ings on their heads. In contrast, the bar down the road was rowdy with a handful 
of people drinking intensely in what seemed like an act of defiance. Farther up 
the road, Raul and the group had as usual gathered in the street outside Tio’s 
house, the sound of their discussion traveled down the road leaving fragments 
of the conversation hanging in the air. As I reached them Raul looked at me 
and stated, “es ke no ta kunsi” (“this is what we know”), painting a picture of the 
outburst of fighting as expected and habitual. In contrast to the unsettled nature 
of the situation, he was calm and collected. Having survived the war a few years 
earlier—first as a young man in a city at war and a later as a militiaman on the 
front lines—he did actually know war better than many others.
Raul’s attitude made him stand out in the small crowd. While most people 
in the group were negatively affected—some depressed and others enraged—
Raul appeared attentive but at ease. Over the next couple of days the fighting 
moved through Bissau and into the countryside. As it escalated some people 
hid while others sought to flee the city; in contrast, Raul became revitalized 
and navigated the uncertain situation as if it were his environment of choice. 
Moving back and forth between fraction and military formations, he used the 
conflict to reengage and his skills to liaise and connect. I would see him move 
swiftly up the street, stop to assess the passability of the road ahead, and con-
tinue in a confident flow. As he returned home he would spend a bit of time 
talking, pass on information about what was happening, and move on again. In 
the volatile situation, which otherwise halted the movement of the city as most 
people lost their bearings, Raul seemed to gain his—like a chaos pilot1 whose 
capacity lies in maneuvering tumultuous circumstances and acquiring insights 
in situations that are otherwise conducive to confusion.
The conflict ended in the total rout of the military faction led by the former 
Army Chief of Staff, ex-Brigadier General Asumané Mané, leaving Bissau to 
1. The concept of “chaos pilot” has a tradition in Denmark as both an education and an 
aspiration. Emerging from the culturally and politically alternative parts of 1980s 
political movements, it became institutionalized as a school for entrepreneurship 
and design in 1991.
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return to its normal state of agitated stagnancy. In the unreliable calm I man-
aged to ask Raul about the recent development and his view of it. He answered:
There are those who do not want peace, who want war. When war comes they 
are okay (saffa), you understand? If there is confusion they are the ones who see 
their path (caminho).
What did you do?
When there is war, there are those who will become frightened (elis ki panta). In 
wartime a lot of people will just be afraid . . . to the point where they hide. That is 
what war is like, everyone just looks after his own head, you know!? But for those 
who know war there is a type of path (typo di caminho), you see?
Though he was referring to people higher up in the system who, as he saw it, 
would use conflict to rearrange the landscapes of power, he seemed to fit the 
description better than most. The conflict allowed him to see um typo di caminho 
(“a type of path”), as he phrased it, which breathed new life into his truncated 
existence. He maneuvered the situation as “edgework,” not as the voluntary 
risk-taking of those who have other options (Lyng 2005; Lyng and Matthews 
2007) but as the action of those who are so marginal that their potential for 
engagement is limited to the fissures and crack of the dominant order—or the 
imposition of alternative ones. You must be in motion, movimenta, he would say, 
and for the radically excluded, conflictual disruption indeed provides a space 
of participation (Richards 1996; Vigh 2006, 2009), making engagement and 
mobilization a potential, albeit desperate, move toward a better state of being.
HAPPINESS AND HARDSHIP
I first met Raul sixteen years ago. At the time I was not interested in conflict 
but in its aftermath, yet as it has consistently refused to acquire the suffix “post” 
in the country, with one coup or attempted coup following another, I have been 
able to ethnographically follow the militiamen ever since, allowing me to see 
not just the way that they have been demobilized but the multiple and recurrent 
nature of their mobilization and demobilization. The longitudinal aspect of the 
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work has allowed me to illuminate the ways that they navigate militant2 net-
works and conflictual events. Taking my cue from Raul’s story, what I will do in 
this article is explore conflict and mobilization in relation to ideas of emplace-
ment and the struggle for happiness. In doing so, I will show how the conflict 
engagement of the Aguentas may shed light on the ways that warfare can open 
up otherwise closed social environments for the young men that participate in 
it, and enable movement toward better lives and positive futures. In other words, 
instead of researching such moves into militant formations by illuminating what 
people see themselves as having to fight against—the last decades of war in Bis-
sau being remarkably devoid of ideological standpoints and collective visions 
of dangerous others (Vigh 2009)—the article looks at the visions of well-being 
that transcend the experience and knowledge of oncoming wartime suffering.
I have written about the Aguenta militia elsewhere and sought to make 
sense of their conflict engagement by focusing on the concept of “social navi-
gation” (Vigh [2003] 2006, 2006, 2010) and by situating them in contexts of 
“crises and chronicity” (2008). In contrast, the current article looks specifically 
at their mobilization through the concept of “emplacement” and relates this to 
ideas of happiness and well-being in Bissau. Though visions of happiness figure 
as powerful motivators for the young men I talk to, it remains, as we shall see, 
illusive and elusive as an experiential state. It figures as an existential goal that 
avoids capture, making the pursuit of it stand forth as its primary instantiation. 
In this manner the article takes its inspirations from Michael Jackson “in under-
standing well-being, not as a settled state but as a field of struggle” (2011: ix). It 
asks, thus, what happiness might look like seen from a situation of conflict and 
scarcity, where it may be imagined to be located, and how it may be attained 
(cf. Jiménez 2008: 181)? Doing so allows me to clarify how mobilizing into a 
militia in the midst of war may be seen as a way to gain well-being by mov-
ing toward positions of social worth and value3; a process of emplacement that 
shows how imaginaries of being well motivate action as both short-term and 
long-term orientations (cf. Thin 2008: 151).4
2. “Militant” is used in the traditional meaning of the word signifying “engaged in 
warfare, warring . . . disposed towards war” (www.oed.com).
3. This is, of course, not as unusual as it may seem. Much mobilization in, for example, 
the United States and the United Kingdom can be seen as driven by the same 
dynamics, as the military offers social mobility to those who often struggle to attain it.
4. The concept stands in contrast to “forced” mobilization. I recognize that “voluntary,” 
when caught between a rock and a hard place, may not be a choice per se.
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I realize that the Aguenta militia may be seen by some to provide a peculiar 
point of departure for addressing well-being. As a youth militia in one of the 
world’s poorest and most unstable societies, the logical angle of approach might 
appear to be a focus on suffering and despair (cf. Robbins 2013).5 The militia 
was a haphazardly formed fighting force. Poorly trained and unimpressive in 
terms of numbers, equipment, and abilities, they fared poorly in warfare and 
are spoken of in Bissau as carne di bazooka, (“bazooka meat”) or cannon fodder 
(Vigh [2003] 2006, 2009, 2011). Yet, while life in the militia may stand in direct 
contrast to our common understandings of well-being, such hardship and suf-
fering is, as we shall see, shadowed by dreams and ideas of happiness and made 
endurable as a perceived movement toward better lives and more valued posi-
tions of being. Happiness and hardship are in this respect dialectically related as 
one instantiates an imaginary of the other. Just as the experience of happiness 
can conjure a fear of its termination, so hardship may be brightened by hopeful-
ness, and suffering by imaginaries of well-being ( Jackson 2011).
In Bissau, happiness emerges perhaps less frequently and more fleetingly 
as its coming into being is quickly surpassed by the reality of everyday social, 
political, and economic life. Yet though the phenomenon may be experienced as 
an ephemeral experience rather than a lasting state, happiness is not necessarily 
ontologically different in Bissau in comparison to elsewhere. The points of de-
parture may be more meager and the aspirations more modest but the concept 
is similar in use. Just as we in English may differentiate between different shades 
of happiness and well-being along temporal and contextual parameters, from 
the situational and fleeting sensation of pleasure to the underlying experience 
5. This division between the anthropology of suffering and the anthropology of “the 
good” has come to the fore within the discipline over the last couple of years. Joel 
Robbins’ article “Beyond the suffering subject,” (2013) forcefully argues that the 
last twenty years of our discipline has been characterized by a focus on such issues, 
and that we need to redirect anthropology toward a focus on the good. Suffering, 
Robbins holds, became influential as it offered anthropology an experiential state, 
which unites humanity and makes the other imaginable as self, as it is seen to define 
the minimal commonality underlying the human condition. Robbins’ article is both 
acute and timely, and the few works on the anthropology of suffering that he lists 
as examples appear to fit the critique. The problem is that they are exceptions to the 
rule, and that the major part of the literature dealing with such experiential states 
does not. On the contrary, they deal with, and may more reasonably be highlighted 
for their focus on hope, coping, and compassion even if set in situations of distress or 
suffering. They work, thus, with exactly the dimensions of human life that Robbins 
criticizes them of overlooking.
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of contentment, the intense affective state of joy, and the more lasting condi-
tion of well-being, so to, in Bissau, is the concept internally differentiated from 
pleasure, sabi (literally, “sweet”), to bem estar (“well-being”), fica contente (“being 
content”), and alegria (“happiness” or “joy”). However, despite the differenti-
ated nature of happiness its many shades share a similar trait, namely that it is 
commonly experienced as a hope and aspiration. It is a condition we strive to 
move toward, which orientates action and stands as a beacon of our being. The 
concept seems to have most life while it is being pursued as “people use it to 
designate what they don’t have yet, what they are longing for, that which they 
have just lost and would like again” (Lear 2000: 23).
DISPLACED WITHOUT MOVING
Focusing on happiness and well-being in relation to the mobilization of the 
Aguentas in general, and Raul’s story more specifically, may in this perspec-
tive partly inform us of the motives behind their conflict engagement. Despite 
the common-sense distance between warfare and happiness a closer look may 
illuminate how such motivations are socially anchored, and how the well-be-
ing people strive toward is informed by relational concerns and obligations. In 
the Bissauan case this means framing happiness and well-being within a state 
of prolonged decline and political instability (Vigh 2008; see also McGovern 
2011). Guinea-Bissau has been caught in a process of economic and political 
deterioration for the better part of its existence as an independent country, to 
the point where political instability and insecurity is perceived as chronic, and 
where people experience their lives as increasingly difficult to live in agreeable or 
meaningful ways. However, the consequences of crises and decline affect diverse 
social groups in different ways, closing down various avenues of possibility and 
creating specific situated concerns.
One result of the above-mentioned process of decline is that an extraordi-
narily large part of the younger male population—the unconnected and dis-
enfranchised—have become trapped in a position of persistent economic and 
political marginality (Vigh [2003] 2006, 2008; see also Cole 2004; Jensen 2008; 
Pratten 2007; Mainz 2008) where it is increasingly difficult for them to meet 
gendered and generational norms and obligation. As I have described else-
where (Vigh 2006, 2015) they are expected to move toward feeding into family 
networks rather than merely feeding off them, yet as many are incapable of 
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surviving without the help of families that they ideally ought to be supporting, 
they are caught between the expectations and obligations placed upon them 
and their meager possibilities of meeting these, leaving them unable to position 
themselves positively in the relational landscape that their lives are anchored 
in. It is impossible for them to set up a household, marry, and provide for par-
ents, female relatives, wives, and girlfriends, and their social failings keep them 
trapped in the category of youth—as untimely dependents—relegating them 
to the position of, literally, social retards, lacking in worth and attraction (Vigh 
[2003] 2006).
The result is an experience of enforced presentism (Guyer 2007) as a socio-
spatial predicament of entrapment “of having nowhere to go” and no way of 
furthering or consolidating one’s life in an acceptable or recognized manner. 
That is, of existential immobility (Hage 2003: 20; cf. Hage 2005; see also Jansen 
2014). They have, we may say, become displaced without moving. As the politi-
cal and economic conditions have deteriorated around them it has become in-
creasingly impossible for the young men I work with to gain the social position 
and possibilities expected of them, leaving them detached and distanced from 
who they “ought” to be.
This experience of social displacement creates a struggle for emplacement, 
not as a question of physical localization (Englund 2002: 263; Jansen & Löfving 
2009) but as a striving toward being positively situated in a relational landscape. 
It results in a longing to attain valued presence in respect to the life-conditions 
of one’s important others. The desire to inhabit a position of relational worth 
means that emplacement comes to stand as an image of happiness, as convivial-
ity—a satisfying rather than sullen sociality (cf. Overing and Passes 2000: xiv).
OPENINGS
Displacement and emplacement are, in this perspective, questions of sociality 
rather than locality. Although they constitute multifaceted and open-ended 
processes, which stretch from the political to the existential (cf. Huttunen 2010; 
Glick Schiller 2012: 527), they refer to the experienced relational and positional 
quality of our lives.
Emplacement provides a prism that incorporates . . . subjective sentiments, on 
the one hand, and the structural forces that both contribute to defining the 
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sociocultural criteria of these sentiments (e.g., through cultural idioms about the 
good life) and the constraints to achieving such ends (e.g., local social hierar-
chies, broader socioeconomic structures, etc.), on the other. (Bjarnesen 2013: 40)
As we shall see, for the young men I talk to emplacement is articulated as a 
desire to move toward a position of social worth from where it is possible to 
become reciprocally pivotal rather than marginal (Vigh 2015). It is, as such, 
not an end point of movement but the attainment of a (minor) patrimonial 
position from where one can distribute resources and futures. Forced to wait 
for better times, they search for inclusion in economic and political life,6 and 
warfare and heightened conflict may provide just that. In this respect Raul and 
my other informants react to war not just by assessing the dangers of it but also 
by scrutinizing it for possible subsistence, security, empowerment, mobility, and 
emplacement (cf. Lubkeman 2008). In a society like Guinea-Bissau, the move 
from crisis to conflict or warfare becomes a vital conjuncture—an intersec-
tion of change and opportunity that opens up otherwise frozen socio-political 
landscapes, enabling young men to navigate networks and events toward better 
states of being (cf. Johnson-Hanks 2002).
When I first started my fieldwork with the Aguentas I initially asked rather 
simplistically why they had joined the militia in the first place. At the time the 
question was not such an unusual one. The Aguentas had just lost the war and 
been demobilized, and as they returned home to their neighborhoods from the 
barracks in town, or the places where they had been keeping their heads down 
in the aftermath of the war, people would ask “ke ke bu bai busca la” (“what were 
you looking for there”)? The young soldiers would often reply pragmatically. 
M’bai busca nha vida, (“I went looking for a life”), they would say, or alterna-
tively m’bai busca nha futuro (“I went looking for a future”) or m’bai busca nha 
caminho (“I went looking for a path”). The replies direct our attention to the 
fact that a decent existence, future, or positive life trajectories were not seen as 
6. As the logic of patrimonialism is reciprocal rather than transactional people 
sketch possible trajectories into the future by letting themselves be “exploited” in 
the present in the hope that it may generate a prospective reciprocal obligation. 
Thus, despite the fact that it is becoming increasingly clear, following the period of 
prolonged decline, that the return rate of the tactics of patrimonial alliance is poor 
(Durham 2000: 113), it is still treasured as the only possible way of escaping the 
position of marginality and exclusion that characterize the social position of urban 
youth in the city.
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present in the period prior to their mobilization. Nelson, another young Aguen-
ta from Bissau, had willingly mobilized in 1998 in order “to look for a life,”7 as 
he termed it. Joining the militia had been an attempt to align himself with a 
homi garandi, a big man, in order to gain entry into a political network and thus 
secure access to flows of power and resources; an attempt forge the connections 
and liaisons that would allow him to survive physically and socially. His mobili-
zation was motivated neither by greed or grievance (Berdal and Malone 2000), 
but merely by the search for a better future than what was imaginable from the 
impoverished status quo surrounding the position of being a young, urban male 
in Guinea-Bissau. From Nelson’s point of view, envisioning himself as a soldier 
and as postwar victorious was the only positive prospect in sight.
However, probing ideas of “paths,” and “futures” a bit further, and asking into 
what they actually saw themselves as moving toward, it becomes clear that mili-
tary life was not just described as a means to attaining social standing but was 
also articulated (somewhat ironically) as a position of relative safety. Mobilizing 
could be a way of moving toward emplacement, encompassing the experience 
of empowerment, as a struggle toward the positive social positioning and em-
beddedness that might enable one to engage and attain recognition and respect 
(Bourgois 1996). But it equally offers security, as a very first foundational step 
toward being well at all. The relative lack or loss of social networks and connec-
tions renders young men unprotected in a volatile and impoverished social en-
vironment, creating a longing for positions where danger is not a constant and 
perils less prevalent. In a country without institutionalized authority to protect 
one’s safety; without a working legal system, police force, or impartial judici-
ary, disenfranchised young men inhabit a position of precarity—a vulnerability 
beyond poverty (Butler 2012).8 In this manner, mobilization may come to be 
treasured as a way of gaining entry into a social or patrimonial network, provid-
ing not just access to flows of resources and possibilities but security through 
mutual dependence and obligations of protection.
What I will do in the remainder of this article is move, empirically and 
analytically, from empowerment to emplacement. Where the former defines the 
more immediate experience of gaining a sense of security and the attainment 
of social standing, the latter describes an imagined movement into a position 
7. M’bai busca nha vida.
8. The concept of precarity is interesting in this context as it literally means “obtained 
by prayer,” indicating the level of agentive limitation and power at play.
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of positive social embeddedness. Both are related to the struggle for well-being 
and happiness yet characterized by different temporal stages of the phenomena.
EMPOWERMENT
For the unprotected, Bissau is generally an uncertain place to come of age. The 
experience of being an unconnected urban youth in the city is not just defined 
by the poverty and lack of mobility but by insecurity and danger. While this 
accounts for most of the poorer inhabitants of the city, the lack of protection 
was particularly prominent for many urban youths during the war when the 
majority of the Aguentas were mobilized. Luiz, for example, was stuck close to 
the frontline of the fighting as he tried to protect his family’s few belongings. It 
was, at the time, a common tactic for families, who had the misfortune of having 
the war encroach upon their neighborhoods, to ask their young men to remain 
to look after their houses while the rest of the family fled. Escaping the war, 
most families could take only their most needed or treasured possessions with 
them and in order to protect the rest from being looted, and their houses from 
being occupied by soldiers, young men were often singled out to stay behind. As 
we were talking about how and why he entered the Aguentas, Luiz explained:
They fled, but I stayed in Bissau in order to take care of the house. I had to stay, 
but I had nothing, no food, not a thing. .  .  . When the fighting started again 
[after a small ceasefire] a man came from the government to call us up [to join 
the Aguentas] . . . so I thought that if I went to the Aguentas, I would be able to 
go [at the same times as I] could protect our house.
Luiz stressed later in the interview that joining the militia would both deliver 
and allow him to provide in material terms. M’na bin tene tamben (“but I would 
also get [something]”), he said, as the militia would supply food enough for 
people to survive, and many were given half a bag of rice as payment for mobi-
lizing. However, it also offered the muscle necessary to feel safe in a vulnerable 
situation. In other words, though mobilizing means drawing near to violence in 
terms of actual battles and fighting, it also offers security and protection in the 
intermediate periods between hostilities, making the move toward the militant 
formations a safety issue (Vigh 2011). It can be understood as an attempt to 
exchange generalized low-intensity uncertainty with momentary high-intensity 
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insecurity, paradoxically providing respite from the chronic lack of safety that 
defined and defines everyday life for many young, urban men in the city.
The act of gaining security was, however, a first step in a further movement. 
M’bai pa m’pudi fica bem (“I went so that I could be well”), Orlando simply an-
swered as we were talking about his decision to enter the Aguentas. Mobiliza-
tion was for Orlando a future-bound act aimed at achieving a better life. When 
I asked what would make him feel “well,” he answered:
Food, women, a car, migration, well-being, you understand? You have stabil-
ity, security, earn a living. . . . Living conditions! . . . That’s what fires up the light 
in your belly.
Sinti ki luz na barriga (“fire up that light in your belly”), is Orlando’s way of 
phrasing hope, as an embodied feeling of optimism and elevation. The quotation 
is interesting as it shows that mobilization was motivated by ideas of well-being as 
a nodal point that connects disparate meanings by centering other notions around 
it (Lacan [1960] 2004). From the concrete substance of food to the abstract dream 
of migration, Orlando sees mobilization as a chance to improve the situation at 
hand and gain security (denoted as stabilidade and securidade)—the lack of uncer-
tainty and insecurity being seen as the primary characteristics of being well.
Yet becoming a member of the Aguenta militia does not just provide safety 
when not actively engaged in combat, it also generates a positive social position 
in relation to family, friends, and romantic relations. The most obvious connec-
tion between mobilization, happiness, and well-being is, in this perspective, that 
it offers provisions in a landscape of scarcity. When demobilized, and thus not 
part of the militia, many young men in the city have to rely on their network of 
kin in order to feed themselves. You have to “beg for flour,” pedi semoula, they say, 
describing the belittling aspect of constantly having to ask for food. While the 
Aguentas did not receive much in terms of money or goods, joining the militia 
meant no longer having to worry about everyday survival. The point may seem 
banal, yet joining not only secures one’s physical being but equally effectuates 
a change in one’s social position. Gaining access to regular provisions moves 
one out of the category of being a poor man toward being a potential provider. 
Joining the militia reversed then these men’s habitual social position and possi-
bilities. From being insecure, marginal, and abject, without power or possibility, 
they were granted centrality (however momentary and expendable), security, 
and possibility. In a similar manner, demobilization is conversely experienced 
as social detachment, not just from the militant formation one was part of but 
from the secondary social position and possibilities that it offered.
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DESTITUTE AND UNDESIRABLE
Mobilization affords, in other words, a move into other and more positive social 
positions, something that is clear in, for example, the intimate relationships that 
my interlocutors seek to forge and engage in. When Nino Vieira, the former 
president who had initially mobilized the Aguentas, was killed in 2009 and the 
Aguentas lost yet another conflict, many of my interlocutors found themselves, 
once again, without a patron or the security and backing of a patrimonial politi-
cal network. They were, ten years after they had first been mobilized, back where 
they started, unprotected and unconnected. I re-met Latino shortly after the 
skirmish that caused the death of President Nino. He was sitting on a doorstep 
in a dark beco (alleyway) in Bairro Reina, a deprived neighborhood in Bissau. 
When I asked him how he was, he laconically replied, “here I am,” locating 
himself as a mere physical presence.
I struggled to get a conversation going, ritually inquiring after the well-being 
of his various family members. Having asked after what seemed like the majori-
ty of his extended family, I started running out of kinship terms and asked about 
his girlfriend instead. He looked up briefly and answered that he had nothing 
to offer women. His measly social and economic possibilities meant that he was 
struggling to survive, and as sex and relationships contain a clear transactional 
dimension in Bissau, Latino was frank about his unattractiveness as a partner. 
His awareness of his predicament echoed a common complaint among my in-
terlocutors. Women often expect to receive money from boyfriends, as well as 
a gift (money or goods) after sex. As a result, many of the young men I talk to 
bemoan the grasping demands that attractive girls make, and the fact that they 
themselves have so little to offer in transactional terms. In other words, when 
not mobilized, their poverty and lack of positive futures make my interlocutors 
unappealing partners, demoting them to the lower echelons of desirability in 
romantic and sexual terms. While demobilized, the Aguentas thus share a com-
mon complaint as they contrast their current lack of appeal with their time in 
the Aguentas, idealized as a period when women flocked around them. They 
hark back to their attractiveness to women while in the Aguentas, the promis-
cuity made possible by being a militiaman, and frequently engage in hyperex-
plicit descriptions and performances of their coital exploits—bodily movements 
and sound effects included.
As I was primarily interested in politics, I found the endless and excessive 
stories about fucking trivial. I would fold away my notebook when they started 
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and patiently wait for the topic to sway back to something more noteworthy 
before opening it again. Yet the massive presence of sexual discourse and de-
scriptions might actually be ethnographically interesting in its own right. Their 
descriptions were mostly told in the past or future tense, as articulations of a 
time when the narrators had been or would once again become attractive part-
ners. The sex talk, in other words, was a reminiscence of a time when they had 
social status and worth, which was seen as directly measurable in the ease of ac-
cess to women. The performative nature of their “sexploits,” the explicitness and 
extreme extent of the stories, were enactments of social worth, referring back to 
being “somebody” socially substantial rather than immaterial, positioning them 
as masculine rather than socially emasculated (cf. Dolan 2009, Vigh 2015).
The reminiscence thus relates to situations of receiving social recognition, 
of being seen as a person of worth with the ability to act and attract. M’kumelis 
tudo (“I ate them all”), Iko said about a group of girls in his neighborhood 
that he had slept with during his time as an Aguenta. To eat is a metaphor for 
fucking, and in contrast to his demobilized position, the statement narratively 
redefined him not as someone to whom things are “done” but as someone with 
the capacity to “do” (Feldman 1991:101; Jackson 2005: 73). The somewhat bor-
ing sex talk resolved into rather interesting enactments of figments of past and 
potential status and a bestowal of social standing, attractiveness, and sex.
The story of the Aguentas can very well be told as a tale of suffering. Yet con-
fining their mobilization to a narrative of anguish and distress would conceal the 
fact that what motivates and moves people to mobilize. Suffering and hardship 
are clearly important aspects of the social and political environment that their 
lives are set in, but spending time with groups of demobilized Aguentas, most 
often hanging out in Bissau’s inner suburbs, what is foregrounded in the stories 
they tell are feelings of camaraderie and empowerment—not as an ability to exert 
power over people but as an enabling condition of engagement. Issues of violence 
and war are, in fact, mentioned very little. At times, conversations will touch upon 
the hardship of actual warfare and the fear and chaos of the battlefield; however, 
during my fifteen years of on-and-off fieldwork with Aguentas there has been 
very little talk about trauma or suffering. They generally do not dwell on the intri-
cate details of violence or the anguish of warfare (cf. Robbins 2013: 455). When 
they actually mention suffering it is most often in stoic ways, and when address-
ing combat, violence, and wounds—both those they had suffered and those they 
had inflicted—they limit themselves to factual accounts of what happened, to 
whom, and what the consequences were for the present and future. They are, as 
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Jackson shows in his work on Sierra Leone, focused on social futures rather than 
“psychic wounds” (2004: 72), on potentials rather than traumatic pasts. I do not 
want to downplay the devastating experiences of warfare, nor rule out the pos-
sibility that posttraumatic stress may be an adequate diagnosis, yet for the young 
men that joined it, the militia is not seen merely as a formation of suffering but 
as an opening in an otherwise closed and stagnated social environment.
EMPLACEMENT
Mobilization may as such offer both a possibility to move into a better position 
in the here and now as well as to move out of poverty and marginality and into 
a space of future well-being and happiness, moving us from the hedonic to the 
eudaimonic—that is, from the relief of gaining security and value toward the sat-
isfaction found in meeting cultural norms and social expectations, and, hence, re-
alizing one’s potential (Keyes, Shmotkin, and Ryff: 2002). It can, in this respect, 
be related to a struggle to gain a sense of social fulfillment. This move between 
well-being in the immediate future and the more distant was made clear to me 
by Vitór as he was explaining his reasons for mobilizing into the Aguentas:
Things might get better if I went there [enrolled], well you know, things like 
. . . things like the military they give you money. Others were [here in Bissau] 
until they stopped school . . . they said: “Well the day my studies end, and I fin-
ish school, I don’t have anything to do, you see? If I stay here [in the Aguentas] 
maybe when the war ends I might have a chance to get money to go abroad and 
study or to go to military academy or things like that. . .” Others say: “[When] 
the war ends, I’ll have no [living] conditions,” or “If I leave it will be worse,” be-
cause they fled during the war, they fled and things went badly, they didn’t have 
money to buy anything, they didn’t have rice, they didn’t have a thing. So they 
had to return to Bissau, to stay here, and maybe get a hold of these things. Others 
came for that reason and because of food and things like this, you see. . . ?
The quote stretches, once again, from the near future to an imaginary of a more 
long-term goal of “going abroad,” going to “military academy,” et cetera, in order 
to improve one’s existence. As regards the latter aspirations, being a militiaman 
is not seen as a goal in itself but as a means to acquiring social mobility and a 
better life after the war.
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As shown earlier, mobilization is in this manner seen as a navigable connec-
tion and a way to embark upon a potential trajectory. It becomes a means by 
which people can seek to gain the momentum they imagine will enable a move 
toward a better social position by acquiring the ability to sustain intimate others 
and gain worth through the distribution of goods and capital within affective 
circuits (Vigh 2015). “You know,” Dario lectured me,
here if you do not give to your family you are bad (mau). If you are a man, even 
if you only have a little, you must give if someone asks. If you want to be a man, 
you must find money to put [something] in the mouths of your family, if you do 
not give you are worthless.
Though articulated as obligation, the ability to provide is experienced as a de-
sire. It is a longing for a position where people are able to fulfill the expectations 
placed upon them, a desire to be recognized in terms of what you offer others. 
We seek to “come into our own with others,” Jackson states, suggesting, “hope is 
predicated on the experience of being integral to the lives of others” (2011: 92). 
Hope and happiness are, from this perspective, not merely inner states but 
closely related to the satisfaction that emerges from one’s emplacement, that is, 
through a positive engagement with one’s social environment (Moore 2013: 36). 
Yet the ability to participate as someone who counts is not equally distributed 
but experienced in terms of centrality and marginality. “Anxiety and audacity, 
fear and courage, despair and hope are born together. But the proportion in 
which they are mixed depends on the resources in one’s possession” (Bauman 
2002: 122), making the movement toward happiness, in the sense of positive 
emplacement, a greater journey for some than others. As Amadu explained to 
me, trying to describe his feeling of inadequacy and his hope for a better life,
We do not have 100 percent. We only have 50 . . . 50 percent . . . [but] if you are 
a man then only 50 percent is worthless. To be a man you must be 100 percent. 
Even if you suffer, you suffer on the inside. You cannot show it. You must be 100 
percent. Manliness is secret (machuandade i secreto). You do not cry, but if you are 
50 [percent] that is no good.
How do you become 100%?
If you help your family. If you have a job, you have means (meio). Like this you 
are 100 percent. Clearly.
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The expectation placed upon you as a young man in Bissau is, I have suggested, 
one of increasingly coming to provide for and look after your kin. As you pro-
gress through life, your sphere of provision is expected to increase, turning you 
into a “big man” whose merit is relative to the number of people for whom you 
provide. What Amadu describes is a situation where the parameters of manli-
ness are becoming increasingly unattainable because of the many years of crisis 
that have marred Guinea-Bissau, leaving him in a state of diminished man-
hood; as, in his words, half the man that he ought to be.
When I ask young men in Bissau about their imagined futures, and what 
they envisage themselves becoming, their answers often start with a default “um 
align” (“somebody”), a concept that, in all its vagueness, is defined merely by be-
ing a valued and recognized part of a relational landscape. When further clarify-
ing what “being somebody” actually entails, the term is often qualified as being 
“good” or “respected.” The point may be straightforward, but it not only indicates 
an aspiration that guides my informants’ action but equally directs our attention 
to their current experience of being the opposite: insubstantial and caught in a 
situation of existential occlusion. In this respect, demobilization entails being 
reverted into a figure of social incompletion, just as remobilization provides a 
possibility of fulfillment, creating a willingness to reengage. As Samba explained, 
seeking to describe the inspiration that ex-President Nino Vieira installed in 
the urban youth who mobilized into the Aguentas, “it is a thing of influence 
(fluencia). He had this influence [that gave the] possibility of having hope.”9
CONCLUSION
 “Look at me I am still sitting here. 
 When you leave and come back again I will still be sitting here. 
 Nothing changes. The only difference is that I am no longer young.
 Now I am just poor.”
 – Nelson, 2011
Nelson did not move on in life by joining the Aguenta militia. Though he was 
repeatedly mobilized, demobilized, and remobilized over a period of ten years,10 
9. Possibilidade pa tene esperanca—muito allegria pa.
10. The last time in spring 2009.
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he ended up defeated and demoralized sitting in the same run-down area of 
Bissau with the same group of friends, waiting once again for better times and 
brighter futures. With an aptitude for joining the losing side of any battle, he 
never experienced victory. Instead of moving toward a better life he found him-
self drifting from the social position of “youth,” a position that at least offers 
the possibility of mobility, into a default position of poverty; a social position of 
generalized immobility as um algin coitado (“a poor man”). Though struggling to 
gain momentum in life he managed, in other words, only to glide into a generic 
space of scarcity and to become further caught in a marginal position within a 
turbulent and volatile political scenario.
This article has sought to illuminate happiness and well-being from within 
a space of hardship and conflict. Looking at the Aguentas through a prism 
of emplacement has clarified how mobilization is related to gaining security, 
provision, and prospects, directed toward a feeling of safety and the relief of 
being connected and protected. Yet it also shows how, in situations of conflict, 
the pursuit of happiness may paradoxically produce actions that bring people 
into a space of suffering. In this respect, happiness can have an ironic pres-
ence when sought in conditions that are not generally conducive to it. Not 
only may the struggle to attain it bring one into harm’s way; as Nelson’s story 
indicates happiness may also remain a phantom state of being despite peoples 
desperate struggles to attain it. It is illusive and elusive, potentially present 
but presently absent as an experiential state that avoids capture (Gotfredsen 
2013).
Yet perhaps happiness actually has most life while it is being pursued. As an 
existential goal it reveals itself in imaginaries and instantiations that are transi-
tory and contingent. It moves as people move along, shifting elsewhere when 
approached, making us chase it regardless of the situation we find ourselves in 
( Jackson 2011: ix). The Aguentas may provide an unusual point of departure 
for describing and discussing happiness and well-being. Yet they offer a good 
description of how we struggle to attain it and how it may inform our acts and 
motives in even the most difficult of circumstances. This becomes terribly clear 
as urban youth seek to navigate war as a vital conjuncture, a constellation of 
events that opens up otherwise frozen socio-political landscapes. As we have 
seen, happiness in such situations becomes a bearing, simultaneously a direc-
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chapter nine
Le bonheur suisse, again
Michael Lambek
Happiness is good activity not amusement.
– Aristotle, Ethics X, 6
Happiness raises serious challenges as a subject; difficult to speak about without 
sounding either trite or ironic.1 As Tolstoy famously wrote, happy families are 
all the same. The absence of happiness is evidently a different matter. Tolstoy’s 
compatriot Akhmatova was led to ask, “Whoever said you were supposed to be 
happy?” And Kolakowski (2012) takes the question a step further, wondering, “Is 
God Happy?” It is also difficult to ask people directly about happiness, whereas 
you can generally hear what makes people unhappy without asking. Unhappi-
ness is perhaps the best diagnostic of happiness. But the larger problem is how 
to escape from the discourse of happiness to the substance. As we say repeatedly 
in North America, after swallowing our antidepressants, happy birthday, merry 
Christmas, and have a nice day. Or as Kolakowski bluntly remarks, “Happiness 
is something we can imagine but not experience” (2012: 16). 
Although Kolakowski was speaking about one’s own happiness, this may be 
a lesson for ethnographers as well—the happiness of others is only something 
we can imagine, not experience. This is not only because the state or condition 
is elusive or because we can never fully know another or know exactly how he 
1. The title of this chapter is after Luc Boltanski, Le bonheur suisse. 
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or she feels, but also because of a fundamental uncertainty as to what happiness 
“is” and how we might define or describe it, let alone authoritatively establish its 
presence. How we perceive the happiness of another is linked to how we con-
ceive of it as a concept. It is naïve to assume that we simply know what it is—or 
will know it when we see it—before we start to study it.
“Happiness” contains the same difficulty as all words that are located some-
where between, or simultaneously as, an emotion and a moral quality, or a value 
and a virtue. Work on such “moral sentiments” (Smith [1759] 1976) wavers 
between being overly linguistic (semantic or pragmatic) in analysis, and overly 
psychological, without grasping them as broader features of the world.2 Is hap-
piness (to be) understood as biological, psychological, phenomenological, ethi-
cal, cultural, or political (a happy, prosperous nation), and in what ways are these 
connected? Is it personal, interpersonal, or transpersonal? 
There are also existential questions. Is happiness ordinary or extraordinary? 
Is it characterized by tranquility or intensity, contentment or joy? Is it a limited 
good or like a love triangle—my happiness at your expense? Can we be happy 
in knowledge of the misery of others? Can happiness last? Can we really live 
“happily ever after”?
It is unresolved, perhaps irresolvable, whether happiness is an ideal or a con-
dition, and many complex arguments arise, whether we take one or the other 
tack. For instance, there is the translation problem: if happiness and wellbeing 
are more distinct in English than in French, or happiness and luck than in 
German, imagine the differences between English and Malagasy, or with Greek 
eudaimonia. And the evidence problem: If happiness is a condition, how do we 
know it when we see it? Should we rely on personal reports or indexical signs?3 
If I am aware that I am happy, does not my self-consciousness already mitigate 
2. Although happiness can be seen as the end of ethics by both utilitarian philosophers 
and virtue ethicists, and could even be called a metavalue (Lambek 2008b), 
philosophy has not generally treated it directly as an emotion or a subjective 
state. Anthropological work on ethics, including my own, has largely ignored the 
emotional quality of ethical states or attributions, while the literature on emotion 
(e.g., Lutz 1988) does draw attention to the ethical dimension of emotion talk. See 
also Leys (2007) on guilt and shame, Fassin (2013) on resentment and ressentiment, 
and more generally from philosophy Strawson (2008) and Baker (2010), all of 
which deal with negative sentiments. For recent attempts to bring emotion into 
ethical accounts, see Throop (this collection) and Cassaniti (2015).
3. There is also the measurement problem. Elizabeth Colson quotes herself approvingly 
from 1962: “We cannot measure or record happiness” (2012: 7).
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the condition?4 Is happiness only a judgment after the fact? Moreover, one can 
fool others and even oneself. Should one speak, after Harvey Sacks (1984), of 
“doing being happy”?
I have decided to cut through these difficulties by taking as the unit of hap-
piness not a statement, bodily expression, or feeling, but a life. I treat happiness 
not as an abstract ideal, value, or attribution, nor as an immediate sensation or 
emotion, but as what is tacitly affirmed and manifest in the living and recollect-
ing of an actual life. I describe a man who regards his life with contentment. It 
is a life in which the protagonist has embraced local models, expectations, and 
criteria and has excelled. Hence it is a life of virtue in the classical sense and in 
the eyes of his contemporaries. However, I do not say that only this kind of life 
could be happy; it is one kind of happy life. It is also a Protestant (Reformiert) 
life, characterized by a strong work ethic and a certain sobriety, lived at a pe-
riod of history when opportunities presented themselves to hard-working and 
self-directed individuals to fulfill their goals, earn a reasonable livelihood, and 
participate actively in their community. Like all lives, it is inflected by moral 
luck (Williams 1981).
It is also a Swiss life. Hence a second aim of the article is to depict a Swiss 
way of life. This is difficult because Switzerland has been subject to so much 
popular representation that no one, Swiss included, can approach their lives 
except through a veil of stereotypes. Happiness is one epithet that has been ap-
plied to the Swiss collectively, as they have been imagined, by themselves and 
by many observers. On the very day I sat down to revise this essay, the BBC 
carried a headline “Switzerland is ‘world’s happiest’ country in new poll.”5 In-
deed, among the factors that led me to Switzerland were, first, that it is a place 
about which no one speaks without some kind of value judgment, and, second, 
because I thought it would be interesting to study a society that was prosperous 
and peaceful (cf. Steinberg 1976). What would the human condition look like 
in or from such a place? Because so much contemporary anthropology concerns 
places and people characterized by poverty, submission, or suffering, it could 
4. This would seem to follow from Dean Falk’s suggestion (2012: 8–9) that happiness 
is a matter of focused attention. Conversely, perhaps self-awareness is a constitutive 
feature of happiness?
5. Interestingly, the survey appeared to say nothing about the psychological state of 
individuals. “The study . . . takes into account variables such as real GDP per capita, 
healthy life expectancy, corruption levels and social freedoms” (April 24, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32443396).
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be of interest to restore some balance. Thus, one of the questions that brought 
me to Switzerland is rather like the ones that motivated the editors of this 
collection.6
I was heartened to discover that Luc Boltanski addressed very similar issues 
in Le bonheur suisse (1966).7 Boltanski raises the significant question of how to 
picture a society already inundated and captivated by portraits of itself. How 
do you move beyond evident and omnipresent stereotypes without dismiss-
ing what may be true in them? He makes an important methodological move, 
pointing out that he is studying self-definition, the expressed ideology, rather 
than national character per se; in my earlier language, the ideal rather than the 
condition. He also observes that while the dominant Swiss virtues appear to be 
the same across the language borders, the relationships that people bear toward 
the virtues, notably their ability to live up to them, vary by class and across the 
urban/rural divide. 
Another question that Switzerland and its stereotypes raise is the rela-
tionship, conceptually and empirically, between happiness and boredom. Is 
Switzerland happy or boring? Is happiness distinct from and opposed to bore-
dom, or might happiness itself be boring? Is that not one of the objections intel-
lectuals have made to the bourgeoisie? Is that not one of the objections people 
make to the idea of Switzerland? Does happiness emerge in acts of engagement 
or struggle, or is it to be found in complacency? These questions are also internal 
to Switzerland, evident in the polarized ideal types of the hardy mountaineer 
and the satisfied bourgeois, but also transcended by two significant features, 
both noted by Boltanski, namely that (a) the work ethic was as characteristic of 
urban as of rural Swiss and (b) all Swiss citizens are by one definition bourgeois, 
being identified saliently and in the first instance as having the responsibilities 
of citizenship of specific municipalities, of whatever size.8 
6. These ideas were developed long before Joel Robbins’ provocative article on the 
subject (2013). Need I add that any study of prosperity, happiness, or wellbeing 
must transpire with a degree of irony?
7. The book was published one year after Denis de Rougemont’s La Suisse ou l ’histoire 
d’un peuple heureux (1965). Boltanski’s book is curious insofar as it reports on a 
project led by Isac Chiva, Ariane Deluz, and Nathalie Stern, who first engaged 
him to statistically analyze survey questionnaires. Nevertheless, Boltanski writes as 
already a Bourdieusian, beginning many sentences with “tout se passe comme si . . ./
everything takes place as if . . .” and taking pleasure in exposing forms of deception.
8. In Switzerland, the term “bourgeois” refers to local citizenship rather than class, but 
241LE BONHEUR SUISSE, AGAIN
As it turns out, and despite Swiss irony about themselves (which is consider-
able), I recount the life of a man who conforms somewhat to type and without 
intentional irony. Willi Preisig is neither a banker, hotelkeeper, nor psychoana-
lyst, but a retired dairy farmer, a citizen of Appenzell Ausserrhoden9 and an 
inhabitant of the “pre-Alps” rather than the high Alps. He is not a stereotype, 
but a type, a legitimate figure (Barker, Harms, and Lindquist 2013) in the Swiss 
landscape, and a serious, dignified individual. Switzerland is a country charac-
terized by a quite particular juxtaposition of bureaucracy, conformity, and free-
dom. Most contemporary farmers in Switzerland are not entirely happy people; 
they own farms too small to be viable, survive on government subsidies, and 
are subjected to strict environmental regulations and impracticable bureaucratic 
controls.10 Willi is a generation or more older than these people, and his experi-
ence speaks more to the freedom side of the story. But many of his generation 
were also unhappy, largely owing to poverty, and they expressed their unhappi-
ness by emigrating. 
I draw on Willi to illustrate a certain form of life (obviously not the only one 
to be found in Switzerland). I claim neither that every participant in this form 
of life will be happy, nor that I offer a full life history or an intimate portrait of 
a unique individual, nor yet that I can provide objective criteria for identifying, 
let alone measuring, happiness. My subject in this article is Willi’s life as he 
presented it to me; it is not Willi himself, not his subjectivity; it is not a complex 
personal portrait that takes into account a person’s inner doubts or contradic-
tions. The exercise is rather to draw on Willi’s life as he described it both for 
purposes of ethnographic exposition and to think about happiness by means of 
consideration of a life, that is, as an attribute of a life, and possibly of a way of 
life, rather than of a person or personality.11
the implication is also that this is more salient than class; to be bourgeois is to be 
equal to others. Residents who are not citizens are manifestly unequal. Regarding 
the work ethic, it is a relative ascription, differently viewed from France than from 
Germany, perhaps, and subject to stereotypes across internal lines.
9. Appenzell is a small canton subject to its own stereotypes within Switzerland as 
rural and conservative. It is divided into two half cantons; Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
is largely Protestant and considered by other Swiss less distinctive and conservative 
than Appenzell Innerrhoden, which is Roman Catholic.
10. Droz and Forney (2007) argue that agrarian reforms are destroying the farming way 
of life.
11. Hence, although it draws on only one person, this essay is not conceived as a 
fully person-centered ethnography in the sense of Levy and Hollan (2015), nor 
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* * *
I met Willi at the Sonne, the small hotel that served also as restaurant, bar, and 
café for people of a small Gemeinde (municipality) in western Appenzell Aus-
serrhoden. Willi would roar up dangerously on his motorcycle. Dismounting, he 
removed his helmet and goggles, adjusted his rucksack, and grasped two canes 
in order to hobble painfully up the steps. I spoke with him mostly through the 
help of the waitress, Kathy. Kathy was the girlfriend of the cook; she was un-
happy, and indeed the family of her partner was not a happy one, the father and 
former owner of the Sonne having unexpectedly committed suicide some years 
prior to my stay. Ostensibly high rates of suicide are the reverse side of Swiss 
happiness.12 
The hotel owners were a family of the Dorf, the nucleated part of the Ge-
meinde, whereas Willi was a farmer (Bauer) and herder (Senn), though now liv-
ing in a flat in the Dorf. Appenzeller farms are dispersed; elongated farmhouses 
with attached barns dot the landscape. The lines between farmers and villag-
ers were not strict, people insisted, but in practice there were some differences, 
including the fact that most residents of the village were shopkeepers, small 
business owners, butchers, bakers, mechanics, or white-collar workers. What lay 
just below the surface of the bucolic countryside, historically and literally, was 
industrial labor; most farmhouses once had weaving looms in their basements 
(Weberkeller), while the bourgeois owners and suppliers built more substantial 
houses in the Dorf and neighboring town, a few families rising to considerable 
wealth and political prominence. From the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eight-
eenth century, Reformed (Protestant) Appenzell Ausserrhoden was perhaps the 
did I know Willi long enough to produce a full-length, well-rounded, or intimate 
portrait of the order of Crapanzano (1980) or Shostak (1981). I do not discount 
or dismiss the study of subjectivity as an ethnographic endeavor, but the subject 
of this article is a life in its outward forms and achievements (as described by the 
man who lived it), not a person or a self, or inner experience. Conversely, the article 
does not claim to offer a full analysis of society in this part of Switzerland, though 
it uses the discussion of a single life (a key interlocutor) toward that end. Despite 
some important studies (R. Bendix 1985; J. Bendix 1993; Witschi 1994; Blum, 
Inauen, and Weishaupt 2003; see also Lambek 2007 for a different individual 
portrait), there is, to my knowledge, no comprehensive ethnography of Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden or Innerrhoden. 
12. This would not have surprised the Freud of Civilization and its discontents ([1929] 
1991), who argued that social harmony and peace turn personal aggression inward.
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most industrialized and, aside from Malta, the most densely populated part of 
Europe (Schläpfer 1977: 45).13 The ascendants of many present-day Ausserrho-
ders were undernourished child laborers working long hours in dark basements, 
the difference from Manchester being that their workplaces were within their 
own homes. Max Weber, or “Weaver,” as my research suddenly made clear to 
me, would have been fascinated by the fact that the adjacent Catholic half-
canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden had no weaving industry, providing a labora-
tory ripe for a historical sociologist. The half-cantons split apart in what they 
proudly represent today as a peaceful partition (Landteilung) in 1597.
In the not distant past, there was also a sharper distinction between the 
Bauern and Sennen families. The former owned the hay fields and barns and a 
few head of cattle. The Sennen were vertical transhumants who migrated an-
nually between the relatively low lands of the Bauern and the summer pastures 
up on the mountain, where they milked the herd and made cheese. During 
the winters, Bauern families hosted Sennen families, the women cooking side 
by side. Sennen cattle fed on the stubble and on stored hay and deposited their 
manure to grow the next crop. The annual move to the summer pastures, the 
Alpfahrt, was highly ritualized and remains celebrated today: male Sennen wear 
colorful clothing, with eastern dyes once purchased in the markets in Milan, and 
carry heavy cowbells over their shoulders. Virtually every Appenzeller I met, 
whatever his or her age or occupation, maintained an emotional attachment to 
the mountain, the Alpstein. People gaze at the mountain from their windows 
or from benches set along the forest edges all over Appenzell and they hike it 
on weekends and holidays. Some people still graze flocks at the cliff face in the 
summer months and participate in a cheese cooperative. The mountain makes 
people happy, or perhaps serves as a mirror to reflect their happiness back to 
them, helping them to realize their happiness.
* * *
I first met Willi in 2003, when he was eighty-eight. He looked back at his 
life with considerable satisfaction, rather like the grandfather invoked by Rita 
Astuti in her essay on Vezo kinship in Madagascar (2000). He spoke with pride 
13. The population of Appenzell Ausserrhoden reached its peak of 57,973 in 1910, 
when 50 percent of the work was still in textiles, but by 1941 it had declined sharply 
to 44,476 (Schläpfer 1977: 48). 
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about children and grandchildren, but even more about the growth of his farm-
ing enterprise and his successful transferral of it to his offspring. What he re-
called with most happiness was his youthful trip to the Sennenball, the annual 
midsummer cowherds’ ball, an event that through his eyes has become legend-
ary in mine, and one to which I will invite you shortly.
As we talked over glasses of red wine, he told me that he (actually his mid-
dle son) looked after ninety cows, distributed over three Alpen (highland pas-
tures), with a big barn on one high pasture housing fifty head of cattle and with 
twenty-six on his farm. Willi had nine children, thirty-three grandchildren, and 
thirteen great-grandchildren. He had owned an Alp as well as a farm and farm-
house. This had not come easily, he said, and he was proud of his success; reflect-
ing on it was certainly one of the things that made him happy in the present. 
Willi had worked hard on other people’s farms in his youth in order to earn the 
money to purchase his property. 
As a child, Willi heard his Sunday school teacher compare herders to the 
pastoralists of the Old Testament and knew he wanted to be a farmer. However, 
his father disapproved; the latter worked as a carpenter in a factory in town and 
also made good money designing embroidery patterns.14 His mother worked as 
an office cleaner at the same company. His father asked the company for a job 
for his son but, to his great anger, Willi refused. This was a time when work was 
hard to find; many people were unemployed. However, Willi’s teacher knew 
someone who was seeking a farmhand. Willi was able to work on this man’s 
farm during the summer and went to school to learn farming in winter. At the 
first farm, Willi earned only 20 Swiss francs per month, which, he said, was very 
little. But the farmer fed, housed, and clothed him, so it was enough. Willi was 
the youngest child in his family and the only one to become a farmer.15 
Willi finally saved enough to rent a farm and his enterprise gradually grew. 
He said people today didn’t know that he began with only three cows and a pig. 
The next day, as we continued the conversation, he explained how hard his wife, 
Katarina had worked, both on the farm and raising so many children. She had 
been a servant at the farm where he was hired. He was seeking a girlfriend and 
a wife; he looked far and wide and didn’t recognize that she was right in front of 
him. Later he thanked God for realizing this. “She was sent from heaven.” 
14. Neither Willi nor his father worked at weaving or actual embroidery.
15. One sister never married, but served in households her whole life; the other became 
a nurse. A brother trained as a mechanic and eventually became a salesman.
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Willi said he always believed in God, and that God helped him through 
many problems. In the 1930s, the Catholics and the Protestants (die Reformi-
erten) did not get along well. But it is the same God, he affirmed. “God is the 
same in Switzerland and in Canada. People make things complicated, but God 
makes things simple.” Willi leaned toward me with urgency and said, “It is im-
portant to believe. We all have a Maker. And we will all return to our Maker.” 
Willi himself, like virtually all elderly people in Ausserrhoden, was Reformiert. 
He didn’t often go to church because he could no longer hear the preacher well, 
but he had been there on the Sunday prior to our talk.
Willi met his future wife at the age of twenty and married her at twenty-six. 
They stayed with the farmer, who had hired them for six years. In those days, he 
explained, you weren’t allowed to have a relationship with a fellow farm worker, 
a girlfriend, not in the same house, so their situation was quite unusual. They 
married in 1941, but then had to be apart when he was mobilized. However, the 
war enabled him to earn some money he could put toward the rental and later 
purchase of his own farm. In 2003, he volunteered that they had been married 
sixty-two years. Willi always spoke with great numerical precision.
* * *
What Willi recalled from his courtship was the Sennenball. This took place (as 
it still did in 2003) once a year on the first Monday after Jakobi (St. Jacob’s day), 
which is July 25.16 It was held at the Rossfall, a restaurant halfway up to the 
Schwägalp. The ball was held for herders from the entire western part of Ap-
penzell Ausserrhoden; Catholics of Innerrhoden had their own ball. You could 
attend only if you had your boss’s permission and he agreed to take over your 
work for those hours. Also, you had to have a girlfriend; you couldn’t go alone. 
Every year, Willi searched for a woman and couldn’t find one until God said, 
look beside you. You had to attend as a couple, but, Willi added mischievously, no 
same-sex ones. You also had to have special clothes. Today many people come 
to watch; it’s become partly a tourist attraction, like a show. You wear the tradi-
tional clothes and do special dances with your partner and in a group.17 
16. Willi said there used to be a ball in winter also, but this no longer existed.
17. Here and elsewhere, I am paraphrasing Willi’s speech as I recorded it in my 
notes. Willi is perfectly conscious of the way tradition has become objectified but 
distinguishes that from the way he has experienced it.
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When Willi was young, it was unusual to have a day off. For the Sennenball 
he got only half a day. He had to walk very fast down from the Alp, for two and a 
half hours. “Only a man in love would do this.” Katarina joined him there, coming 
up from the farm. They went to the ball once before they married and once after. 
Willi said he wanted to show me the Rossfall, and later we made the expedition. 
The next day, Willi returned to the Sonne with photos and memorabilia. He 
showed me a photo of his farm (Liegenschaft) located on a hill not far from our 
windows. The house dates to 1505. It is constructed of wood with flowerboxes 
and an adjacent flower and vegetable garden and barn.18 Willi first rented and 
then bought it. At the age of sixty-eight he passed it on to his youngest son, who 
has expanded it since.
There were photos of Willi giving a speech to his yodeling club, and many of 
the Alpen—both the one he worked at as a youth and the one he later purchased. 
There was a dance card from the Rossfall with an image of a man in yellow breech-
es and several shots of the annual procession to the Alp. A girl walks in front, lead-
ing the goats. A man walks at the head of the cows, dressed also in yellow breeches. 
When the path is very steep, Willi explained, the men take the heavy bells off the 
cows and wear them themselves, walking with a special stride so that they ring 
musically. Although they went up in a festive group, only one or two of the men 
stayed the whole summer, looking after the cows and making the cheese. During 
his youth, Willi spent seven summers on the Alp of his employer; he liked the work 
but said it could get lonely. Willi wore traditional clothes every day on the Alp.
There was a photo of Willi surrounded by children and grandchildren on his 
seventieth birthday and a poem in Swiss German written by a son-in-law. A whole 
album was devoted to the erection of a new barn on the Alp. The barn, belonging 
to his second son, had two rows of twenty-five stalls, thus room for fifty cows. 
Willi stained all the wood; he was seventy-five at the time. When the roof beams 
were finished, they raised a small fir tree decorated with colored ribbons, placed as 
thanks that no one was injured and also for good luck. The workers drank a glass 
of wine to celebrate and sang in the local and beloved form of polyphonic yodeling 
known as Zäuerli.19 In 1991 Willi’s middle son made his first Alpfahrt wearing the 
18. See Hermann (2004) on Appenzell farmhouses.
19. Zäuerli is still practiced by young people and is, as a knowledgeable referee pointed 
out, “an enormous source of happiness and nostalgia.” For professional recordings 
see Zemp (1980); for current ones, search online for Zäuerli. A brief segment 
surprisingly appears in the recent film The Grand Budapest Hotel.
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brown vest and breeches signifying ownership of the herd. The back of the photo 
album had some blank pages; “left for my funeral,” said Willi dryly.
The barn raising points to the orderliness and precision of pre-mortem in-
heritance, a subject Willi discussed at length. Willi and his wife had six daugh-
ters followed by three sons. When the children were growing, they helped on 
the farm, and once they reached a certain age, he paid them for the work. It was 
clear to his children that the first son to marry would inherit the farmhouse and 
farm. Usually this is the oldest, but in this case the boy was disinclined. From 
an early age, he indicated that he didn’t want goats for Christmas, whereas the 
other two boys received them as presents and gradually built up their herds and 
learned to care for the animals. When they got a bit older, they received calves 
for Christmas and birthdays; the girls received household items. When the 
youngest of the three boys decided to marry, Willi called his children together 
to divide the estate. The youngest son purchased the farm, at a price far below 
market value. Willi then allocated the Alp to his second son.20
From the payments received from the two sons, Willi gave 10,000 francs to 
each of the other siblings. He said proudly that while division of the estate is 
often a big problem, this was not the case in his own family.21 He planned every-
thing carefully. If something were to go wrong for the son who has the farm, the 
other brothers have first rights to buy it from him. This point was written up and 
deposited at the municipality office. It remained a real possibility because the son 
had only two children of his own, both daughters, and they learned other trades 
and weren’t much interested in farming. So one concern of Willi’s remained: 
Who would inherit the farm after his son? One of Willi’s daughters who is a 
farmer’s wife could buy her brother’s farm; the point is that it should go to some-
one who will operate it, that is, to someone who chooses farming as a living.22 
The second son, who inherited the Alp, has a farm in a neighboring Gemeinde. 
He married a farmer’s daughter where there were no sons, so he and his wife will 
likely inherit that property. He currently rented it from his wife’s parents. 
20. Willi’s farm was thirteen hectares of which ten were cultivated and three forest. 
Willi’s youngest son rented an additional thirteen hectares of Weide (grazing 
meadows) from a retired farmer and did not bring his cattle to an Alp in the summer. 
Willi’s middle son had use of fifty-two hectares on the Alp, one parcel of which was 
his own and the rest rented. He spent fifteen weeks a year on the Alp.
21. Willi attributed conflict in the family of the hotel owners to the inability of the 
mother to gracefully hand over control to the next generation. 
22. This is in part because of strict zoning laws.
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In addition to the farm and the Alp, the two sons had to purchase cows from 
Willi. Because they had received a salary from him all along, they were able to do 
so. (Kinship and commoditization are not understood as antithetical.) By the time 
he sold, Willi’s herd had grown from three to fifty-eight head of cattle. The money 
from the sale of the farm didn’t go far once he had paid the remaining children, so 
Willi and his wife needed the money from the cows to live on (they also received 
a modest pension). The goats had always been the exclusive property of the sons; 
their milk was taken to the factory to make goat cheese or consumed at home. 
When Willi was young, families made their own cheese and butter and sold some 
but consumed most. Now the milk is taken daily to the factories for production.23
The oldest son never married and took a job selling agricultural implements 
in the neighboring town. Willi reiterated that you give to the first son who gets 
married and wants to farm. A man without a wife has too many problems to 
run a farm. To this, Kathy the waitress added that single male farmers often 
took to drink. 
* * *
A week later Kathy, Willi, and I drove up to Schwägalp, at the base of the 
immense rock face of the Säntis peak, and toured the cheese factory, run as a 
cooperative of fifty-seven farms and with the facility to process 6,100 liters of 
milk daily. Rounds of Schwägalpkäse sold at 22 francs per kilo. Willi expressed 
his pleasure at visiting the Alp and called it the most beautiful place he had ever 
been to. The whole area is very dramatic, composed of meadows, forest, streams, 
and rock. The huts, carved partly into the hillsides, are within view of one an-
other and cattle wander between them. The air is fresh and there are trout in the 
streams to supplement the milk diet.
On the way down, we stopped at the Rossfall. The ballroom was on the second 
floor. It was a lovely place, square with an uncharacteristically high ceiling and 
23. , In nine months, a lactating cow gives around six thousand liters of milk, around 
twenty-two liters per day. Cows are milked twice daily; an exceptional cow, milked 
three times, might give between thirty-five and forty liters of milk a day at her best 
period. Calves are allowed to drink for half a year. Heifers begin to calve at three 
and Willi let them calve three times before selling. At six they need more food. The 
purchasers were farmers in lower areas who had better fodder. Steers were sold at 
one or two years. Farmers differed with respect to the age of the livestock they chose 
to keep, and Willi’s son had fewer calves than he did.
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large windows on three sides. The windows contained semicircles with stained 
glass arranged in star-like geometric patterns. A painted frieze showed scenes 
from each season of the year: the procession of animals up to the Alp; wild ani-
mals; harvests; hay pulled in horse-drawn sleds over the snow. The men in the 
paintings wore yellow breeches, high white socks, white shirts, red vests, and black 
hats with flowers. Antlers, stuffed birds, and large cowbells also adorn the room.24 
In Willi’s youth, the Rossfall was at the end of the road; once the road was 
pushed further and new restaurants built higher up, it lost business and was threat-
ened with closure. The citizens of the Gemeinde made a special effort and formed a 
co-op to buy and save it; later it was in private hands.25 More than one elderly per-
son came to reminisce, the owner told me, and indeed Willi settled with no hesita-
tion at the Stammtisch (regulars’ table), where he knew several of the other men.
Figure 1. Gasthaus Rossfall - Urnäsch, AR. Photo taken from website.
24. Most of the stained glass and paintings were done by local workmen after the old 
building collapsed in 1981.There were two portraits of men smoking pipes, wearing 
skullcaps and earrings said to be at least a century old. In one corner of the room, 
there was a small platform for musicians, the Gigestahl. The traditional orchestra 
had two violins, a bass, and a Hackbrett, a string instrument hit with hammers. 
The restoration cost almost three million francs; donor families had their names 
inscribed on the windows.
25. In fall 2012 it appeared to be for sale over the Internet.
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* * *
Another day at the Sonne, we were joined by an elderly gentleman, Hans L, a 
villager not a farmer. Kathy later explained that the two men loved to talk and 
argue with each other. They almost never agreed on politics, but they respected 
and liked each other. The talk would get especially heated before a referendum 
or election. They each knew lots of people, and their conversation covered de-
tails of marriage and kinship in addition to politics. 
Willi mentioned the Stimmbürger, the voting citizens. “We voters decide.” 
But he added that a lot of people didn’t vote. I asked why and he said, “They’re 
not interested.” Hans interjected, “If we had more problems, like hunger, per-
haps more people would vote. But everything works, people are reasonably sat-
isfied.” (Le bonheur suisse.) Willi added that citizens are asked to vote too often 
about seemingly small and trivial things; there are too many referenda. A salient 
part of Swiss democracy, citizen-initiated referenda to remove unpopular regu-
lations take place when enough signatures are gathered. A Volksinitiative, to add 
text to the Swiss constitution, requires a majority of cantons as well as a popular 
majority. Willi thought this right, since rural cantons have different interests 
than urban ones, whereas Hans affirmed that the majority of people was the 
more important principle. Debating this sort of question is central to the Swiss 
ethos, their respective positions emphasizing a more conservative and a more 
liberal outlook, respectively.
Willi was never a member of a political party, preferring to be independent. 
Yet his civic engagement was extensive. He served on the municipal council 
(Gemeinderat) for seven years. He received 8 francs for each meeting attended, 
but they would go for dinner after the meeting and spend more than that. As a 
council member he was appointed Bürgerpräsident, a position he held from 1964 
to 1972. His responsibility was to prepare the cases of everyone who applied for 
Einbürgerung (naturalization, citizenship) in the citizens’ assembly that voted in 
new citizens.26 Willi told me about one case, a young Italian man of very good 
reputation. A lawyer argued they shouldn’t grant citizenship to a Catholic. Then 
Willi took the floor and said, we have freedom of religion in Switzerland. We 
26. On acquisition of citizenship, see Centlivres (1990). In 2003, the federal high 
court declared the method of Einbürgerung by means of a public citizens’ vote 
unconstitutional and a violation of human rights. It had already been disbanded in 
Herisau during the 1970s.
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can’t deny him citizenship on this basis, and even if we did, he could take the 
case to the high court and win. So the opinion of the assembly was turned and 
people voted him in. 
Willi had not wanted to join the municipal council in the first place, but said 
he did so to ensure representation from the agricultural faction. In addition to 
serving as Bürgerpräsident, he sat on the agricultural, children’s home, building, 
and health committees, the auction committee to dispense the goods of bank-
rupt farmers, and the forest, legal guardianship, and young offenders commit-
tees. The latter provided work as punishment. Willi said he declined to stand for 
cantonal representative, because he wanted time with family. 
The public office most important to Willi was presidency of the 
Viehzuchtgenossenschaft, the livestock-breeding cooperative. He accepted the po-
sition once his children were old enough to take responsibility at the farm and 
held it for some twenty years, not for the money but because he loved cattle. He 
evaluated the quality of the cows, judged their value and health, and recorded 
any signs of illness or weakness. He said proudly that Appenzeller cattle were 
unequaled, adding jokingly that if they were side by side, he would rather look 
at a cow than a woman.
Willi was not a vet and didn’t doctor cows for the canton, although he treat-
ed his own. He gave cows points for their beauty and fitness. He had learned 
a lot about cows from the time he spent on the Alp and had gone to a special 
agricultural school (Landwirtschaftschule) from the age of sixteen to eighteen. 
This was not usual at the time, he explained, so he knew more than many other 
people. Attending the school was his choice; he paid for it with his own money, 
having nothing left over for any kind of enjoyment. The only government sub-
sidy he ever received was to help build a paved road to his farmhouse. “You get 
support from the Bund [Federal government] if you switch to bio [organic] 
agriculture, but the bureaucratic dimension is enormous. There are lots of rules, 
regulations, and requirements, and if you miss out on even a single one you 
don’t get the money. It’s very difficult and cannot really be followed in practice.” 
That’s why Swiss farmers emigrated to Canada. “There are too many rules here!” 
He added that Swiss people liked to be autonomous, free of rules, to be able to 
do what they wanted. I remarked on the paradox that this society was so highly 
regulated. 
Willi did try to preserve the farming way of life, and to this end in 1963 
he helped found the Landjugendgruppe, an association providing young people 
from farm families with a chance to meet suitable marriage partners who also 
252 MICHAEL LAMBEK
wanted to stay on the land. It led to many a marriage, he said, and members still 
celebrated each other’s weddings.
We briefly discussed the expansion of voting in the Landsgemeinde to in-
clude women. This was the annual public assembly of all cantonal citizens in 
which votes were taken by a raising of hands ( J. Bendix 1993). Women were 
included in Appenzell Ausserrhoden in 1989, and eight years later the assembly 
voted itself out of existence; it continues in Appenzell Innerrhoden, where it 
is also a tourist attraction. Here the men wore bourgeois clothing, not herders’ 
outfits, and carried swords. Willi explained that the men wore dark clothes so 
that their white hands were visible. He called it the Urdemokratie, the original 
democracy.
Willi originally was uncertain whether giving women the vote was a good 
thing. He always discussed each issue with his wife before voting and took her 
opinion into account, but admitted that the man had the final say. Willi reflect-
ed that when he was young, women stayed home and looked after the children 
and so they had little understanding of public affairs. Now that a lot of women 
either had no children or went to work anyway, they understood them better 
(and so there was more reason they should have the vote). However, he did not 
approve of women working: “They should look after their children!” He explained 
that the family was the most important institution. “If the family isn’t happy, the 
whole of Switzerland could have problems!”
Willi was president of his Lesegesellschaft for four years. These “reading so-
cieties” were originally district (Bezirk) discussion groups, and some proved the 
foundation of the modern political parties (and illustrate the Habermasian pub-
lic sphere). They met monthly over the winter. At first, people were too poor 
to have their own subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals so they pooled 
them. The Lesegesellschaften bought and then circulated them among the mem-
bers, functioning rather like libraries, Willi explained. A number of Lesegesells-
chaften still existed.27 Willi’s group had around forty members, including not 
only farmers but also teachers and others, from all walks of life. Willi explained 
that the Lesegesellschaften were nonpartisan, politically neutral places for think-
ing things through together. They discussed policy and forthcoming issues, “so 
we went to the Landsgemeinde well prepared to vote.” In his early years, people 
27. There were five Lesegesellschaften in Herisau during the time Willi was active. 
Although literacy was part of the Protestant tradition, the Lesegesellschaften were 
definitely not religious (Peter Witschi, pers. comm.).
253LE BONHEUR SUISSE, AGAIN
didn’t have time to go to read the papers in the restaurants, so, although voices 
were equal, someone, usually the president, had to come to each meeting well 
prepared to talk. In any case, Willi never just sat and listened; that was why, he 
said, they wanted to give him more and more responsibility. They discussed pri-
marily local issues, örtliche Probleme, like the schools, but also external issues, 
concerning NATO, for example. Willi thought it was good for Switzerland to 
join the United Nations, but not the European Union. 
When I suggested that the reading societies might have been the foundation 
of democracy, Willi agreed strongly. “Parties today may be larger and stronger, 
but not necessarily better! Parties are too interested in money. Decisions are 
better reached within the Lesegesellschaften since politics with conscience is 
the basis. Thank God we still have some conscience!” he concluded, “even in the 
Bundesrat.”
Willi also spoke positively about the cooperatives (Genossenschaften) of for-
esters, cheese makers, and so forth. These, he said, illustrating with his hands, 
emerged from below, not from the top down. Switzerland, he concluded, was 
the oldest democracy in the world. To people like Willi, these were not mere 
words but the product of lived experiences and the model for living.
* * *
On later occasions, I visited Willi in his flat, once alone and the following year 
together with Bea Schwitter, from the University of Zürich. There I met Willi’s 
wife, Katarina. On the first visit, the couple graciously set aside their Parcheesi 
game and invited me in for coffee and cake. Since unsuccessful operations to 
replace her hips a decade earlier, Katarina moved about in a wheelchair. Willi 
shopped and cooked, following his wife’s instructions. He wasn’t accustomed to 
household duties at first, he said, but was very glad to have some work to do. 
The apartment was large and airy. They were happy to have a beautiful view of 
the Alpstein from their windows. The rooms were clean and tidy, with adjacent 
duvets neatly folded on the bed. Katarina had a workroom where she knitted 
blankets and socks for her grandchildren. “I have the time,” she explained. 
On the walls were a lovely painting of an Alp, in a style Willi called naïf, 
old photos of their parents, and a photo of three generations of men at the Alp: 
Willi, his middle son, and the son’s oldest son, who would also become a farmer. 
There was a framed picture of Willi and Katarina’s sixtieth wedding anniversary 
in front of the Sonne, with all the children and grandchildren. 
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They turned next to photo albums evoking further details of their lives There 
was a photo of the young couple at the Rossfall—Katarina in a Toggenburg 
Tracht (outfit)28—and photos of their engagement when they were each twenty-
five and of their marriage six months later. Willi got two days off army service 
to get engaged, at Katarina’s father’s farm. They exchanged gold rings. She still 
wore hers; Willi’s “got lost inside a cow!” He was helping the cow give birth, it 
was very slippery and somehow the ring came off. There was an album devoted 
to their children’s families, with precisely two pages for each, including a wed-
ding photo, a shot of their house, and a photo of their children. They had opti-
mistically left two blank pages blank for the eldest son, who was then fifty. The 
daughters all married farmers. Willi and Katarina listed the professions of each 
grandchild. Some were farmers or in farm-related business. One grandson-in-
law had a farm too small to live from so he was also a butcher and a driver. The 
wife worked in a hospital. One daughter had married a farmer in canton Zürich; 
their daughter in turn was a schoolteacher, married to a Canadian. 
There were photos of the houses in which they had lived, and one of the 
house where Willi grew up, taken much later. Looking at it, he said he had had 
a good youth. There were pictures of the Alp where he first worked and later 
their own Alp. In their wedding photos and those of their children, people wore 
traditional dress, the husbands in beautiful Sennen outfits with shiny gold orna-
ments and red vests. But when the newest generation married, the brides wore 
white and the men suits. They ducked under arches of flowers set up outside the 
churches. The stacks of photos shifted from images of grandchildren, to calves, 
to udders. Katarina also showed me postcards sent from all over the world by 
various grandchildren.
When I contacted him again in 2004, Willi pronounced himself happy to 
hear from me and asked whether I had already published something about him. 
He received us that same afternoon in his house. Asking whether we planned 
to take notes, he immediately led us to the kitchen table, which contained two 
hardback volumes of Appenzeller Geschichte and a couple of novels. The Parcheesi 
board was laid out on another table. Willi wore suspenders, his old-fashioned 
trousers, and a pale blue lightly embroidered shirt characteristic of local farm-
ers. Katarina moved in and out of the conversation. She inspected the cake we 
brought and put it away. Willi offered us coffee and opened a bottle of sparkling 
28. Katarina was from a farm high up in the neighboring Toggenburg valley.
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mineral water. He asked Bea her last name and her Heimatort, eager to place her 
and happy to discover her origins were not in a large city.
They showed us more photo albums and reviewed their children and grand-
children. Five of the six daughters trained as homecare nurses once their chil-
dren were grown and they were free to make some money. The latest grand-
daughter to wed worked as a Senn and married a mountain farmer (Bergbauer). 
Other grandchildren were between twenty-one and thirty and might still marry, 
they said, hopefully. People married later than before, because women worked 
now. I suggested that Katarina had worked when she was young, but they said 
this was just an apprenticeship.
In those days, the late 1930s, Katarina explained, your parents looked after 
you on their farm so long as you went to school. Then you had to go work on 
someone else’s farm. Her father had a large farm and was quite well off, but she 
was sent to a different farm to make money directly after confirmation, at the 
age of sixteen. She’d attended an agricultural housekeeping school. Willi and 
Katarina worked together on a big farm. Katarina did housework but also cut 
hay and so forth. Everyone helped; there were horses, no machinery. They were 
not unhappy. I asked Willi if he had been exploited and he said decisively, “No.” 
I assume this is because he, like Katarina, understood his work there at the farm 
as an apprenticeship, because he chose the work, because it enabled him to build 
toward his own enterprise, and, finally, because he worked alongside the owners 
and relations with them were warm.29 The farmer attended their twenty-fifth 
wedding anniversary and later moved in with them at Willi’s farm for the last 
eighteen months of his life.
Katarina was from a big Sennen family, one of nine siblings, her father one of 
thirteen. I asked whether big families were good. “In big families children learn 
to share, an advantage for the rest of your life. When there are only one or two 
children, they are not accustomed to do without. One bears one’s upbringing 
throughout life. Things from early life become ingrained.”
Willi knew the Sennenball had been held the past Monday. One of his 
grandsons had danced there; they had his picture from the newspaper. One 
dance is composed of a team of eight young men holding hands in a circle, 
29. By contrast, there have been recent stories in the Swiss news of “contract 
children” who in earlier decades were sent by social workers to farms where their 
labor was exploited (BBC Switzerland: “Stolen childhoods,” November 2, 2014: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0297188).
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with the alternate four held almost horizontal very close to the floor between 
their upright partners; “It requires a great deal of strength,” Willi emphasized. 
This grandson was currently working as a Senn on an Alp. In former days, they 
reflected, there were only a very few times you had free from work. There were 
no holidays. “‘Holidays’ meant going on military service, but sometimes that was no 
holiday!” 
Willi and Katarina showed us a wonderful photo of themselves as a very 
young couple from 1936. It was color tinted by hand and gave them very rosy 
cheeks. It was taken at the Sennenball, the occasion of their first kiss! Willi 
laughed. He rented a large farm and people told him he was crazy, because it 
was such a difficult time for farmers. But he put his faith in God. He quoted 
Jeremias Gotthelf, an early nineteenth-century Swiss novelist and pastor, who 
said, “Im Haus muss beginnen was im Staate leuchten soll” (“What shines in the 
state must begin at home”). Like many Swiss, when Willi thought about politics 
in the public sphere, he understood it as emerging from values rooted in the 
household.
Willi had had hip operations some years earlier; that was why he walked 
with sticks. He thought perhaps the hip problems came from working very hard 
in his youth. In the Alp, you often had to carry loads of wood, and he was proud 
of lifting very heavy weights. When the doctor first examined his hip, he was 
amazed he’d postponed the operation for so long, as the bones were rubbing 
against each other. He had lived in pain for several years but hadn’t wanted the 
operation. Afterwards he admitted he should have done it years earlier. “But one 
survives.”
It was getting difficult for them to attend grandchildren’s weddings, but they 
received frequent visits from them and enjoyed staying home. “We don’t know 
how long we can go on living here, so the time here counts. It is a gift, staying at 
home at our age.” Both were eighty-nine.
I asked about the values Willi had lived by. “Real values,” he said at once. He 
started with almost nothing, he continued. Then followed six years of military 
service (because of the war and when he could otherwise have been accumulat-
ing cattle). But they were always healthy, and that was very important. “Trust in 
God,” he added. Even today, this was the foundation of their daily life. I asked 
why people were leaving the church. “If people leave the church, that is their 
business. But no one can run away from God, only from the church. No human 
being can make a decision until they are born and no one can choose his or her 
death, unless they commit suicide. Even then, many are unsuccessful.”
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Willi said he hoped he had passed his values on to his children. “But you 
can’t prescribe them. You show by the example of your own life. Nothing else, 
but I tried my best.” He learned his values from his mother and father; they 
had the same values (although they were not farmers). He was confirmed in the 
church but never worked for it directly. “One can just as well do things in the 
background; it doesn’t matter whether others see it or not.”
Kathy had told me that Willi used pious sayings and written folk wisdom 
to guide his life, and indeed these are ubiquitous in German-speaking Swit-
zerland, and can be seen, for example, inscribed on signs hung along mountain 
paths. Before we left, Willi showed Bea the wooden plaque on his wall com-
memorating the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Viehzuchtgenossenschaft (1892–
1967) that took place during his presidency. On it was carved a poem that, he 
affirmed, was very important.
 Der Bauer steht auf verlässlichem Grund
 Ihn bindet ein alter verschwiegener Bund
 Die Arbeit macht seine Hände steif
 Die Arbeit macht seine Seele reif
 Ein jedes Werk das er vollbringt
 Ist das Werk das um ein Wunder ringt
 Ist auf Verheissung aufgebaut
 Weil‘er der eignen Kraft vertraut
 The farmer stands on sturdy ground
 He maintains an old concealed alliance
 Labor makes his hand stiff
 Labor makes his soul ripe
 Every work that he accomplishes
 Is a work that strives for a miracle 
 It is built on a promise
 From confidence in his own strength.30
30. Written by Huckenberger, a farmer in canton Thurgau. Bea corrected my 
transcription and translation but told me that she did not fully understand the 
poem, finding the language old-fashioned and poor. The translation does not fully 




I have used Willi’s conversation to illustrate aspects of farming life at a certain 
period in this part of Switzerland. It may be that I have taken his description 
of his life at face value, but my aim has not been to understand his inner life so 
much as to depict his own depiction of contentment. And even if you do not 
want to be a Swiss farmer yourself, with worn-out hips, a stiff hand, and never a 
day off, you have to acknowledge that Willi has a “ripe soul.” 
I draw on Willi’s life to illustrate something about the social conditions of 
his time and place that enabled a good life of a certain kind. I am not interested 
either in generalizing about men like Willi or in describing happiness in the 
abstract. Willi is not unduly self-conscious. He did not go out of the way to 
describe himself as happy, and it is not for me to describe his happiness in an 
emotional sense (nor was it an explicit object of my questions). But he evidently 
manifests a happy life, a life well lived. He exemplifies the virtues he describes; 
he simply has the character he has, is the person he is. My concern is not with 
Willi’s subjectivity or the depths of his character but with what he presented 
of himself to me (and as I received it). His world is one in which both rational 
calculation and divine will play their part. He has a Protestant work ethic, even 
a Weberian calling (Beruf); without being born into a farming family, he devel-
oped the ethos of a self-sufficient farmer and achieved success according to local 
ideals of the farmer’s life and of civic engagement. I take Willi to epitomize a 
certain liberal ideal of wellbeing and an ideal liberal citizen in a political sense.31 
Willi was, I conclude, a good and happy man, and I have been describing a 
good and happy life (without, of course, advocating it as the best or only good 
life). This is not to deny there may have been periods of conflict or unhappiness 
in his life or even some concealed regrets, or that one could interrogate his sense 
of satisfaction. What I offer is an interpretation, based on the evidence I have 
presented here.
I cannot, of course, either solve the mystery of human happiness or give an 
original philosophical response to it, and it has not been my intention to do 
either. With respect to the happiness of this life, I would emphasize the way the 
temporal and the ethical dimensions intertwine. Central is Willi’s satisfaction 
31. Liberalism is part of a general Swiss ethos, but Appenzell Ausserrhoden has 
considered itself particularly liberal; the word “liberal” recurred frequently in my 
discussions with citizens and in the historical sources
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at accomplishments over time, a sense of direction, fruition, and resolution, as 
evident in his career and the smooth generational succession he enabled. These 
are achievements over which many Swiss farmers worry. At least in retrospect, 
Willi had the sense he always knew where he was going, and when he didn’t, he 
says, God stepped in and showed him the way. Willi also recognizes where he 
has been. He understands his freedom not as existential but as a matter of faith 
and of meeting his practical needs and familial and civic responsibilities. His 
autonomy is never individualistic or isolated but mediated through work, fam-
ily, and political engagement. Not wealth but work and family. Not just simple 
labor, daily toil (Arbeit), in Arendt’s sense ([1958] 1998), but also work in the 
sense of something produced, something that lasts (Werk), and that is framed 
within the commitment to a calling.32 
Willi said he felt called to livestock from his first childhood lessons in the 
Bible. Labor was indeed long, repetitive, arduous, and sometimes lonely, but he 
showed nostalgia for the Alp and its connotations of masculine independence as 
well as a real interest in cows. There was also the courtship and happy marriage 
and the settlement of the children, livestock, and land. Willi argues for the pri-
macy of the family over the political sphere, but this is precisely because he sees 
a direct connection between them. Wellbeing and ethical conduct are simulta-
neously conditions of family, municipality, and country. Here he exemplifies the 
Swiss political ethos, which has been one of starting at the local community and 
placing the most weight on the smallest level of inclusion (in striking contrast 
to the French model).33 Willi has been an engaged and active citizen, seeing 
one duty of citizenship as critically evaluating and discussing the issues before 
voting, and another as holding office. His life also illustrates the inseparabil-
ity of the ethical from the aesthetic, evident in the love, appreciation, and care 
of landscape, tradition, and livestock. His interest in the latter is comparable 
to ethnographic descriptions of eastern and southern Africa (Evans-Pritchard 
1940 and Solway 1998, respectively), albeit the attention of the African live-
stock holders is turned to the beauty of oxen or bulls, and that of Swiss farmers 
like Willi to lactating cows.
The values by which men like Willi live have sometimes been described 
as ascetic. I would protest that this diminishes them and risks parody. My 
32. It seems to me that for Willi and people like him, Arbeit has many of the positive 
qualities that Arendt somewhat snobbishly reserved for Werk.
33. See Weinberg (1975). As one manifestation, municipal tax is higher than federal.
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approach in this article has been evidently broadly Aristotelian. To return to 
Aristotle’s words in my epigraph, “Happiness is good activity not amusement.” 
In this tradition, a good human life requires the exercise of the capacities rather 
than simply the fulfillment of needs (Lambek 2008a, after Macpherson 1973). 
The availability of the means for, and appreciation of, such exercise—in work, 
politics, art, music, philosophy, nurture, or love—is salient. Phrased another way, 
the values intrinsic to the means, or internal to practices, must not be overshad-
owed by those external to them (MacIntyre 1981).34 Perhaps most striking in 
this region, until recently, civic engagement has been a significant field in which 
a man could exercise his capacities, not unlike male citizenship in the ancient 
Greek polis. Willi took full advantage of the opportunities and has also been 
lucky. His own view is also Aristotelian in the sense that he advocates discipline 
over rule following and that his sense of freedom emerges as a judicious but not 
unthinking or unforceful adherence to social convention.35
At the beginning of the article, I addressed a common stereotype of 
Switzerland and the Swiss as boring. It is one thing to depict the lives of oth-
ers, from the outside, as boring; it is quite another to experience boredom for 
oneself. The conditions necessary to preclude boredom are not reducible to ob-
jective features, like the number of venues for entertainment, or even more 
subjective ones, like the edginess of the art scene. Practices through which to 
exercise the capacities must be available and meaningful. It is hard to be happy 
when frustrated, undirected, understimulated (or perhaps overstimulated). 
Stimulation comes from activity—this may be quiet contemplation, intellectual 
enjoyment, or reading literature; it may be something more vigorous or creative, 
like writing, hiking, or singing; and it may be something more practical, like 
raising livestock or children, or deliberating and administering the political life 
of one’s community. And of course practice entails the balancing among such 
activities.36 
34. I have also argued (Lambek 2008b) that happiness might be considered 
the metavalue, that is, the value internal to the art of living, understood as the 
metapractice.
35. For further discussion of the ethics of freedom and judgment, see the contributions 
to Lambek (2010) as well as Lambek (2015).
36. There is also a balance among the virtues or practices such as piety (Mahmood 2005; 
Hirschkind 2006) or freedom (Laidlaw 2002) highlighted in recent anthropological 
work elsewhere.
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To answer the earlier provocation, happiness is precisely not boredom, and 
Swiss citizens like Willi are a far cry from the inhabitants of provincial Russian 
cities, as described by writers like Chekov or anthropologists like Anna Kruglova 
(2015), who struggle with and against what Kruglova calls “acedia.” Happy peo-
ple may sometimes appear boring to writers and intellectuals in their midst, 
but that is not the same as to say that they are bored themselves. One reason, 
then, for making happiness a focus of ethnographic investigation is precisely to 
use it as a lens to see what interests people, what engages, and challenges them. 
“Happiness” in this sense is more an ethnographic means than an ethnographic 
end, much as happiness in ethnographic practice is to be found in the means of 
our work rather than in externalized ends. (My happiness comes more in the 
conduct of fieldwork and the struggle of writing this article than in seeing it in 
print.)
Of course, this means that we do not experience our work as alienated from 
our being. Willi’s is what I would call an integrated life. Work, property, au-
tonomy, family, God, political conversation and engagement, landscape, and 
love—all come together in a harmonious whole.37 To draw from various ac-
counts of ethics, there is a relation between good character, social justice, and 
self-realization, between virtue and happiness. Willi is justifiably well respected. 
A feature of his life, characterized by its absence, is abjection; Willi never had 
to suffer social shame for his origins, citizenship, class, religion, or sexuality. 
Likewise there is little indication of loneliness.
The life-course is not fully individual, but articulated with consociates and 
people of alternate generations. To conclude, I want to emphasize, as Willi does, 
that succession is critical, each generation taking the place of the one previous 
to it, mutually confirming their actions. Ideally, the young are happy to suc-
ceed their parents, the old to see the young doing so. But succession is also 
fraught with uncertainty and danger—competition, ambivalence, unexpected 
events, changed circumstances, and difficult choices. It is bittersweet insofar 
as the arrival of one generation signals the eventual departure of another. Nor 
does the happiness of one generation confirm the happiness of the next. Social 
conditions were right for talented, hard-working, and patient people like Willi 
37. Pieces that don’t fit, like the oldest son’s divergent interests, are partly acknowledged—
he received different kinds of gifts on his birthdays—and partly not—Willi still 
hopes for his eventual marriage.
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to succeed; whether this is still possible for the following cohorts of Swiss farm-
ers is more doubtful.
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Amazonian Urarina styles of happiness 
Harry Walker
I’m living peacefully now. Nothing happens. . . . We’re all living peacefully be-
cause I have my sons to whom nothing happens because I’m with my husband. 
Even when he’s drunk, he doesn’t do anything to me, that’s why I’m peaceful. . . . 
I’m living contentedly. He works properly, this man, I prepare my manioc beer 
for him, and he invites his neighbors, I also invite my female companions. So I’m 
working peacefully. 
Rosa held my gaze as she answered my questions about her new life as a married 
woman. She went on to emphasize how difficult it was when her husband trave-
led far away, leaving her alone with the children, but how she would wait pa-
tiently for him until his return. She told me how her husband’s peaceful life now 
contrasted dramatically with the ongoing problems he had with his previous 
wife. The term she used over and over again, raotojoeein, meaning loosely “being 
calm” or “being tranquil,” is one I often heard used by my Urarina companions 
when speaking about fond memories of times past, but also when invoking the 
ideal style of life they sought to bring about for themselves and their loved ones, 
and was closely linked to ideas of satisfying forms of work. As one man put it 
succinctly when I inquired about his hopes and dreams for the future: “I hope 
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to live peacefully.” A straightforward aim, I thought at the time, if somewhat 
unexciting. Only much later did I realize just how sophisticated was this ideal of 
tranquility, and how it brought into alignment a constellation of ideas ranging 
from truth and right to sensory pleasure, freedom from anxiety, moral conduct, 
and the opportunity to pursue one’s own good in one’s own way. 
The Urarina, a group of around four thousand hunter-horticulturalists who 
inhabit the Chambira river and its tributaries in the Peruvian Amazon, are not 
alone in their preoccupation with “the good life.” Anthropologists of Amazonia 
have routinely been invoking this and related concepts since well before the re-
cent surge of interest in Western popular discourse—largely, I think, because it 
is so clearly a central concern of native Amazonian peoples themselves. Philippe 
Descola (1996), in his meticulous study of the Jivaroan economy and its em-
beddedness within the social and cosmological order, was able to show how 
it was the distinctive Jivaroan conception of “the good life,” with its emphasis 
on marital harmony, the provision of ample home-made manioc beer and the 
like, that effectively prevented the intensification of agriculture where ecologi-
cal conditions would otherwise have allowed for it, thus keeping production 
in a condition of homeostasis. Descola’s argument ran directly counter to the 
materialist and ecological determinist theses of the time, which emphasized 
the so-called “limiting factors” of soil quality, protein scarcity, and so on, while 
in some ways anticipating the belated “discovery” by some Western economists 
that maximizing happiness may be a more worthwhile goal than increasing 
material wealth, and that the two do not always coincide. In a different vein, 
Joanna Overing (e.g., 1989) pioneered the study of what she termed the “art of 
living” or the “aesthetics of everyday life,” showing how the Western distinction 
between ethics and aesthetics is irrelevant in a world where people strive for 
beauty in their social relations with others. In various ways, concepts of “the 
good life” or “living well” have since pervaded a large number of anthropologi-
cal accounts of Amazonian sociality (e.g., Overing and Passes 2000a; Belaunde 
2001), which often emphasize the ways in which Amazonian social life focuses 
on emotional comfort and the maintenance of good or harmonious interper-
sonal relationships, some of which may even extend beyond the human sphere 
to embrace nonhumans in an expansive social order. This is not to say, however, 
that violence, hostility, conflict, and danger are absent from Amazonian life; on 
the contrary, they are ever-present, and indeed they comprise the sociocosmic 
backdrop against which the ideals of peaceable everyday sociality must inevi-
tably be understood (Overing and Passes 2000b: 6–7). Moreover, as Fernando 
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Santos Granero (2000) has argued, though peaceful conviviality is more than an 
unrealizable ideal, its achievement in practice is nevertheless constantly under-
mined, precisely because it entails such strong feelings of love, trust, and gen-
erosity: any rupture in such relations quickly generates equally intense negative 
emotions, such as anger, hatred, or shame, which end up driving people apart. 
Despite this long-standing interest in the conditions of the good life, or the 
“criteria of good living,” to use Descola’s expression, there has been relatively 
little exploration of what it actually feels like to lead a good or virtuous life, or 
how this correlates with happiness as a positive affective state: the relationship, 
we might say, between morality and pleasure. While Amazonians clearly enjoy 
and hold in very high esteem the sensory pleasures associated with food, sex, 
and meaningful, sociable work, among other things, exactly how short-term, 
apparently subjective forms of enjoyment relate to broader conceptions of the 
good (e.g., Robbins 2013), and longer-term goals or aspirations in life, remains 
an open question. It has been suggested that ideals of happiness and wellbe-
ing may be closely linked to health and productivity (Izquierdo 2009), as well 
as social relations and success in common subsistence activities (Reyes-Garcia 
and Tsimane’ Amazonian Panel Study [TAPS] 2012). According to one study, 
among the Bolivian Tsimane (ibid.), the most frequently mentioned reason for 
happiness was, significantly, “nothing bad happened.” Yet, despite widespread 
recognition among scholars of the general importance of “peacefulness” or 
“tranquility” in everyday sociality, precisely what this means, in moral or affec-
tive terms, has scarcely been investigated.
According to Durkheim, for whom the relationship between the moral and 
the sensuous was in many ways a key concern, socialization entailed an eman-
cipation from sensory pleasures through the acquisition of a shared moral sen-
sitivity, comprising common rules of conduct directed at a higher end which he 
equated to the good. Such a conception, which Durkheim drew from Kant, thus 
seeks sharply to distinguish morality from happiness (or pleasure) and provide 
a firm grounding for the former. The framing of morality in terms of the obli-
gations incumbent upon people, however, appears ill suited to the Amazonian 
context, where rule following is not a salient feature of moral life, and where 
scholars have found greater mileage in approaches drawn from virtue ethics, 
which emphasize the cultivation of moral character rather than doing one’s duty 
or bringing about good consequences. On the other hand, Durkheim also ac-
knowledged a possible connection between the sensuous and the moral in his 
notion of collective effervescence, as a kind of exaltation that reaffirms social 
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bonds and imbues shared moral values with powerful affective meanings, there-
by enhancing their salience in everyday life. Such a conception suggests that 
certain moral dispositions or sensibilities may be reinforced precisely in liminal, 
transitory moments of shared jubilation; and indeed later scholars—most nota-
bly Victor Turner (e.g., 1969)—have shown that liminal or liminoid moments 
may play a crucial role in orienting people to others. 
In engaging with these issues, we are soon confronted with a great rift 
that has run through Western thinking about happiness from ancient times 
to the present day. Much work in the recent “economics of happiness” move-
ment follows a broadly utilitarian approach whose purest form may be found 
in Jeremy Bentham’s assertion that maximizing the sum total of happiness in 
society should be everyone’s goal, and the explicit aim of governmental policy. 
In this view, happiness is conceived as a positive affective state, or simply “feel-
ing good,” and often associated with a subjective sense of satisfaction with life. 
An alternative approach follows Aristotle’s conception of happiness as a life of 
virtue, emphasizing ideas of purpose and self-actualization, while stressing that 
the goals of life are diverse and not always dependent on subjective experience 
(see, e.g., Ryan and Deci 2001; Tomer 2011; Henderson and Knight 2012: 196). 
Adherents of the latter approach point out that the conception of happiness as 
a subjective feeling is a recent development, and that the ancient philosophers 
who saw happiness as the goal of life were talking about a far broader concep-
tion of human flourishing, one which has a certain objective content to it and 
involves a strong moral or evaluative component. This ongoing debate is some-
times referred to as the tension between hedonic and eudaimonic approaches, 
and while some have attempted to reconcile these by suggesting that a life rich 
in both kinds of pursuits is associated with the greatest degree of wellbeing 
(e.g., Huta and Ryan 2010), the relationship between these two forms of hap-
piness remains unclear, not least in terms of how they might actually interact in 
practice in a given social context. 
In this article, I suggest that Urarina manage two distinct but related con-
cepts of happiness that loosely (though not entirely) map onto this division 
between hedonism and eudaimonia. Both are ultimately social and relational 
ideals, attributes of groups rather than individuals, as it were, though one cor-
responds to short-term, momentary pleasure, and the other to a more enduring 
sense of a life well lived, rich with meaning and purpose, and centering on a 
quite distinctive and multifaceted concept of tranquility. I argue that they are 
not contradictory, but come into alignment in interesting ways; in particular, I 
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suggest, the short-term concept resembles a total social fact, one which con-
denses the meaning of the long-term, more objective concept of living well, 
in all its complexity, into an enjoyable subjective experience. Central to both 
forms of happiness are a particular form of nonalienated labor in which people 
are free to extend their capacities in satisfying ways, and a sense of harmony or 
correspondence between people’s attitudes, beliefs, and actions, one that endows 
them with a sense of individuality while contributing to a distinctive and intrin-
sically enjoyable “style of life.”
THE VIRTUES OF TRANQUILITY 
The Urarina pursue a generally subsistence lifestyle of hunting, fishing, small-
scale horticulture, and gathering wild forest fruits and other produce, inter-
spersed with occasional bouts of extractive activity for passing fluvial traders 
under the system of habilitación¸ in which goods are advanced on credit in or-
der to incite people to work. They mostly live in small, scattered settlements 
of around ten or twenty houses, each relatively autonomous both economi-
cally and politically. Although few Urarina today would readily be described as 
Christian, either by outsiders or by themselves, it is quite possible that Chris-
tianity—as imparted by Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, for instance—has nevertheless shaped present-day 
moral values, as it may have done elsewhere in the region (see, e.g., Fausto 
2007). Over the course of a couple of years spent living with them, I came to 
appreciate that Urarina people maintain a certain conviction that despite life’s 
many hardships and struggles, their own way of life is the best one possible. 
They are especially scornful of urban life, where “you can’t do anything un-
less you have money,” though they also disparage the ways of their indigenous 
neighbors, who, they admit, are stronger and richer, but also, they insist, morally 
inferior. Though they sometimes lament the fact that many of the neighbor-
ing Candoshi have entered wage labor or become so-called “professionals,” few 
Urarina, when given the opportunity, were themselves willing to enter wage 
labor for more than a few days at a time, valuing their flexibility and freedom 
more than increased income or the ideal of “progress.” People would often re-
mark that they want to, or should, “replace [their] forefathers”: that is, live their 
lives in broad accordance with the same general values and aspirations as previ-
ous generations. 
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In seeking to characterize these values and aspirations, a good place to start 
is the ubiquitous Urarina term raotojoeein, which, as noted above, means loosely 
“being calm” or (as I prefer) “tranquility.” Its prevalence in everyday conversa-
tion would be difficult to overestimate: someone asked how a recent trip into 
the forest went, for example, or how a patient recovering from illness was faring, 
could well be expected to answer, simply, “tranquilly.” To begin with, it is clear 
that raotojoeein implies freedom from danger and distress. As such, we are im-
mediately reminded of superficially similar ideas in ancient Greek and Buddhist 
philosophy, most notably the concept of ataraxia, or tranquility, promoted as 
the goal of life, or telos, in both Pyrrhonism and Epicureanism (e.g., Warren 
2002). Tranquility in this context may be glossed as freedom from disturbance, 
or absence of trouble, and for the Skeptics in particular arises from a suspen-
sion of judgment concerning the nature or essence of things. Unlike the ancient 
Greek ataraxia, however, the Urarina ideal of tranquility should not be taken 
to imply an attitude of equanimity, mental composure, or emotional stability in 
the face of external fluctuations or adverse circumstances (e.g., Striker 1990). 
Nor does it equate to an absence of passion. For Urarina, as for perhaps most 
other native Amazonians, certain legitimate forms of violence, especially violent 
revenge against enemies, may be an important part of the good life, or at least 
may imbue life with a sense of purpose even as it disrupts the hard-won state 
of tranquility. On the other hand, it is in many ways the perennial threat of vio-
lence, the sense that danger lurks around every corner, that renders its absence 
so valuable. As Peter Gow (2000) has observed, his initial sense that daily life 
among the Piro was rather boring gradually gave way to an appreciation of the 
fact that this apparent boredom was experienced not as a lack, but as a positive 
achievement—a goal, in fact, of social life. “Doing nothing” was not only essen-
tially an invitation to sociality, it was also necessarily a state carved out against 
a background of inevitable suffering and helplessness, in a cosmos pervaded 
by the constant threat of violence in which myriad hostile agents, human and 
nonhuman, always threaten to disrupt the calm surface of life, bringing illness 
or misfortune, or worse. 
It is very common when among Urarina people to hear someone say, “noth-
ing happened” as a form of praise, to mean that everything went well. In Rosa’s 
account, with which this article began, she repeatedly emphasized that “nothing 
happened” to express her satisfaction with her husband and with married life in 
general. Yet this apparent lack of events certainly does not imply boredom. So 
far as I can tell, the Urarina have no term for boredom, and while it is perfectly 
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possible that the experience of boredom is not unknown to them (especially in 
the city, as I discuss further below), I think they would be more likely to describe 
such a feeling as a kind of “sadness,” arising from a temporary lack of people 
with whom to socialize. This indeed is what people would say—“it’s sad”—
when large numbers of people left the village for a few days to extract timber 
for sale. When surrounded by one’s kin, with ample opportunities for productive 
labor, it seems more or less impossible to be bored. 
Examining more closely the Urarina term for tranquility, raotojoeein, would 
seem to imply a much greater semantic density than obtains in its English 
equivalent. The stem rao or rau is found in a number of possible cognates, all as-
sociated in one way or another with Urarina conceptions of the good. These in-
clude words for calm (raoti), peace (raotono), taste (raotono), right or law (rauhi), 
an honorable person (raunacaaena), to be straight (rauhicha), truth (rauhijidi), to 
make happy (rausiaaeca), to heal (rautaa), and to like or enjoy (rautatoha). There 
are echoes here of the Cofán ideal of opa, which Michael Cepek (2008) has sug-
gested denotes the paradigmatic Cofán conception of the desirable. Opa is used 
equally to refer to a “satisfying” existence, a “happy” community, and a “good” 
person, while also (and perhaps above all) referring to a certain quality of col-
lective calmness, and freedom from fear. In the words of one of Cepek’s inform-
ants: “Opatssi means living without being timid or nervous. It means that you’ll 
be happy” (ibid.: 341). In my case, the Urarina word raotoha, or “delicious”—
which would seem to be part of the same semantic matrix—was in fact the very 
first Urarina word I ever learned, quite simply because it was the first word my 
hosts took it upon themselves to teach me, immediately after we shared our first 
meal. The singular importance of this moment will become clearer below, as we 
see precisely how the sociable enjoyment of food is integrated into the wider 
constellation of values that make life rich and worth living. 
Beyond the numerous semantic connections to morally worthy conditions 
and qualities, tranquility is associated with a range of other conditions necessary 
for living well, free of fear and stress, including good food and an abundance 
of game animals; good weather, especially sunshine, implying plenty of time 
remaining until the inevitable apocalypse; harmonious sociality, full of wit and 
good humor while avoiding heated emotions; and ample opportunities for the 
free and peaceful exercise of one’s skills in carrying out productive chores, espe-
cially tasks dedicated toward the satisfaction of the needs or desires of others, 
such that competence and concentrated exertion become an expression of con-
trol and self-mastery. Urarina conceptions of the good life are broader than any 
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straightforward concept of happiness would imply, and it is the former rather 
than the latter that they typically seem to strive for. Shamanic knowledge and 
power, for example, are extremely highly valued and widely sought after, but 
can only be obtained through stringent forms of discipline and self-denial, and 
often lead to a life full of suspicion and magical violence. There is a widespread 
sense in which “suffering” is seen as essential for obtaining certain benefits, in-
cluding especially bodily skills or forms of knowledge (see also High 2010: 758). 
Ultimately, perhaps we should say that happiness acquires meaning in relation 
to suffering, but that both may nevertheless figure as valued components of a 
more overarching conception of a purposeful life (see also the introduction to 
this collection). 
In a similar vein, it is also important to note that Urarina do not live tranquil 
lives all the time, free from anxiety and fear. On the contrary, their lives are all 
too often pervaded by hostility and envy, tension and resentment, and ongoing 
attempts to ward off dangers from all sides. In some cases, tranquility is will-
fully disrupted through the active pursuit of conflict or danger, the production 
of enmity, or engagement with a hostile exterior, which may also figure as an 
important and socially productive dynamic of Amazonian life (see, e.g., Overing 
1981; Viveiros de Castro 2001: 37–8). Tranquility is an ideal, a goal, achieved 
for periods of time, but never permanent, and it cannot be taken for granted. 
It is, importantly, not a natural state, but a collective achievement of people 
working well together: an immaterial product of people’s labor. It is conducive, 
in turn, to meaningful involvement in work and love, allowing these to come 
to the fore of daily experience, giving rise to lasting satisfaction and a sense 
of purpose. Achieving a state of tranquility opens up new horizons for action 
and is the condition of possibility of a life of meaning in which one is free to 
develop one’s capacities and to exercise virtues such as generosity, self-control, 
and respect for others. 
THE MASTERY OF WORK 
In contemplating our own ideal working lives, leisure time often seems to 
emerge as a central preoccupation. In his classic paper on “the original affluent 
society,” Marshall Sahlins (1968) claimed that hunter-gatherer societies had 
achieved an easy form of material wellbeing because their needs were few and 
easily met by just a few hours of work per day. Descola (1996) and others have 
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pursued similar arguments in an Amazonian context on the basis of meticulous 
measurements of time spent by both sexes in work as opposed to “leisure” activi-
ties. This kind of study arguably reflects a certain concern in the West with in-
creasing leisure time—a laudable goal, by all means, but one that can regrettably 
come to substitute for that of improving or transforming the work experience 
itself. It seems to me that Amazonians do not rigidly distinguish between work 
and free time, nor do they see leisure as the more enjoyable of the two. What 
better accounts for their “affluence,” if that is the right term, is the pleasure and 
satisfaction they find in their work, arising largely from the ways in which work 
itself is organized. As Overing has written apropos of the Venezuelan Piaroa, 
“The affluent community . . . was the one that could take into account on a daily 
level both flexibility in schedules of work and individual preferences for the spe-
cific tasks themselves . . . affluence was a matter of achieving personal comfort 
in work, and not of productive accumulation” (1989: 166).
Many basic work activities, such as gardening or gathering wild forest 
produce, are carried out in pairs or small groups. As the composition of these 
groups differs according to the task, specific social relationships can be activated 
or nurtured through the choice of activity. Moreover, insofar as Amazonian 
sociality routinely stretches beyond humankind to implicate a range of non-
human animals, plants, or spirits, successful engagement in many subsistence 
tasks can require management of these relationships in some form or another 
(e.g., through the performance of ritualized songs or chants). Given how inter-
personal relationships are consistently singled out as the most important factor 
in subjective wellbeing, we should perhaps not underestimate the importance 
of engaging with the living landscape intersubjectively, rather than as objective 
resources awaiting exploitation (Miles-Watson 2010). Such intersubjective rela-
tions with nonhumans are of course often highly unstable, and may be down-
right anxiety inducing, as noted above, further casting into relief the ideal of 
tranquility. When managed successfully, however, they may contribute to the 
sociability of productive life and perhaps even to that sense of immersion in a 
mesh of immanent mental processes that Gregory Bateson (1972) associates 
with the idea of grace. 
Another reason why people mostly enjoy their work seems to be that 
opportunities for action remain more or less equal to people’s capabilities, al-
lowing them to become immersed in their tasks, exercising their skills in a con-
centrated but relaxing way. An activity such as extracting timber, for instance, 
contains within it a universe of technical operations—clearing, felling, cutting, 
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rolling, tying, floating—each of which requires the mastery of a specific set 
of technical operations, thus offering considerable experiential diversity even 
within a “single” chore. This opportunity for the exercise of practical mastery is 
a key reason why the vast majority of Urarina find city life highly unsatisfac-
tory, even downright frustrating. After one prolonged period of idleness in the 
city, during which time he had done little but sit around in the old church in 
Iquitos where all Urarina are welcome to stay for free as long as they please, 
one man said to me, “I just can’t stand it anymore here. I want to go back to 
my work. In the city you can’t be tranquil.” Though it is not always achieved, 
people strive for a kind of rhythm while they work, such that even hard la-
bor—sometimes described as “suffering”—can still ultimately be experienced 
as satisfying. “Working in the field, you really suffer . . . but we live well,” as 
one person put it. 
This merging of action and awareness within daily activities resembles what 
psychologists have described as the experience of flow: “People become so in-
volved in what they are doing that the activity becomes spontaneous, almost 
automatic; they stop being aware of themselves as separate from the actions 
they are performing” (Csikszentmihályi 1992: 53). There is a sense of total con-
centration and focus, combined with relaxation and a sense of involvement or 
absorption in the task at hand. It is not the sense of being in control that people 
enjoy, but the sense of exercising control in difficult situations (ibid.: 61). The 
freedom to act on the need to create opens up possibilities of self-realization, 
and directs desires toward externalization through creation rather than the ac-
quisition of goods. As Hegel and Marx recognized, such creative work allows 
persons to know one another by externalizing themselves in an existence ori-
ented toward others. 
For this reason, I think, the prototype of “real work” is not wage labor. Thus 
when I once stopped briefly in an Urarina community and asked after the 
schoolteacher, who was a friend of mine, I was told simply, “He’s at his work.” 
My interlocutor clearly did not mean the school, which was deserted, despite it 
being a weekday. Instead, the implication was that he was out fishing or tend-
ing his garden, engaged in productive labor in order to meet the immediate 
needs of his loved ones. In engaging in such work, people typically have a wide 
range of tasks from which they are free to choose at will, and this “pluriactivity” 
(Gasché and Vela Mendoza 2012) is central to one’s ability to live well. People 
do what they feel like doing on any particular day, do it with whom they wish to 
socialize, and (with the partial exception of schoolteachers) rarely engage in the 
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same activity for more than a couple of days running—which is of course one 
reason why anything resembling long-term wage labor is steadfastly avoided by 
the majority. In Marxian terms, people manage to avoid any form of alienation 
from their labor or its products. 
Even short-term paid work is only temporarily attractive: when an oil com-
pany once began drilling in the area, for example, the company representative 
announced that there was work available and that people should turn up at the 
site each morning, ready to go. For a short while, the company was inundated 
each day by a sea of willing workers. But the numbers very quickly dwindled 
to a small trickle, and their performance on the job grew increasingly erratic. 
One day, I overheard the company representative exclaim in frustration to a 
colleague, “I can’t go on! I just can’t work with these people!” In a similar vein, 
when Urarina today enter temporarily into apparently hierarchical relationships 
with labor bosses, or patrones, they manage to do so largely on their own terms 
and always for limited periods of time. Indeed, while the system of habilitación 
is sometimes seen as exploitative, both by Urarina and by other outside observ-
ers, its intermittent nature allows it to fit in well with the flexible and varied 
schedules that most people prefer. 
INDIVIDUALITY AND STYLE 
That there is something resembling a consensus among Urarina on the basic re-
quirements of living well should not be taken to imply a homogeneity of values, 
or that there is little or no significant individual variation in life choices or goals. 
For some people, the desire for continuity with the ancestors exists alongside 
(or is even superseded by) a parallel desire for “progress,” to “be civilized,” to 
move away from the ancestors to the extent that the latter lived in what by some 
standards now appears as a state of savagery, ignorance, and violence. Such peo-
ple commonly extol the virtues of so-called “civilized” life in sedentary, orderly 
villages fashioned in accordance with the model of the Native Community set 
forth by the Peruvian government, complete with elected officials, a primary 
school, football field, communal first aid kit, and the like. Maintaining a com-
munity of this sort requires ongoing “collaboration” from its inhabitants, in vari-
ous ways, and this pressure can give rise to tensions, usually when those desiring 
progress seek to impose their vision on others by inducing them to contribute 
to common community projects.
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On the whole, however, differences in values do not give rise to conflicts, 
because of the pervasive emphasis on individual autonomy. People would rarely 
if ever dream of telling someone else what to do. Hence the general refusal to 
“read” or appear to know what is going on in the mind of another—an insist-
ence on mental opacity that appears to reflect people’s sensitivity to impinging 
on others’ self-determination (see Stasch 2008). The Urarina are not moralists 
who seek to impose a single view on all, and within the context of an over-
arching emphasis on tranquility, they recognize that good lives may take many 
different forms—at least up to a point—because lives are made good by the pos-
session of many different goods. These can be combined in many different ways, 
and perhaps even ranked in different orders of importance, depending on peo-
ple’s character and their social context, but because these can differ greatly, there 
cannot be a single blueprint of how one should live. It is perhaps less a matter 
of what is done than how something is done that leads to enjoyment in life: 
what Irving Goldman (1963), writing of the Amazonian Cubeo, has referred to 
as their “style of life.” According to Goldman, each social relationship for the 
Cubeo demanded a specific atmosphere of feelings, sentiments, and emotions: 
“Nothing of consequence can result from an act divorced from its proper mood” 
(ibid.: 253). Manufacture itself was a pleasurable recreation, and when the exer-
tion of some particularly strenuous task—such as housebuilding—broke “the 
spell of good feeling,” it was exchanged for another (ibid.: 66). Economic ex-
pansion or material advantage was of far less interest than emotional comfort or 
ease and personal autonomy. In the successful creation of a Cubeo community, 
Goldman suggested, its members had achieved a “spontaneity of correspond-
ence between emotion and action” (ibid.: 285, see also Overing 1989).
The concept of a style of life is useful in describing how people derive en-
joyment. Though the concept of style is most commonly understood as an aes-
thetic judgment, it can be used to characterize the moral aspect of some lives, as 
emerges from distinctive ways of acting. As the philosopher John Kekes points 
out, a good life is made enjoyable by pleasure derived from certain kinds of 
activities: from “actions done in the right way, from our rightful being, from the 
possession of a manner that confers merit, and from being the right manner of 
man. The enjoyments these ingredients of a good life provide are the result of 
one’s style of life, from how something is done, not what is done” (2008: 22). 
Styles of life reflect one’s attitude to life in general and to one’s own life in 
particular. Even though the Urarina may easily appear to an outside observer to 
be quite homogeneous in many ways, with relatively little variation in beliefs, 
279JOY WITHIN TRANQUILITY
attitudes, and behaviors, there is in fact—as everywhere—considerable scope 
for individual variation in attitudes and values, within the broader spectrum of 
possibilities recognized as valuable or legitimate in a particular cultural con-
text. Some men I knew, for example, would seek out a quiet, modest existence 
at some distance from other households, characterized by heightened levels of 
self-sufficiency and relatively free of material possessions; others would thrive 
on being at the center of social and political life in the most densely populated 
villages. Such life choices are equally good, and seen as such, provided that they 
accurately reflect what people most deeply care about, and that those leading 
such lives are in control, rather than at the mercy of necessity and contingency. 
If so, they exhibit a form of mastery of life that is both virtuous and inherently 
enjoyable. 
Not all Urarina, it should be said, enjoy the privilege of a successful or en-
joyable style of life. For example, one man I knew was virtually obsessed with 
his own political career, and with winning the countless minor feuds in which 
he constantly found himself embroiled wherever he went. He pursued victory 
by seeking to expand his power and influence, and for a while was convinced 
this would come with greater official (governmental) recognition as a citizen 
and legitimate authority in the community. Yet he was continually frustrated in 
these endeavors by his inability to negotiate the complex bureaucracy required 
by the Peruvian state to obtain even the simplest form of identity documents, 
such as a birth certificate. He did not seem to particularly enjoy his existence, 
on the whole, because his style of life comprised attitudes that were in some 
sense unrealistic, together with patterns of action that were not particularly 
successful, with the result that he was unable to live on his own terms. As an-
other of my collaborators once expressed it: “Wherever he goes, he just can’t 
live tranquilly.” 
Styles of life make corresponding actions characteristically and identifi-
ably the actions of particular individuals. People do what they do cheerfully, 
confidently, wholeheartedly, and so on; as Kekes (2008) puts it, it is as if their 
characteristic actions bear their personal stamp. Independence; wit and good 
humor; exuberance and wholeheartedness; the pursuit of knowledge; creativity; 
political achievement; compassion for others: all these and more may feature 
more or less prominently in Urarina people’s attitudes to life, informing their 
sensibilities, motivating their most important activities, eliciting their deepest 
emotions, providing a standard of judgment for evaluating what is good or bad 
and better or worse in their lives. To the extent that people’s attitudes, beliefs, 
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and emotions are consistent with each other, and consistently reflected in their 
actions, no matter what those actions may be, they have a style of life that re-
duces the extent to which they are at the mercy of necessity or contingency, and 
thus allows for an enjoyable feeling of control or mastery, similar to that derived 
from valued forms of labor. 
Free from fear and anxiety, in good health, people are thus encouraged to 
pursue their own conception of the good in their own way. This is a central 
component of Amazonian individualism, where self-determination is highly 
valued, but remains resolutely social at the same time, and, far from coming 
into conflict with the needs of a wider social group, often directly supports 
them. If the mastery of work allows for a feeling of autonomy and control, the 
practice of these techniques is nevertheless always aimed at satisfying the needs 
and desires of others, at improving their wellbeing. Thus, men master the art 
of hunting so that their wives and children can eat meat; women master the 
art of weaving so that their husbands and children can sleep well at night; and 
so on. Total self-sufficiency is never the aim; instead, balancing autonomy and 
desirable forms of dependency is always a central concern and a source of deep 
satisfaction. 
Tranquility (raotojoeein), then, as an enduring (though not permanent) at-
tribute of a group of intimates, usually close kin, would seem to be the outcome 
or product of certain kinds of action in the world, or work conducted in the 
right kind of way. As an achieved state of being that enriches lives and makes 
them valuable, it might usefully be construed in terms of Urarina conceptions 
of the common good. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009) point out, 
the notion of the commons refers to such environmental resources as land and 
water, but equally (and, in the modern West, increasingly) to the results of 
human labor and creativity, in the form of ideas, languages, knowledge, codes, 
affects, and so on. Refusing any rigid distinction between the “natural” and 
“artificial” commons, these authors argue that under what they term biopoliti-
cal production, what is ultimately produced is not simply objects for subjects, 
but subjects for objects, or forms of subjectivity itself: the object of production, 
in other words, is a subject defined by a social relationship or a form of life. 
Tranquility, I suggest, might be considered as precisely such a form of life. Such 
a construal does not imply homogeneity, nor is it at odds with the emphasis 
on individuality as revealed through a style of life. As Hardt and Negri make 
clear, far from negating difference, the common brings with it an affirmation 
of singularities. 
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THE RETURNED HUNTER 
I now want to turn from these long-term senses of tranquility, as part of the 
commons and an aspect of people’s lives as a whole, to a more short-term sense 
of “feeling good.” To refer to this latter state, Urarina may use the expression 
rachojoiha, “to be happy,” which can refer to any scenario of momentary joy: As 
one man told me once: “When my son Jorge was born, I was so happy (rachojoi-
ano). Before that I only had daughters. But you know, sometimes fathers want to 
have sons, to accompany them and help them with their work. And son-in-law 
isn’t the same.” Another man said: “I’m happy when my family arrives, when 
my son comes to visit, and sleep in the house, and stays here a while.” Other 
moments of joy would include the baptism of a child, or drunken dancing at 
a party (or, better still, both at once: “Baptizing a child makes people dance 
with enthusiasm!”). We may note that such moments, pregnant with possibil-
ity, imply a state of arousal or excitement, and are also best shared with others, 
or held in common, in which the positive affect is not easily reducible to indi-
vidual experience. Yet when I began asking a range of different people to give 
me an example of a time in their own lives when they felt “happy,” I was curi-
ous to find that many independently offered, by way of example, the moment 
of seeing someone returning to the community having just slain a large game 
animal, knowing that they would soon all eat together. In fact, for many people, 
this apparently straightforward scenario seemed to epitomize or exemplify the 
Urarina conception of happiness. As such, I wish to spend a moment exploring 
it further, elucidating its components. 
To begin with, it is noteworthy that the experience singled out as happy is 
not the straightforward gratification of the senses through the process of eat-
ing, or even the sight of one’s children taking pleasure in this way. It is instead 
an anticipation of that moment, while it still exists in the future as something 
to look forward to. The reasons for this, I think, will soon become apparent. 
Secondly, given the enjoyment that comes from practical mastery in general and 
from hunting in particular, it is of interest that no one, not even men who were 
accomplished hunters, gave as an example of happiness their own returning to 
the village with an animal. There can be no doubt that hunting is considered 
great fun, and I have seen little among Urarina to compare with the adrenalin 
and excitement that comes from spotting and pursuing potential prey. Similarly, 
though they always make efforts to appear low key and implacable, and would 
never dream of boasting, returning hunters must feel a real surge of pride at 
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their success and the happiness they bring to others. But active excitement, the 
rush of blood and the frenzy of pursuit—like immediate sensory gratification—
did not seem to encapsulate real happiness as well or as fully as the more passive 
but morally loaded state of anticipation of a pleasurable moment shared with 
others in which need is alleviated. 
The importance of food—or, more specifically, the importance of satisfying 
people’s desires for food—has been demonstrated by Gow (1991) to be central 
to the functioning of the subsistence economy. Piro people find the sight of a 
child eating earth, and thus satisfying its own desires, to be intensely disturb-
ing. Yet there is a broader context to the scene of the returned hunter, in the 
sense that Urarina believe that game animals were placed on the earth by the 
divine Creator (Cana Coaaunera), for their nourishment. Animals are divine 
gifts that manifest the Creator’s concern for humankind, and His pity for those 
in His care: proof of His active, caring presence. While a scarcity of game is a 
sign that all is not well—that humans have been forsaken or the apocalypse is 
near—finding and killing an animal conversely implies that the Creator is look-
ing kindly upon His children, who live “under His watchful eye” (notaracae), as 
people sometimes put it. At these times, not only those humans who will eat feel 
happy: I often heard it said that pet birds, for example, know in advance when a 
hunter will return to the village, knowledge they communicate to their human 
owners by “dancing” and “jumping for joy,” throwing dry grass up into the air. 
Yet to overemphasize the cosmological dimensions of this moment would 
risk obscuring its phenomenological aspects, the importance of which become 
clear when one has lived in this way for a period of time and experienced first-
hand this very moment. One of the greatest difficulties I faced in adjusting to 
life in the jungle was adapting to the highly erratic food supply. I generally 
made an effort to eat as and when others did, and this often meant long periods 
of time, sometimes a day or more, subsisting on little more than warm banana 
drink, which, as Urarina say, “deceives the stomach” but never really satiates. 
Hunger for meat would begin to dominate my thoughts, even as my belly was 
kept full by watery banana, and I began to devote more and more time to think-
ing about my next meal and where it might come from. I suspect others were 
often in a similar situation, which is why a hunter would usually set out into 
the forest on the stated grounds that his wife or children were desperate to eat 
meat. It is in this context, too, that we must place the sight of his successful 
return, animal in hand: an immediate relief from anxiety about the food supply, 
and an anticipated relief from hunger. This sense of relief brings with it a feeling 
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of lightness, an easing of burdens, and a sense that one is being taken care of, 
looked after. In such moments, life is truly good. 
It is worth spending some time on what happens next, for while sharing 
food has very often been discussed by anthropologists from a conceptual stand-
point in terms of the creation of kinship through shared bodily substance, very 
few have explored it from the point of view of what it actually feels like for one 
doing the eating. In Amazonia at least, this has arguably led to an excessive 
focus on consubstantiality and the body at the expense of the emotional and 
affective dimensions of sharing a meal. The returned hunter is not a guaranteed 
positive experience, and can sometimes evoke anxiety as it is not always certain 
that one will be invited to eat or given a share. Being denied an invitation can 
easily cause offense, though, which is why the hunter and his family will usually 
be quite discreet, and as secretive as possible, if they are not planning on sharing 
with everyone in the vicinity. For this reason, perhaps, the truly happy sight is 
of an animal sufficiently large, say a peccary or tapir, that one can be sure of not 
being overlooked, avoiding the added discomfort and indignity of growing still 
hungrier while others eat. 
Hospitality and generosity are central to what comes next. The animal as a 
whole is a gift from the Creator, but as meat, raw or cooked, it takes the form 
of gifts from the hunter and his wife to neighbors and loved ones. Sometimes 
cuts of raw meat are given, but more commonly a large, thick soup (corerajaa) 
is made, from which everyone shares. The men of the village come together to 
eat at the house of the hunter, whose wife sends their children with portions for 
neighboring wives and children who stay in their homes. People eat only what 
they have been offered to eat, such that food sharing forms part of a hospitable 
exchange that will be reciprocated in the future. Hence the distinction between 
human eating (lenoniha) and animal feeding (quiha), which so many languages 
seem to make. Eating a meal together in the human style is an inherently hu-
manizing activity, much as eating foods such as game animals designated for 
humans is at the heart of what distinguishes humans from other kinds of be-
ing—hence, for example, mythical accounts of transformation into animal form 
often describe the foods eaten (berries, leaves, grass) as the hallmarks of nonhu-
man existence.1 
1. In Urarina, it is possible to say that humans “feed” (quiha), just as it is in English, 
but it sounds odd or amusing.
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The moment of eating itself involves the stimulation and satisfaction of all 
the senses. Usually no condiments or flavorings are used other than salt, with 
the result that the flavor of the meat itself is very important. There is all the 
difference in the world between different species of animal, but while many 
people have their favorites, they would not mention this while eating, as this 
could seem ungrateful. Similarly, children always eat what they are given, with-
out complaint; any hint of refusing food is met with extreme scorn. Eating is 
relaxing, an excuse to take a break from what one might have been doing, and 
sometimes to withdraw in a way, though eating is also, and perhaps more com-
monly, an excuse to enter into sociality. Women typically eat with their children, 
while men especially eat with other men, using this as an opportunity to sit 
together and talk, and this liminal phase approaches what Turner (1969) would 
have called “communitas.” At the conclusion of a meal, a few words are said by 
the host to each guest in turn, and a short speech is made of thanksgiving to 
the Creator. 
A good meal is prepared such that everyone eats his or her fill and is left 
with the slight heaviness that comes of a full belly, associated with a real sense 
of satiation and a readiness to relax. Eating well thus makes it easier to achieve a 
state of tranquility. Yet if we examine this feeling of satisfaction more closely, or 
more specifically our experience of moving past satisfaction from one activity to 
another, it becomes apparent that this is more than simply a moment of closure 
or fulfillment. One never becomes specifically aware of moving past fullness to 
emptiness, or from absence to presence. As phenomenologists have pointed out, 
the feeling of satisfaction does not mean an absolute limit has been reached, so 
much as that a new horizon has opened to us: we reach the threshold of one 
particular engagement with the world and enter into another ( Jager 1999). We 
notice a shift in our attention, a turn in our interest, and the opening up of a 
new path that invites our exploration. In other words, “to be satisfied” means to 
give in to a new adventure and to approach the world from a different angle. 
There is a strong sense of flow here, in other words, such that the moment of 
joy is anything but cut off from the rhythms of social life which encompass it, 
as anticipation gives way to satiety while opening up new horizons of activity. 
The returning hunter thus precipitates a cycle of desire and satisfaction, in 
which the shared quality of the experience is crucial. Rather like enjoying a great 
view, there is a sense of shame or loss if one cannot share the experience with 
another, and shared experience is often, I suspect, more highly valued than indi-
vidual experience. It is not a static moment, and does not simply end in satiety. 
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While it certainly alleviates the anxieties that surround an uncertain food sup-
ply, thus paving the way for a state of tranquility, it also leads to an opening 
up of horizons, of new possibilities, in a continuous dynamic movement that 
orients daily life. The returned hunter might indeed be considered an example 
of what Mauss ([1925] 2002) termed a “total social fact,” a unifying event or a 
symbol of core social values that integrates all aspects of Urarina life, economic, 
moral, religious, and aesthetic; at once eminently sensory, social, and cosmologi-
cal. It brings together the values and practices that, taken together, comprise 
the Urarina vision of the good life, and condenses these into a short-lived but 
multifaceted and dynamic subjective experience that lies at the heart of their 
conception of happiness. 
CONCLUSION 
A distinction between short-term, affective or hedonic conceptions of happi-
ness that emphasize satisfaction or “feeling good,” and long-term, objective or 
eudaimonic conceptions of happiness that stress self-actualization, a life of vir-
tue, and a wider sense of “flourishing,” has pervaded Western thinking on the 
subject for millennia. While there is a growing sense that focusing on one of 
these contrastive aspects of happiness to the exclusion of the other is prob-
lematic, and that integrating them is necessary (e.g., Tomer 2011), exactly how 
they do or should inform people’s life goals and motivations in differing cul-
tural contexts remains unclear, as does the nature of the relationship between 
them. How does momentary pleasure, in short, involving enjoyable and positive 
experiences, relate to active involvement or engagement in life and all that it 
requires, and to having a higher purpose, a meaningful life? In seeking to answer 
this question for the Peruvian Urarina, I have shown how they manage two 
interrelated concepts of happiness, one of which is long term and is epitomised 
by a state of “tranquility”; the other of which is short term and is epitomized by 
the joyous sight of the successful hunter returned from the forest. These are not 
opposed concepts; in fact they imply each other in several ways. Interestingly, 
some similar distinctions appear to be made by at least some other Amazonian 
peoples: one is reminded of the distinction Piro people make between “having 
a good time, having a festival” and “living well, living quietly” (Gow 2000); as 
well as the contrast drawn by the Trio between onken, the condition of every-
day contentment that implies calmness and quiet, and sasame, a more climactic 
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state of ritual happiness, exemplified by joyous, collective dancing (Rivière 2000: 
257). According to Peter Rivière, the latter might be understood as a kind of 
“aesthetic intensification” of the former.2 
The Urarina concept of “tranquility” (raotojoeein) is central to their sense of 
a life well lived, and perhaps even more than short-term pleasure is a goal or 
ideal for which they actively strive. It must be understood, in the first instance, 
in relation to the uncertainty, danger, and violence that provide the backdrop of 
everyday sociality. In some ways, it recalls certain other, better-known concepts 
of happiness as tranquility, such as the ancient Greek concept of ataraxia, which 
is often described as a lucid state of robust tranquility, characterized by ongo-
ing freedom from distress and worry. According to Epicurus, one reaches the 
pleasant state of tranquility by realizing that there are only a handful of desires 
that must be fulfilled in order to lead a pleasant life, and that those can easily be 
satisfied. Epicurean tranquility is “a state of contentment and inner calm that 
arises from the thought that one has or can easily get all that one needs, and has 
no reason to be afraid of anything in the future” (Striker 1990: 100).3 
The Urarina sense of tranquility differs significantly from this emphasis on 
imperturbability, and from the Stoics’ indifference to everything bodily or exter-
nal, and consequent freedom from emotion (apatheia). For Urarina, tranquility 
is more an external condition, one that necessarily involves others, and it im-
plies emotional engagement and spontaneity. It is the grounds from which an 
enjoyable but also virtuous life becomes possible, a collective resource, part of 
the immaterial commons. A state in which, to a casual outside observer, little 
seems to happen, it can easily seem rather boring, even if this boredom is recog-
nized to be a purposive achievement, a space of calm carved out within a hostile 
2. According to Rivière, sasame means “happy” in its simplest sense, but also has a 
deeper meaning that “implies a sense of inner contentment and the feeling of 
belonging not only to society but to the whole of nature and the universe” (ibid.: 
254).
3. For Pyrrho and his followers in particular, tranquility was also closely linked to 
suspension of judgment concerning the true nature or essence of things. The things 
of the world are ultimately unfathomable and unknowable, and refusing to trust in 
our senses or judgments, especially as concerns goods and evils, is the best way to 
avoid anxiety and achieve peace of mind (Striker 1990: 102–4) . It is tempting to 
speculate whether the “highly transformational world” of native Amazonians, in 
which, as Rivière put it, “it is never entirely safe to believe the evidence of your own 
eyes” (1994: 261), might similarly be an attitude of skepticism, though it scarcely in 
this case seems conducive to tranquility.
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cosmos pervaded by danger. Yet a quiet, calm but profound sense of enjoyment 
may be derived from going about one’s tasks in the right kind of way, in accord-
ance with one’s attitudes to life, and I would suggest that the boredom of the 
anthropologist is directly proportional to his or her lack of practical mastery, a 
failure to develop the skills required to achieve small but meaningful goals from 
the materials at hand, and an inability to recognize opportunities for action and 
interaction. The only time I ever heard Urarina describe themselves as “bored” 
was when they were in the city, a place with few meaningful opportunities for 
the exercise of skill, and little if any available work that allows people to express 
their freedom and creativity. Work in the city for them was a drudgery, involving 
specialized routine tasks performed day in, day out, ad infinitum. Boredom, in 
short, is possible only in the absence of tranquility. 
In their preferred forest environment, by contrast, work is freely chosen, flex-
ible, and diverse. A happy, tranquil life is the result of creative activity developing 
in multiple directions, and where economic production just one form among oth-
ers. Activity is not merely a means adapted to certain ends; it is an end in itself. 
People literally “do one thing today and another tomorrow,” to invoke Marx and 
Engels’ well-known (if half-joking) description of a nonalienated society, in which 
one might “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticize after dinner . . . without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or 
critic.” ([1845–6] 1970: 53)4 Through their work, which ideally becomes a free 
expression of their life, people affirm themselves as well as those nearby who use 
or enjoy what they produce, whose needs they satisfy, and who in turn complete 
and confirm the worker in their thoughts and love. This kind of work is thus 
inherently communal, even when performed alone. The flexibility and nonalien-
ated character of work encourage people to focus on the activity at hand, allowing 
themselves to be absorbed into or lost in the interaction. This experience of flow is 
valuable precisely because of the way it steers a middle course between boredom 
and anxiety. Challenges are perceived not as threats, but as opportunities for ac-
tion; put differently, goals and challenges imply each other, allowing people to 
achieve a feeling of control. Getting to this point requires discipline and determi-
nation, and does not come naturally. Over and above the material goods that are 
perhaps the most obvious outcome, such work is also directly responsible for the 
4. Alternatively, as Marx expressed the idea in an unpublished notebook: “The very 
activity of his work would enable him to enjoy his personality and realise his natural 
capacity and spiritual aims” (cited in McLellan 1969: 464). 
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production of those immaterial commons—affects, social relationships, forms of 
life—that are conveniently captured in the notion of tranquility. 
The condition of tranquility allows people to act consistently and in accord-
ance with their attitudes to life, their beliefs and emotions forming a harmoni-
ous whole. This means acting for others as much as for oneself, contributing 
to their wellbeing, exercising the virtues of hard work and generosity. Practical 
mastery in work is inextricably linked to fostering relatedness with others. In 
fact, these are mutually reinforcing: people work to meet the needs of their loved 
ones, but are loved in turn, respected by their spouse and family, because they 
work hard. Hence Rosa’s account of her marriage to Lucho: “I’m happy with my 
husband because he works well. . . . Because of this, nothing ever happens.” In its 
ideal, the entirety of life is transformed into a kind of single activity with unified 
goals that provide a constant sense of purpose. When thoughts, feelings, and 
actions are congruent with one another, when boredom and anxiety are absent, 
people find in themselves an admirable strength and serenity. 
Within this broader state of tranquility (raotojoeein) arise fleeting moments 
of joy (rachojoiha), epitomized by the scene of the returned hunter. At first glance, 
the difference between joy and tranquility appears to correspond to a difference 
between subjective and objective conceptions of happiness, or between the posi-
tive affective state of feeling good and the objective conditions of the good life, 
which include scope for self-actualization and the practice of virtue. Yet I have 
argued instead that the difference lies more in the fact that the momentary ex-
perience of joy, in its purest form, is a crystallization and intensification of all the 
ingredients that make up the good life, allowing for a harmony between sensory 
pleasure or gratification, and moral, virtuous living with and through others. 
Pleasure is effectively a measure for judging moral goodness, as delight is taken 
in actions perceived to be worthy. This does not mean that tranquility can be re-
duced to joy, or vice versa, nor does it mean that there can be a single standard of 
hedonic value through which all forms of the good may be evaluated. It points 
instead to a different kind of achievement: the ability to find enjoyment in those 
fleeting moments in life that integrate one’s convictions of the good. 
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afterword
On happiness, values, and time
The long and the short of it
Joel Robbins
This collection on the values of happiness in part responds to the fact that hap-
piness has made a major push recently to move itself up in the Euro-American 
hierarchy of values. Bhutan got there first, of course, but at the currently very 
busy crossroads of psychology, economics, and policy discourse, some Euro-
American elites are lobbying hard to get happiness to the top of their own 
countries’ evaluative charts. In a social critical mood, it is hard not to find all of 
this interest in happiness a little disappointing. One remembers almost wist-
fully the early years of the recent recession, when many people voiced the hope 
that the devastation the financial crisis was wreaking would finally provide an 
opening to reconsider the stark neoliberal version of the value of individualism 
that had until that moment seemingly become so entrenched as to be beyond 
challenge. Then the energy and rapid initial spread of the Occupy Movement 
appeared poised to go some way toward making this hope for a real effort at 
value change seem realistic. If the only innovation we end up with out of this 
ferment, at least on the elite academic and policy levels, is a concern with “nudg-
ing” us toward happiness regardless of the state of the world around us, one has 
to wonder how much will really have changed (Davies 2015).
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It is also hard to imagine that the current vogue for happiness will not pass 
rather quickly. One expects that either the global economy will make stronger 
moves toward recovery and neoliberal individualism will confidently stride back 
to the very center of our value concerns (it is surely already taking giant steps 
in this direction, and it never had a long way to go to get there in any case), 
or things will get worse and happiness will come to look like too flimsy a goal 
to pursue by way of fixing them. Thus it is a relief that this collection, in both 
conception and realization, does not stake everything on happiness, and does 
not address only what Ross Abbinnett (2013: 32) calls the “neo-utilitarianism” 
at the heart of recently emergent versions of the science of happiness, but also 
responds to the resurgence of anthropological interest in the study of values 
(e.g., Graeber 2001; Pedersen 2008; Otto and Willerslev 2013). The ultimate 
goal of this afterword is to work along with the articles collected here to trace 
out some of the threads that tie discussions of happiness and of values to one 
another. In pursuit of that goal, I will push further some theoretical sugges-
tions made in the articles, and put forward a few arguments of my own that 
build on them. But before I get to work on this, I also want to respond to the 
unusually ethnographically creative and compelling quality of most of the arti-
cles by making some observations about some aspects of what it means to take 
on happiness as an ethnographic object (or set of different objects). As Sara 
Ahmed (2010: 15) puts it in her book The promise of happiness, a work many of 
the contributors here cite, it is worth asking not only what happiness is, but also 
“what it does.” In that spirit, I want to start by asking what happiness does to 
ethnography and ethnographic writing. As we will see, answering this question 
will lead us onward toward more theoretical concerns. 
HAPPINESS: THE LONG AND THE SHORT OF IT
One thing that is striking about many of the articles collected here is that they 
show that a focus on happiness somewhat reworks the standard ethnographic 
construction of time. Borrowing an element of Jason Throop’s elegant phenom-
enological description of the nature of happiness, an element Ahmed (2010) 
also elaborates, happiness as a modality of engagement with the world brings its 
own horizon(s) to bear on the way we understand what we encounter, and it is 
clear that this horizon or these horizons have informed to productive effect the 
way many of the ethnographic accounts collected here approach time.
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Put straightforwardly, many of contributors to this collection are concerned 
either with intense moments of experienced happiness or with people’s reckon-
ing of their own or others’ happiness over long spans of time. Some of them also 
take up the relationship between these two temporalities of happiness. So Dena 
Freeman shows us how Gamo Highlanders of Southern Ethiopia once aimed 
for the long-term pleasures of living with smooth social relations but have re-
cently switched to seeking the strong momentary highs of Pentecostal ritual. In 
studying Bangladeshi migration to London, Katy Gardner similarly counter-
poses the “emotional high” that migration promises the would-be migrant will 
feel on arrival at a new home to the way in which family projects that involve 
migration for some members aim at “wellbeing” or “the good life”” as a much 
“longer-term” reward. Iza Kavedžija shows us that the elderly Japanese people 
she studies explicitly seek to balance pleasures of the present moment with the 
construction of narrative coherence across the life-course, while Harry Walker 
finds the Amazonian Urarina representing all that goes into defining a life well 
lived over time in their joyful response to the sight of a successful hunter re-
turning to the village with a lot of game in hand. Finally, following what should 
by now begin to look like a pattern, Charles Stafford, working in China and 
Taiwan, compares families motivated by goals of long-term economic better-
ment with those who have opted for the rather narrower time horizon of the 
pleasures of decadence.
Even the ethnographic phenomena and accounts presented here that are not 
built on some or other opposition between long-term and short-term pleasures 
situate themselves at one extreme or the other. Thus we can contrast Throop’s 
discussion of the Yapese concern that happiness narrows a person’s temporal 
(and social horizons) too drastically with Michael Lambek’s analytic decision 
in his study of one version of Swiss happiness to take as “the unit of happiness 
not a statement, bodily expression, or feeling, but a life.” And in a related twist, 
Henrik Vigh builds his discussion of the motives that lead young Bissauan men 
to join a rather millitarily weak militia around the notion that these men vol-
unteer out of a sense that it is worth trading short-term experiences of violence 
for the possibility of living out long lives of secure, happy social involvement
Even in an afterword, it is probably not good practice for a writer to over-
load two consecutive paragraphs with as much diverse ethnographic material as 
I just have. But I am hoping that the kaleidoscopic near-repetition of concerns 
with either or both the present instant and the very long term in sentence after 
sentence above can help me make in quite concrete terms my point that once 
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anthropologists start to write about happiness, something interesting happens 
to the way they engage time. One might say that most ethnographic writing, 
whether phrased in the ethnographic present or not, at least implicitly con-
structs a kind of thick temporal middle ground between the moment and the 
long-term horizon. This is the temporal middle of routine actions and their 
expected consequences, of getting things done, of everyday social reproduction, 
and of, we might say, succeeding more or less at being a “normal” person of 
a certain social type living a “normal” life in local terms. In ethnographic ac-
counts set in this temporal middle, time recedes into the analytic background, 
and it rarely appears as an important aspect of the motives that ethnographers 
demonstrate or imply drive the actions of those they are studying. But when it 
comes to studying happiness, this temporal middle does not appear to provide 
an adequate framework for ethnographic discussion. Gardner’s and Stafford’s 
articles, for example, stand out against the general run of ethnographic writ-
ing for the way their considerations of happiness allow them to integrate long, 
two or more generation time-spans and diverse temporal perspectives into their 
descriptions of what Stafford elegantly calls the “intergenerational coordination 
of goals and intentions.” Most of the other pieces offer us detailed accounts of 
the way actors draw on culturally available materials to help them work out 
the relationship between living for or nonreflexively engaging in the moment 
and, by contrast, working toward longer-term projects thought to lead to the 
achievement of something like a good life. I would suggest that such compli-
cated considerations of time are part of what makes these articles so fresh, and 
that this concern with the temporal lends these pieces a deep coherence beyond 
that which follows from the fact that they all focus on happiness.
To this point, I have wanted to make a descriptive claim: the articles col-
lected here, all of which take happiness under one definition or another as their 
object, crowd around the ends of the temporal continuum upon which human 
lives are lived, and very few of them dwell much in the temporal middle that 
so commonly provides the setting of ethnographic work. Furthermore, many 
of the contributors also tell us that one of the projects that is important to the 
people they study is finding some way to relate the momentary and the long-
term versions of happiness, or to decide how much energy they should devote to 
seeking each type. Staying on the descriptive level here, I would also note that 
the activity of work appears in a number of the articles as a practice that ideally 
relates these two modalities of happiness. Throop, for example, notes that the 
Yapese, often suspicious of happiness as too individualizing in its effects, still 
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find it morally appropriate to take pleasure in work. The Urarina, Walker tells us, 
likewise find nonalienated labor productive of the momentary pleasure they call 
“joy” as well as the long-term tranquility that marks the good life. In Freeman’s 
account, it is changing labor relations that in part account for the reorientation 
of Gamo approaches to happiness that she charts. We might say that work is 
usually by its nature an activity viscerally experienced in the present but also 
oriented to future goals. When people enjoy it in the moment, then, they never 
wholly lose sight of the longer term. Perhaps this is what gives work the ability 
to bind together the kinds of times to which happiness is relevant. Unlike work, 
sex only makes a few appearances in these articles (perhaps surprisingly in a 
collection on happiness). But in Vigh’s discussion of it, the ability to engage in 
sexual relations assures young Bissauan men of the true social belonging they 
value, and so sex turns out, like work, to provide momentary pleasures without 
completely occluding long-term goods.
I consider the points I have just discussed to be some of the findings of these 
articles taken as a set: happiness in a wide range of diverse cultural settings ap-
pears to come in momentary and long-term forms, and people frequently feel 
themselves challenged to construct some relationship between them. Work and, 
maybe, sex stand out as activities that have been attractive to people living in 
some cultural settings for their ability to link these two temporalities of hap-
piness. Simply figuring this much out in empirical terms is worth the price of 
admission here, especially since I, at least, have not seen these kinds of points 
made anywhere else. But findings are not theories, and so a crucial next step is 
to think about ways to get some theoretical purchase on the varied temporalities 
of happiness that these articles lay out. I want to suggest in what follows that 
turning to the question of values can help us in this endeavor.
I recognize that it might at first glance appear that, taken together, the arti-
cles already lay out a theoretical approach to the issue at hand, rendering a turn 
to the discussion of values superfluous. This appearance rests on the way that 
some of the contributors turn to the classic philosophical distinction between 
hedonism and eudaimonia to shape up the opposition between momentary and 
long-term happiness. This works well in many of the articles, but it is impor-
tant to recognize that in itself this distinction does not constitute a theory of 
happiness per se but rather a classificatory device for distinguishing between 
different kinds of the purported phenonemena. Even when we draw on this 
philosophical distinction, we still have theoretical work to do. And the wager of 
the approach I will be taking here is that doing this work in anthropological and 
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sociological terms, rather than in philosophical ones, may help us reach some 
new destinations in our thinking about happiness.
I should also note that difficulties for any theory of happiness arise for the 
fact that when confronted with its momentary and long-term temporalities, 
particularly when they are construed by means of the hedonism/eudaimonia 
distinction, it is fair to wonder whether happiness is not more than one kind of 
thing. Perhaps hedonism has to do with something like a feeling of joy, while 
eudaimonia is about a feeling of contentment. Or maybe eudaimonia is not 
about a feeling at all, but more about a culturally informed judgment on the 
nature of a particular life. In light of similar concerns, the philosopher Dan 
Haybron (2011: 3) suggests that philosophers have long pointed to, and of-
ten conflated, two distinct things in their discussions of happiness: “a state of 
mind” and “a life that goes well for the person living it.” I bring this up because 
in reading the articles in this collection is it hard not to wonder whether if in 
fact the contributors do routinely conflate two different things under the term 
“happiness,” then there is something confused at the very heart of the attempt 
to have an anthropology of happiness, and particularly one that relates happi-
ness to values, that encompasses them both. Haybron, for his part, finds that it 
is only the “life going well” kind of happiness that is clearly about values, since 
“to ascribe happiness” in this sense “is to make a value judgment: namely, that 
the person has whatever it is that benefits a person” (ibid.: 4, emphasis removed). 
In response to this problem, I want to take a different tack and suggest that 
through the articles collected here, perhaps we can find a core element shared by 
these two kinds of happiness, and that this core has crucially to do with the way 
both kinds of happiness involve values. This is where my argument is headed.
EFFERVESCENCE, VALUE, AND EMOTION 
What is the relationship between happiness and values? There are a number of 
ways one could approach answering this question. In this section, I want to take 
one that leads through the work of Émile Durkheim and which thus deploys 
materials with which anthropologists have long been familiar.
To accept values as a central theoretical concern means to follow James 
Laidlaw (2013: 60) in defining human beings as profoundly “evaluative” crea-
tures and to agree with the philosopher Józef Tischner (2008: 50) that “our world 
is a hierarchically ordered world and our thinking, a preferential thinking.” But 
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even when we have gone only this far in thinking about values, we confront a 
problem that has beset the scholarly debate about values ever since it began to 
take something like its current shape in the nineteenth century (for a brief his-
tory, see Schnädelbach 1984): Are values essentially subjective, such that we as 
Laidlaw-like evaluative creatures add them to the world, or are they objective, 
in the sense that they are qualities of Tischner’s hierarchically ordered world 
taken on its own terms? Is this not in some ways analogous to our problem of 
two kinds of happiness (each with its own distinct temporality)? Does not the 
hedonic, in-the-moment kind of happiness appear to be wholly subjective, and 
does not the eudaimoniac, life-span version of happiness, even if we can imagine 
it might find subjective expression in a feeling like contentment, seem ineradi-
cably to involve some kind of “objective” or at least socially shared and stable 
judgment on what it means to live a good life?1 The fact that this problematic of 
plausibly being considered both subjective and objective is shared by values and 
happiness alike is, I think, a clue that values and happiness are related and that 
examining them together can enrich our understanding of both.
Let us start with values. In the history of philosophy and the human sciences 
more generally, there are many answers to the question of whether value is a 
subjective or an objective phenomenon, and there are strong arguments on ei-
ther side. There is no space to review much of this debate here. But as it happens, 
Durkheim took it up in a lecture entitled “Value judgments and judgments 
1. A reviewer of this article took issue with this point, suggesting that if we take 
happiness only to be a feeling, then one can have “long-term happiness” as long as 
one feels such happiness, regardless of whether one realizes socially shared values 
or not—even mass murderers, on this argument, can have happy lives. I would not 
want to suggest that it is impossible to argue for this position, but I would point 
out that the position I am taking here is not idiosyncratic. It is often taken by 
philosophers interested both in happiness and in values. To refer to just two very 
recent examples, Roberts (2015) considers this very issue and argues for a position 
like the one I have argued for here, while May (2015) makes a strong argument 
for the need for values to be objective or socially shared if the realization of them 
is to contribute to a meaningful life (see also the quotation from and discussion of 
Durkheim immediately below in the main text, for his own grappling with some 
related issues). This reviewer is more generally worried that in connecting happiness 
to values, I fail to define happiness as only a feeling. I am not sure I would want to 
restrict the meaning of “happiness” in this way in any case—I have already noted that 
I take “happiness” to be a complex term—but I would point out that I do intend the 
following discussion of Durkheim’s work to offer a novel way of connecting short-
term and long-term happiness by tying them both to the experience (emotion?) of 
what Durkheim calls effervescence.
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of reality” given in 1911, just before publishing his great book on religion (in 
English the lecture appears in Durkheim [1924] 1974 and the religion book as 
Durkheim [1912] 1995). As he puts the problem:
One the one hand, all value presupposes appreciation by an individual in relation 
with a particular sensibility. What has value is in some way good; what is good is 
desired, and all desire is a psychological state. Nevertheless the values under dis-
cussion have the objectivity of things. How can these two characteristics, which 
at first blush appear contradictory, be reconciled? How, in fact, can a state of feel-
ing be independent of the subject that feels it? (Durkheim [1924] 1974: 81–82)
As we might expect, especially if we are familiar with the Introduction to the 
Elementary forms, by drawing on his notions of social facts, shared representa-
tions, and effervescence, Durkheim finds an answer to this question that lets 
him have it both ways.
Durkheim begins by arguing that the value of something emerges when it is 
placed into relation with an “ideal” (ibid.: 90). Or, as he puts it somewhat more 
clearly, “value derives from the relation of things to different aspects of the ideal” 
(ibid.: 94). “Since ideals and their corresponding value systems vary with various 
human groups,” Durkheim continues in a vein that should be a comfortable one 
for anthropologists, “does this not suggest a collective origin for both?” Turning 
then to an argument that will become very well known through the versions 
of it that appear in the Elementary forms, he suggests that sentiments that are 
shared among members of a social group have more “energy” than purely indi-
vidual ones and thus appear to subjects as ideal ones by contrast to their more 
personal, less obviously shared “real” ones. Durkheim goes on to add that such 
powerful, shared sentiments and the ideals they produce arise in moments of 
“collective ferment” (ibid.: 91). Once created in such moments, these ideals are 
invested in concrete objects and shared concepts that allow them to be continu-
ally apprehended, even outside of moments of collective enthusiasm (ibid.: 94). 
In this way, things in the world come to be related to ideals, and thus to have 
value, and values come at once to be in us, as experiences and recollections of 
collective ferment, and to transcend us, as things in the world that we feel have 
a value of their own.
In the Elementary forms, the argument we have been tracing appears in a 
modified version as an account of how moments of collective “effervescence” 
produced by ritual elevate individuals, making them feel they are more than 
301ON HAPPINESS, VALUES, AND TIME
themselves and in touch with an external power greater than their own, and 
thereby give rise to the notions of religion and the sacred, which are in fact sim-
ply representations of the force of collectivity (society) itself (Durkheim [1912] 
1995: 220). I have gone back to Durkheim’s slightly earlier and less often dis-
cussed text because there this argument appears not as one primarily about the 
origin and nature of the sacred, but rather as one about the roots of ideals and 
values. Values and the sacred are surely not unrelated in Durkheim’s thought, 
but I want to focus on the values argument here.
In particular, I want to suggest that we take Durkheim’s feeling of efferves-
cence as at least the paradigm case of what the contributors to this collection 
treat as happiness in the present moment, and as at most wholly equivalent 
to it. Durkheim would then be telling us that it is this kind of experience of 
happiness that produces values (or, to be precise, it produces ideals which then 
produce values). Sometimes he seems to want to suggest that this emotional 
state produces new ideals and values de novo (as in the Reformation or the 
French Revolution: Durkheim [1912] 1995: 215–16; [1924] 1974: 92). At other 
times, I think it is more compelling to read him as suggesting that experiences 
of intense happiness convince subjects beyond a doubt that they live in the 
objectively “hierarchically ordered” worlds Tischner describes in which some 
things are clearly better than others, rather than producing such worlds anew 
every time they occur. More importantly, we should also note the recursive ele-
ment of Durkheim’s argument. We experience effervescent happiness when we 
feel we are joined together with others in sharing the same representations and 
evaluations of a situation and are therefore acting in concert in relation to it. It 
is this sense of shared approach to the world that produces the feeling in ques-
tion in the first place. Yet if we take objective values to be productive of shared 
judgments of the world and shared desires to act upon it in particular ways 
(remember that for Durkheim values elicit desires), we can also say that values 
produce collective effervescence as much as collective effervescence produces 
values. A corollary of this recursive quality of the relationship between values 
and effervescence/happiness is that subjects sometimes find themselves expe-
riencing moments of happiness when they act in terms of a shared value, and 
they sometimes discover they are in the presence of a shared value when they 
feel such happiness.
A number of prominent philosophers in the phenomenological tradition 
have connected emotions to the discovery of values in a way that bears some 
relation to Durkheim’s argument (though with no particular focus on the social 
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production of such emotions). They have argued, as Fiorenza Toccafondi (2009: 
150) puts it, that a “certain type of expressiveness [here taken as a quality of 
an object] and the emotional tonality connected to it discloses to us the value 
of what we are faced with, thus giving rise to certain axiological beliefs.” Max 
Scheler ([1913–16] 1973) is the most prominent phenomenologist to hold a 
position of this kind, arguing that feelings of love and hate in particular are the 
“organs” of the perception of values, but arguments along these lines are com-
mon in this philosophical tradition more generally (see Gubser 2014). What 
makes Durkheim’s position stand out, along with the role it gives to social expe-
rience and to effervescence or happiness rather than love or hate as a key emo-
tion of value perception, is the fact that he goes beyond asserting that feelings 
disclose values to subjects to also offer an account of what it feels like to realize 
a shared value in the performance of a concrete activity. In Durkheim’s recursive 
model, that is to say, effervescence attends not only the revelation of a value, but 
also the performative realization of it. This point becomes clear if we turn to 
ethnography.
I carried out fieldwork among the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea, a com-
munity of roughly four hundred persons. I have elsewhere argued that what 
I have called “relationalism” is one of the two most important contemporary 
Urapmin values (Robbins 2004). This is a value that defines the creation and 
maintenance of relationships as two of the best things a person can accomplish. 
One of the key ways Urapmin realize the value of relationalism is through car-
rying out exchanges of foodstuffs and other material items with one another, for 
they see such exchanges as the most powerful way of fostering relationships. In 
examining the relationship of values to happiness, it is worth noting that one 
kind of exchange the Urapmin find very pleasurable is that of feasts that consist 
of large platters of mashed taro covered in oil that has been squeezed from the 
seeds of pandanus palms.
All Urapmin families own stands of pandanus trees, and because these are 
situated at a wide range of altitudes and the fruiting of the trees is very sensitive 
to microclimate, different stands produce seeds at different times throughout 
the year. At any given time, only a few families will have trees with fruits that 
are in seed and ready to use for preparing a feast. When a family has pandanus 
trees in seed, it will invite friends and relatives to come to a feast. There follows 
several long hours of labor-intensive preparation on the part of the host family, 
both cooking and mashing the taro, and squeezing the thick red oil from the 
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Pandanus seeds. Once the dish is ready, the guests will crowd around the plat-
ter (made from a large slab of dried tree bark) and devour the food with great 
speed, fending off as they do so the inevitable crowd of dogs eager for their 
share. The consumption of the pandanus feast thus unfolds as a brief period of 
intense fervor. The eating part of the event is always frantic and over quickly. 
It is also emotionally very highly pitched. Urapmin find pandanus oil delicious 
and highly satisfying; it is an extremely fat-rich component of a diet notably 
lacking in fat. People are always excited to be invited to a pandanus feast, and in 
my experience the events themselves are routinely happy and effervescent ones 
that stand as a clear realization of the value of relationalism in Urapmin life.
If a group of people have been invited to a pandanus feast, it is also expected 
that they will invite their host to a return feast when their own pandanus fruits 
are ready for harvest. Often, at the initial feast, the guests will use some bark 
string to measure the size of the dish prepared. They will give the hosts this 
string to keep until they come for the return feast, when the second dish will 
be measured to check if it is a true reciprocal match for the first one. (As I have 
noted elsewhere, the Urapmin find the exchange of precisely matched items to 
be an especially satisfying way of realizing the value of relationalism:Robbins 
2009a.) At one return feast where I was present, the string was brought out and 
it was discovered that the return dish was slightly larger than the original one 
it was given to reciprocate. Everyone in attendance immediately became very 
animated, producing a chorus of whooping exclamations that often indicates 
moments of effervescence among the Urapmin. The source of this great hap-
piness was the fact that because the return dish was larger than the first, the 
original hosts would have to start the cycle again, since the exchange could not 
be left in a non-matched state. What made this feast even more effervescent 
than usual was that the discovery of the excess meant that this realization of the 
value of relationalism, exciting enough in its own terms, pointed to another one 
in the future.
Urapmin pandanus feasts, with their relation-enhancing quality and emo-
tional intensity, are a good example of the way people experience moments of 
intense happiness when they realize values they find important. Young Urapmin 
who attend these feasts learn about the value of relationships from them in pre-
cisely the kind of effervescent setting in which Durkheim expects that people 
will first come to recognize the values that hold in their communities. Older 
people know this value already, but through the intense happiness they feel at its 
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realization, they reconfirm their sense that relationships, and particularly those 
of equivalent exchange, are some of the most valued things in their world.
The contributions to this collection are full of moments in which the re-
alization of an important value is connected with strong feelings of happiness 
in precisely the way it is in Urapmin Pandanus feasts. Freeman, for example, 
tells us about the delight the Ethiopian Gamo take in “playing,” the jocular 
kind of interaction they take to most directly realize the value of “smooth social 
relations.” One similarly senses that the British humanists Matthew Engelke 
studies find themselves feeling quite happy when they realize their core value 
of reason as they publicly criticize those they take to be overly invested in reli-
gion or hold what they call “ethical juries.” For the elderly Japanese people with 
whom Kavedžija works, achieving balance between the multiple values that call 
out to them appears to be their primary value, and they find happiness in ac-
complishing this by, for example, “properly” carrying out everyday tasks such as 
“preparing meals and growing vegetables,” thereby demonstrating they can still 
balance the value of autonomy against the also valued dependence that increas-
ingly marks their lives.
The connection between happiness and the realization of important values 
can also have an anticipatory or retrospective character. We have already seen 
the anticipatory side of this in the Urapmin excitement over the way too large a 
return of pandanus sets up a new round of feasting. In a major contribution to 
the anthropological study of values, Frederick Damon (2002) provides another 
example. He describes how the Muyuw people of Milne Bay Province in Papua 
New Guinea take the achievement of fame in kula exchange as their primary 
value (see also Munn 1986). As locally understood, the achievement of fame 
in kula is a temporally extended process. When one first gives (or “throws”) a 
kula valuable to a partner, one’s “name” (or fame) “falls” as that of one’s partner 
“climbs” (Damon 2002: 129). It is only when one’s partner gives one’s valuable 
onward that one’s own name will climb. Damon describes the emotions that 
attend kula exchanges in these terms:
While the initial throwing of a valuable is experienced as a loss, and often an 
angry one, fairly soon my informants assumed an attitude that was more like 
dancing. “Mwon won” is the term employed for this condition, and it is reason-
ably well translated as “ecstacy” [sic]. It is a sense of coming back to life as one 
envisages a valuable moving on down a line of actors. This experience of being, 
perhaps like being blessed, is the realization of fame one imagines. (Ibid.: 130)
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Though the time-scale is shorter, Walker illustrates a similar kind of happiness 
in the anticipation of the realization of a value when he discusses, in his con-
tribution to this collection, the way the Urarina take the experience of seeing a 
hunter return to the village with a large game animal he has bagged as one that 
“epitomizes” intense short-term happiness. What the Urarina anticipate in this 
moment—a moment in which they know there will be enough meat for every-
one to eat—is the performative realization of their core value of “tranquility.” To 
explore an emotionally charged form of retrospection, rather than anticipation, 
we can turn to Lambek’s discussion of the restaurant and ballroom (Rossfall) 
that is so important to Willi Preisig, the Swiss man whose life-history he nar-
rates. This ballroom, the recurring site of youthful courtship in the region, and 
also, as a restaurant, the scene of visits by older adults, appears to represent, or to 
have represented during the course of Willi’s life, the highly valued possibility 
of reproducing the local farming way of life. Finally, in Gardner’s and Stafford’s 
contributions, we catch glimpses of the ways in which anticipations and recol-
lections of the production of happiness through the realization of values are 
managed in intergenerational and transnational social groupings. The two au-
thors describe social situations rendered very complex either by migration or by 
rapid socioeconomic change or by both. But it is fair to assume that all societies 
must in part be bound together by intergenerational constructions of shared 
values and moments of anticipated, recollected, and presently experienced hap-
piness of the kinds they discuss (on the creation of intergenerational sharing 
more generally, see Wentzer 2014).
Having brought time into my argument about effervescent happiness and 
value by looking at anticipation and recollection, I have begun to move toward 
returning to the problem of determining the relationship between momentary, 
hedonic bursts of feeling and more long-term, eudaimonic-type feelings of con-
tentment and judgments of happiness. In the remainder of this section, I want 
to consider one way of thinking about this link from the Durkheimian perspec-
tive I have been developing here.
As it happens, Durkheim’s notion of effervescence has recently received a 
good deal of attention from sociologists (Fish 2005 provides a good overview). 
One of the most important contributions to this renewed discussion has been 
Randall Collins’ (2004) elaboration of a theory of what he calls “interaction 
ritual chains” (see also Robbins 2009b). Collins accepts Durkheim’s assertion 
that collective actions produce effervescence and his further claim that rituals 
are a kind of action that is especially suited to generating this emotional state. 
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Noting that rituals can be characterized by their combination of a shared focus 
of attention and a high degree of mutual coordination between participants, 
Collins goes on to follow Erving Goffman (1967) in suggesting that all suc-
cessful social interactions have a ritualized quality. Because this is so, Collins 
concludes, all well-formed social interactions must also produce at least some 
effervescence, or what he calls “emotional energy,” among those who take part 
in them. If one is tempted to check Collins’ argument against the evidence of 
one’s own experience, one might think here of the elevated feeling one has after 
a good conversation with a friend, or a successful meeting with colleagues, or 
even after an unproblematic interaction with a stranger who stops to ask direc-
tions on the street. 
On Collins’ account, smooth social relations, even when they are not valued 
in themselves as among the Gamo, are productive of some quantum of the kind 
of happiness that we have tied to the disclosure and realization of values. In 
making this statement, I am suggesting that it is possible to bring Collins’ argu-
ment about interaction ritual chains together with the one about the relation 
between values and happiness I am making here. To fully carry off a synthesis 
along these lines, I would have to show that many social interactions aim at the 
short- or long-run realization of some locally important value, for this would 
make a large number of social interactions capable of generating appropriate 
effervescence when successful. I do not have space to pursue such an argument 
here (though I have tried to do so in Robbins 2012), but I do not think it is at all 
far-fetched, and I hope it can be taken as a plausible hypothesis for the purposes 
of the present discussion.
If we accept that all successful social interactions not only produce at least 
some effervescence, but that in doing so they also reveal their links to values, 
then a final argumentative step that Collins takes can give us some help in find-
ing a link between punctual experiences of happiness and the happiness of a 
life well lived. The step in question comes when Collins (2004: 44) argues that 
it is the effervescence or “emotional energy” produced by ritual interaction that 
propels us through life. Human beings actively seek such energy, Collins argues, 
and they use the energy produced by previous interactions to move themselves 
forward into new ones. The emotional links between interactions that result 
create the “chains” that Collins refers to in his titular phrase “interaction ritual 
chains.” I want to suggest at this point that with Collins’ claims in mind, we 
might take a life well lived to be one that produces a steady flow of effervescence 
by virtue of moving regularly through a wide range of successful interactions 
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across the life-course. These interactions may realize any number of locally im-
portant values, and we know the values at stake will differ across cultures, but 
perhaps the form of a life well lived (rather than its content) could be said to 
be fairly stable in the way it links values and the production of happiness in 
the routine movement of a person through a large number of successful social 
interactions.
In defining a life well lived in this way, I do not mean to suggest that every 
social interaction a person engages in has to go smoothly in order for his or 
her life to go well (for a related point made in philosophical terms, see Roberts 
2015: 42). This would be too high a bar to set for a life to be defined as good. The 
point is rather that a good life will be one in which social relations often tend 
to go well, to be oriented to and disclosive of important values, and therefore to 
produce a reasonable amount of effervescent happiness that can carry a person 
forward into the future. But even when the bar is lowered in this way, this ac-
count still leaves out one important feature of the way people live lives oriented 
toward values: the fact that people often find themselves confronted with values 
that conflict, or with the need to make choices between values which will lead 
them to set aside the pursuit of some important ones. How do people’s nego-
tiation of these kinds of complicated value situations factor into the question 
of how well their lives have gone? To address this question, we will have to set 
Durkheim’s preoccupations aside and turn instead to those of Max Weber. 
VALUE PLURALITY AND THE NATURE OF A LIFE WELL 
LIVED
Weber, more than Durkheim, is known as a sociological theorist of value. One 
of his most influential arguments, after all, is that there exist a number of differ-
ent values in society (or at least in “modern” society), and that these are destined 
forever to conflict with one another like “warring gods” (Weber 1946: 147, 153). 
Economic and ethical values, for example, often pull in different directions, as 
do scientific and political ones, and so forth. If Weber’s argument is correct, it 
raises problems for any theory that would want to relate in a simple way the 
kind of happiness that results from the realization of a single value to the kind 
of happiness that is supposed to characterize a life well lived. (Such problems 
are also taken up in slightly different terms in the introduction to this collec-
tion.) For if multiple values exist and sometimes conflict with one another, the 
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happiness of a good life is going to have to follow in some respects not only 
from realizing particular values, but also from choosing to realize the right ones 
at the right time, even if that means failing to realize others. In this section, I 
want to take Weber’s position to be partially though not wholly right, and I 
want to consider what the issues it raises mean for the anthropological analysis 
of short- and long-term happiness.
Even in the very simple form in which I have just presented Weber’s argu-
ment about value conflict, it consists of two parts. The first asserts that there 
exist many values in society. Let us call this a claim of value plurality. In the 
rest of this section, I am going to assume that all social formations contain a 
plurality of values.2 The second part of Weber’s argument concerns not just the 
existence of multiple values, but also the nature of the relationships that hold 
between them. The relationships between values, he asserts, are destined to be 
ones of conflict, and this will mean that people living in these societies will often 
be faced with “tragic” choices that require them to forgo realizing one value in 
order to realize a conflicting one. Thus, for example, a person might choose to 
act on an ethical value at the expense of realizing an economic value he or she 
also holds to be important. The position that all societies will contain values 
that conflict in this way is know as “value pluralism” (see Lassman 2011 for an 
excellent discussion of value pluralism that also surveys the positions of Isaiah 
Berlin and others).
It is worth going to the trouble to distinguish value plurality from value plu-
ralism because there is another theory of the relations between values that, like 
that of value pluralism, assumes the existence of value plurality, but that, unlike 
value pluralism, does not assume values are inevitably in conflict. This position is 
known as value monism, and its primary claim is that the various values present 
in any given society ultimately work harmoniously together. One way this can 
come about is if all of the diverse values ultimately serve one “supervalue.” In 
hedonistic versions of utilitarianism, for example, happiness or pleasure stands 
as a supervalue in this way (Chang 2001). It can also come about because, prop-
erly understood, all of the values in a society work together, such that realizing 
one helps a person realize others (Dworkin 2011). And, finally, drawing on Du-
mont’s crucial anthropological contributions to value theory, and simplifying 
2. I make an argument for this position, drawing on the work of Louis Dumont, 
in Robbins (2013). More generally, Robbins (2013) and (2014) offer much more 
developed accounts of the arguments of the next several paragraphs.
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them a great deal, value monism can come about because society allocates the 
realization of different values to different social domains (or contexts), such 
that people do not in fact face tragic choices between values that in the ab-
stract would conflict (Dumont 1986). For example, one can imagine societies 
in which ethical values are thought to apply most importantly to the domain 
of family life, while those of economic gain apply most fully to the market. If 
people properly identify the domains in which they are acting, they should be 
able without tragic difficulty to determine which values they should be real-
izing by their actions. Dumont further adds that different social domains are 
themselves ranked by values, such that while each domain sometimes provides 
the appropriate context for action, some are more important and widely relevant 
than others. Such relations between domains allow people to sort out how to act 
in situations in which more than one domain appears to apply: in a rough-and-
ready way, one can assume that the more highly valued domain should govern 
action in such circumstances. A society that is exhaustively ordered by the kinds 
of value relations Dumont lays out would be a monist one in the sense that, as 
in the other monist formulations, tragic value conflicts would not arise.
I have argued elsewhere that social formations tend to display both mon-
ist and pluralist tendencies, but that at any given time some lean more in one 
direction or the other (Robbins 2013). The hypothesis I want to explore in the 
rest of this section is that the way punctual moments of happiness contribute to 
a life well lived will look somewhat different in societies with a more monist in-
clination than they will in those that are more tilted toward the pluralist side. In 
their introduction to this collection, Walker and Kavedžija argue that in practice 
conflicts between values do not tend to trouble people very much. As they put 
it, in “the everyday world of practical ethics, people routinely make judgments 
involving incommensurable values in a straightforward, formal, or schematic 
manner.” I think this accurately describes the situation in largely monist social 
settings.3 These are ones in which finding the right value to realize in any given 
3. I am less confident than Walker and Kavedžija that it also describes the situation in 
most pluralist settings, in which they suggest values frequently differ from one another 
but do not conflict. Perhaps they are thinking of situations of value plurality but not 
pluralism, as I have defined these terms. There are some important theoretical issues 
at stake here, such as whether the fact that values always involve ranking constrain 
the kinds of relations that can exist between them, so that situations of value plurality 
that are not ones of value pluralism must be monistic in some way, but these are not 
issues that need to be settled in the context of the argument I am making here.
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situation is relatively straightforward. Where this is true, movement from one 
moment of happiness to another throughout life in the way Collins predicts 
ought to eventuate at the end of the day in having a lived a life socially under-
stood to be “good.”
We catch glimpses of the kind of good life more monistic social settings 
allow in some of the contributions to this collection. One senses, for example, 
that Willi Preisig, the Swiss farmer at the center of Lambek’s article, has lived 
this kind of life. It is not that his life has been wholly free of difficult choices, but 
few of them appear to have been tragic, and the many momentary happinesses 
he has experienced appear to sum neatly and with little or no remainder into a 
quiet but secure sense of satisfaction with how his life has gone. Lambek does 
not make this argument, but it is possible to imagine that for many people of 
Willi’s generation, Le bonheur suisse has taken this form. It is possible to catch a 
glimpse of a similar sense of long-term achievement among the elderly Japanese 
discussed in Kavedžija’s article, where a high or even preeminent valuation of 
balance provides people with a very effective way of approaching conflicts that 
arise between their lower-level values; whenever faced with such conflict, find-
ing a way to balance the realization of both values will count as having realized 
one that is higher than either of them. In this way, a wide range of value-linked 
experiences of momentary happiness that follow from the achievement of bal-
ance can feed into a life well lived. Even the militia volunteers of Vigh’s study 
appear to have a pretty strong sense that social involvement is unchallenged as 
their primary value, and they thus aim for it with a monistic steadiness that, 
as Vigh shows to powerful effect, cuts against the apparent chaos of the world 
around them. Yapese altruistic suffering, in Throop’s account here, similarly 
helps organize other values into what appears to be an at least partially monistic 
formation in which the route that connects momentary happiness to long-term 
eudaimonic success is not a hard one for people to identify (though it may be 
hard for some or even many of them to traverse).
Some of the other contributions to this collection, by contrast, paint por-
traits of social formations that seem better characterized as value pluralist. In 
these cases, the line that links momentary pleasures to notions of the good 
life does not run at all straight, and one senses that finding the good life in 
these places is less a matter of achieving the quiet satisfaction that comes from 
pursuing values that fit well together than it is one of making “heroic” efforts 
of practical judgment in the face of the significant challenges that follow from 
confronting values in conflict. In pluralistic formations, it is always possible to 
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go astray not by failing to seek the good as one pursues the pleasures of the 
moment, but by indulging too much in some value-linked pleasures and too 
little in others. These kinds of concerns appear in the ethnographic portraits 
offered by Gardner and Stafford, where across spans of time and space people 
wrestle with choosing the values on which to focus. Should one aim for familial 
closeness or economic uplift, educational and artistic cultivation or the ascetic 
work routines that can bring greater wealth? And the people they discuss in 
their contributions further ask themselves if one person can make value choices 
for another, a particularly fraught question in situations in which tragic loss in 
some value dimension always accompanies gain in another. Similarly, though 
the tragic drama of choice has a different ethnographic feel in this case, Engelke 
shows us how humanists wrestle with the need to allow themselves to recognize 
the value of some emotional insights and experiences to ethical deliberation, 
even as they promote reason as their primary value (and as the one most condu-
cive to the production of happiness). And finally, Freeman’s article, focused on a 
situation of significant change, paints a picture of a settled Gamo monism built 
around the core value of smooth social relating displaced by Gamo entry into 
the market and exposure to pluralistic struggles that changing legal regimes and 
Pentecostal ritual help to address, but perhaps not to resolve into a new monist 
formation.
By means of this rapid marshaling of ethnography, I have meant to suggest 
that the nature of good lives is different in different places, and not just because 
of differences in the content of the values that exist in various societies, but also 
because of the differences in the ways those values relate to each other. I have 
suggested two ideal types of good life in this regard: one in which more mon-
ist formations allow moments of happiness to add up to good lives in a fairly 
straightforward manner; and one in which value pluralism and conflict mean 
that good lives are going to be at least different from, and maybe even felt by 
those who achieve them to be “more” than, the sum of the happy moments they 
have had in the course of arriving at them. No one lives in ideal-type worlds, 
so there is no question of reifying these accounts into a hard dichotomy. The 
point is to be aware as anthropologists of the different ways people can hope or 
seek to connect feelings of happiness to the accomplishment of happy lives in 
the social formations in which they live. In this way, we can acknowledge the 
ethnographic differences in kinds of notions of the good life that show up in 
this collection, and confirm the strong hunch, one that has guided me here, that 
these reflect real if subtle differences in the materials the contributors present, 
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and not just differences in the way they have written them up. It is through be-
ing attentive to these differences that we can build on the progress made in this 
collection toward the goal of creating accounts that are adequate to both the 
long and the short of happiness.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago, at the height of the most recent wave of disciplinary particu-
larism, anthropologists might have suspected that happiness is too much a cul-
ture-bound Western notion to be of much use in cross-cultural research (Keane 
2003). I have sought to argue here that the consistency with which these articles 
raise issues of short- and longer-term temporal horizons, rather than simply 
relying on the unspoken temporal middle ground that provides the setting for 
most ethnographic discussions, gives the lie to this position. There is something 
about happiness and its relation to values that everywhere presents challenges 
to people seeking to integrate the various temporalities through which their 
lives unfold. If we focus on how people face those challenges, it is not difficult 
to shape up happiness and values as topics of comparative investigation, even as 
happiness may be understood differently in different places, and even as values 
and the relationships that hold between them clearly differ across diverse social 
settings.
In the past, anthropologists who have not focused on issues of happiness 
have arguably raised issues of the relation of long- and short-term temporali-
ties similar to those found in these articles. Most notably, Maurice Bloch and 
Jonathan Parry’s (1989) influential discussion of the various ways social for-
mations use currencies to articulate the two transactional orders constructed 
by individual, short-term interests, on the one hand, and long-term, collective 
interests in the reproduction of social orders, on the other, strikes me as pointing 
to a similar area of investigation. And it is perhaps not accidental that although 
Bloch and Parry are not interested in happiness in their piece, they are interest-
ed in matters of certain kinds of value. Values on their own, this might suggest, 
render human temporality complex. Happiness without value, then, would not 
raise the same kinds of questions about time. But it is a great accomplishment 
of this collection that it shows us that happiness without value appears to be a 
rare occurrence. Even if there are very few societies in which happiness itself is 
the primary, overriding value people seek to realize—it is rarely the supervalue 
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that rallies all others to its cause—we now know that happiness is routinely tied 
up with the disclosure and realization of values, and hence with the complexi-
ties of the personal and social management of time. This unusually rich collec-
tion of articles puts this important point before us, and in doing so redeems its 
promise of showing why happiness is an important subject of anthropological 
investigation. 
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